JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree of Addl. Civil Judge, Agra, in Suit No. 151 of 1978, decreeing the suit for ejectment of the appellant from disputed accommodation. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment of the appellant from disputed accommodation and realisation of licence fee amounting to Rs. 60/-. A decree for mesne profits from 1-3-1978 to 5-5-1978 and pendente lite and future damages at @ Rs. 100/- per menses were also claimed. Radha Swami Satsang Sabha Dayalbagh Agra, the plaintiff, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The suit was filed through its Secretary. It was alleged that the plaintiff owned a colony and also the residential houses therein including the disputed house. No one was permitted to reside in the colony or any house therein without express permission or licence granted by the plaintiff. The defendant was a member of the staff of D. E. I. Women's Training College, Agra. That college was run and managed by another society subordinate to the plaintiff society. The staff of the college aforesaid, from time to time, approached the plaintiff for permission to reside in the colony. The colony owned by the plaintiff was being maintained with a specific object as stated in the memorandum of association of the plaintiff. The memorandum of the association and the bye-laws of the plaintiff are Ext. 13. The persons who were prepared to abide by the discipline and the rules of the society were alone permitted to reside in the society. The defendant as a member of the staff of the college aforesaid made applications from time to time to reside in the colony. She also applied for residing in the colony through the Principal of her college. She was permitted to reside in the colony in a house described at the foot of the plaint till March 31, 1975. Her application for permission to reside in the colony for the period 1976-77 was not recommended by the Principal. The application was, therefore, rejected and the defendant was informed accordingly. The defendant under an agreement was to pay Rs. 20/- per month as licence fee for the accommodation allotted to her by the plaintiff. Her application for permission to reside in the colony for the period 1976-77 was not recommended by the Principal. The application was, therefore, rejected and the defendant was informed accordingly. The defendant under an agreement was to pay Rs. 20/- per month as licence fee for the accommodation allotted to her by the plaintiff. In spite of termination of her earlier licence and rejecting of her application for continuance of her residence in the colony and the house in dispute, she did not leave. Ultimately a formal notice was given to her terminating her licence and asking her to vacate the premises on 20-1-1978. She replied the notice and denied the existence of licence altogether and claimed tenancy rights. Consequently, a suit was filed for her ejectment. It was alleged that the licence fee at Rs. 20/- per month was charged from the plaintiff by way of concession due to her being employed in one of the colleges in the colony belonging to the plaintiff. The market rate of mesne profits for use and occupation of the house was Rs. 100/- per month. The defendant was liable to pay the mesne profits for the use and occupation of the premises at that rate. 3. The defendant filed a written statement alleging that the plaintiff was not a registered society; that the defendant was residing in the house as a tenant and not as a licence; and the defendant had not violated any rule of the society. Her ejectment was not justified. The defendant was a tenant. She was not occupying the house merely on the sweet-will of the plaintiff; that the rules of the society regulating the residential house were void and ineffective and hit by S. 23, Contract Act. The rules were not enforceable. The plaintiff was a lawful tenant and there was no question of any permission by the plaintiff for residence and occupation of the house in dispute. If any application for permission to reside in the house was found, she must have signed the same at the asking of the principal of the College without understanding its implications. Her tenancy has not been terminated and the rent having V been accepted by the plaintiff, the suit for ejectment was liable to fail. If any application for permission to reside in the house was found, she must have signed the same at the asking of the principal of the College without understanding its implications. Her tenancy has not been terminated and the rent having V been accepted by the plaintiff, the suit for ejectment was liable to fail. The suit of the plaintiff was hit by the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Urban Buildings Act'. In additional pleas, it was alleged that the defendant occupied the house, under the contract of her service, as a tenant and not as a licencee. The plaintiff had accepted rent up to November, 1977, and the suit was barred under S. 20, Urban Buildings Act, and for want of notice under S. 106, T. P. Act. The defendant had also deposited rent under S. 30(1) U. P. Urban Buildings Act The defendant could not be evicted during continuance of her service. The court fee paid was insufficient and the licence was coupled and co-extensive with the continence of defendant's service with the D. E. I. Women's College, and was not revocable till she was in employment of the said college. 4. The court below framed several issues. The first issue related to valuation and court fee. That issue was decided as a preliminary issue, by a separate order dated 2-2-1979, in favour of the plaintiff. The following issues were farmed by the court below : - "1. Whether the suit was not valued properly and the court fee paid was insufficient ?. 1-A. Whether the defendant was a licensee of the plff. in the quarter in suit ? If so, whether licence has been revoked, if so, its effect ? 2. Whether the defendant is a tenant in the quarter in suit, if so, its effect ? 3. Whether the suit is barred by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ? 4. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice U/s 106 of Transfer of Property Act ? 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable through Baboo Ram Jodav, as alleged in para 26 of the written statement ? 6. Whether the defendant is occupying the disputed quarter as part of contract of service, if so, its effect ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any mesne profits ? 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable through Baboo Ram Jodav, as alleged in para 26 of the written statement ? 6. Whether the defendant is occupying the disputed quarter as part of contract of service, if so, its effect ? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any mesne profits ? If so, to what amount ? 8. Whether the plaintiff has accepted the alleged rent up to November, 1977 ? If so, its effect ? 9. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 5. An amendment was sought in the written statement and thereafter a replication was filed by the plaintiff. Issues 10 to 15 were framed after the amendment of the pleadings. They are as under 10. Whether the plaintiff society is a registered society ? If not, its effect ? 11. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property ? 12. Whether the suit is barred by S. 23, Contract Act ? 13. Is the suit not cognizable by this Court? 14. Is the notice in question illegal and void, as alleged in para 27 of the written statement ? 15- D;k izfroknh] oknh ds vf/kdkj dks pqukSrh nsus ls foofU/kr gSA A statement was made by the counsel for the parties that no further evidence was to be laid. Issues 1-A and 2 were decided together. It was held that the defendant was not a tenant, but was a licensee. On issue 3 the defendant's contention was that under S. 14, U. P. Urban Buildings Act a licensee who was in possession with the consent of the landlord was an authorised tenant. Section 20(2)(g) of the same Act provided that where the tenancy was a part of employment had ceased. Both the contentions of the defendant were negatived by the court below and it was held that the defendant was not given the disputed accommodation as a part of the contract of employment, nor she was entitled to benefit of S. 14, U. P. Urban Buildings Act. It was further held that the plaintiffs society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, and its buildings were in the exclusive use of the employees of the plaintiff. Consequently the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings Act were not applicable to it. The plaintiffs buildings were exempted under S. 2(l)(b) and (f), Urban Buildings Act. It was further held that the plaintiffs society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, and its buildings were in the exclusive use of the employees of the plaintiff. Consequently the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings Act were not applicable to it. The plaintiffs buildings were exempted under S. 2(l)(b) and (f), Urban Buildings Act. Under issue 4, court below held that as the defendant was not found to be a tenant, the question of notice under S. 106, T. P. Act, did not arise. Under issue 5, it was held that the suit was maintainable through Babu Ram Jadoun, the secretary of the society. Under issue 6, it was held that the occupation of the defendant was not under the contract of her employment and she was liable to eviction as her license had been revoked. Under issue 7, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs.20/- per month and not Rs.100/- as claimed by it. Under issue 8, it was held that by payment of license fee by the defendant, no tenancy came into being and the license of the defendant was validly revoked by notice dated 12-1-1978. Under issue 8 it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for eviction of the defendant and mesne profit at the rate of Rs.20/- per month. The defendant was, however, granted four months' time to vacate the accommodation. Under issue 10 it was held that the plaintiff was a registered society, hence the suit was maintainable. Issues 11 and 15 were decided together. The court below found that as the defendant had taken the disputed promises from the plaintiff under license, she could not challenge title of the plaintiff, unless she delivered possession of the property to the plaintiff. She was estopped by S. 116, Evidence Act. Under issue 12, it was held that the suit of the plaintiff was not barred under S. 23, Contract Act. She was merely a licensee and the law relating to tenancy was not applicable to her. Under issue 13, the court below repelled the contention of the defendant that the suit, being for ejectment in respect of a building, could be filed only before the court of small causes and not before the regular civil court. Under issue 14, the validity of the notice dated 12-1-1978 revoking the license was upheld. Under issue 13, the court below repelled the contention of the defendant that the suit, being for ejectment in respect of a building, could be filed only before the court of small causes and not before the regular civil court. Under issue 14, the validity of the notice dated 12-1-1978 revoking the license was upheld. Ultimately the suit of the plaintiff was decreed as mentioned above. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised seven points before us. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the suit was not maintainable for eviction of a licensee from a building. The only procedure available to the owner of a house for eviction of a licensee was provided under sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A, U. P. Urban Buildings Act. The second point raised by the learned counsel was that the plaintiff-society was not registered as its registration was not renewed in accordance with S. 3-A, Societies Registration Act. The third argument of the learned counsel was that the license was not proved from the documents on record. The fourth point of the learned counsel was that the defendant was a tenant and not a licensee of the building. The fifth argument was that the defendant occupied the disputed house as a part of the contract of employment and during the continuance of her employment, she was not liable to be evicted. The sixth, a argument of the learned counsel was that the plaintiff was not the owner of the disputed premises. The last submission was that the court below has not considered some important pieces of evidence produced by the appellant. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Point No. 1 : 8. This point relates to the maintainability of the suit in civil court for the eviction of the appellant. 9. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant is that under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", there are specific provisions for licensees of buildings. Section 2-A has been incorporated in the Act by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Thereafter all the licenses in respect of buildings covered by the Act, had to be governed by the provisions of the Act. Section 2-A has been incorporated in the Act by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Thereafter all the licenses in respect of buildings covered by the Act, had to be governed by the provisions of the Act. The provisions for licenses have been made in order to eliminate the license under the Easement:; Act in respect of the buildings and to prevent the contravention of the Act by such landlords and tenants who in order to avoid the procedure under the Act may enter into an agreement of license instead of lease. The contention of the learned counsel is that no license except that provided under S. 2-A of the Act was valid in respect of buildings to which the Act applied. Section 14 of the Act was also amended. All existing licenses on the date of enforcement of the U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976, i.e. 5th July 1976, stood regularised by S. 14 and recognised as 'authorised licences' within the meaning of S. 2-A. 10. The defendant appellant for the sake of argument, accepted that she was a licensee and not a tenant. Assuming the defendant to be a licensee, the license being in force on 5th July, 1976, she became an authorised licencee' under the amended S. 14 read with S. 2-A of the Act. Her eviction and other conditions of licence must be governed by S. 2-A of the Act and no other provision. As there was a specific provision for the licences in respect of the buildings in Urban areas, the special Act pertaining to the same i.e. the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act applied to the exclusion of general provisions relating to the license in the Easements Act. 11. The emphasis of the learned counsel was that the defendant appellant was admittedly a licensee according to the plaintiff himself; she was also in possession of the disputed accommodation as a licensee on 5th July, 1976. Consequently her rights as a licensee were recognised by the amended S. 14 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of, S. 2-A provided that in case a licensee omitted or refused to vacate after expiry of the period, the license could make an application to the District Magistrate for eviction of that licensee. Consequently her rights as a licensee were recognised by the amended S. 14 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of, S. 2-A provided that in case a licensee omitted or refused to vacate after expiry of the period, the license could make an application to the District Magistrate for eviction of that licensee. As the terms on which a license could be granted as well as the eviction of the licensee were both provided under S. 2-A of the Act, the provisions of general law i.e. S. 52 and subsequent sections of the Easements Act stood abrogated. 12. The objections of the respondent are as under. Firstly that the defendant had pleaded that she was not a license but a tenant. She cannot be permitted to take up a case against her own pleadings; secondly that the argument about the application of Sections 2-A and 14 of the Act, was never raised at any stage of the suit. No ground has been taken even in the present appeal. It cannot be permitted to be raised at the time of arguments. Third objection is that Sections 2-A and 14, Urban Buildings Act do not cover all the licenses and the provisions of the Act do not apply to the present case. The Fourth objection of the respondents was that U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting* Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 did not apply to the plaintiffs colony. It was a special religious denomination and plaintiffs colony. It was a special religious denomination and was covered by the provisions of Article 26 of the Constitution. Its rights were protected under the Constitution. They could not be curtailed by any enactment. The colony was established and maintained exclusively for religious purposes. 13. So far as the new plea of the defendant being a license is concerned in our opinion it should be accepted. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was a licensee. The court below accepted the plaintiffs case and held the defendant to be a licensee. We are also inclined to hold that the defendant is a licensee and not a tenant. The plaintiff will not be prejudiced in any manner if the defendant's stand that she was a licensee is permitted. 14. The next question is about the suit being barred by the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A of the Act. We are also inclined to hold that the defendant is a licensee and not a tenant. The plaintiff will not be prejudiced in any manner if the defendant's stand that she was a licensee is permitted. 14. The next question is about the suit being barred by the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A of the Act. The appellant's argument is that this bar was never pleaded or raised at any stage or even in grounds of appeal. It is true that this plea was not raised earlier. The question is a pure question of law and therefore we permit it to be raised. The applicability of S. 2-A to the instant license should also be considered. If S. 2-A applies only then the question of the suit being barred by its provisions can arise. 15. Section 2-A. of the Act makes a provision for licenses to be granted by any one in occupation as owner or as tenant, or in any other capacity to any one for a limited period i.e. three months. The' intimation of the license has to be given to the District Magistrate within one month. The license could be extended by the District Magistrate for the total period of six months. No further license could be granted to any other person within one year of date of vacation by the last licensee. In case the licensee refused or failed to vacate after expiry of the license he could be evicted by the prescribed authority on the application of the licensee The licensees in occupation on 5th July 1976 became authorised licensees under S. 14. Thereafter they could only be evicted by the process provided by the Act itself, i.e. under sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A. 16. Section 2-A does not apply to licenses in general. It applied only to short term licenses for a period of three months or so. The present license was not one of that type. We are unable to accept the contention that there could not be a license except one for a short term of 3 or 6 months as provided by the Act. There is another reason for not accepting that argument. The Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, has been enacted to regulate tenancies as its preamble shows. We are unable to accept the contention that there could not be a license except one for a short term of 3 or 6 months as provided by the Act. There is another reason for not accepting that argument. The Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, has been enacted to regulate tenancies as its preamble shows. It reads as under : - "An Act to provide, in the interest of general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith." ' It does not, purport to regulate licenses. On the other hand the preamble of Easements Act, 1882, reads as under : "Whereas it is expedient to define and amend the law relating to easements and licenses; it is hereby enacted as follows : - For Statement of Object and Reasons see Gazette of India, 1880; Pt V., P. 494. The report of the Select Committee is on page 1021." 17. Licence has not been defined in the ( U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of' Letting , Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. It has been defined in the Easements Act in S. 52 as under; - "Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the grant, some thing which would in the absence of such right, be unlawful and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license." 18. Now let us examine the preamble of U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 by which S. 2-A was incorporated in the Act and S. 14 was amended. It reads as under : - "An Act further to amend the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972." It is thus evident that the original Act or the amending Act does not purport to make law in respect of licences. 19. Reference may be made to S. 38 of the Act as well. 19. Reference may be made to S. 38 of the Act as well. It is as follows : - "The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Act No. IV of 1882), or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." 20. The provisions of Act were to apply in cases where there was a conflict with the provisions of Transfer of Property Act or Code of Civil Procedure. The legislature did not intend that the Act should apply where there was a conflict with the provisions of Easements Act. The law relating to licenses as contemplated by the Easements Act cannot be controlled or effected by the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 21. The conditions in the society are such that additional accommodation has to be arranged for several religious and social functions. The accommodation with the public in urban areas, to which the Act applies, is generally short. At the time of marriages or other functions several relations and friends assemble. Accommodation has to be arranged for outstation guests. That is done by arranging for living accommodation temporarily from friends and neighbours, sometimes free of charge and sometimes on payment of rent. Permitting occupation by one who was not a family member would attract the provisions of S. 12. The person giving his accommodation to help one at such occasions will be threatened by a deemed vacancy and may lose his accommodation under the provisions of the Act. To save such cases S. 2-A has been enacted. Subsection (2) provides that such licensee would not be deemed to be a tenant notwithstanding that he had been liable to payment of rent. Sub-section (3) provides that such license shall not be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building within the meaning of S. 12. Sub-section (4) prohibits the allotment under S. 16. Subsection (5) provides for eviction of 'the licensee'. 22. It is thus clear that the entire S. 2-A has been drafted with only one purpose in view i.e. to save such licenses from operation of S. 12 of the Act. The license in the present case is not under section 2-A. It is not alleged that the tenant and landlord gave any intimation to District Magistrate as required by the first proviso to sub-s. (1). The license in the present case is not under section 2-A. It is not alleged that the tenant and landlord gave any intimation to District Magistrate as required by the first proviso to sub-s. (1). It is also not alleged that any extension of period of licence was obtained under the second proviso to sub-s. (1). It cannot be said that the license of the defendant was covered by S. 2-A of the Act. 23. According to the appellant sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A of the Act provided a remedy for eviction of licensee. As the Act was a special enactment and the remedy was provided under it the general remedy of suit was not available and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction. 24. We are unable to agree with the same. The Act does not prohibit filing of the suit against the licensee as it does in case of tenants by S. 20. Thus even if sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A was applicable, the suit could not be barred. 25. There is yet another aspect of the case. Assuming that the license in favour of the defendant was governed by the Act, there was neither any intimation to the District Magistrate nor any extension granted by him as required by the first two provisos to sub-s.(l) of S. 2-A of the Act. It will also be hit by S. 23, Contract Act. Thus it will be illegal and invalid. The defendant's possession under such a license would be wrongful, as a mere trespasser. She has no right to continue her occupation. There is no provision barring a suit against a trespasser. 26. In view of our finding that S. 2-A, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, does not apply to the license of the defendant and even if it applied the license was illegal and the suit was not barred. We do not think it necessary to go into the question of protection of Article 26 of the Constitution to the plaintiff and its properties. 27. We accordingly hold that the suit was maintainable in Civil Court and was not barred by the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Point No. 2 : 28. This related to the plaintiffs society being registered. 27. We accordingly hold that the suit was maintainable in Civil Court and was not barred by the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 2-A, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Point No. 2 : 28. This related to the plaintiffs society being registered. The latest and current registration certificate is on record. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that the certificate showing earlier registration has not been produced. The learned counsel for the respondent produced a certified copy of the registration certificate for the earlier period. That connects the current registration with the original registration. It fully proves that the plaintiff society was registered at all relevant time. The learned counsel for the appellant was given an opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal to that document but he did not produce any. It is consequently held that the plaintiffs society was properly registered and its registration was renewed in accordance with S. 3-A, Societies Registration Act. Points Nos. 3 and 4 : 29. Point No. 3 related to the proof of license in favour of the defendant-appellant and the next point relates to the proof of tenancy of the defendant. The defendant claimed herself to be a tenant and not a licensee. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to Exhibit 2 dated 26th February 1973 signed by defendant herself. By that document the plaintiff granted license to her to reside in the colony as a licensee. The exhibit mentions that the applicant was permitted to live in the colony and the house mentioned therein. It further mentioned that the permission was for residence in accordance with the rules, printed at the back of the exhibit and fully understood by the defendant. It was specifically mentioned that the plaintiff had a right to cancel the license in favour of the applicant whenever it so liked. On this ocument the defendant had endorsed "only signatures admitted rest denied". In her cross-examination she admitted that these forms Exhibits 2 and 4 were filled up and written by her. The defendant has deposed that she signed some papers on the asking of the principal without reading them. The defendant is M. Sc. B. Ed. and a lecturer in the Training College. It is impossible to believe that she would sign a document without reading the same and ignoring its contents. The defendant has deposed that she signed some papers on the asking of the principal without reading them. The defendant is M. Sc. B. Ed. and a lecturer in the Training College. It is impossible to believe that she would sign a document without reading the same and ignoring its contents. The same is the position of Exhibit 3 for the years 1974-75. Exhibit 4 is a letter by the defendant to the Secretary of Radha Swami Satsangh Sabha for allotting her any other house. That application is dated 31st October, 1974. It does not mention about any lease or rent. Exhibit 5 is a detailed application by the defendant to the Secretary of the Radha Swami Satsangh Sabha; that application states that the defendant be permitted to occupy any house on payment of license fee. The column 1 of the same mentions license fee and the period mentioned as "till permitted". Just after the columns, there is a writing that the applicant had fully read and understood the rules for permission as given at the back. It was further written that she be granted a license to reside in a house or live in Dayal Bagh as a licensee. She also prayed for amenities of electricity, supply of water and conservancy service while she had to stay in the quarter. The rules on the back of this document are quite explicit. 30. Rule 3 provided that ladies below forty years were not to be allowed to live in Dayal Bagh without a proper male guardian. It also restricted the relative who could be permitted to reside in the house. There was further a proviso that the occupant was bound to render social service and the service of the colony in some form or the other as may be demanded from the residents of the colony and the condition was a pre-requisite for grant of the permission. It was further mentioned that in case the applicant did not participate in the field work of Dayal Bagh the license may be cancelled. There were additional rules for occupying a house belonging to Satsangh Sabha. It was mentioned in R. 2 that the licensee could not permit anyone, even temporary visitors, to live in the house with him without applying for permission within twenty four hours. Exhibit 6 is another application signed by the defendant. There were additional rules for occupying a house belonging to Satsangh Sabha. It was mentioned in R. 2 that the licensee could not permit anyone, even temporary visitors, to live in the house with him without applying for permission within twenty four hours. Exhibit 6 is another application signed by the defendant. Exhibits 6 and 7 are applications for permission to reside, signed and filled up by the defendant for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78. 31. The trial court after considering the aforesaid documents and the oral evidence produced by the parties gave a finding that the various exhibits mentioned above were binding on the defendant and the defendant was a licensee of the plaintiff. She was not a tenant. 32. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that rent was payable by heb at the rate of Rs.20/- per month in the shape of license fee. He argued that the defendant was a tenant and he alleged licence was merely a camouflage for tenancy. 33. The license that is in question in the present case is a peculiar type of license. The various conditions of license are found at the back of Exhibit 5 that is the application for permission for living in a house belonging to Radhaswami Satsang Sabha on payment of license fee. The application clearly mentions that the applicant was applying for a license. It sought the permission to reside in the quarter at the end. At the back of the application there are general rules for the residence in Dayalbagh colony. These rules are to be examined in view of the memorandum of association, bye-laws and rules of the plaintiff society. Exhibit 13 is the constitution and bye-laws of the society. The memorandum of association mentions as point 3 the objects of the society as under: "To maintain and run the Colony of Dayalbagh so as to fulfil the objects of its foundation as an ashram. (a) having an atmosphere and environments conducive to the successful performance of the devotional practices prescribed by the Radhaswami Faith, (b) enabling the residents thereof to subdue their minds by subjecting themselves to proper rigour and displine, and (c) providing opportunities to the residents for service to mankind. (a) having an atmosphere and environments conducive to the successful performance of the devotional practices prescribed by the Radhaswami Faith, (b) enabling the residents thereof to subdue their minds by subjecting themselves to proper rigour and displine, and (c) providing opportunities to the residents for service to mankind. The bye-law 4 provides as under : "According to the teachings of the Radhaswami Faith, special environments being most conducive to the successful performance of the devotional practices prescribed by the Faith, the Sabha shall maintain the colony of Dayalbagh founded with the express object of creating and maintaining such environments, and to attain that object, it shall have the power to regulate the conduct and mode of life of the residents of the colony and to debar all such persons from residing in it as do not abide strictly by the rules which the Sabha may from time to time lay down in that behalf." "The Sabha may whenever it thinks fit found and maintain colonies in other parts of the country also on lines similar to those of Dayalbagh and the rules laid down in this constitution and bye-laws and any future ^ amendments and modifications thereof and also such other rules as may be made hereafter shall apply to those colonies as well, unless the Sabha frames any special rules for them." Clause 2 of the bye-law 20 reads as under: "(ii) No individual or individuals shall have any right, which has not been granted by the Sabha or under its authority, in 'he property referred to in cl. (i)." Paras 23 and 24 restrict the rights of occupant in respect of colony. 34. We thus find that the colony has been established for creating a religious atmosphere and the interest is not transferable and cannot be transferred unless substantially done so as provided by Cl. (2) of bye-laws. 35. The tenancy has been defined under S. 105 T. P. Act. It is a transfer of a right to enjoy property. License has been defined in S. 52, Easements Act, as a right to do or continued to do something over the immovable property of the grantor which in the absence of such right be unlawful. The conditions on which the defendant was permitted to reside in the house have to be examined for determining whether her occupation was as a licensee or as a tenant. The conditions on which the defendant was permitted to reside in the house have to be examined for determining whether her occupation was as a licensee or as a tenant. It is clear from Exhibits 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 that she was not given any right to enjoy the property. She was merely permitted to live with certain conditions such as rendering social service, doing field work and obtaining permission for keeping any one, it) observe the rules of conduct of sat sang not to take non-vegetarian food or liquior etc, in the colony and so on. It specifically mentioned that the permission was to live, merely as a licensee. It was further provided that the occupant shall have to vacate the premises as and when required by the plaintiff. The license could be revoked, at the sweet will of Sabha. The license fee was chargeable even from guests or temporary visitors under condition 2. The persons who were suffering from loathsome diseases were totally debarred from living in the colony. These conditions show that it was not a right to enjoy the property nor the occupier had any interest therein. He was just permitted to live or to continue to live at the sweet will of the Satsang Sabha. 36. A simila license by the present respondent came up for consideration before this court in the case of Shanti Sarup v. Radha Swami Satsang Sabha reported in AIR 1969 All 248 . The Division Bench considered the various provisions of' the transaction between the appellant and the Satsang Sabha and held as under : "In the present case no interest in the property was transferred to the allottee under the terms of the memorandum (Ex. 8) and the same will become more explicit by a reading of paras 8 and 11 of the memorandum. Para 8 provides that the Satsangis should keep their residential house neat and clean and must not give any cancer of complaint to any of the officers of the Sanitary Department of Dayal Bagh. Para 11 of the memorandum laid down that in case of non-compliance or breach of any of the rules the Executive Committee of the Radha Swami Satsangh Sabha shall be empowered to get the houses vacated by the occupants. Thus the right conferred on the allottees was in the nature of a licence to live in the houses. Para 11 of the memorandum laid down that in case of non-compliance or breach of any of the rules the Executive Committee of the Radha Swami Satsangh Sabha shall be empowered to get the houses vacated by the occupants. Thus the right conferred on the allottees was in the nature of a licence to live in the houses. The facts that ground rent or rent was being realised from the allottees or that they were allowed to live in the houses will not show that the position of the allottees was that of lessees. Licence fee can be charged from the licencees and the some may even be described as rent. Even exclusive possession may be given to a licensee. The case of Mrs. M. N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, AIR 1965 SC 610 is an authority for the aforesaid propositions." 37. In view of the authority aforesaid and looking the terms on which the appellant was permitted to occupy the house we are not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the defendant appellant was a tenant and not a licensee. POINT NO. 5 : 38. This point relates to the occupation of the houses as a part of contract of defendant's employment. The argument of the appellant is that she was given this house in pursuance of her employment as a teacher in the Training College, Dayalbagh. She was given the disputed accommodation as a part of contract of employment in the Women's Training College. She was not liable to be evicted till her employment continued. Exhibit 21 is the letter of appointment. There are as many as ten clauses in this letter. It does not contain any clause giving the defendant a right to any residential or other accommodation. 39. It may further be noted that the Dayal Bagh colony and the houses therein belonged to the Radha Swami Satsang Sabha whereas the Women's Training College is managed by another registered society. Dayal Bagh Satsang Sabha is not the employer of the defendant. The defendant examined herself as D. W. 1. She stated that she paid rent to college and consequently she thought that she was a tenant of the college. She denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the colony and the house. She admitted that her contract for employment was with college itself. The defendant examined herself as D. W. 1. She stated that she paid rent to college and consequently she thought that she was a tenant of the college. She denied that the plaintiff was the owner of the colony and the house. She admitted that her contract for employment was with college itself. She stated that she never paid any rent to the plaintiff. About her applications she stated that she had made them to the Principal of the College. However, the various applications Exhibits 2 to 7 referred to above speak for themselves. She cannot be believed to say that she took the house on rent from the college. The service agreement of the defendant is Exhibit 18. There is absolutely no mention about the offer of any residence. The agreement Exhibit 18 as well as the appointment letter Ex. 21 are in writing. They are admitted by the defendant. Any oral evidence on her behalf that the house was given to her as a part of contract of the employment cannot be accepted. Any oral statement made by her in that respect is liable to be discarded in view of Sections 91 and 92, Evidence Act. We, therefore, hold that the defendant was not given the disputed accommodation as a tenant and as a part of contract of her employment with her college. POINT NO. 6 40. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff was not the owner of the disputed premises. The various exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 mentioned the plaintiff as owner. They are executed and signed by the defendant. The defendant took possession of the accommodation from the plaintiff. She is estopped from denying the tittle of the plaintiff under S. 116, Evidence Act. The defendant stated that she did not know that the house belonged to plaintiff. She took the college to be a owner. She never paid rent to the plaintiff. She had signed certain papers on the asking of the principal. She had to admit paper 16-A (Exhibit 4) was written by her of her own free will. That letter is addressed to the secretary of Radha Swami Satsang Sabha for giving her a house. She further admitted that she paid the licence fee for residing in the colony as Rs. 0.25/-. She had to admit paper 16-A (Exhibit 4) was written by her of her own free will. That letter is addressed to the secretary of Radha Swami Satsang Sabha for giving her a house. She further admitted that she paid the licence fee for residing in the colony as Rs. 0.25/-. She admitted that the papers Exhibits 2 and 3 were in her own hand. They are all addressed to the plaintiff. She admitted that she sent the rent (licence fee) by money order and by cheque to the Secretary of the plaintiff. She had filed the copy of her application for depositing rent under S. 30, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. She has described the plaintiff as owner in the same. In vitew of these documents and her statement she cannot be permitted to deny the title of the plaintiff. This argument also fails. Point NO. 7 : 41. According to the appellant some of the pieces of evidence produced by her have not been considered by the trial court. The learned counsel referred to papers 27-C, 26-C, 31,-C, 57-C, 58-C, 59-C, 72-C and 73-C, as documents on record which have been ignored by the trial court. We, however, find that most of these papers have been considered by the court below. Some papers have even been specifically mentioned by it. However, we have examined the papers ourselves and we do not think that the consideration of these documents could have made any difference. 42. Paper 27-C, is a letter of the defendant dated 27-3-1976. 26-C is also defendant's own letter. By these letters the defendant asserted that she was a tenant and not a licensee of the plaintiff. The defendant's letters in her own favour cannot have much value. The defendant was asked to vacate and thereupon she sent these replies. They are not binding on the plaintiff. They do not prove that the defendant was ever accepted as a tenant of the plaintiff. 43. Paper No. 31-C is a receipt given by the College for a cheque issued by the defendant mentioning E. W. and House Rent Charges. On the face of it this receipt has not been issued by the plaintiff and cannot bind it. Further, mention of license fee as rent or license fee is not very material. Substance of a contract has to be seen. 44. On the face of it this receipt has not been issued by the plaintiff and cannot bind it. Further, mention of license fee as rent or license fee is not very material. Substance of a contract has to be seen. 44. 57-C is a notice issued by the College to two members of the staff for payment of rent. It is issued to Mrs. Jyoti Devi and Mrs. Luxmi Narayan. The defendant is not mentioned therein. This letter does not relate either to the defendant or to the accommodation in dispute. 45. Paper No.58-C is the copy of an application under S. 30, U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, moved by the defendant for depositing rent. 59-C is ex parte order on the same. It has been found by the court below that the proceedings for setting aside the ex parte order were pending. The learned counsel for the parties admitted that the proceedings for restoration were still pending and the matter was not final. Any assertion made in the application is not binding. The ex parte order is not final. These papers do not prove any tenancy in favour of the defendant. 46. Papers 72-C and 73-C are letters sent by the defendant to the Vice-Chancellor, Agra University. These letters are in the nature of complaints against the College and the plaintiff has nothing to do with the same. 47. After considering all the papers as pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendant we do not find that the consideration of these letters could have had any impact on the judgment of the court below. 48. In the result the appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs.