JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member - In a suit under section 22V-B/209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, the plaintiffs had alleged that they were bhumidhars of the land in suit and were in possession as such and that the defendant No. 1 had got his name fictitiously recorded in Clause IX of the Khatauni. The plaintiffs further prayed that if they were found out of possession, the court may be pleased to deliver possession to them. The defendant No, 1 contested the suit on the ground that he was in adverse possession of the land for the last 10/18 years and that he had prescribed his rights as a sirdar under section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The learned trial court gave a finding of fact that the defendant No. 1 was in possession of the land in suit in 1371 Fasli and that as the suit had been filed in 1382 Fasli the defendant had matured his rights as a sirdar of the land in suit and the rights of the plaintiffs had been extinguished by lapse of time. This finding of fact was not rewarded by the learned Additional Commissioner, but in spite of that the learned Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs and declared them to be the bhumidhars of the land in suit and ordered ejectment of the defendant No. 1 from the suit plots. The reasoning of the learned Additional Commissioner is that the defendant is plaintiffs' sister's husband and that his possession was permissive and not adverse to that of the plaintiffs. 2. The second appeal has been filed by the defendant No. 1. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Additional Commissioner has not taken into consideration the evidence of the parties in its proper perspective and that he has arrived at a wrong conclusion because of that. His contention is that the defendant No. 1 was recorded as a trespasser of the land in suit since 1371 Fasli and that this occupation of the defendant No. 1 was not permissive but was adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs. 4. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. There can be no dispute that the possession of the defendant No. 1 star ed in 1371 Fasli or near about that time. 4. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. There can be no dispute that the possession of the defendant No. 1 star ed in 1371 Fasli or near about that time. The question to be decided is whether this possession was permissive or was adverse. The best light there on the nature of this possession is the omission of the defendant No. 1 himself, who has said that his father-in-law, father of the plaintiffs, had given this land to him. He lias admitted that no sale was executed, nor any gift was made to him. The natural inference of this is that the father-in-law of the defendant No. 1 i.e., the father of the plaintiffs, gave the land in suit to the defendant No. 1 because he was a close relative and was in need of some support. There was no intention of the plaintiffs father to part with his rights in the land in suit in any manner whatsoever. The defendant No. 1 further admitted that he never forcibly occupied the disputed land and that before the institution of this suit, there was no dispute between him and the plaintiffs regarding the disputed plots. The defendant No. 1 never tried to get his name recorded as tenant of the land in suit, nor however paid any land revenue or irrigation dues in respect of the land in suit. 5. In this context, there was no move to see the nature of the possession of the defendant No. 1 over the land in suit, except for the entry of transfer in his favour There is no overreaction on his behalf to show that he ever claimed this land in his own rights in exclusion to the plaintiffs. In 1952 R.D. page 104, (High Court), it has been held that possession with the tenant of tenure-holder is not adverse possession and no rights under section 210. U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act can be claimed by the person in possession in such a case. In 1982 R.D., page 1, (High Court), it was held that in a case where a close relative tried to put up the case of adverse possession and better and strong evidence of positive character of hostile possession in the knowledge of the tenure holder is necessary to establish title by prescription and adverse possession"- 6. In 1982 R.D., page 1, (High Court), it was held that in a case where a close relative tried to put up the case of adverse possession and better and strong evidence of positive character of hostile possession in the knowledge of the tenure holder is necessary to establish title by prescription and adverse possession"- 6. Close relationship, ordinarily, rebuts the presumption of hostile occupation. In India, where much importance is given to close relatives and specially to sons-in-law, it is not uncommon that the close relative is permitted to enjoy the property of his relatives in circumstances in which that relative needs some help. Even in America, courts of law have held that the cases where close relatives are in possession of some property belonging to other relative, the presumption of adverse possession should not be ordinarily made. I may here quote from the commentary of Mansha Ram Murthy in his book. Law of Adverse Possession at page 245 (1978 Edition) : "It is a general principle that members of a family may not acquire adverse possession against each other in the absence of showing of a clear, positive, and continued disclaimer and disavowal of title, and an assertion of an adverse right brought home to the true owner a sufficient length of time to bar him under that statute of limitations from asserting his rights. Strong evidence of adverse possession is required where there is a family relation between the parties then where no such relation exists. The existence of a family relationship between two parties will prevent or rebut a presumption of adverse holding." 7. The language used and the principle applied show that in ordinary course of nature adverse possession should not be presumed in cases of relatives. It has been firstly set out that the disclaimer and disavowal of title should be a corresponding assertion of adverse right, and, further, this adverse right must be brought home to the true owner and that also within reasonable time. In this commentary, the case Metze v. Metze, 221 S.C. 154, 97 S.E. 2D 514 is referred, wherein it was held that "the family relationship existing between an adverse claimant and his father-in-law rebutted the presumption that the claimant's possession perforce of certain hedges which had been planted along with the boundaries of his plot was hostile to the title of his father-in-law". In simple language, it means that the son-in-law had forcibly planted some hedges on the plot of his father-in-law and yet the American court held that the presumption of adverse possession was rebutted because of the close relationship of the parties who were father-in-law and son-in-law. Here, in this case before me, the possession of the defendant No. 1 was not forcible and he has himself admitted that he never forcibly occupied the land in suit. Hence, in the instant case the presumption of adverse possession would be much weaker than the presumption which was sought to be made by the parties in Metze v. Metze, referred to above. 8. A discussion of the evidence as well as the material circumstances of this case lead us to the inference that the possession of the defendant No. 1, though it started in 1371 Fasli, was never adverse to the rights of the plaintiffs and that the defendant No. 1 therefore, could not get any sirdari rights in the land in suit on the basis of such possession. I fully agree with the view of the learned Additional Commissioner on this point. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued if the nature of the possession of the defendant No. 1 was only permissive, then he could not be ejected in a suit under section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and that a suit under section 202 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was necessary for his eviction. The argument, ex facie, appears to be attractive. If a person is a licensee, he cannot be ejected in a suit under section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act because this section is meant for the ejectment of trespassers. But the question to be decided by the court will be whether at the time of the institution of the suit the possession of the defendant was that of a licensee or that of a trespasser. We know that some times people enter into possession with permission of the right for owner, but the fact that their possession was permissive at its inception does not mean that it continued to be permissive even after the occupant declared in unequivocal terms that his possession was adverse to the rightful owner. We know that some times people enter into possession with permission of the right for owner, but the fact that their possession was permissive at its inception does not mean that it continued to be permissive even after the occupant declared in unequivocal terms that his possession was adverse to the rightful owner. The history of this case shows that having entered into possession of the land in suit by permission of the plaintiff's father the defendant later on developed hostile intention and asserted his own rights in the land in suit and disclaimed that he was in permissive possession of the land in suit. In such a case, there can be no doubt that, at the time of the institution of the suit, he was not a licensee, but a trespasser and, therefore, this suit under section 209, U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was maintainable against him and he was liable to ejectment from the suit plots. 10. Another question, which arises is whether notice under section 106 of the transfer of Property Act was necessary or not. This, in my opinion, is not necessary for two reasons. Firstly, nature of possession of the defendant No. 1 had become, at the time of the suit, that of a trespasser and he did not remain a licensee as not was before. Secondly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held recently that where the Eviction Act does not require notice to be given to the licensee, no notice under section 106, transfer of Property Act is required to be given. On the basis of this ruling, a Full Bench of this Board has also held that notice in such a case is not necessary and that the institution of the suit itself amounts to a notice of termination of the licence. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant lastly argued that the judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner was liable to be set aside on the sole ground that he had not discussed the oral evidence of the parties. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is a short one, of course, and he has not discussed in detail the evidence of the parties. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner is a short one, of course, and he has not discussed in detail the evidence of the parties. But, it cannot be said, and no law has been cited on the point that merely because a court of law does not discuss in detail the evidence for the parties, its judgment becomes no judgment in the eyes of law and is to be set aside. If a court of law has framed proper issue and has in its mind the points involved in the case and has discussed those points, its judgment, though short, is entitled to full respect, It is only, when material points and material evidence had been ignored that the judgment of a court is liable to be set aside. I have myself considered the oral evidence of the parties in this case and find that the judgment and order of the learned Additional Commissioner has not ignored the oral evidence of possession adduced by the parties. The defendant himself has admitted that his father-in-law, i.e., the father of the plaintiffs, had given the land in suit to him and that he had not forcibly occupied it. 12. No other point has been argued in this case : 13. There is no reason to disturb the finding given by the learned Additional Commissioner and I find no substance in this appeal. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed with costs and Rs. 50/- as counsel's fees.