S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is the proprietor of Krishna Cement Traders carrying on business at 10 Cavasji Patel Street Sheel chambers Bombay challenges by way of the present petition an order passed by the Collector Junagadh dated 12-3-1982 under sec. 6a of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act by which the Collector held that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing Control and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Order ). The Collector consequently ordered confiscation of 42 658 begs of red cement (2500 tonnes ). The said order of confiscation was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge Junagadh in criminal appeal No. 26 of 1982 taken out under sec. 6-C of the said Act. The petitioner has also challenged the aforesaid appellate order in the present proceedings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) ). A few relevant facts leading to the present proceedings deserve to be noted at the outset. The petitioner is carrying on business at Bombay. She deals in purchase and sale of cement in the name and style of Shree Krishna Cement Traders at Bombay. In the course of her business she used to purchase manufactured cement from Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Limited which has its registered office at Ranavav in this State. She had placed orders for purchase of coloured cement or red cement from the said manufacturing concern in the months of December 1981 and January 1982. Pursuant to the purchase orders placed by the petitioner with the aforesaid manufacturer about 14000 tonnes of red cement were supplied to the petitioner by the said manufacturer. Majority of cement purchased by the petitioner was already transported to Bombay but about 21132. 9 tonnes of cement represented by 42 658 bags (actually 44030 bags) of red cement were found lying at Porbandar and Ranavav when two different godowns were raided by the officers of the civil supply department of the State of Gujarat on 3-2-1982. It was felt by the raiding officers that the said cement was stored without licence which was required to be obtained under the provisions of the control order of 1981. It was felt by the raiding officers that the said cement was stored without licence which was required to be obtained under the provisions of the control order of 1981. The stored quantity of cement was seized by the said officers under a panchnama. These cement bags were left in the custody of the persons who were in charge of the godowns and they were made to hold charge for and on behalf of the department. It appears that the present petitioner moved this court on or about 10-2-1982 by filing a writ petition praying for several declarations pertaining to the aforesaid seizure order. In the said proceedings it was contended on behalf of the respondents that the Collector had yet to adjudicate the question as to whether the seized cement bags were liable to be confiscated or not. Under these circumstances the petitioner withdrew the petition at that stage and the Collector Junagadh was directed to complete the confiscation proceedings within a stipulated period. Accordingly Miss Manjula Subramaniam the Collector Junagadh who is respondent No. 2 in the present proceedings issued show cause notice to the petitioner on 4-3-1982 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why the seized cement bags should not be confiscated on the allegation that provisions of clause 3 (b) of the control order were contravened by the petitioner while she stored 42 658 coloured cement bags without obtaining necessary licence for the same. The inquiry proceeded before the Collector. Evidence was recorded by the second respondent in the said inquiry and thereafter the second respondent passed the impugned order dated 12-3-1982 by which she held that the provisions of the control order were contravened by the petitioner when she stored the concerned cement bags in the two godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav without obtaining requisite storage licence from the concerned authorities. Accordingly she directed that the seized cement bags should be confiscated to the State under sec. 6a of the said Act. ( 3 ) THE petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the learned Sessions Judge at Junagadh under sec. 60 of the said Act. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on 16-4-1982. Accordingly she directed that the seized cement bags should be confiscated to the State under sec. 6a of the said Act. ( 3 ) THE petitioner carried the matter in appeal before the learned Sessions Judge at Junagadh under sec. 60 of the said Act. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on 16-4-1982. That is how the petitioner has landed in this court invoking its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for getting the impugned orders quashed and set aside and for getting a declaration that the seized cement bags are not liable to be confiscated under the provisions of the said Act read with the control order promulgated thereunder. ( 4 ) ). It is obvious that the powers of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution are limited and circumscribed powers. As laid down by the Supreme Court in GOPAL GANU V. N. P. A. A. TRUST A. I. R 1978 S. C. 347. The limits of the High Courts jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution are too well established to require any elaborate restatement. The High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 cannot function as a court of appeal and is generally bound by the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal below. It has been further held: A manifest error from which the concurrent findings of the three revenue authorities suffer is their uncritical reliance on two circumstances neither of which can help establish the tenancy of the appellant. It is therefore clear that this court will be entitled to interfere under Article 227 with the findings reached by the authorities below if it is demonstrated that the findings reached by them especially by the lower appellate court suffered from any manifest error or the findings are such which cannot reasonably be arrived at in the light of the evidence on record. Keeping in view the aforesaid settled legal position I will proceed to deal with the present special criminal application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) ). It is necessary at this stage to look at the relevant statutory provisions. Keeping in view the aforesaid settled legal position I will proceed to deal with the present special criminal application. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) ). It is necessary at this stage to look at the relevant statutory provisions. The Essential Commodities Act has been enacted by the Parliament with a view to providing in the interests of the general public for control of production supply and distribution of and trade and commerce in commodities which are specified in the Act. Under sec. 3 of the said Act the Central Government is empowered by an order to provide for regulating or prohibiting production supply and distribution etc. of essential commodities Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub- sec. (1) an order made thereunder may provide amongst others for regulating by licences; permits or otherwise the storage transport distribution disposal acquisition use or consumption of any essential commodity as laid down by sec. 3 (2) (d ). Essential commodity has been defined by sec. 2 (a) to mean various enumerated classes of commodities. It is not disputed before me that cementcoloured cement in the present case is an essential commodity as defined by sec. 2 (a) of the said Act. It is therefore obvious that the Central Government by promulgating requisite order can regulate storage transport distribution disposal acquisition use or consumption of any essential commodity including the present commodity viz. coloured cement. Sec. 5 of the Central Act is also required to be noted at this stage. It deals with delegation of powers of the Central Government and states that the Central Government may by notified order direct that the power to make or issue notifications under sec. 3 shall in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions if any as may be specified in the direction be exercisable also by (a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or (b) such State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to a State Government as may be specified in the direction. It is thus open to the Central Government to delegate its power of issuing orders under sec. 3 to a a delegate of its choice including a State Government. It is thus open to the Central Government to delegate its power of issuing orders under sec. 3 to a a delegate of its choice including a State Government. The State of Gujarat has been constituted one such delegates by the Central Government. Relevant order of the Central Government delegating its powers to the State Government has been annexed to this petition as annexure A. It is standing order No. 681 and reads as under :"in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 (10 of 1955) the Central Government hereby directs (a) that the powers conferred on it by sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 of the said Act to make orders to provide for the matters specified in clauses (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (ii) and (j) of sub-sec. (2) thereof shall in relation to all essential commodities other than foodstuffs and fertilizers (whether inorganic organic or mixed) be exercisable also by a State Government or in relation to a Union territory by the Administrator thereof subject to the following conditions namely (I)THAT the delegation of powers under clause (d) shall not extend to interstate transport or distribution and the powers under that clause shall not be exercised so as to prejudicially affect such transport or distribution in pursuance of any order issued by the Central Government. "it must therefore he held that if any essential commodity is in the process of interstate transport or distribution it cannot be regulated by any order passed by a delegate State Government in exercise of its power under sec. 3 (1) read with sec. 5 of the Act. Mr. Bhatt learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the present case it is an admitted position that the petitioner is a dealer in cement who does not carry on her business in any part of the Gujarat State. That she is permanently stationed at Bombay. She carried on her business there. That for the purpose of her business she would naturally require cement for being sold at Bombay. That she is permanently stationed at Bombay. She carried on her business there. That for the purpose of her business she would naturally require cement for being sold at Bombay. As the manufacturer of cement dealt with by the petitioner in the course of her business at Bombay is situated in the Gujarat State the petitioner had of necessity to place order to purchase her required quota of cement from the manufacture in Gujarat State and that is how she had placed the order for purchase of cement from the manufacturer of cement viz. Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries at Ranavav and the cement sold by the said manufacturer to the petitioner was to be despatched to Bombay where the petitioner is carrying on her business as a cement dealer. That in the course of the interstate transport of the said cement from the manufacturers end at Panavav to the purchasers and at Bombay the said purchased stock of cement remained in the realm of interstate transport and consequently the control order in question could not be made applicable to the said stock of cement and hence it cannot be said that the petitioner had contravened any of the provisions of the said control order with respect to the small bulk of cement which remained to be transported to Bombay. 4/5th of the stock purchased by the petitioner had already been despatched to Bombay and had reached the petitioners end at Bombay. As already stated above even Mr. Vin for the respondents did not challenged the legal position that the State of Gujarat while issuing the control order could not as a delegate issue any order which would affect the interstate transport or distribution of essential commodity in question. But Mr. Vins contention was that the concerned bags of cement which were ordered to be confiscated by the Collector were not in actual process of interstate transport but they were found stored in the local godowns and therefore they could be said to have been stored for sale. In this connection Mr. But Mr. Vins contention was that the concerned bags of cement which were ordered to be confiscated by the Collector were not in actual process of interstate transport but they were found stored in the local godowns and therefore they could be said to have been stored for sale. In this connection Mr. Vin placed special emphasis on the definition of the word (dealer as mentioned in subclause (5) of clause 2 of the control order which states that dealer means a person a firm an association of persons a company a corporation or a cooperative society engaged in the business of purchase sale or storage for sale of any essential article whether or not in conjunction with any other business and includes his representative agent. Mr. Vin submitted that in order to be a dealer a person must be engaged in the business of purchase or sale of any essential article and that even though the petitioner was permanently stationed at Bombay and was carrying on business at Bombay she would be a dealer for the purpose of the control order so far as the Gujarat State is concerned. If she was engaged in the business thereby in the essential articles and once it is shown that she has stored the concerned cement bags for sale she would be covered by the definition of the word dealer. Mr. Vin is right to the extent that the definition of the word dealer would take in its sweep any person carrying on business with respect to any essential article. The petitioner is carrying on her business though outside the Gujarat State but her business pertains to an essential commodity viz. coloured cement. But the question is whether she can be said to be carrying on business of purchase sale or storage for sale of essential article. Mr. Vin submitted that as a dealer in essential commodity the petitioner cannot be said to have stored such huge quantity of 42 658 bags of red cement within the Gujarat State for her own consumption. Therefore it can easily be said that the said storage of cement was for sale and that was enough for the purpose of applicability of the control order so far as the concerned cement bags went. In short Mr. Therefore it can easily be said that the said storage of cement was for sale and that was enough for the purpose of applicability of the control order so far as the concerned cement bags went. In short Mr. Vin contended that the expression storage for sale as employed by clause 2 (5) of the order would cover storage for sale in any part of the country including the State concerned or anywhere else. It is difficult to accept the later part of the submission of Mr. Vin. The reason is obvious. The State of Gujarat as a delegate has limited power to issue control order under sec. 3 (1) of the Central Act read with sec. 5 of the Act. The delegation of power as made by the Central Government to the State Government is a fettered delegation subject to conditions one of which is that the delegate State cannot issue any order under sec. 3 (2) (d) which may cover interstate transport or distribution. If a dealer carrying on business in essential article outside the State of Gujarat purchases his stockintrade from a manufacturer within the State of Gujarat and desires to carry the purchased essential commodities outside the State of Gujarat to their destination in other State which is the usual place of business for the outside dealer it cannot be said that the said outside dealer is carrying on business of purchase sale or storage for sale of any essential article within the meaning of the control order. In the background of the limited delegation of power made in favour of the State Gujarat by the Central Government it must be held that before the control order as issued by the State can rope in the activities of any outside dealer meaning thereby any dealer in essential article who does not engaged himself in business in Gujarat it must be shown that such outside dealer has been actually engaged in either purchasing or selling of essential commodity within the Gujarat State or has stored such article for the purpose of sale in Gujarat. If Mr. If Mr. Vins contention is right and if it is held that a dealer outside the Gujarat State who carries on busines outside the State and who has stored any essential article within the State of Gujarat for the limited purpose of selling it outside the State territories after getting the said article conveyed beyond the State of Gujarat to its destination outside the State he would still be covered by the control order the order itself would become ultra vires the powers of the State as in that eventuality the provisions of the control order would extend to inter. State transport or distribution of essential commodity which is not permissible in view of the limited delegation of the ordermaking power as conferred by the Central Government on the State Government as seen earlier. It must therefore be held that the control order takes in its sweep only those dealers who are engaged in the business of purchase or sale or storage for sale of any essential article within the Gujarat State and it cannot and does not seek to cover dealers carrying on business in essential commodity outside Gujarat State territories who do not purchase any essential commodity in Gujarat State for the purpose of its sale or storage for sale within Gujarat State limits. ( 6 ) ). Mr. Vin in support of his contention that the learned appellate Judge was not justified in arriving at his finding on point No. 2 for determination invited my attention to clauses 15 and 18 of the control order. Clause 15 deals with restriction on possession of essential articles and states that no person shall either by himself or by any person on his behalf store or have in his possession at any time any essential article mentioned in the Schedule I in excess of the quantity fixed under any order issued by the Central Government or State Government or under the direction issued by the State Government under this order. The aforesaid provision prohibits a person from storing or having in his possession any essential article in excess of the quantity permitted by the concerned order. It is difficult to appreciate how the aforesaid provision can give the control order any extra territorial operation. The aforesaid provision prohibits a person from storing or having in his possession any essential article in excess of the quantity permitted by the concerned order. It is difficult to appreciate how the aforesaid provision can give the control order any extra territorial operation. It is trite to say that the State of Gujarat can issue legally effective control orders with a view to maintaining supplies of essential commodities and can have scheme for their equitable distribution at fair prices within the Gujarat State itself. It obviously cannot contemplate passing any Control order for ensuring the aforesaid object regarding essential commodities so far as they are dealt with in other States. That would be the function of the concerned other States. It is therefore obvious that it cannot be urged with any emphasis that the provision of the control order can possibly have any extra territorial operation. In that light it is obvious that clause 15 can also have its operation for persons holding stocks of essential commodities for dealing with them within the State of Gujarat. Such a provision cannot even by any remotest chance have any reference to essential commodities which are in transit and which are subject matter of inter-State transport. Mr. Vin then invited my attention to clause 18 of the order. It provides for general conditions for dealers and states that a licence holder under this order shall apart from any special conditions that may be imposed by the licensing authority observe the following general conditions Mr. Vin in particular invited my attention to sub-clause (5) of clause 18 which states as under. "notwithstanding anything contained in clause 15 every person not being a licence holder who has on the date of the notification fixing the limits of stocks or any time thereafter in his possession or under his control any essential article in excess of the limits which may by a notification in the official gazette be fixed by the State Government shall within three days after the issue of such notification or within two days from any date thereafter when the stock exceeds such limit make a declaration in writing to the concerned licensing authority showing therein his name address and quantity of each kind of essential article in his possession or under his control. "there are three provision attached to the said sub-clause with which we are not concerned. Mr. "there are three provision attached to the said sub-clause with which we are not concerned. Mr. Vin submitted placing strong reliance on the said sub-clause (5) that no person even apart from a licence holder is permitted to stock essential commodity exceeding the permissible limit and within two days of the eventuality in which the concerned stock of essential article exceeds the permissible limits the person stocking essential commodity has to declare the same in writing to the concerned licensing authority and if he does not do so it would amount to contravention of the order. It is true that sub-clause (5) of clause 18 does visualise such a situation. But from that it cannot be inferred that an outside dealer who has purchased essential commodity from a manufacturer within the State of Gujarat and who has stored the concerned article for its conveyance to its ultimate destination outside the Gujarat State will be required to comply with the provisions of sub-clause (5) of clause 18. In the background and in the context of the entire settings of the order it must be held that clause 18 (5) applies to only such stockists of essential articles who stock them with a view to disposing them of in Gujarat State territories. Any other interpretation would render the provisions ultra vires the powers of the Gujarat State as a delegate of Central Govt. for the purpose of sec. 3 clause (2) read with sec. 5 of the Act. Clause 18 therefore indicates that it would apply to a dealer or to any other resident of Gujarat State who may at the given stage be found in possession essential commodity beyond permissible limits which in its turn is meant to be sold in Gujarat State. It can never apply to an outside purchase who is not a resident of Gujarat state and who does not carry on business in cement viz. the essential commodity in Gujarat State. Consequently sub-clause (5) of clause 18 cannot help Mr. Vin in submitting that even an outside purchase like the petitioner who after purchasing essential commodity from the Gujarat manufacturer has not carried the said commodity outside Gujarat State limits and has get it stored in the Gujarat State awaiting its transport to Bombay i. e. outside the Gujarat State would also be required to follow the gamut of the provisions of the control order. ( 7 ) ). It is further interesting to note that clause 3 of the control order states that on and after the 20/04/1981 no person shall carry on business as a dealer in essential commodities except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted under this order. It is necessary to recall at this stage that the impugned action of confiscation of the petitioners articles has been taken on the allegation that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of clause 3 of the control order meaning thereby the petitioner is carrying on business as a dealer in essential commodity viz. cement without obtaining due licence under the control order. It is obvious that the petitioner is not carrying on business as a dealer in cement within the State of Gujarat. This is an admitted position. The petitioner is carrying on her business at Bombay. But according to Mr. Vin the petitioner can be said to be carrying on business as a dealer in Gujarat because she has stored for sale essential article within the Gujarat State at the time when raids were held on 3-2-1982 and that is how the provisions of clause 3 (a) and (b) apply to her case. I have already shown enrlier that for applicability of the definition of the word dealer as envisaged by clause 2 (5) of the order it must be shown that an outside dealer in essential commodity who has his place of business beyond the Gujarat State has at the given point of time stored for sale in Gujarat the concerned essential commodity. Even otherwise requirements of clause 3 clearly contemplate circumstances in which the concerned dealer has to obtain a licence under the order. Clause 4 of the control order provides that every application for issue or reissue of a licence or renewal thereof shall be made to the licensing authority inform A and clause 4 (b) provides that every licence shall be issued reissued or renewed in form B. A mere look at form A shows that the application for grant/renewal of licence for essential articles is contemplated by a dealer who is carrying on business in Gujarat. Clause 8 of the said form A requires the applicant to mention situation of his place of business with particulars as to No. of house mohalla town or village police station taluka and district and clause 9 requires him to state full particulars of godowns where the essential articles are to be or will be stored. At the end of the said from A are found certain declarations which are required to be made by the applicant. Declaration (a) says that the applicant has to state whether he has previously applied for any licence in the district for any of the essential articles; while declaration (b) requires him to state whether he had applied for such licence in the district for a particular year and was or was not granted licence for a particular year. A comprehensive reading of various clauses of the statutory form A for application for grant of licence under the control order shows that in order to obtain a licence for carrying on business in essential commodity as required by the control order the concerned applicant must be a dealer in the State of Gujarat and that he must clearly indicate as to at which place in a particular district of Gujarat he wants to carry on business as a dealer in essential commodity. It is obvious that dealers carrying on business at Bombay can never apply as per form A as prescribed by the control order. Then follows form B in which licensing authority is permitted to issue concerned licence to the dealer. Form B shows that licence for purchase/sale/ storage for sale of essential articles can be issued to the concerned applicants as a retailer/hawker/wholeseller/commission agent/producer. Clause 2 of form B shows that the licence must permit the dealer/ producer to carry on the business at the indicated place which is to be mentioned and specified in the licence itself. Sub-clause (b) of clause 2 of form B shows that the essential articles will be required to be stored and the business as a dealer will be required to be carried on at only particular place and at no other place. Sub-clause (b) of clause 2 of form B shows that the essential articles will be required to be stored and the business as a dealer will be required to be carried on at only particular place and at no other place. Clause 4 of form B shows that the licence holder shall except when specially exempted by the State Government or by the licensing authority in this behalf maintain a register of daily accounts relating to the transactions or dealings of each of the essential articles mentioned in para 1 showing correctly (a) the opening stock on each day; (b) the quantity received by making purchases or otherwise on each day showing the place from where and the source from which received; (c) the quantities delivered or otherwise removed on each day showing the places of destination and (d) the closing stock on each day. Sub-clause (2) of clause 4 of form B mentions that a licence holder shall complete his accounts for each day on the day to which they relate unless prevented by reasonable cause the burden of proving which shall be upon him. Clause 7 of form B provides that the licence holder shall daily exhibit at the entrance or at some other conspicuous part of the premises where he carries on his business the board showing his name the price list of essential articles held by him for sale and the availability or non-availability of stocks of essential articles legibly written in the Gujarati language. Clause 9 of form B lays down that the licence holder shall except when specially exempted by the state Government or by the licensing authority in this behalf issue to every consumer a correct receipt or invoice as the case may be giving his own name address and licence number the name address and licence number (if any) of the purchaser the date of transaction the quantity of essential articles sold the price at which it is sold and the total amount charged and shall keep a duplicate of the same to be available for inspection on demand by the licensing authority or any officer authorised by it in his behalf. Under clause 10 of form B it has been laid down that the licence holder shall give all facilities at all reasonable time to the licensing authority or any officer specified under clause 26 of the order or any officers authorised by licensing authority or by the State Government for the inspection of his stocks and accounts at any shop godown or other place used by him for the storage sale or purchase of essential articles and for the taking of samples of essential articles for examination The aforesaid relevant clauses of the statutory form B in which licence has to be issued to the dealer in essential articles clearly indicate that only a dealer carrying on business in Gujarat and who will be subject to the detailed supervision of the licensing authority having jurisdiction in Gujarat can be given licence in form B. as contemplated by the control order especially clause 3 thereof. It is impossible to visualise how the dealer like the petitioner who is permanently stationed at Bombay and even though she is a dealer in essential article viz. cement at Bombay can be compelled to subject herself to the requirements of clause 3 of the control order as well as the provisions for application for licence as per form A and how the licensing authority in Gujarat can ever issue any licence to a dealer like the petitioner in form B. Various clauses of the said licence form B can never operate so far as dealers like the petitioner who are carrying on their business outside Gujarat are concerned. It would be impossible to visualise how their day to day stock position can ever be controlled or supervised by the licensing authority of Gujarat and as to how the licensing authority in Gujarat can require such outside dealers like the petitioner to stock their essential articles at a particular place and how they can be asked to give facilities to licensing authorities of Gujarat inspect the stocks of essential commodity as held by such outside dealers. It must therefore be held that neither clause 3 nor requirements of anyother provisions of the control order can apply in cases of outside dealers like the petitioner who do not carry on their business in essential commodity in any part of the Gujarat State. It must therefore be held that neither clause 3 nor requirements of anyother provisions of the control order can apply in cases of outside dealers like the petitioner who do not carry on their business in essential commodity in any part of the Gujarat State. It would be impossible to ask such a dealer to obtain licenses under clauses 3 (1) (b) read with clause 4 as it would amount to asking them to do the impossible and equally it would be beyond the power and jurisdiction of the licensing authority in Gujarat acting under the control order to call upon such outside dealers to even apply for such licence nor can such licence be ever issued to such outsiders. Consequently in the light of the limited delegation of the power as conferred by the Central Government to the State Government in exercise of which the present control order has been issued by the State of Gujarat it must be observed that it has no extra territorial operation and it seeks to encompass only those dealers and persons dealing in essential commodities who are permanently stationed in Gujarat and who in the course of their business deal with such essential commodities within the State of Gujarat and while doing so they purchase these commodities in Gujarat for selling them within this state or store them in Gujarat for ultimately selling them within the State territories. Mr. Vin as a last resort submitted in this connection that if such an interpretation is placed on the relevant provisions of the control order an impossible situation may arise He submitted that in case of a border village which is situated just near the outer limits of the Gujarat State a businessman in essential commodity may actually reside a few kilometers outside the Gujarat State and may with immunity carry on business in essential commodity in the Gujarat State and still he would not be touced by the salutory provisions of the control order. It is not possible to take such a pessimistic view of the situation as Mr. Vin would like to have. It is not possible to take such a pessimistic view of the situation as Mr. Vin would like to have. Taking the extreme case which he has posed for my consideration it can be seen that if a dealer in an essential commodity with a view to frustraining the salutory provisions of the control order takes up his residence a few kilometers outside the Gujarat State territories but while doing so actually operates with respect to the essential commodity within the State of Gujarat he will certainly be covered by the clutches of the control order as in fact it would be found that even though he is actually residing outside the State of Gujarat in reality and in substance he is carrying on business of purchase sale and storage for sale of any essential commodity within he Gujarat State. It is obvious that the State of Gujarat would be anxious to see that distribution of essential commodities and its avail ability at fair price within the State of Gujarat is ensured. I therefore it is found as a fact that even though apparently posing himself to be outside dealer a person deals with essential commodities within the State of Gujarat he would obviously be liable to answer the licensing procedure as laid down by clause 3 of the control order. I may now take a converse case which was also posed for my consideration. Mr. Vin submitted that in a given situation a dealer may be having his place of business in a border town within the State of Gujarat but his place of business may be situated very near the territories of the adjoining State as we find in border line cases where certain villages are situated within the State of Gujarat but they are very near the adjoining States of Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan or Maharashtra. That in such a case submitted Mr. Vin a dealer in essential commodities in Gujarat State may divert part of his goods outside Gujarat and may sell them to purchasers outside Gujarat. If his dealings are not covered by the provisions of the control order the control order would be practically rendered otiose. Even this submission of Mr. Vin does not represent any insurmountable difficulties in the way of proper implementation of the control order. If his dealings are not covered by the provisions of the control order the control order would be practically rendered otiose. Even this submission of Mr. Vin does not represent any insurmountable difficulties in the way of proper implementation of the control order. The very illustration posed for my consideration presupposes that a dealer is stationed in Gujarat and he carries on business in essential commodities in Gujarat. But in the course of his business he diverts a part of his stock in trade beyond Gujarat. Still the fact remains that as a dealer carrying on business in Gujarat when the business pertains to essential commodities he has to take out requisite licence under clause 3. It is this regular course of business and situs of business which will be the clinching circumstance for applicability of the control order. Even the control order itself suggests that the concerned licensee dealer in essential commodity even though in the course of his business in Gujarat may divert a part of the essential commodities outside Gujarat still he has to comply with the provisions of the licensing order. Under clause 17 of the control order it has been provided that every licence holder shall furnish a true return duly signed by him for every fortnight in form C so as to reach there spective licensing authority as per scheduled time. Form C lays down a form of return to be furnished by the licence holder to the concerned licensing authority. Clause 4 (b) of form C shows that the licence holder in his return of sales has to point out the quantity of essential commodities sold by him within the State of Gujarat and outside the State of Gujarat and the total thereof. It is therefore obvious that once a dealer in essential commodities carrying on business in Gujarat obtains a licence as per the control order it is not open to him to submit that he has diverted part of essential commodity outside Gujarat and therefore he is not liable to comply with the requirements of the control order. It is therefore obvious that once a dealer in essential commodities carrying on business in Gujarat obtains a licence as per the control order it is not open to him to submit that he has diverted part of essential commodity outside Gujarat and therefore he is not liable to comply with the requirements of the control order. The aforesaid statutory form C of the return to be furnished by the licence holder contemplates that a dealer who has obtained a valid licence under the control order can legitimately sell apart of the essential commodity outside Gujarat but he has to point out this relevant fact to the licensing authority while furnishing the required return. It is therefore not possible to agree with Mr. Vin that in border villages of Gujarat operation of the control order would get frustrated if a view is taken that the provisions of this Order cannot apply in case of inter State transport of essential commodities where outside purchaser like the petitioner who does not carry on business in any essential commodity within the State of Gujarat has purchased his stock in trade from the Gujarat manufacturer and part of his purchased goods remain stored in Gujarat awaiting its transport to the place of destination Bombay. It must therefore be held that the learned appellate judge was justified when he concluded on points Nos. 1 and 2 to the effect that the control order cannot apply beyond the territorial limits of Gujarat State and that the expression storage for sale was amenable to the interpretation that the ultimate sale must be within the State of Gujarat. It is obvious that the aforesaid conclusions to which the learned appellate Judge reached are clearly borne out from the statutory settings in which the control order saw the light of the day and to which I have made a detailed reference earlier. I fully concur with the reasoning of the learned appellate Judge with respect to his findings on points Nos. 1 and 2. ( 8 ) ). I fully concur with the reasoning of the learned appellate Judge with respect to his findings on points Nos. 1 and 2. ( 8 ) ). Once it is held that the control order in question does not apply to the petitioner who is a dealer outside Gujarat State it is obvious that cement bags in question which were found stored at Ranavav and Porbandar awaiting their onward transport to Bombay which was the place of their destination could not have been confiscated legally and validly by the Collector unless it was shown to the hilt that these cement bags were stored by the petitioner who was an outside purchaser with a view to ultimately selling them in Gujarat markets. It is true that even though the petitioner is an outside dealer who does not carry on her business in essential commodity within the State of Gujarat if it is found that at a given point of time such an outside dealer stores any essential commodity within the State of Gujarat with a view to ultimately disposing it of in Gujarat market the control order would obviously apply as such a dealer would clearly be covered by the definition of the word dealer as laid down by clause 2 (5) as he would be a person engaged in the business of storing for sale of such essential commodity in Gujarat State. It must therefore be found on the record of the case as to whether the concerned 42658 bags (in fact 44030 bags) of red cement belonging to the petitioner and which were stored at Ranavav and Porbandar at the relevant time when the raids were arranged by the civil supply authorities were stored for sale within the Gujarat State or not. It is obvious that the confiscating authority has to be satisfied on objective facts and beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt that these goods were stored with that end in view. If on the contrary the evidence falls short of such a finding however suspicious the conduct of the concerned stockist may be the benefit of doubt must go to him and not to the confiscating authority. If must be realized that the order of confiscation which can be passed under sec. 6a of the Act is a very drastic order having grave consequences affecting fundamental rights of the citizen to acquire hold and dispose of their properties. If must be realized that the order of confiscation which can be passed under sec. 6a of the Act is a very drastic order having grave consequences affecting fundamental rights of the citizen to acquire hold and dispose of their properties. It is true that sec. 6a engrafts a reasonable restriction on such fundamental rights of the citizen. But before it can operate and have its effective sway it must be shown that the concerned provisions are applies to the hilt. Sec. 6a (1) of the Act provides as under :"where any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under sec. 3 in relation thereto a report to that effect shall without any unreasonable delay be sent to the Collector within whose jurisdiction the seizure is made and the Collector may if he thinks it expedient so to do inspect or cause to be inspected such essential commodity and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order the Collector is satisfied that there has been contravention of the order may order confiscation of (a) the essential commodity so seized. " It is therefore obvious that the Collector has to be satisfied that the reis a contravention of the order with respect to the concerned seized commodity and only then he can order confiscation thereof. It is interesting to compare sec. 6a (1) with sec. 7 of the Act. Sec. 7 deals with penalties and states " (1) If any person contravenes any order made under sec. 3 (A)HE shall be punishable. Thus before powers under sec. 6a (1) or under sec. 7 can be invoked it has to be demonstrated with respect to the concerned essential commodity that there is a contravention of the control order with respect to that commodity. Before any order of confiscation under sec. 6a or order of punishment under sec. 7 is passed requirement to be proved is that there has been a contravention of the order issued under the Act. It is therefore obvious that such act of alleged contravention of the order with respect to the concerned essential commodity constitutes the basis of prosecution as well as the basis for an order of adjudication and confiscation. Thus the scope and ambit of sec. 7 are parallel to that of sec. 6a (1 ). It is obvious that sec. It is therefore obvious that such act of alleged contravention of the order with respect to the concerned essential commodity constitutes the basis of prosecution as well as the basis for an order of adjudication and confiscation. Thus the scope and ambit of sec. 7 are parallel to that of sec. 6a (1 ). It is obvious that sec. 7 is a penal provision Sec. 6a (1) order must also therefore be treated to be penal in nature. Before imposing penalty under sec. 7 for contravention of order under sec. 3 the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt its case that the concerned person has contravened the order. Equally it must be held that before the Collector can be treated to be satisfied under sec. 6a on evidence before him it must be demonstrated that the evidence clearly indicates beyond reasonable doubt that the concerned person has contravened the provisions of the order with respect to the commodity in question which is liable to be confiscated. Reading the provisions of sec. 6a (1) and sec. 7 in juxta position it appears clear that same set of circumstances must be established before the order of conviction is passed or confiscation of property is directed by the Collector. In this connection it is profitable to have a look at the history of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 The legislative history of the said Act shows that originally the only penal section was sec. 7. Sec. 7 itself came to be modified from time to time and the present form of that sec. is due to the last amendment by Act 30 of 1974. It came into force on 22nd of June 1974. In the year 1966 by amending Act 25 of 1966 sec. 6a to 6d came to be introduced. They represent a separate scheme for the purpose of adjudication and confiscation by the Collector. When a breach is caused of any provisions of the Act or Order issued under sec. 3 of the Act in relation to any essential Commodity a seizure can be effected by the appropriate officers. 6a to 6d came to be introduced. They represent a separate scheme for the purpose of adjudication and confiscation by the Collector. When a breach is caused of any provisions of the Act or Order issued under sec. 3 of the Act in relation to any essential Commodity a seizure can be effected by the appropriate officers. The commodity is then required to be produced forthwith without delay before the Collector who has been given the right to confiscate the entire commodity or a part the reof if a contravention of the order is established As seen at earlier the contravention of the order is also the basis of a prosecution under secs. 7 and 8. The Collector has to adjudicate the question of confiscation after following the procedure laid down in sec. 6e. Against the order of the Collector an appeal has been provided under sec. 6g to the appellate authority to be appointed by the State Government. It is further interesting to note that even though commodity may have been confiscated by the Collector and that order may have been confirmed by the appellate authority with respect to the same commodity and on the same allegation that there was any contravention of the order in question when the prosecution takes place under sec. 7 if the concerned person is acquitted by the criminal court the confiscated commodity has to be returned to the accused as laid down by sec. 6c (2) of the Act which provides. "where an order under sec. 6a is modified or annulled by such judicial authority. or where in a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of the order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under sec. 6a the person concerned is acquitted and in either case it is not possible for any reason to return the essential commodity seized such person shall except as provided by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 6a be paid the price therefor as if the essential commodity had been sold to the Government with reasonable interest calculated from the day of the seizure of the essential commodity and such price shall be determined. "it is therefore obvious that the provisions of sec. 6a (1) on one hand and sec. 7 on the other are complementary to each other and they operate on the same field. As sec. "it is therefore obvious that the provisions of sec. 6a (1) on one hand and sec. 7 on the other are complementary to each other and they operate on the same field. As sec. 7 is a penal provision of necessity it must be held that sec. 6a (1) provisions are also of penal nature and hence satisfaction of the Collector for invoking his powers of confiscation under sec. 6a (1) must be based on strict proof of facts leading to a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the concerned article is liable to be confiscated as with respect to it there has been contravention of the control order beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. ( 9 ) ). In this connection it is also interesting to refer to relevant provisions for confiscation of goods under the Customs Act. In AMBALAL V. UNION OF INDIA A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 264 the Supreme Court was concerned with the question of confiscation of goods under Sea Customs Act 1878 The power entrusted to the customs authorities to confiscate goods was treated by the Supreme Court to be penal in nature. Subba Rao J. speaking for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations in this connection :" A customs officer is not a judicial tribunal and a proceeding before him is not a prosecution. But the relevant provisions of the Sea Customs Act and the Land customs Act are penal in character. The appropriate customs authority is empowered to make an inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by a person under the said Act summon and examine witnesses decide whether an offence is committed make an order of confiscation of the goods in respect of which the offence is committed and impose penalty on the person concerned. To such a situation though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Evidence Act may not apply except in so far as they are statutorily made applicable the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence and of natural justice must necessarily apply. If so the burden of proof is on the customs authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Acts by adducing satisfactory evidence. If so the burden of proof is on the customs authorities and they have to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence under the said Acts by adducing satisfactory evidence. Where the accused contends that the goods were imported from Pakistan before the customs barrier was established the onus is on the customs authorities to prove that they were imported after the barrier was put up. " ( 10 ) ). In the background of the aforesaid settled legal position therefore it would have to be found out as to whether on the evidence as led before the Collector there was material on the basis of which the Collector could reach a satisfaction that the concerned cement bags were stored by the petitioner for sale within the territorial limits of the Gujarat State. If the evidence on record cannot lead to such a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt the benefit of course must go to the petitioner and not to the confiscating authority. ( 11 ) ). A mere look at the aforesaid evidence shows that even giving full effect to the said evidence it is impossible to reach a conclusion that the goods stored in the two godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav awaiting their transport to Bombay were meant to be sold within the Gujarat market. It must be mentioned at this stage that the learned appellate Judge agreeing with the Collector has come to the conclusion on point No. 3 that the explanation offered by the petitioner for storing these goods at godowns at Ranavav and Porbandar was not probabilised. He based his aforesaid conclusion on two grounds; (1) the transport strike which started on 11-1-1982 appears to have ended on 15-1-1982. Consequently thereafter there was no reason for the petitioner to go on storing various quantities of cement bags in the two godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav upto 3-2-1982 when during the raid this stock of bags was detected by the raiding party; (2) there was no evidence to suggest that railway wagons were not available during the relevant time. It is on these grounds that the learned appellate Judge agreeing with the Collector took the view that the explanation offered by the petitioner for not shifting these goods earlier to Bombay was not probabilised. It is on these grounds that the learned appellate Judge agreeing with the Collector took the view that the explanation offered by the petitioner for not shifting these goods earlier to Bombay was not probabilised. It is difficult to agree with the aforesaid conclusion to which the learned appellate Judge reached on point No. 3. The evidence on record which I have narrated above clearly indicates that involuntarily and for reasons beyond her control the petitioner at Bombay could not get full delivery of the entire cement contracted to be purchased from the manufacturer at Ranavav. Out of 15000 tonnes of cement purchased by the petitioner she could get 4/5th of the stock actually transported to Bombay and 1/5th stock remained. It is nobodys contention that so far as 1/5th part of the cement purchased by the petitioner was concerned at any time the petitioner had changed her mind and had exhibited a different intention of segregating this quantity from the total bulk of cement purchased with a view to selling it off in Gujarat markets. Leaving aside any evidence to that effect there is not even a whisper to this effect on the record of the case on behalf of the respondents. If the petitioner could transport 4/5th of the cement purchased from the manufacturer at Ranavav there was no reason for her not to transport the remaining quantity but for the fact that for the reasons beyond her control the said quantity could not be transported to Bombay within time and with a view to preserving such commodity awaiting its ultimate transport to Bombay it had to be stored so that in the meantime it may not be damaged. ( 12 ) ). But even assuming that the finding of the learned appellate Judge is upheld and it is held that the explanation offered by the petitioner that the goods stored in both the godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav were stored awaiting their transport to Bombay and could not be transported earlier because of paucity of transport facilities is not acceptable and the finding on point No. 3 is upheld even then the position does not improve for the respondents from any point of view. As already shown above in these confiscation proceedings which are penal in nature it must be established by the respondents on the basis of the evidence on record that the concerned goods which were seized and which were sought to be confiscated under sec. 6a of the Act were shown to be involved in any breach of the control order and such breach must be demonstrated to have existed beyond any reasonable doubt. There is no such evidence on record from which it can be gathered that the goods in question were stored in the aforesaid two godowns by the petitioner with a view to selling them in Gujarat markets. Merely because the explanation offered by the petitioner is found to be unreasonable it would not automatically follow that these goods were meant to be sold by the petitioner in Gujarat markets. Leaving aside any positive evidence to this effect there is not even a single suggestion to this effect in the series of questions put by the Collector to various deponents who were examined on behalf of the petitioner and there is no evidence in rebuttal led by the seizing authority before the Collector. Consequently there was only one version in the field and that was tendered by the petitioner and which remained unchallenged. In that view of the matter in the background of the evidence as it stands on record it is impossible to come to the conclusion that there was nay material much less any sufficient material to reach the satisfaction that qua the concerned goods the petitioner had committed breach of the control order and that such breach was established on her part beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. May be once the petitioners explanation is found to be unreasonable a strong suspicion may arise in the mind of the confiscating authority that the petitioner as a busi nessman would not store such huge quantity of cement in godowns in Gujarat save and except with an intention to dispose of these goods in Gujarat. But that would only remain in the realm of suspicion. It may be realised that the present proceedings cannot be entertained on mere suspicion against any one. But that would only remain in the realm of suspicion. It may be realised that the present proceedings cannot be entertained on mere suspicion against any one. These are not proceedings analogous to preventive detention under the National Security Act or Cofepossa where mere suspicion would furnish enough background for the detaining authority to reach his subjective satisfaction to detain the concerned detenu. On the contrary in the present case confiscating authority exercising quasi judicial powers and required to follow all principles of criminal jurisprudence has got to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the concerned party against whom show cause notice is issued has contravened the provisions of the control order and such contravention is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Till such satisfaction is reached there will be no jurisdiction with the confiscating authority to confiscate goods in question. Such satisfaction would be a condition precedent to the effective exercise of power of confiscation by such authority. In the present case on the evidence on record such satisfaction cannot be reached and even the learned Appellate Judge has not come to this conclusion. Mr. Vin therefore was at pains to point out that once the learned Judge held that the explanation offered by the petitioner was not acceptable there is an implicit and implied finding that these goods were stored by the petitioner at Porbandar and Ranavav with view to selling them in local market or in any of the market of Gujarat. It is impermissible to reach such implied or concealed finding in such a quasi judicial proceedings where in a drastic order of confiscation has to be passed and which has to be confirmed by the appellate court. Mr. Vin submitted that the storage of these goods in the local godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav would be a circumstantial evidence from which an inference can be drawn that they were meant to be sold in Gujarat markets. With respect it is not possible to agree with the said submission of Mr. Vin. It is now well settled that in case of circumstantial evidence the legal chain which can be forged by diverse links of such evidence should be so complete that it is incompatible with the innocence of the concerned accused. With respect it is not possible to agree with the said submission of Mr. Vin. It is now well settled that in case of circumstantial evidence the legal chain which can be forged by diverse links of such evidence should be so complete that it is incompatible with the innocence of the concerned accused. It cannot be said that the so called circumstantial evidence of finding the said goods stored in local godowns at Porbandar and Ranavav was incompatible with the petitioners case that they were stored awaiting their transport to Bombay and that it leads to but only once conclusion about involvement of the petitioner in the contravention of the order beyond any shadow of doubt. Therefore even assuming that the learned appellate judge of justified in arriving at his finding on issue No. 3 by holding that the explanation offered by the petitioner for storing goods in the local godowns at Ranavav and Porbandar was not acceptable he was not justified and he patently erred in law in coming to his conclusion on point No. 4 that the Collectors order was required to be confirmed only on the ground that the explanation offered by the petitioner was not acceptable I may point out in this connection the reasoning adopted by the learned appellate Judge while deciding point No. 4 by which he confirmed the order of the Collector after having rejected the explanation of the petitioner as unreasonable. In para 153 of his judgment the learned appellate Judge has noted that the question of proving beyond reasonable doubt the case against the petitioner will not arise in the present case. I have already shown above that the aforesaid approach is contrary to the well established principle of law. It is the aforesaid error of law committed by the learned appellate Judge that has resulted in the final conclusion to which he reached. In para 160 of his judgment the learned appellate Judge has held that when the goods worth about Rs. 12,00,000. 00 were left stored awaiting transport to Bombay the petitioner should have been vigilant and as she was not vigilant and she allowed her local agents to keep these goods stored the petitioner should thank herself. It is difficult to appreciate the aforesaid reasoning of the learned appellate Judge. 12,00,000. 00 were left stored awaiting transport to Bombay the petitioner should have been vigilant and as she was not vigilant and she allowed her local agents to keep these goods stored the petitioner should thank herself. It is difficult to appreciate the aforesaid reasoning of the learned appellate Judge. It is not the case of any one that under the guise of appointing local agents the petitioner wanted to dispose of the stored goods within the Gujarat markets. Then the maxim qui facit per alium facit perse as relied upon by the learned appellate Judge could have applied. In the absence of such an allegation and evidence the learned appellate Judge could not have held that the petitioner was responsible for the act of storing goods in the local godowns and therefore she had committed breach of the control order. It may be noted that clause 3 of the control order does not require an out of State purchaser of any essential commodity which gets temporarily stored in Gujarat awaiting its transport to points outside Gujarat to obtain any licence under the order nor does he offend the order simply because the goods in transit remain stored in Gujarat for a couple of months awaiting their ultimate conveyance outside Gujarat. In para 163 of his judgment similarly the learned appellate Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed breach of the order on account of the fact that her local agents had committed the said breach To say the least there is no such allegation by the respondents even and hence it is impossible to agree with such a conclusion to which the learned appellate Judge reached while deciding point No. 4. .