JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners challenge the levy of octroi and/or terminal tax on naphtha which is supplied to the petitioners by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., from their refinery at Barauni, in the State of Bihar, and also the legality, validity and vires of the orders contained in the letter No. 1818/C/81 dated March 26, 1981 and letter No. 1655/Chungi/81 dated Feb. 18, 1981, issued by respondent No. 1. 2. The first petitioner is the Indian Explosives Ltd., hereafter referred to as 'IEL', a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and as such an existing company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956. It has got its registered office at No. 34 Chowringhee, Calcutta-71. It carries on the business of manufacture and sale of commercial explosives and fertilizers and it has got a plant for the manufacture of fertilizers at Panki in Kanpur. The second petitioner is a share-holder of IEL. Respondent No. 1 is Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika. Respondent No. 2 is the State of U. P. and respondent No. 3 is Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., hereafter referred to as 'the IOC. 3. A petition on similar lines was first filed by the petitioners before the Supreme Court but when it came up for admission on 5th May, 1981, on which date this Court had opened for work again, that petitioner was withdrawn and thereafter this petition was filed before this Court. 4. The question raised in this petition is as to whether IEL is liable to pay octroi duty and/or terminal tax in respect of naphtha obtained by it from the IOC for manufacture of fertilizers of its factory at Panki in Kanpur within the municipal limits of respondent No. 1. 5. The facts set out in the petition are that the IEL established and commissioned a plant for the manufacture of fertilizers at Panki in Kanpur and it produced there a total quantity of approximately 4,50,000 M.T. of urea per year. The essential raw material for the manufacture of ammonia is naphtha. Up-till now naphtha is neither manufactured nor produced in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The IEL obtains the naphtha mainly from the IOC's refinery at Barauni through a piple line. Supplies have been obtained by railway wagons also. By an agreement dated Feb. 9, 1970 (effective from Sept. The essential raw material for the manufacture of ammonia is naphtha. Up-till now naphtha is neither manufactured nor produced in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The IEL obtains the naphtha mainly from the IOC's refinery at Barauni through a piple line. Supplies have been obtained by railway wagons also. By an agreement dated Feb. 9, 1970 (effective from Sept. 1969) between the IOC and IEL, the IOC undertook to supply naphtha to IEL at the price determined in accordance with the pricing formula laid down or is allowed by the Government of India from time to time. Such price was and is exclusive of transfer charges, excise duty and all other taxes and levies. This agreement came to an end on or about Dec. 31, 1980, but the IEL is continuing to get naphtha from the IOC for the manufacture of fertilizers. The then local Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 296 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, by a notification issued on 30th November, 1922 framed rules for the assessment and collection of terminal tax in the Kanpur Municipality in respect of goods liable to terminal tax imported into the municipality by rail, river, canal, or road. This notification was amended from time to time and then by a notification No. 6601-B(I)/II-6-183-72 dated the 24th of March, 1973, issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 219, 227 and 514 (1) of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, rules were framed for assessment and collection of octroi by the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, and by notification No. 1878-B/XI-6-27/72 dated March, 30, 1973, the Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur in exercise of powers conferred under section 172 (2) (b) of the Adhiniyam imposed a tax of octroi with effect from Apr. 1, 1973. This notification was modified by a further notification issued on August 27, 1976, by respondent No. 1. For the first time in 1981 the IEL received a demand from respondent No. 1 by a letter No. 1655/Chungi/81 dated Feb. 18, 1981, calling for a statement of receipt of naphtha by it. A similar letter was addressed to the IOC. In reply to that letter it was submitted on behalf of the IEL that naphtha did not attract the payment of any octroi duty, whether it was obtained through pipe line or by rail. 18, 1981, calling for a statement of receipt of naphtha by it. A similar letter was addressed to the IOC. In reply to that letter it was submitted on behalf of the IEL that naphtha did not attract the payment of any octroi duty, whether it was obtained through pipe line or by rail. Subsequently, respondent No. 1 by its letter No. 1819/C/81 dated March 26, 1981, called upon the IEL to pay terminal tax amounting to Rs. 25,17,893.82. The IEL paid Rs. 2,50,000/- by a cheque dated Apr. 3, 1981 and the remaining sum on 1-5-1981. 6. The petitioners challenge the levy of octroi and/or terminal tax on supplies of naphtha made to it by IOC on the ground that naphtha is not used by it for lighting, fuel, toilet or lubricants but is used only for manufacture of fertilizers, that in any event it is not a mineral oil and further that it is not brought by rail, road, river, canal or air. It is also contended that in the agreement which the IEL had entered into with respondent No. 1 for payment of terminal tax on goods imported or received at IEL's railway siding naphtha was not specifically included. According to the petitioner the aforesaid demand was absolutely illegal and unconstitutional and the amount paid under protest is liable to be refunded. The , petitioners accordingly pray for a declaration that the Adhiniyam and the notifications issued thereunder are not applicable to naphtha imported by the IOC for the IE1 into the State of Uttar Pradesh for manufacture of fertilizers and no octroi and/or terminal tax can be imposed on the same. In the alternative it has been prayed that in case the provisions of the Adhiniyam or the notifications issued thereunder authorised imposition of octroi/terminal tax on naphtha, the same were illegal and unconstitutional. The petitioners also pray for issue of a writ prohibiting the respondent No. 1 from imposing, realising and demanding payment of any octroi or terminal tax on naphtha imported into the State of Uttar Pradesh and utilised for manufacture of fertilizers, as also for refund of the amount of Rs. 25,17,893.82 paid by the IEL to respondent No. 1 on account of octroi duty under protest. There is a prayer for quashing the aforesaid impugned orders also. 7. 25,17,893.82 paid by the IEL to respondent No. 1 on account of octroi duty under protest. There is a prayer for quashing the aforesaid impugned orders also. 7. On behalf of respondent No. 1 counter-affidavit has been filed by one Kailash Narain, Sahayak Nagar Adhikari (Octroi), Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur. The use of naphtha by the IEL for manufacture of fertilizers is not disputed but it is averred that it is liable for payment of octroi duty. The stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that the import of naphtha is subject to payment of octroi under the impugned notification and the impugned demand was perfectly legal and justified. It is also claimed that naphtha is useable as a fuel by IE1 and as such is liable for payment of octroi. Further, it is claimed to be mineral oil. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of the Adhiniyam and the notifications issued thereunder has also been controverted. 8. On behalf of the State of U. P. a separate counter affidavit has been filed but the stand taken by the Nagar Mahapalika, respondent No. 1, has been adopted. On behalf of the respondent No. 3, the IOC, a counter-affidavit has been filed. Therein the case set out in the petition has been supported. 9. Before coming to the submissions made before us on behalf of the parties we may read the relevant provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and the relevant notifications issued thereunder. S. 172 of the Adhiniyam which occurs under Chapter IX provides for Mahapalika Taxation. Sub-s. (1) of this section says that for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof and of Article 285 of the Constitution of India the Mahapalika shall impose the following taxes, namely : - (a) property taxes, (b) a tax on vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles, and other conveyances plying for hire or kept within the City or on boats moored therein; and (c) a tax on animals. Sub-s. (2) says that in addition to the taxes specified in sub-s. (1) the Mahapalika may for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof impose any of the following taxes mentioned in els. (a) to (j). Cl. (b) is relevant for the present purpose and it reads (b) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the City for consumption, use or sale therein. (a) to (j). Cl. (b) is relevant for the present purpose and it reads (b) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the City for consumption, use or sale therein. Sub-s. (3) says that the Mahapalika taxes shall be assessed and levied in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules and bye-law framed thereunder. Sub-s. (4) reads that nothing in this section shall authorise the imposition of any tax which the State Legislature has no power to impose in the State under the Constitution of India. 10. It would, thus, be seen that the Mahapalika has been empowered to impose, inter alia, an octroi on goods brought within the City for consumption, use or sale therein. As for imposition of taxes, provisions have been made in Sections 109 to 206. We may only give a summary of these provisions. When a Mahapalika desires to impose a tax specified in sub-s. (2) of S. 172, it shall, by resolution, direct the Executive Council to frame preliminary proposals. On a resolution being passed the Executive Committee shall frame the proposals and also prepare a draft of the rules which it desires the State Government to make. Thereafter, the Executive Committee shall publish the proposals and the draft rules so framed in the manner prescribed. The procedure subsequent to framing proposals is contained in S. 200. Objections are required to be invited. In case any objection is filed, the Mahapalika is required to consider the same. If it decides to modify the proposals of the Executive Committee. It shall publish the modified proposals and again invite objections to the same and deal with them. After the proposals are finally settled, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall submit them along with the objections, if any, made in connection therewith to the State Government. Under S. 201 the State Government may either refuse to sanction the proposals or return them to the Mahapalika for further consideration or sanction them with or without some modifications. After the sanction of the proposals by the State Government, the State Government shall proceed forthwith to make such rules in respect of the tax as for the time being it considers necessary. After the sanction of the proposals by the State Government, the State Government shall proceed forthwith to make such rules in respect of the tax as for the time being it considers necessary. A copy of those rules is to be sent to the Mahapalika and thereupon the Mahapalika shall by special resolution direct the imposition of tax with effect from a date to be specified in the resolution. The imposition of tax is made under S. 302. A copy of the resolution passed under S. 302 shall be submitted to the State Government. On receipt of copy of such resolution the State Government shall notify in the official Gazette, the imposition of the tax from the appointed date, and the imposition of tax shall in all cases be subject to the condition that it has been so notified. Sub-s. (3) of this section says that that a notification of the imposition of a tax under sub-s. (2) shall be conclusive proof that the tax has been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. It would be seen that these are substantive provisions with regard to the imposition of tax by the Nagar Mahapalika. As for the rules as to assessment, collection and other matters, the provision is made in S. 219. Further S. 227 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Chapter, i.e. the Chapter relating to Mahapalika Taxation. 11. Now, the first notification in regard to Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, that was issued on 24-3-1973 was in exercise of the powers under Sections 219, 227 and sub-s. (1) of S. 540 of the Adhiniyam read with S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1904. By means of this notification all existing rules for assessment and collection of terminal tax, terminal toll and octroi on animals were suspended and fresh rules for assessment and collection of octroi by Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, were framed. We shall refer to the relevant rules set out in this notification during the course of the judgment as and when the occasion arises. 12. By notification dated 30th March, 1973, in exercise of the powers under sub-s. (2) of S. 203 of the Adhiniyam the Governor was pleased to notify that the Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur has, in^exercise of the powers conferred by cl. 12. By notification dated 30th March, 1973, in exercise of the powers under sub-s. (2) of S. 203 of the Adhiniyam the Governor was pleased to notify that the Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur has, in^exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) of S. 172 of the Adhiniyam imposed certain taxes with effect from Apr. 1, 1973. The tax consisted of an octroi on goods and animals brought within the octroi limits of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, by any means for consumption, use or sale therein to be levied at the rates shown in the Schedule and subject to the exemption given therein. This notification, thus, gives a list of the goods subjected to octroi, the rate thereof as also the exemptions. This notification would amount to the charging provisions. It was superseded by a subsequent notification dated 27-8-1976 which came into effect from September 1, 1976. In regard to these notifications it would be relevant to keep in view that both of them had emanated from the same authority, i.e. the State Government. 13. Now, it was contended before us on behalf of the petitioners by its learned Senior counsel, Sri A. K. Sen, that naphtha does not fall under any of the classes or items specified in the schedule attached to these notifications. After hearing counsel for parties we are not inclined to agree with these submissions. It is not disputed that the petitioner in its factory at Panki manufactures fertilizers. There are separate summoning and urea plants in the factory. Naphtha is an essential raw material for manufacture of ammonia. It is also not disputed that naphtha is a product of petroleum, i.e. an intermediate between the associate products of gasoline and benzine all of which do not differ in their essential nature but vary only in the degree of inflammability when brought into contact with radiate heat. Naphtha is sometimes defined as any of the various volatile, strong smelling, inflammable liquids as ordinary ether. It is a generic term embracing the lighter or more volatile parts of crude oil down to and sometimes including kerosene and takes in all the elements of finished gasoline. In this way, naphtha, benzine or benzol and kerosene are all refined coal or earth oils not differing in their nature but only in the degree of inflammability. It is a generic term embracing the lighter or more volatile parts of crude oil down to and sometimes including kerosene and takes in all the elements of finished gasoline. In this way, naphtha, benzine or benzol and kerosene are all refined coal or earth oils not differing in their nature but only in the degree of inflammability. The petitioner uses naphtha in its factory as a raw material to produce carbon and hydrogen required for manufacture of ammonia which, in turn, is used for the manufacture of urea fertilizer. There is no dispute that naphtha is not used by the petitioner as a fuel for generation of steam or for lighting, or for fuel or toilet or for lubricants. Nonetheless, it cannot be disputed that naphtha is a chemical product and is a mineral oil. 14. In the notification of 30th March, 1973, the goods and animals on which octroi was imposed by the Kanpur Mahapalika were described in the schedule under eight classes, viz. : - (i) Articles of food and drink for men and animals; (ii) animal-birds, (iii) Articles used for fuel, lighting, toilet and lubricants; (iv) stone, wood, ivory and articles made thereof, utensils, glass and articles made thereof and other articles used for building and furnishing; (v) Chemicals, medicine, gum, perfumery articles, dying and tanning materials; (vi) tobacco manufactured and unmanufactured and its related articles; (vii) textile fabrics apparel and other articles made thereof, rubber, gattaparcha, plastic, cellulide, bisatkhana and sports materials; and (viii) metals, articles made of alloy, electric goods and other articles. These are only broad categorisations of goods and animals. In the notification dated 24th March. 1973, Clause 2 (iv) defined 'goods' to mean "the goods specified in the Appendix 'ka' to these rules". In Appendix 'Ka' goods on which octroi is chargeable were described and they were categorised under eight classes which were the same as mentioned in the subsequent notification and which have been reproduced above. However, as for the classification of goods and animals on which Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur imposed octroi with effect from April 1, 1973, we will have to refer to the notification of 30th March, 1973 and not the earlier one which only contained the rules framed for assessment and collection of octroi. However, as for the classification of goods and animals on which Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur imposed octroi with effect from April 1, 1973, we will have to refer to the notification of 30th March, 1973 and not the earlier one which only contained the rules framed for assessment and collection of octroi. Entry 51 of Class III of the Schedule to this notification and Entries 190 and 191 of class VIII and similarly Entries 83 and 84 of class III and 290 and 291 of class VIII of the Schedule to the notification of 27th Aug., 1976 would be relevant for our consideration. Relevant entries of the Notification dated 30.3.1973 Corresponding entries in the Notification of 27-8-76 51 Lubricating Oils and other Mineral Oils not free from Octroi, Machine Oil and other Lubricating Oils. 83 Lubricating Oils, Machine Oil and other Lubricating Oils. 84 Petrol, all mineral oils except those not mentioned elsewhere. 190 All unspecified articles not exempt from Octroi. 290 All unspecified articles not exempt from Octroi. 191 Undeclared goods. 291 Undeclared goods. 15. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners Entry 51 of the Notification dated 30-3-73 and Entries 83 and 84 of the Notification dated 27th August, 1976 will not cover naphtha even though this is a mineral oil because these entries occur in class III, the heading of which is "Articles used for fuel, lighting, Toilet and Lubricants." Further, entries 190 and 191 of the first notification and 290 and 291 of the latter one will not cover naphtha because they occur in class VIII, the heading of which is "Metals, Articles made of alloy, Electric goods and other articles". We do not agree. The headings given to the various classes will not be essentially decisive of the nature and character of goods specified therein. The headings are only descriptive and have been given by way of broad classifications. It would not be correct to say that the goods mentioned under various classes will take their colour and content from the heading of the class in which they occur. If we scrutinise the different entries which occur in any of these classes, it would be seen that they do not, in all cases, necessarily fall under the heading given to that class. If we scrutinise the different entries which occur in any of these classes, it would be seen that they do not, in all cases, necessarily fall under the heading given to that class. For example the heading of class VIII is "Metals, Articles made of alloy, Electric goods and other articles." Now, even Tonga, Bullock Cart, Boat, Handcart, Ekka, Hand Driven Thela, Cycle, Rickshaw have been enumerated in this class. Similarly, there are some other articles also which would not take their colour and content from the heading of the class. If we scrutinise carefully we would find that under each of the classes, goods answering the description contained in the heading of the class are mentioned. Allied goods are also mentioned and then there are residuary entries which would cover other articles. Particularly, in class VIII "the other articles" would stand in a different category altogether. All unspecified articles not exempt from duty and all undeclared goods fall in the heading of "other articles". So, even if for the time being we agree with Sri Sen that naphtha would not fall under any of the entries mentioned in class III of these two notifications then certainly it would be covered by residuary entries which occur in class VIII. As noted above, we are not of the view that the various entries mentioned in different classes will take their colour and content from the description of the heading given to that class. It is correct that the petitioners are not using naphtha "for fuel, lighting, Toilet and Lubricants", but it cannot be disputed that naphtha can be used for these purposes. If that be so, naphtha would be covered by the expression "mineral oils" occurring in Entry 51 of the first Notification and Entry 84 of the latter Notification. We do not think that the incidence of tax would depend on the actual use of the goods by the person concerned. If it is capable of being used for the purpose mentioned in the heading, it would certainly fall under the relevant entry of that class. Naphtha being a mineral oil, therefore, is covered by Entries 51, and 84 of these two notifications, respectively. 16. If it is capable of being used for the purpose mentioned in the heading, it would certainly fall under the relevant entry of that class. Naphtha being a mineral oil, therefore, is covered by Entries 51, and 84 of these two notifications, respectively. 16. Another contention raised by Sri Sen in this connection was that since there is no machinery provided in the rules for assessment and collection of octroi on naphtha, no octroi can be levied on the supplies of naphtha made to the petitioner by IOC. According to the learned counsel under R. 13 of these rules only goods which are imported within the octroi limits of Mahapalika "by rail, road, river, canal or air" can be subjected to the levy of octroi. Naphtha is not imported by any of these means, and, therefore, octroi cannot be levied on import of naphtha within the octroi limits of Mahapalika, Kanpur. In the same connection our attention was also invited to R. 5 which provides for assessment of goods. Sub-r. (1) of this Rule says that goods imported into the octroi limits of the Mahapalika which are liable to the payment of octroi, shall be dealt within one of the following ways - (a) the goods may be assessed at the barrier; (b) all goods or part thereof may be taken to the head octroi office and assessed there; (c) they may be assessed under the rules applicable to goods imported by railway; (d) the octroi may be compounded; (e) where a mill or an establishment has a facility of railway siding, and agreement for payment of octroi may be entered into in the form given in Appendix 'Kha'; (f) in case of the mills or factories which have their own Railway sidings they shall submit statements regarding the import of goods at their sidings within a week of such import and the octroi thereon shall be paid within a week of the expiry of the month in which the goods have been so imported; (g) the octroi may be charged by the Mahapalika in the following manner - (i) through the railway; or (ii) by setting up a barrier near the gate of the Mill Railway Siding; (iii) by entering into an agreement with the mill as in Appendix 'Kha'. In the instant case the petitioner had entered into an agreement with Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, on 22-4-1970. In the instant case the petitioner had entered into an agreement with Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, on 22-4-1970. According to the learned counsel since octroi can be levied only on the goods imported by rail, road, river, canal or air, no octroi could be levied in imports of naphtha by the petitioner which were made not by any of these means but pipe-line. We do not find any merit in this contention either. As noted above, the petitioner had entered into an agreement with Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur on 22-4-1970. There is no mention therein that the Mahapalika would be entitled to charge any terminal toll or terminal tax imported by the petitioners by pipe-line. It is also correct that no demand was made by the Nagar Mahapalika for payment of octroi on such imports till 1980. In our opinion the modes of transport of goods mentioned in Rule 13 are only illustrative. The liability to pay octroi on goods brought otherwise than by rail, road, river, canal or air will not be wiped off, and any way, as brought to our notice by Sri Raja Ram Agarwal, learned counsel for the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, the word "canal" would also include pipe line. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles "Third Edition Vol. I" at page 274 one of the meanings given to "canal" is a pipe for conveying liquid, also a tube or tubular cavity, channel. Similarly in Webster's Third New International Dictionary Vol. I, at page 324 the word 'canal' is also stated to mean "a pipe especially for conveying liquids; channel". Thus, according to the Dictionary meaning canal would include a pipe line. It may be that while entering into the agreement dated 22-4-70 it was not in the contemplation of the parties that naphtha brought by pipe line can be subjected to octroi, it does not mean that this extended meaning should not be given to the word 'canal'. In Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 , while considering the import and ambit of the word "industry" as defined in S. 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the observations made by Subba Rao J. as he then was, speaking for the Court in the Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159 were approved. Those observations were (at p. 163) : - "The fundamental rule of construction is the same whether the Court is asked to construe a provision of an ancient statute or that of a modern one, namely, what is the expressed intention of the Legislature. It is perhaps difficult to attribute to a Legislative body functioning in a static society that its intention was couched in terms of considerable breadth so as to take within its sweep the future developments comprehended by the phraseology used. It is more reasonable to confine its intention only to the circumstances obtaining at the time the law was made. But in a modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of a Legislature to the meaning attributable to the word used at the time the law was made, for a modern Legislature making laws to govern a society which is fast moving must be presumed to be aware of an enlarged meaning the same concept might attract with the march of time and with the revolutionary changes brought about in social, economic, political and scientific and other fields of human activity. Indeed, unless the contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending In the instant case as we have shown above the Dictionary meaning given to the word "canal" includes a tube or tubular cavity as also a pipe for conveying liquid. In other words according to the Dictionary meaning of this word itself canal would include a pipe line. Thus, even if it was not in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the agreement was made, it would be reasonable to give the expression "canal" as occurring in the Notification aforesaid an enlarged meaning so as to include a pipe line also. It cannot be said, therefore, that there is no provision in the rules to assess octroi on the supplies of naphtha made to the petitioners by pipe line. 17. According to Sri Sen we should adopt the rule of strict construction while interpreting the entries, the charging provisions and the rules for levy, assessment and collection of octroi duties. We were referred, in support of this contention, to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. 17. According to Sri Sen we should adopt the rule of strict construction while interpreting the entries, the charging provisions and the rules for levy, assessment and collection of octroi duties. We were referred, in support of this contention, to the decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. of Patiala v. Shahzada Nand and sons, ( AIR 1966 SC 1342 ). In that case, of course, the Court approved the classic statement of Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commr., (1921) 1 KB 64 at p. 71) as still holding the field. It reads : - "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." To this the Court added a rider; in a case of reasonable doubt, the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted. There can be no dispute in so far as this principle of law is concerned. However, as observed by the Court in Commr. of Income-tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders, ( AIR 1980 SC 485 at p. 491) that it is well settled that the principle that the fiscal statute should be construed strictly is applicable only to taxing provisions such as a charging provision or a provision imposing penalty and not to those parts of the statute which contain machinery provisions. We have already mentioned above that the notification dated 24-3-1973 contains rules made for assessment and collection of octroi. These are machinery provisions and do not constitute charging or substantive provisions. It is the' latter notification dated March 30, 1973 as superseded by notification dated September 1, 1976 which constitute the substantive provisions. Apart from this, as we have indicated above the headings given to the various classes are merely descriptive in nature and do not essentially control the import and scope of the various entries occurring thereunder. Further the expression 'canal- would include, according to the dictionary meaning, a pipe line as well and it would be reasonable to give it an extended meaning. Further, if we look to the Legislative history, it would appear that the intention was to rope in almost all the goods. Further the expression 'canal- would include, according to the dictionary meaning, a pipe line as well and it would be reasonable to give it an extended meaning. Further, if we look to the Legislative history, it would appear that the intention was to rope in almost all the goods. An attempt was made to classify the goods and categorise them under certain classes. However, in regard to unspecified, and undeclared goods as well special mention was made. The first notification in the series is that of 30th Nov. 1922, which was issued by the Local Government in exercise of the power conferred by S. 296 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. By this notification terminal tax was imposed on the goods mentioned in the Schedule thereto. In this Schedule the goods were classified according to the amount of terminal tax imposable. Entry 31 provided for levy of terminal tax on "mineral oil except those which are shown in the Imperial tariff under the category of petroleum No. 33", the quantum of tax being 9 pies per maund and the incidence being on import and export. Under the heading "at anna per maund", entry No. 32 provided for all articles not elsewhere specified and tax at one anna on import and 6 pies of export. Thus looking to the Legislative history also it can be said that the intention has been to rope in all goods. Anyhow, naphtha being a mineral oil stands specifically provided for under entry 51 of notification dated 30th March, 1973 and entry No. 83 of notification dated September 1. 1976. This being the position, octroi duty was clearly chargeable on the supplies of Naphtha received by the petitioner from the IOC. 18. In this behalf it would also be useful to note that the petitioner IEL had made an application on 29th of July, 1968 to the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, in which it was stated that Naphtha along with fuel oil, Doth of which woulu be supplied to the IEL by the IOC are principal raw materials for the manufacture of Urea, that the Uttar Pradesh Government had already exempted urea from levy of any terminal tax and it was prayed that a recommendation may kindly be made to the State Government to exempt these basic raw materials also from the levy of any terminal tax. A copy of this application is annexure 'A' to the counter-affidavit of Sri Kailash Narain, Sahayak Nagar Adhikari (Octroi), Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur. This application was rejected by order dated 16-2-1970. It appears to have been communicated to the IEL by means of letter dated 29-6-81. The copy of the same is annexure 'B' to the said affidavit. This evidence also renders support to the conclusion at which we have arrived above and at least goes to show that it was in the knowledge of the petitioner that terminal tax was liable to be imposed on supplies of Naphtha made to it by the IOC. 19. In this very connection we may dispose of another argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner by Sri Sen that assuming that Naphtha is subject to payment of octroi duty, there is no provision made in the relevant rules which may justify or empower the collection of arrears of duty after the goods have passed the barriers of octroi check post. According to the learned counsel there is no machinery available to assess the goods which are not present at the barrier and particularly so in respect of any arrears of octroi duty. Our attention was invited to the various rules contained in the notification dated 24th of March, 1973, in this behalf and reliance was placed on a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. Union of India, (AIR 1952 Nag 139). We do not find any merit in this submission either. As noted above as long back as in 1968 the petitioner had made an application for exemption of Naphtha from the. levy of terminal tax. That application was rejected on 16-2-1970 and the intimation was given to the petitioner on 19-6-1980. The petitioner was required to furnish a statement of the supplies of Naphtha which had been made, to it by the IOC. It furnished such a statement and the amount of octroi duty leviable was calculated thereon. There is absolutely no dispute in regard to the quantity of Naphtha received by the petitioner from the IOC and when it is found that Naphtha is liable to be subjected to the levy of octroi duty there should be no difficulty in finding out the amount due and making a demand in respect of the same. There is absolutely no dispute in regard to the quantity of Naphtha received by the petitioner from the IOC and when it is found that Naphtha is liable to be subjected to the levy of octroi duty there should be no difficulty in finding out the amount due and making a demand in respect of the same. In our opinion it would be merely academic to enter into the question as to whether under the rules any demand can be validly made in a case in which there has been escapement of octroi duty. The petitioner had made a request for exemption of terminal tax which was turned down. When required it furnished necessary details and on the basis of the same the demand was made and it has satisfied the same though under protest. In our opinion the demand was validly raised. 20. Now we come to the last contention urged on behalf of the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner octroi duty is a duty which impedes the freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution and it can be justified only if it satisfies the conditions contained in cls. (a) and (b) of Article 304. In order to appreciate this aspect we may read the relevant provisions. Articles 301 to 305 find place in Part XIII of the Constitution, the heading of which is "Trade, Commerce and Intercourse within the territory of India". Articles 301 to 305 read as under : - "301. Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse.- Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. 302. Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse, - Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. 303. 302. Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse, - Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest. 303. Restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union and of the States with regard to trade and commerce.- (i) Notwithstanding anything in article 302, neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State shall have power to make any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference to one State over another, 6r making, or authorising the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent Parliament from making any law giving, or authorising the giving of, any preference or making or, authorising the making of, any discrimination if it is declared by such law that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. 304. Restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse among States. - Notwithstanding anything in Article 301 or Article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law - (a) impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest: Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President. 305. 305. Saving of existing laws and laws providing for State monopolies.- Nothing in Articles 301 and 303 shall affect the provisions of any existing law except in so far as the President may by order otherwise direct; and nothing in Article 301 shall affect the operation of any law made before the commencement of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, in so far as it relates to, or prevent Parliament or the Legislature of a State from making any law relating to, any such matter as is referred to in sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (6) of Article 19". Article 306 was repealed .by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. Article 307 provides for appointment of authority for carrying out the purposes of Articles 301 to 304 and is not relevant for our purposes. The scope of those provisions came up for consideration in Atiabari Tea Co.'s case ( AIR 1961 SC 232 ). The view taken by the majority was that : "The doctrine of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse enunciated by Article 301 is not subject to the other provisions of the Constitution but is made subject only to the other provisions of Part XIII; that means that once the width and amplitude of the freedom enshrined in Article 301 are determined they cannot be controlled by any provision outside Part XIII." The question again came up in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 ). The context was challenge to the constitutional validity of imposition of tax on motor vehicles in Rajasthan, under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. S. 4 of that Act provided for imposition of tax and S. 8 imposed an obligation on the owner of every motor vehicle to make a declaration every year in respect of motor vehicles in the prescribed form stating the particulars etc, and S. 11 provided for penalties under the Act. The Constitutional validity of these provisions was challenged on the ground that the scheme provided therein was in conflict with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India assured by Article 301 and other articles contained within Part XIII of the Constitution. The Constitutional validity of these provisions was challenged on the ground that the scheme provided therein was in conflict with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India assured by Article 301 and other articles contained within Part XIII of the Constitution. The majority view in that case was that the taxes imposed under the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act are compensatory taxes which do not hinder the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse assured by Article 301 and hence the Act does not violate the provisions of that Article. The majority view in Atiabari Tea Company's case (supra) was explained and it was laid down that regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304 (b) of the Constitution. Das, J. speaking for the majority observed (at p. 1420 of (SC)) : "The concept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse postulated by Article 301 must be understood in the context of an orderly society and as a part of the Constitution which envisages a distribution of powers between the States and the Union, and if so understood, the concept must recognise the need and the legitimacy of some degree of regulatory control, whether by the Union or the State. This is irrespective of the restrictions imposed by the other articles in part XIII of the Constitution. That which in reality facilitates trade and commerce is not a restriction, and that which in reality hampers or burdens trade and commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined. It is not possible a priory to draw a dividing line between that which would really be a charge for a facility provided and that which would really be a deterrent to a trade; but the distinction, if it has to be drawn, is real and clear. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance." 21. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance." 21. The interpretation of the articles given by Das, J. in brief is : Article 301 imposes a general limitation of all legislative powers in order to secure that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. This general limitation is relaxed by Article 302 in favour of Parliament. But a restriction is to be confined to relaxation by Article 303(1) which prohibits Parliament from giving preference to one State over another or discriminate between one State and another by virtue of the entries there referred to. A similar restriction is placed on the State. Article 303 (2) carves out an exception to the restrictions placed by Article 303 (1) on the power of Parliament and the exception applies only to Parliament. Each of the clauses of Article 304 operates as a proviso to Articles 301 and 303. Article 304 (a) places goods imported from sister States at par with similar goes manufactured or produced inside the State in regard to State taxation within the allocated field. Article 304 (b) is analogous to Article 302 for it makes the States' power contained in Article 304 (b) expressly free from the prohibition contained in Article 303 (1) by reason of the opening words of Article 304. There is, however, one difference and it is that whereas in Article 302 the restrictions are not subject to the requirement of reasonableness, the restrictions under Article 304 (b) are so subject. 22. It is Article 304 which is more relevant for our purpose. It contains of two clauses which are connected with the word 'and'. In our opinion the word 'and' means and/or because each clause confers a power and the power may be exercised separately or together. The power under Article 304 (a) is unqualified. It empowers the Legislature of a State to impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject. This power is not qualified in any manner. Cl. The power under Article 304 (a) is unqualified. It empowers the Legislature of a State to impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject. This power is not qualified in any manner. Cl. (b) gives power to the State Legislatures to impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in public interest. This is qualified by the proviso. Thus, Cl. (a) deals with taxes and cl. (b) with restrictions. The power to enact a law under clause (a) can be exercised by the ordinary method of legislation on a subject mentioned in List II of the Seventh Schedule. As regards the law falling under sub-cl. (b), the ordinary method of enacting a valid State law in respect of matters in List II is circumscribed inasmuch as the previous sanction of the President to the introduction of a Bill proposing a law falling within it is required. Thus, in our opinion it is not correct to say, as urged by Sri Sen, that in order to qualify the test prescribed under this part it is necessary for a law enacted by a State Legislature to satisfy the conditions contained in both these clauses. Under Article 304 (a) a tax on goods would include every tax in respect of any aspect of goods which is within the legislative power of the State and such a tax can be imposed by the ordinary process of law. What it prohibits is that the tax so imposed should not discriminate against outside goods. A tax on imported goods at the same rate or lower rate than those imposed on domestic goods would not violate the freedom of trade. What constitutes a barrier to trade and commerce is not an equal tax or lower tax imposed on imported goods but a higher tax imposed on imported goods. Thus a tax simpliciter is not a restriction on the freedom of trade. The distinction is made clear by the provisions of Article 304 itself. The restrictions in Article 304 (b) do not include a tax. Article 304 (b) enables even discriminatory restrictions to be imposed which are forbidden by Article 303 (b). Such legislation is, however, to be subject to the limitations contained in the proviso to this clause. 23. The distinction is made clear by the provisions of Article 304 itself. The restrictions in Article 304 (b) do not include a tax. Article 304 (b) enables even discriminatory restrictions to be imposed which are forbidden by Article 303 (b). Such legislation is, however, to be subject to the limitations contained in the proviso to this clause. 23. What thus comes out is that clause (a) of Article 304 gives powers to the Legislature of a State to impose a tax on goods, the only limitation being that such tax should not discriminate against goods imported from other sister States. In other words, the quantum of tax on imported goods should not be more than the tax imposed on similar goods manufactured or produced within that State. In our opinion there is no warrant for saying that if certain goods are not manufactured or produced within the State then that State has no power to impose tax on such goods imported from sister States. The question of discrimination would arise only when similar goods are manufactured or produced within the State imposing tax on such goods. Hence we do not agree with the contention of Sri Sen that since Naphtha is not produced within the State of Uttar Pradesh, this State has no power to impose tax on it. The requirement of clause (b) is not to be imported for finding out the justification otherwise of the tax imposed under clause (a). The two as noted above are different inasmuch as Cl. (a) provides for imposition of tax on goods while cl. (b) provides for imposition of restrictions on trade, commerce or intercourse with or within a State. 24. Thus we do not think that imposition of octroi duty on Naphtha brought within the local area of the Mahapalika Kanpur, is, in any way violative of the provisions contained in Part XIII of the Constitution. 25. In Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. Kanpur v. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, ( 1975 UPTC 707 ) : ( AIR 1976 All 274 ), the petitioner company imported mineral oils, steam coal and spare parts of machinery along with large number of other things for manufacture of cotton textiles and cotton piece goods at its factory at Kanpur. These commodities were exempt from octroi duty under a notification dated 24-10-1925 issued by the State Government under S. 128 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. These commodities were exempt from octroi duty under a notification dated 24-10-1925 issued by the State Government under S. 128 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. That notification continued in force even after coming into effect of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. Octroi was imposed thereon by means of the notifications which are under challenge in the present writ petition and one of the grounds was that the levy of octroi duty violated the freedom of trade guaranteed by Articles 301 and 304 (a) of the Constitution and since the requirements of Article 304 (b) were not complied with the levy was unconstitutional. This contention was repelled by observing I at p. 283 of AIR) : - "Furthermore, as explained by the Supreme Court in Atiabari Tea Co. case supra) ( AIR 1961 SC 232 ) as well as Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd., case ( AIR 1962 SC 1406 ) (supra) Article 304 (a) is an exception to Article 301. It will not be attracted to levy of a tax which is not a restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the meaning of Article 301. It was expressly held in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. case that if a tax is compensatory it does not hamper trade and so does not contravene Article 301, and, therefore, it need not comply with Article 304. The same position will obtain for taxes which though not compensatory, yet do not impede the free flow of trade within meaning of Article 301. The validity of such taxes cannot be adjudged under Article 304 (a)." 26. According to Sri Sen this Court left the question open in the Elgin Mills case. We do not think so. As for requirements of Article 304 (a) and (b) Sri Sen also placed reliance on Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa, ( AIR 1966 SC 1686 ). In that case the imposition of a duty of excise of foreign liquor imported into the State under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1951 was under challenge. The majority view taken in the case was that the expression 'countervailing duties' in Entry 51, List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution meant a duty levied with a view to equalise the burden on alcoholic liquors imported from outside the State and the burden placed by the excise duties on alchololic liquors manufactured or produced in the State. It meant that countervailing duties could not be levied if similar goods were actually produced or manufactured in the State on which excise duties were being levied. In our opinion this decision is distinguishable. The power of levy of duties of excise on the State Legislature is conferred under Entry 51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule while power to impose tax on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein is conferred under Entry 52. We have seen that the power to impose tax is recognised under cl. (a) of Article 304. There is no restriction on such power except of course that there should be no discrimination in regard to goods imported into the State. If the rate of tax is the same or lower than what is imposed on the goods manufactured or produced in the State, there is no discrimination. Certainly if the rate is higher then there is discrimination and the legislation cannot be justified. There is, however, no justification for reading in the provision that the power of the State Legislature to levy tax on imported goods is subject to the manufacture or production of those goods within the State itself. 27. Sri Sen then invited our attention to Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, ( AIR 1964 SC 925 ) for the proposition that the onus is on the State to prove that the restriction is reasonable and is in public interest. In our opinion this decision is not relevant for the point under consideration because as we have noticed above els. (a) and (b) of Article 304 operate in different spheres. Clause (a) gives power to State Legislatures to impose tax while clause (b) refers to imposition of restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within that State. It is only when there is a case of imposition of restriction that the State is required to prove that the restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest. The impugned notifications do not impose any restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within the State and, therefore, there is no question of the State proving that the restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest. 28. The impugned notifications do not impose any restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within the State and, therefore, there is no question of the State proving that the restrictions are reasonable and are required in the public interest. 28. State of Karnataka v. M/s. Hansa Corporation, ( AIR 1981 SC 463 ) is also not of much -help to the petitioner. In that case the State of Karnataka had imposed tax on entry of goods into local areas for consumption, use or sale therein. It was held that the levy was in public interest and was meant to compensate the loss suffered by abolition of octroi and the requirement of the proviso also stood satisfied. The impugned Act was thus held saved by Article 304 and could not be struck down on the ground that it was violative of Article 301. ejectment of Mahapalika and for recovery of arrears of rent. 29. The last case referred to by Mr. Sen is a decision of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. IT D. M. Chamarbaugwalia, ( AIR 1956 Bom 1 ) in support of his submission that Article 301 applies to fiscal statutes and onus is on the State to prove the requirements of Article 304 (b). So far as these principles are concerned there can be no dispute. It is correct that the impugned notifications come in the category of a fiscal statute, but Article 304 (b) does not apply to them. In our opinion, therefore, the impugned notifications do not suffer from any constitutional invalidity. 30. Accordingly, this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 31. The prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been made orally. We are not satisfied that the case raises any substantial question of law which needs decision by the Supreme Court. The prayer is rejected. ,