Judgment :- 1. The only point that is raised in this civil revision petition by the tenant-petitioner herein is that the failure to fix a reasonable rent in a case where there has been no written lease deed, is certainly to be viewed in favour of the tenant and in as much as the court below had not viewed the said point raised by the tenant in a proper and perspective manner, the order under revision becomes revisable under S. 6(B) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating tenants Protection Act, 1955. It is relevant in this connection to note that the tenant has copiously admitted about his commission of default in the payment of rent. Now the trend of the argument that is advanced on behalf of the cultivating tenant is that the quantum of rent is not justifiable and that the fixation of rent ought to have been in accordance with the yield that could be derived from the land in question and the non-appreciation, of course, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, makes this order revisable and facilitate continuation of the tenancy. But, on the other hand, the contention that is raised on behalf of the landlord-respondent herein is that in as much as the default in the payment of rent as a fact, had been arrived at on the basis of the evidence available before it, and that fact cannot be challenged successfully by the tenant, it is only the said commission of default that will have to be taken as a ground for eviction of the tenant and not the incidental and ancillary matter of fixation of rent. In other words, the learned counsel for the respondent stresses further that that was the trend of the decision that had been rendered by the Bench of this Court in Kuppanna Cheitiar v. Ramachandran 1, and the decision rendered by this Court in Kanda sami v. Sowrirajan 2. It is relevant in this connection to note that in Kuppana Chettiar v. Ramachandron 2, it was held as follows— “The fact that, during the pendency of the civil revision petition, the tenants applied for and obtained orders of interim stay of the execution of the order of eviction on condition of the deposit of the rent and did deposit the rent, will not in any way invalidate the order passed by the Authorised Officer. From this point of view, we are unable to agree with the observation of Gokulakrishnan, J. ”As on date, it cannot be considered that there is any default on the part of the petitioner in the matter of payment of rent”. The question that has to be considered in respect of the default is, not with reference to any date subsequent to the order of the Authorised officer, but with reference to the date fixed by him prior to this passing the order for eviction. The section itself contemplates the Revenue Divisional. Officer giving an opportunity to the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within such time he considers just and reasonable and only if the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the s ame as directed, the Revenue Divisional Officer can pass an order for eviction. Consequently, the default in such cases must have occurred prior to the Revenue Divisional Officer passing an order for eviction and in terms of an earlier order, either, independent or conditional. In view of this, the default contemplated by the statutory provision is one occurring and existing on the date of the passing of the order of eviction by the Revenue Divisional Officer himself and not at any stage subsequent to the said order. If the cultivating tenant does not deposit the rent as directed, default has occurred and there is no question of that default being cured or wiped out by the tenant depositing the amount pursuant to any interim order of this Court during the pendency of the revision petition preferred against the order of eviction and any such deposit made during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court pursuant to an interim order of the High Court will be one in compliance with the interim order of the High Court and can never be a deposit in compliance with the original order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. As a matter of fact, the High Court is not concerned in such proceedings with the original default committed by the cultivating tenant in payment of the rent to the landlord. As a matter of fact, the High Court is not concerned in such proceedings with the original default committed by the cultivating tenant in payment of the rent to the landlord. It is because of this original default, the Revenue Divisional Officer directs the tenant to deposit the rent into court before a particular date and the subject matter of the civil revision proceedings in the High Court therefore will not be the original default, but only the failure of the tenant to comply with the direction of the Revenue Divisional Officer. Once that failure is admitted and the consequential order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is unexceptionable, there will be no occasion for the High Court to give an opportunity to the cultivating tenant to comply with the original direction of the Revenue Divisional Officer to deposit the amount, because the original direction no longer stands and that direction has worked itself out in the form of the final order for eviction, which on merits, is not challenged. If the matter is understood in this manner, certainly, any deposit made by the tenant in terms of the interim order of stay passed by this Court staying the execution or the order of eviction passed by the authorised officer can never be tantamount to compliance with the conditional Order passed by the Authorised Officer. We make it clear that, if the tenants had applied to the authorised officer for extension of time for the payment of the rent (in the present case in C.R.P. 2113 of 1979 that question will not arise because even the date for payment of arrears of rent had been agreed to between the parties under a joint endorsement and the order has been passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer only in terms of the said joint endorsement and the Revenue Divisional Officer himself may not have power to extend the time for payment except with the consent of the respondents) and the authorised officer had decided to extend the time and had passed the order for eviction, and the tenants had complained against such order, this Court may, in proper cases, have power to interfere with the order complained against, and extend the time for payment. That is far different from saying that the payments made pursuant to a conditional order of interim stay passed by this Court will be payment made in compliance with the directions already given by the authorised officer before he passed the final order for eviction against the petitioners herein though such payment may be taken into account in cases indicated by us above, namely where the tenant approaches the High Court, complaining that the Revenue Divisional Officer has unreasonably and illegally declined to extend the time applied for by him for the deposit of the amount.’ In Kandasami v. Sowrirajan 1 Sathiadev, J. has held as follows— “In this case, When the Revenue court had taken note of the landlord agreeing for one-half of the amount to be memitted, and who had appraised the court of his properties being destrained for nonpayment of the land revenue and on the second occasion repotting to the Revenue court of his movables having been already distrained, it cannot still be held that the Revenue court had failed to exercise its jurisdiction in holding that the tenant had wilfully avoided paying the rent knowing the circumstances in which the landlord is placed and therefore the request made by him for further adjournment is not bona fide. When a Revenue court thus takes into account the relevant circumstances and also exercises jurisdiction reasonably after granting such adjournments as are necessary for part payments to be made, and when it comes to the ultimate conclusion, that in spite of the indulgence shown, the tenant is wilfully avoiding payment of rent it cannot be in any sense be held that it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Act 25 of 1955. It is not for this Court to go into the question of finding out whether the subsequent payment made during the pendeney of the civil revision petition, would by itself show that the Revenue Court had either wrongly exercised its jurisdiction or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Subsequent payments cannot be taken into account for holding as to what had been committed by the time the order was passed by the Revenue court (sic) was wilful default or not. Subsequent payments cannot be taken into account for holding as to what had been committed by the time the order was passed by the Revenue court (sic) was wilful default or not. I n this case, on the date when the order was passed, there were justifiable circumstances for the Revenue court to hold that the tenant is the person who has wilfully avoided payment and he had not only dragged on the matter but he had not also given any bona fide reason for grant of any further time. In this view, this civil revision petition stands dismissed. No costs” Bearing in mind the principles embedded in the decisions cited above and on a careful perusal of the evidence in this case together with the manner in which the quasi judicial body bad approached the subject relating to the point at issue, namely, whether the revision petitioner herein is liable to be evicted or not, this Court finds that there is absolutely no ground to interfere with the order under revision. There is no merit in the revision petition. The revision petition is dismissed.’ But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.