N. D. VENKATESH, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree dated 1-1-1975 of the Additional Civil Judge, Tumkur, in R. A. No. 178 of 1974 on his file. ( 2 ) THE appellants, who were defendants in O. S. No. 407 of 1973 on the file of the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Tiptur, have come up with this appeal against the concurrent findings of both the courts below upholding the respondent-plaintiff's claim for a declaration as to his age and date of birth. ( 3 ) IN the plaint presented by him the plaintiff (respondent herein) had requested the trial court to pass a decree in his favour "declaring that the correct date of birth. . . . . . as 24-4-1947". He has obtained a decree to that effect. The defendants had, no doubt, contested the claim. After a trial and hearing the parties the learned Munsiff granted the decree and this has been affrmed. as stated above, by the Civil Judge. ( 4 ) IN this second appeal the learned government Advocate for the appellants, while challenging the judgment of the first appellate court, submitted that: (i) the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable he having not issued statutory notices to the State and the Karnataka Secondary Education, Board; (ii) the judgment and decree are liable to be set aside as the court below has not correctly appreciated the facts involved; and (iii) that even otherwise the suit is liable to be dismissed in view of the provisions of the Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974 (the Act ). ( 5 ) ON the other hand, Counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and decree of the court below. ( 6 ) THERE is no substance in the first submission referred to above. The records bear out the fact of the plaintiff having issued prior statutory notices referred to by the Government Advocate, to the appellants herein. ( 7 ) THE learned Government Advocate also has to fail in his second submission that for wrong appreciation of facts the findings of both the courts below were liable to be set aside. As observed by the Supreme Court in deity Pattabiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya (1) "there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. As observed by the Supreme Court in deity Pattabiramaswamy v. S. Hanymayya (1) "there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. The Court has further observed that "the fact that the finding of the first appellate, court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact". In the circumstances of this case the concurrent findings of the courts below, based as they are on appreciation of facts, are not liable to be disturbed. ( 8 ) NOW, to consider his third submission. The suit was filed on 21-12-1973. The judgment and decree of the Munsiff decreeing the suit was as on 31-5- 1974. The defendants preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge in R. A. No. 178 of 1974 on 19-7-1974. In the meanwhile the Act came into force on 18-6-1974. Another date is relevant. The plaintiff joined service on 14-9-1976 under the State Government and admittedly from that date he has become a "state Servant" as defined in S. 2 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE learned Government Advocate argues that the plaintiff having become a State servant during the pendency of this proceeding was not entitled to maintain the suit and that the provisions of the Act and in particular, S. 6 thereof was baf to the Courts entertaining such a claim. On the other hand, in response to this what was argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent was that the judgment and decree of the Munsiff had become final by the time the Act had come into force and therefore, the provisions of the Act were not attracted to his client's case. In this connection he places reliance on the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Act. ( 10 ) THE Act, as set out in the preamble, provides " for the determination of the age of State servants in so far as it relates to their conditions of service as such State servants" (underlining supplied ). S. 3 of the Act provides as to how that job of determining the age of the State servant: was required to be done. Sub-sec. S. 3 of the Act provides as to how that job of determining the age of the State servant: was required to be done. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 states that "notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, after considering the evidence produced by the State and after such enquiry as it deems fit" the appointing authority should determine the age and record or cause to be recorded in the service register or book or any other record of service of the State servant maintained by the State for the said purpose. The proviso to this sub-section reads as follows: provided that if the age and date of birth of a State servant has been determined by a decree of a civil court obtained by the State servant after he became such servant against the State Govt. and which has become final before the commencement of this Act, the age and date of birth so determined shall be accepted and recorded or cause to be recorded in the service register or book or any other record of service of the State servant concerned" (underlining italics supplied) to attract this proviso to a given case what is necessary is that the State servant should have obtained a decree against the State Government after having become a State servant and that that decree should have become final before the commencement of this Act. ( 11 ) BEFORE examining as to whether the respondent's case is covered by this proviso, let us know other relevant previsions of the Act. Section 4 places a bar on the appointing authority from making any change or alteration in the age and date of birth as recorded deemed to have been recorded in the service register of the State servant relying on any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, and S. 5 provides that such alteration can only take place in accordance with an order to be made by the State Government or its officer appointed for that purpose and in the manner set out therein. S. 6 has taken away the jurisdiction of courts to deal with this matter. S. 6 has taken away the jurisdiction of courts to deal with this matter. It says that "no court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide, or deal with any question which is required to be decided under this Act and further provides that "no decision, under this Act shall be questioned in anv court of law. " ( 12 ) S. 6 is not attracted to this case for the reason that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit does not relate to his age and date of birth accepted and recorded or deemed to have been accepted in his service register or book or any other record of service by the appointing authority nor is he seeking any alteration of age or date of birth recorded as aforesaid. The question contemplated under S. 6 of the Act are questions like above. ( 13 ) BUT the learned Government advocate made a further submission in this respect stating that if the judgments of the courts below were to stand as they are, that may give a handle to this State servant to claim alteration in his age and date of birth as might have been entered in his service register and, if not entered by now, the decrees in question may give him a handle to compel his appointing authority to adopt the age or date of birth so declared) in the decrees. As if adding to this apprehension of the Government Advocate the Counsel for the respondent says that his client's appointing authority is bound by the judgment and decree he has obtained in the, proceeding. In this connection he brought to my notice the proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 3 to which reference has already been made above. According to him the judgment of the trial court hadl become final by the time the Act came into force. True, it had become final so far as that court is concerned. But the entire proceeding (suit in the instant case) cannot be said to have been finally terminated- This is in view of the fact that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of kerala v. K. M. Charia Abdulla and Co. , (2) (Para-5) "an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings, in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority. . . . . As observed by the Supreme Court in State of kerala v. K. M. Charia Abdulla and Co. , (2) (Para-5) "an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings, in effect the entire proceedings are before the appellate authority. . . . . . . The decree in the suit can be said to be final when parties to that suit without taking any steps to get that decree set aside in any manner known to law acquiesce in it and suffer it. That has not happened here. The decree of the tria,l court merges in the decree passed by the appellate court in an appeal preferred against that decree. ( 14 ) THE U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947) which had come into force on 1-10-1946 in that State, contained a provision- section 15 and it stated that "in all suits for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation pending on the date of the commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3". Whether that provision was applicable to a case which was pending in an appellate court when the Act came into force, having been disposed of by the, trial court was the question that came up for consideration in Shy am Sundar Lal v. Shagun Chand (3 ). A Full Bench of that Court, after considering various rulings of the Supreme Court, the federal Court, and other courts observes that "appeal is continuation of the suit and hence the word 'suit' in S. 15 includes appeal with the consequence that although at the time of filing of the eviction suit S. 15 is inapplicable", and "if at the time of appeal Act 3 of 1947 is made applicable to areas where in rented premises are situated, the, tenant can claim advantage of projection under S. 15. This question requires no further elucidation. In ithe matter of the determination of the respondent's age on his entry into service or alteration of any entry, if made therein, the provisions of the act are attracted and his appointing authority is bound to proceed) in accordance with the provisions of the, act and not by the decree obtained by him and confirmed by the appellate courts including this Court. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid this appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. However, parties are, directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .