JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - On 30th May, 1981, the State Government issued a Government Order providing for letting out fishery rights to the small Cooperative Societies formed at the village level. This system was initially implemented in six districts of Uttar Pradesh. By an order dated October 22, 1981, the State of Uttar Pradesh applied this system of letting out to the district of Etawah also. Before 22nd October, 1981, the Collector wrote a letter to the State Government on 26th September, 1981 that the Co-operative Societies could not be formed within the time specified in the Government Order dated 30th May, 1980. He also indicated that there was only one Co-operative Society of the local fishermen. On 1st October, 1981, the State Government wrote to the District Magistrate that as the formation of a Cooperative Society on the lines directed by the State Government Order dated 30th May, 1981 was likely to take some time, the Collector could let out the fishing rights to Etawah Sahkari Mataya Jiwi Samiti Ltd. Etawah from Paras to Takrapura in accordance with the old procedure for a period of three years. But before letting out, the fishing right to the said Co-operative Society, the Collector was directed to ascertain that the said Society consisted of fisherman and was a genuine one. On 13th October. 1981, the Collector informed the Society that the fishing right for the year 1981-82 had been given to it on the condition of payment mentioned therein. It was specifically said in Para 3 of this letter that the letting out of fishing right was subject to approval of sanction of the State Government and in the event of State Government not approving the same, the lease would be liable to be cancelled without any notice. On 14th October, 1981, the State Government sent a rediogram to the Collector for not giving effect to the decision to let out the fishing right to the aforesaid Co-operative Society. The Government was, since of the opinion that the Society was not a genuine Society of fisherman, it required the District Magistrate to acquire into the said allegation and stopped the Collector from granting the Patta to the Society till further orders. The Government was, since of the opinion that the Society was not a genuine Society of fisherman, it required the District Magistrate to acquire into the said allegation and stopped the Collector from granting the Patta to the Society till further orders. By order, dated 27th November, 1981, the State Government wrote to the Collector that since Etawah Sahkari Mataya Jiwi Samiti belonged to a single family and its relations not belonging to the fishing community, the Government was unable to approve the transaction. The Government directed the Collector to terminate the lease and to auction the fishing right in accordance with the existing practice till genuine Co-operative Society of Mallahs/Kewats as contemplated in Government Order was properly constituted. Upon the receipt of the aforesaid letter from the State Government, the Collector, on 29th November, 1981, informed the aforesaid society that in view of the disapproval of the sanction, his order dated 13th October, 1981 by which the Theka was proposed to be given to the Society, was cancelled with immediate effect i.e. from 29th November, 1981. Etawah Sahkari Mataya Samiti, thereafter, filed a writ petition in this Court which was numbered as Writ No. 14494 of 81 for the relief of certiorari quashing the Government Order dated 29th November, 1981 and the Order of the Collector dated 29th November, 1981. The writ petition was accompanied with an application for stay. On 4-12-1981, this Court passed the following order "Issue notice. Meanwhile the auction scheduled for 7th December, 1981 may take place but no formal order accepting the bid shall be passed. List this petition for bearing on 14th December, 1981." 2. On 4th December, the Society also filed suit no. 57 of 81 in the Court of the Civil Judge Etawah for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the Society over the five water portions of Jamuna river. On this date, the appellant before us, moved an application before the Civil Judge for being impleaded as a party. The Civil Judge did not allow the application of the appellant and granted him time to file certain papers. 3. On 7th December, 1981, the auction took place. The appellant was the highest bidder for water petition no. On this date, the appellant before us, moved an application before the Civil Judge for being impleaded as a party. The Civil Judge did not allow the application of the appellant and granted him time to file certain papers. 3. On 7th December, 1981, the auction took place. The appellant was the highest bidder for water petition no. 1 i.e. from Parnat to Kachaura Ghat, His bid being highest was accepted and he was asked to deposit one fourth of the amount which was done on the same date. All the four portions were also auctioned along with portion No. 1 which were taken by different persons. The Civil Judge fixed as many as fifteen dates for disposing of the injunction matter. By the impugned order the Society right to continue in possession was accepted. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 4. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent Samiti was about the maintainability of this appeal. Sri S. S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, urged that since the appellant was not impleaded as a party in the suit, he could not file the present appeal in this Court. His contention was that the right of the person, who files an appeal in the civil dispute, has to be strictly decided in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the appellant had not been impleaded as a party in the suit, the injunction not being binding on him, he was not an aggrieved party. He find no substance in true preliminary objection and over rule the same. The appellant had applied to the Civil Judge for being impleaded as a party in the suit on the basis of being highest bidder in the auction held on 7th December, 198L in respect of water channel. The Civil Judge adopted a curious method by permitting the appellant to make argument in opposition, to the injunction application. He erroneously did not pass order to implead him as a party. However, the interest of the appellant in the subject-matter is more than clear. The Civil Judge adopted a curious method by permitting the appellant to make argument in opposition, to the injunction application. He erroneously did not pass order to implead him as a party. However, the interest of the appellant in the subject-matter is more than clear. In the present day, the trend of the judicial authority to the controversy of locus standi has been liberalised to a considerable extent but without going into the same, we consider that the appellant was directly affected by grant of injunction and, as such, had a right not only to be impleaded in the suit but also to file the present appeal. The amplitude of "Legal grievance"as said by the Supreme Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 2602 , has broadened. An appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (i) of the Code of Civil Procedure can be filed by any person who is aggrieved by the impugned order. Any person feeling injured by a possession could be a person aggrieved. In Debholkar v. Bar Council, AIR 1975 SC 2092 . the Supreme Court found that the words "person aggrieved"include a person who had a genuine grievance because an order has been made which pre-judicially affects him. In Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1976 SC 2602 , the Supreme Court held that "locus standi" has a larger ambit in correct legal semantice than the accepted individualised jurisprudence of old. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection. 5. Coming to the merits, the main thing in an injunction matter required to be seen is whether the plaintiff filing the suit has a prima facie case in h s favour. The ground of a temporary injunction by a civil court is regulated by Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. The U.P. Legislature has brought about the amendment in Rule 2 of Order 39 by means of U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. Clause (f) inserted by the aforesaid Amending Act lays down that no injunction shall be granted to restrain any auction intended to be made or, the affect of any auction, made by the Government. 6. In this back ground, the court below was required to consider whether the plaintiff had a prima facie case in his favour to justify the granting of temporary injunction. 6. In this back ground, the court below was required to consider whether the plaintiff had a prima facie case in his favour to justify the granting of temporary injunction. In dealing with the prima facie case, the Civil Judge assumed that a valid lease had come into existence in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. This assumption is absolutely wrong. On 13th October, 19al, the Collector wrote a letter to the Society, respondent, that the fishing right in respect of the year 81-82 had been given to it subject to the approval by the State Government. The plaintiff respondent, thus knew fully that no right could he acquired by it till the State Government had sanctioned the proposal submitted by the Collector. On 14th October, 1981, want was admittedly done was that the plaintiff-respondent submitted a draft/lease which had been signed only on its behalf by a representative. The Collector or any one authorised by the State Government had not signed or executed the said document. The document dated 14th October, 1981 was not lease. There was no basis for this assumption at all. The Civil Judge judged the case and gave a finding of prima facie right in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of this erroneous assumption. 7. In United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, AIR 1981 SC 1426 , the Supreme Court held : - "No injunction could be granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code unless the plaintiffs establish that they had a prima facie case, meaning thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. The question that must necessarily arise is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is a prima facie case, and, if so as between whom. ....................." 8. The learned .counsel for the plaintiff appellant relied upon Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and relied on the doctrine of part performance enshrined therein and urged that the possession given to the plaintiff-respondent on the basis of settlement of terms, the respondent could not interfere with the right of the plaintiff-respondent. In our opinion, this argument proceeds on incorrect interpretation of Section 53-A. It will not apply when there is no contract. Section 53-A can be invoked only when it is invalid for want of registration. In our opinion, this argument proceeds on incorrect interpretation of Section 53-A. It will not apply when there is no contract. Section 53-A can be invoked only when it is invalid for want of registration. It cannot be applied to a case where there is no agreement at all. If there is no agreement, the doctrine of equity on which the said ground is founded can be taken help of. It protects the possession of the transferee, notwithstanding the fact that the contract is not registered. 9. It may be correct that a formal lease is not necessary to attract Section 53-A. All that is required is that an agreement in writing is signed by transferor can be gathered from evidence. If there is no agreement Section 53-A cannot be applied. In the instant case, the Collector had specifically informed the plaintiff-respondent that he would get fishing right on the approval being accorded to his proposal by the State Government. Till State Government had no granted approval, a complete settlement had not come soon after. As there was no complete contract in writing, Section 53-A could not applied. 10. In Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, AIR 1982 SC 989 , the Supreme Court held : - "To qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part-performance it must be shown that there is a contract to transfer for consideration immoveable property and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. There are pre-requisites to invoke the equitable doctrine of part-performance. After establishing the aforementioned circumstances it must be further shown that a transferee had in part performance of the contract either taken possession of the property or any part thereof or the transferee being already in possession continue in possession in part-performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract. There must be a real nexus between the contract and the acts done in pursuance of the contract or in furtherance of the contract and must be unequivocally referable to the contract." 11. Sri S.K. Saxena, counsel appearing for the appellant submitted before us that Section 53-A is available only as defence. There must be a real nexus between the contract and the acts done in pursuance of the contract or in furtherance of the contract and must be unequivocally referable to the contract." 11. Sri S.K. Saxena, counsel appearing for the appellant submitted before us that Section 53-A is available only as defence. It is meant to apply to a case where a transfer or agreement falls short of requirements laid down by the law. In support of this proposition that Section 53-A could be applied as a defence and net as conferring a right on the basis of which a lessee can confer a right on the lessor He relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Delhi Motor Co. v. U.A. Basrurkar, AIR 1968 SC 794 . Without disputing the above position, the counsel urged that as the right wat that of the defendant and the suit had been filed by the plaintiff-respondent, could receive guiding which had been given to it in pursuance of the lease, Section 53-A was applicable to the present case. It is, however, not necessary to go into this vaxed question. On the facts of the present case, we have found that the terms had not been settled and for coming into existence the transaction was required to be approved or sanctioned by the State Government. As it had not been done and the agreement had not been finally arrived at, there was no question of applying Section 53-A. The Civil Judge should have also taken into account the amendment made by the U.P. Legislature by the aforesaid Civil Laws (Amendment) Act before granting the injunction prayed for. He overlooked the said provision and did not consider that the-ground of injunction was bound to effect the auction which the Government had decided to be held. 12. Submission made by the respondents learned counsel was that the Collector had the statutory, right to give the lease to the plaintiff-respondent and that no sanction of the State Government was required. The letter written by the Collector to the State Government was not binding on the plaintiff-respondent. Counsel for the respondent urged that on 13th October, 1981, the lease had come into existence and the right of the parties had been governed by the same. We are unable to agree with this submission of respondents learned counsel. The letter written by the Collector to the State Government was not binding on the plaintiff-respondent. Counsel for the respondent urged that on 13th October, 1981, the lease had come into existence and the right of the parties had been governed by the same. We are unable to agree with this submission of respondents learned counsel. The Collector had been telling the plaintiff-respondent that the transaction would be finalised only on the sanction being received from the State Government. It was open to the Collector to have sought the sanction or approval of the State Government before finalising the transaction. If the Collector decided to do so, objection to the same could be taken. No provision of law could be cited before me showing that the granting of lease was in accordance with it and that the said provisions conferred the absolute right on the Collector to do so. The State Government had permitted the Collector to give the lease to the plaintiff Society provided that it was a genuine body of fisherman. The State Government did not confer any blanket right on the Collector with regard to the settlement of fishing right. Subsequently, the State Government found that the plaintiff Society was not a genuine Society, hence, did not grant the approval sought for by the Collector. In pursuance of this decision of the State Government that the Collector, on 2th November, 1981 informed the plaintiff that the letter written by him to the plaintiff Society on 18th October, 1981 was no longer operative. The nett result of all this was that the plaintiff-respondent did not acquire any fishing right in respect of the year 1981-82 after the orders of the State Government dated 27th November, 1981 and that of the Collector dated 29th November, 1981. Even if it was assumed that the Collector had the power to give the lease to the plaintiff or not to do, it is crystal clear that on 29th November, 1981 the Collector cancelled the settlement arrived at on 18th October, 1981. As a result thereof, the plaintiff respondent did not have anything in his favour in justification of his right to continue operating and exercising fishing right. The Civil Judge committed a gross error in holding to the contrary. 13. As a result thereof, the plaintiff respondent did not have anything in his favour in justification of his right to continue operating and exercising fishing right. The Civil Judge committed a gross error in holding to the contrary. 13. The argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff was that since the fishing right was an immoveable property, the lease deed was required to be registered and the lease was further required to be written on the stamp paper The Civil Judge misunderstood the argument and misconstrued and wrongly negatived the same. However, we do not feel it necessary to deal with that point in this appeal. 14. The requirement of law further was to have given a finding about the balance of convenience. Even if, there was a serious question to be decided, the Civil Judge had to consider the balance of convenience. He did not do so. Without giving a finding on the question of balance of convenience, the court below was not justified in granting injunction to the plaintiff-respondent. Injunctions in such a matter, where the public interest is involved, is to be given with due care and caution in order to advance justice. The plaintiff-respondent was bound in law to make inconvenience in withholding the relief of injunction. It should have been established that the inconvenience in all events to the plaintiff was likely to be more to that of the inconvenience which the defendants were to suffer. In considering this question, the court below should have further found as to whether the plaintiff-respondent was to suffer irreparable damage if no injunction was granted. These things have not been done. Since the court below did not take into consideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the nature of injury, the order of the court-belows to be set aside on that basis. 15. Counsel for the plaintiff respondent also urged that as the auction held in favour of the plaintiff on 7-12-1981 has not been confirmed, he has no right to get the injunction vacated. In that connection the learned counsel pointed out that the appellant had not deposited the solvency certificate within the time after auction, therefore, whatever right he acquired under the auction, he lost. There arguments were controverted by the counsel appearing for the appellant. In that connection the learned counsel pointed out that the appellant had not deposited the solvency certificate within the time after auction, therefore, whatever right he acquired under the auction, he lost. There arguments were controverted by the counsel appearing for the appellant. He admitted that although the solvency certificate was not deposited Within time but that by itself was of no consequence. About the non-confirmation of the auction, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that due to the injunction operating, the Collector did not confirm the same. There appears to be a substance in these submissions of the appellants learned counsel, it is open to the Collector to condone the filing of solvency certificate. The appellant cannot be denied the relief sought for in this appeal on these grounds. 16. It was emphasised this the power to grant injunction since is discretionary and only a few months were left to complete the year for which the lease was given to the plaintiff-respondent this court should not interfere. A person entrusted with discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must Invite his attention to the matters which he is bound to consider and preclude from considering matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has So consider if discretion has been exercised on a wrong assumption and erroneous findings have been arrived at by applying the law incorrectly, this Court would be entitled to interfere and to set aside the order. It is only through the law that a Court should know what is just. In the instant case, we have found above that the court below acted erroneously in granting the injunction application. The balance of convenience was not in favour of granting the injunction. 17. He may also refer to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant about the concealment of facts made by the plaintiff-respondent in the injunction application. Counsel for the appellant urged that although the respondent knew that the lease had not been approved by the State Government and cancelled by the Collector but these facts were deliberately concealed from the Civil Judge and were not mentioned either in the suit or in the injunction application. The submission of the appellant is borne out from the papers produced before us. The plaintiff-respondent had made the mention of these facts in the writ petition filed earlier to the suit. The submission of the appellant is borne out from the papers produced before us. The plaintiff-respondent had made the mention of these facts in the writ petition filed earlier to the suit. In the writ petition these facts were stated but were not stated in the suit. To us, it appear that this was deliberately done. 18. For the reasons given above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order of the court below is set aside and the application for injunction is rejected. No order as to costs.