JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is judgment debtor's petition directed against rejection of their objection u/s 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter called the Code). The petition has arisen in the circumstances hereinafter indicated. 2. The opposite parties 3 and 4 who are real brothers, filed suit for possession against the Petitioners over the house in question. During the pendency of the suit opposite party No. 4 moved an application for deletion of his name from the array of Plaintiffs. The application was allowed and opposite party No. 4 was transposed as a Dfendant. Ultimately the suit was decreed on 23-7-79 and a decree for possession was passed against the Petitioners in favour of opposite parties 3 and 4. Thereafter an application for execution of the decree was made by opposite party No. 3 claiming execution to be for his own benefit and for the benefit of opposite party No. 4 as well. The execution was sought under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code. On 5-8-1980 the Petitioners preferred objection u/s 47 of the Code. The Petitioners' case was that after the decree had been passed on 23-7-1979, an agreement was entered into between the Petitioners and opposite party No. 4 on 2-8-80 whereby opposite party No. 4 agreed to sell his half share in the house in question to the Petitioners for the consideration of Rs. 4000/- and received from the Petitioners Rs. 3000/-. On this basis it was pleaded that the decree stood satisfied and could not be executed under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code. In the result it was prayed that the execution application be rejected as infructuous. Against the objection u/s 47 a reply was filed by Sri. Umapati Rai, Advocate, purporting to be on behalf of opposite party No. 4, Annexure 3. In this reply it was stated that opposite party No. 4 has already executed sale deed in favour of the Petitioners on 21-8-1980 for the consideration of Rs. 8000/-. In this reply also it was stated that the decree for possession had become infructuous. By his order dated 22-9-80 Annexure 4 the executing Court rejected the objection u/s 47. In this reply it was stated that opposite party No. 4 has already executed sale deed in favour of the Petitioners on 21-8-1980 for the consideration of Rs. 8000/-. In this reply also it was stated that the decree for possession had become infructuous. By his order dated 22-9-80 Annexure 4 the executing Court rejected the objection u/s 47. The executing Court held that no partition by metes and bounds had been effected between the opposite parties 3 and 4 and, therefore, no valid agreement to sell could take place between the opposite party No. 4 and the Petitioners. It was further observed that although in the objection of the Petitioners the sale consideration was alleged to be Rs. 4000/-, yet in the reply of opposite party No. 4 the sale consideration was alleged to be Rs. 8000/-. Thus, doubt was expressed by the executing Court regarding the genuineness of the transaction of sale. Against the order of the executing Court the Petitioners preferred revision before the learned District Judge, Lucknow, which came up for hearing before the second Additional District Judge, Lucknow, who by his judgment and order dated 27-11-1981, Annexure No. 6, dismissed the same. 3. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Judge indicates that the case canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner before him was that in view of the sale deed executed by opposite party No. 4 the Petitioners have become co-sharers with opposite party No. 3 and, therefore, the decree could not be executed. Alternatively, it was pleaded that the decree-holder was not entitled to actual possession over the house. It further appears from the revisional judgment that before revisional Court opposite party No. 4 did not support the Petitioners and alleged that the sale-deed relied upon by the Petitioners was fraudulent and fictitious. The revisional Court held that under Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code it was competent for one of the decree-holders to execute the decree on behalf of himself as well as on behalf of his co-decree holder. On this basis it was held that the application for execution filed by opposite party No. 3 was competent. The revisional Court held that under Order 21, Rule 15 of the Code it was competent for one of the decree-holders to execute the decree on behalf of himself as well as on behalf of his co-decree holder. On this basis it was held that the application for execution filed by opposite party No. 3 was competent. It was further observed that the case of the Petitioners with regard to the agreement to sell and subsequent sale was very discrepent and now even the decree holder who allegedly executed the sale deed described the deed to be fraudulent and fictitious. The learnad Judge thought that the dispute that actually arose before him was not one between the decree holders and the judgment-debtors but one between the two decree holders inter se without reference to the evidence on record the learned Judge observed that the agreement to sell and the sale deed were fraudulent and collusive to defeat the decree in question. The learned Judge relied upon the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Bans Raj Singh and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra and Others, AIR 1981 All 280 for the proposition that one of the decree holders could not by his unilateral action defeat the right of his co-decree holder to execute the decree. The judgment of the learned District Judge has been assailed on behalf of the judgment-debtors-Petitioners by their learned Counsel Sri. K.C. Jauhari. I have heard Sri. Jauhari and Sri. Umesh Kumar Srivastava who put in appearance on behalf of the opposite parties. 4. In my opinion the two Courts below have not approached the case from the correct angle. The material questions which arose for determination were as follows: (1) Whether a genuine and valid sale deed had been executed by opposite party No. 4 in favour of the Petitioners? (2) Whether by virtue of the above sale deed the Petitioners have become co-sharers with opposite party No. 3 in the property from which the Petitioners were to be dispossessed in execution of the decree in question? (3) Whether by becoming co-sharers in the property the Petitioners have become co-decree holders with opposite party No. 3? (2) Whether by virtue of the above sale deed the Petitioners have become co-sharers with opposite party No. 3 in the property from which the Petitioners were to be dispossessed in execution of the decree in question? (3) Whether by becoming co-sharers in the property the Petitioners have become co-decree holders with opposite party No. 3? (4) Whether even after becoming co-owners of the property in question and thereby co-sharers in the decree the Petitioners have to be dispossessed physically from the property in suit, or the Dfendant No. 3 is entitled to delivery of symbolic possession only? 5. Before answering the above questions another question may be considered and answered. What is the effect of the transfer of his interest in the property by one of the decree holders upon the decree for possession passed in respect of that property? It cannot be gainsaid that where the interest of the judgment-debtors merges completely with the interest of the decree holders, the decree becomes fully satisfied and cannot thereafter be executed. Where, however, the judgment debtor has acquired interest in the subject matter of the decree only partially, the result cannot be complete extinguishment of the decree. In such a case the extinguishment shall also be partial and shall be limited to the extent of the share acquired by the judgment debtor. Thus the decree will not be executable to the extent it has been extinguished by merger of interest or otherwise, but it will be executable to the extent of the remainder of the interest, fn the case of partial merger of interest and thereby partial extinguishment of the decree, neither can it be argued that the entire decree has become inexecutable nor can it be argued that the entire decree can still be executed. In taking this view I am supported by a Division Bench authority of this Court in Banarsi Das v. Maharani Kaur ILR 1882 All 27. At page 32 of the report this observation has been made by the Division Bench: That a decree should be executed against persons who have themselves acquired rights in it is a result the law does not contemplate.... At page 32 of the report this observation has been made by the Division Bench: That a decree should be executed against persons who have themselves acquired rights in it is a result the law does not contemplate.... Proceeding further the Bench observed at page 33 as follows: ...But in the present case the judgment-debtors have not acquired the entire rights of the decree holder but only a share in such rights, and the question before us is whether this circumstance has the effect of rendering this decree incapable of execution. We are of opinion that such cannot be the case. No doubt there may be joint rights as much as joint obligations, and it may be laid down that the performance of the entire obligation by any one or more of several persons jointly liable under it extinguishes the liability of all, so far as that obligation is concerned. It is an equally well recognized rule that an obligation in favour of several persons jointly, i.e., a joint right, is extinguished by fully performance rendered to any one of such joint holders of the right. And these principles are wide enough to include cases in which the performance of the obligation consists of delivery of money, i.e. payment. The provisions of the last proviso to Section 232, Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits the execution of a money decree purchased by one of the joint judgment debtors, and the provisions of Section 231, CPC , which premits one of several joint decree-holders to take out execution in respect of the entire decretal money, seem to be based upon the principles we have thus enunciated. But it is clear that, in either case, before a liability to pay money can be extinguished (if no other form of performance has been accepted as a substitute), full payment must have been made in discharge of the obligation whether on the one hand such payment is made by one of the joint judgment-debtors, or, on the other hand, such payment is received by one of the joint creditors. We are prepared to hold that, when on account of death a creditor becomes heir to a debtor or a debtor becomes heir to a creditor, and thus the two opposite characters of debtor and creditor become united in the same person, the obligation to pay money may be regarded as extinguished. We are prepared to hold that, when on account of death a creditor becomes heir to a debtor or a debtor becomes heir to a creditor, and thus the two opposite characters of debtor and creditor become united in the same person, the obligation to pay money may be regarded as extinguished. But this rule, even though applied in its full scope to judgment-creditors and judgment-debtors, falls short of showing that when the debtor inherits the rights of only one of his joint creditors the effect is to extinguish the entire judgment-debt.... Applying these principles to the present case, we are of opinion that the effect of the death of Baldeo Prasad was to extinguish only so much of the money-decree as devolved by inheritance upon his sons the judgment-debtors themselves. But so far as the remainder of the decree is concerned, they are as much liable now as they would have been if they had purchased or paid up the proportion of the decree which was devolved upon them by inheritance; and we hold that the decree, to the extent of the balance, is still capable of execution against them.... 6. Applying the proposition of law laid down in the above case to the facts of the present case it would be seen that if the contention of the Petitioners is accepted that they have acquired interest of opposite party No. 4 in the house in question, the decree cannot be executed to the extent of the share which was owned by opposite party No. 4 and can be executed only to the extent of the share owned by opposite party No. 3. It appears from the record that there had been no partition by metes and bounds between the opposite parties 3 and 4 and therefore the transfer by opposite party No. 4 in favour of the Petitioners was not in respect of a defined portion of the house in question. In such a situation the Petitioners would become co-sharers with opposite party No. 3 and their share cannot be said to be attached to any specified portion of the house. In the circumstances the opposite party No. 3 cannot execute the decree by physically dispossessing the Petitioners from the house in dispute. In such a situation the Petitioners would become co-sharers with opposite party No. 3 and their share cannot be said to be attached to any specified portion of the house. In the circumstances the opposite party No. 3 cannot execute the decree by physically dispossessing the Petitioners from the house in dispute. He can only execute the decree by obtaining symbolic possession over the property in dispute, the effect of which would be that he would come to be in joint possession of the house with the Petitioners. Thereafter of course it would be open to either party to separate his share by effecting partition by metes and bounds. But in the present case the question of transfer of interest by opposite party No. 4 in favour of the Petitioners itself has not been properly dealt with by either o f the two Courts below. Before the executing Courts opposite party No. 4 accepted the transfer of his share in favour of the Petitioners. When opposite party No. 4 himself accepted the transfer, it was difficult to hold that the transfer was fictitious. Before the revisional Court opposite party No. 4 himself alleged the transfer to be fictitious, fraudulent and collusive but on this aspect of the matter no evidence appears to have been led. Although the revisional Court has observed that the agreement to sell and the sale deed were fraudulent and collusive to defeat the decree in question, it has not referred to the evidence on the basis of which the finding has been recorded. The said finding, therefore, cannot be sustained. The case, therefore, will have to go back to the executing Court to decide the dispute relating to the genuineness and validity of the sale deed. 7. A word may be said about Bans Raj Singh and Others Vs. Krishna Chandra and Others, AIR 1981 All 280 relied upon by the Court below. This judgment is authority only for the proposition that where a joint decree has been passed, one of the joint decree holders cannot by his action prejudice the right of the other decree holder or decree holders to execute the decree and that one of the joint decree holders is competent to execute a decree on behalf of himself and for the benefit of the other decree holders. With this proposition of law I entirely agree. With this proposition of law I entirely agree. In fact this proposition was accepted even in the case of Banarsi Das v. Maharani Kaur ...that execution of a joint decree cannot be taken out in part, and that when all the decree-holders do not join in applying for execution, any one or more of them can take out execution in respect of the decree for the benefit of all the decree-holders. 8. In view of the above the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 22-9-80, Annexure-4, passed by the Ist Additional Munsif, Lucknow, and the judgment and order dated 27-11-81, Annexure-6, passed by the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Lucknow, are hereby quahsed. The case shall go back to the executing Court who shall decide the same in accordance with law taking into account the observation made herein. The learned Munsif shall obtain clarification from the parties regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the sale deed in question and thereafter afford opportunity to the parties to lead evidence in respect of their respective claims. If it comes to the conclusion that the sale deed is fictitious, fraudulent and collusive and confers no right upon the Petitioners, it shall proceed with the execution of the decree and issue warrant for delivery of possession under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Code. If it comes to the conclusion that the sale deed is valid and thereby the Petitioners have become co-owners in the house in dispute with opposite party No. 3, it shall refrain from giving actual physical possession of the house to opposite party No. 3 and shall act in the manner hereinabove indicated. Costs of this petition shall be easy.