ORDER S. J. Hyder, J. - The petitioner prays that this court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Prescribed Authority dated April 13, 1971, July 3, 1972 and June 30, 1976. A writ of certiorari is also sought for quashing the order passed by the II Additional District Judge Bijnor dated Sept. 2, 1977. The nature of the orders which are sought to be quashed will become clear from what follows in this judgment. 2. One Raja Harish Chandra of Kashipur was the Zimindar of extensive lands situate in different villages in the Tehsil of Nagina. It is alleged that he executed a deed of lease in respect of the said land in favour of the petitioner before the commencement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hereinafter referred to as 'U. P. Act 1 of 1951.' It is not in controversy that after the commencement of the said Act, the petitioner's name was recorded in revenue papers as Bhumidhar of the land. When the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holidings Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', came into force, a notice under S. 10 was issued to the petitioner requiring him to show cause why the area mentioned therein may not be declared surplus area. In response to the said notice, the petitioner filed his objections. After considering the said objections, some area of land recorded in the name of the petitioner was declared as surplus area. Thereafter, proceedings for determination of the compensation amount in respect of the surplus area declared by the Prescribed Authority were started and the petitioner was held entitled to payment of certain compensation amount. It may be stated that no objections were filed by anyone against the draft compensation assessment roll. The petitioner avers that the compensation roll had become final and could not be called in question in subsequent proceedings. 3. On Aprl. 12, 1971, the State Government made an application for the review of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated May 31, 1962 by means of which the surplus area had been determined by the said authority. The review application was based on the ground that the petitioner was not the Bhumidhar of any land and that the notice issued to him under S. 10 of the Act was erroneous. The review application was based on the ground that the petitioner was not the Bhumidhar of any land and that the notice issued to him under S. 10 of the Act was erroneous. On April 13, 1971 application for condonation of delay was moved on behalf of the State which was disposed of by the then Prescribed Authority, Nagina, District Bijnor by a short order which read : - "As requested, delay condoned." 4. After hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority passed an order dated July 3, 1972 reopening the matter. By means of a subsequent order dated June 30, 1976, the Prescribed Authority set aside the order dated May 31, 1962 and held that the petitioner was not entitled to payment of any compensation. The Prescribed Authority, by its order dated June 30, 1976 also held that the petitioner was not Bhumidhar of the land and the notice under S. 10 of the Act had been issued incorrectly. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority dated May 30, 1976, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the District Judge. The II Additional District Judge who disposed of the said appeal was of the view that the appeal was not legally maintainable inasmuch as the order of the Prescribed Authority dated July 30, 1976 was not appealable. As already indicated, the orders which are impugned in this writ petition are the orders of the Prescribed Authority dated April 13, 1971, July 3, 1972 and June 30, 1976. The order of the II Additional District Judge dated Sept. 2, 1977 has also been assailed on behalf of the petitioner. 5. As the preamble of the Act declares, the object of the enactment is to provide for the imposition of ceiling on land holdings in Uttar Pradesh. It was considered by the legislature that the imposition of ceiling on land holdings was necessary for two reasons. In the first place, imposition of ceiling ensured increased agricultural production. In the second place, imposition of ceiling on land holdings made land available for resettlement of the landless agricultural labourers. Both these objects undoubtedly subserve the common good. Nevertheless, the provisions of the Act had to be promulgated within the frame-work of the constitutional provisions. 6. The Act is accordingly sub-divided into five chapters. In the second place, imposition of ceiling on land holdings made land available for resettlement of the landless agricultural labourers. Both these objects undoubtedly subserve the common good. Nevertheless, the provisions of the Act had to be promulgated within the frame-work of the constitutional provisions. 6. The Act is accordingly sub-divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with preliminary matters such as the short title, commencement of the Act and the definition of the terms used therein. Chap. II of the Act provided a machinery for the determination of surplus land and for its acquisition. Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 fall under this Chapter. The Prescribed Authority has been constituted for the purpose of determining the surplus area. S. 5 provides the ceiling limit. Any land in excess of the ceiling limit is deemed to be surplus land. S. 9 of the Act, inter alia, provides that the Prescribed Authority shall issue a general notice to the tenure holders asking them to file objections against the statements prepared under the provision of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. S. 10 lays down that notwithstanding the provisions of S. 9 it shall be the duty of the Prescribed Authority to issue a notice to a tenure holder showing the surplus land included in the holding of such tenure holder. S. 11 of the Act conferred a right on a tenure holder to file objections against the notice under S. 10 and also empowered the Prescribed Authority to determine the surplus area. S. 12 of the Act entrusted jurisdiction to Prescribed Authority to declare surplus area if no objection was filed by a tenure holder against the correctness of the notice issued to him under S. 10. S. 13 of the Act made the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority 'under S. 11 or 12 of the Act, as the case may be, appealable to the District Judge within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. S. 14. inter alia, lays down that once an order declaring a land to be surplus area has become final, the same shall be notified by the Prescribed Authority in the Official Gazette and from the beginning of the date of the notification, such land shall vest in the State free from till encumbrances. 7. Chap. S. 14. inter alia, lays down that once an order declaring a land to be surplus area has become final, the same shall be notified by the Prescribed Authority in the Official Gazette and from the beginning of the date of the notification, such land shall vest in the State free from till encumbrances. 7. Chap. Ill of the Act deals with the determination and payment of compensation amount. The said Chapter, inter alia. lays down that once a surplus area of land has vested in the State Government under S. 14 of the Act, a draft compensation assessment roll shall be prepared by the Prescribed Authority which shall be notified by him. A right has been conferred on the parties interested in payment of compensation to file objection against such draft. The objections filed against the draft compensation assessment roll may be adjudicated upon by the Prescribed Authority, but his order is subject to an appeal to the District Judge. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 21 of the Act declares that subject to the correction of any clerical or arithmetical mistake by the Prescribed Authority or the District Judge, the assessment roll declared under S. 20 or declared or modified under this section shall be final and conclusive and may not be questioned in any court of law. Chap. IV of the Act provides a procedure for disposal and settlement of surplus land and Chap. V is concerned with miscellaneous matters. 8. In brief, from a survey of the provisions of the Act, it is evident that the Prescribed Authority has been constituted as a Tribunal by the Act and has limited jurisdiction. It is concerned in the first place with the determination of surplus area included in the holding of a tenure holder. It has next to decide about the payment of compensation to a tenure holder whose land is adjudged to be surplus land. In either case, the excision of the Prescribed Authority is subject to an appeal to the District Judge. The next duty which is entrusted to the Prescribed Authority is with regard to the disposal of surplus land ant its settlement with the landless labourers. What is noteworthy is that the Prescribed Authority has not been entrusted with any express power to adjudicate upon the rights of persons claiming to be tenure holders. The next duty which is entrusted to the Prescribed Authority is with regard to the disposal of surplus land ant its settlement with the landless labourers. What is noteworthy is that the Prescribed Authority has not been entrusted with any express power to adjudicate upon the rights of persons claiming to be tenure holders. The crucial provision of the Act in so far as it concerns the present writ petition is contained in S. 10. Once a person is shown to be a tenure holder in the notice issued under S. 10 of the Act and some land in his possession is alleged to be surplus land he gets a right to file objections against the notice. The objection is determined by the Prescribed Authority and his order is subject to an appeal to the District Judge. It may be that the Prescribed Authority may with draw a notice after the same hail been issued. But once an objection is filed by the tenure holder against the said notice and has been duly adjudicated under S. 11, this locus paenitentiae is no longer available. The notice under S. 10 and the objection filed by the tenure holder against the said notice get merged in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the Prescribed Authority in the instant case had no jurisdiction to review an order passed by it on May 31, 1962. I do not consider it necessary to go into that question. In my opinion, the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on May 31, 1962 had become final. It was no longer open to the said authority to go behind that order and adjudicate on the question as to whether the petitioner was a tenure holder at all or not. No such power has been conferred by the Act on the Prescribed Authority to go into the question as to whether a person is or is not a tenure holder. He has to decide under S. 11 of the Act whether an objection preferred by a tenure holder against the notice under S. 10 of the Act is sustainable or not and if so to what extent. The power to decide the tenancy rights has been conferred by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1950 on the Assistant Collector. He has to decide under S. 11 of the Act whether an objection preferred by a tenure holder against the notice under S. 10 of the Act is sustainable or not and if so to what extent. The power to decide the tenancy rights has been conferred by U. P. Act No. 1 of 1950 on the Assistant Collector. The II Additional District Judge, while dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner, was conscious of this fact and expressly held that the order dated July 30, 1976 was not appealable as it had not been passed either under S. 11 or 12 of the Act. In my opinion, the District Judge should have probed into the matter more closely and should have held that the order dated July 30. 1976 w as a nullity and it had been passed without any authority of law. 10. The matter may be looked into from another stand-point. It is clear from a perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated July 30, 1976 that he has not discovered any error in the order of his predecessor dated May 31, 1962. The only defect on the basis of which the order dated May 31, 1962 has been set aside is that the defect lay in the notice issued to the petitioner under S. 10 of the Act. In other words, according to the impugned order, no notice should have been issued to the petitioner under S. 10 of the Act as he was not a tenure holder. I am afraid that a review application under O. 47 R. 1 of the Civil P. C. was not sustainable on the said ground. On the finding of the Prescribed Authority, mere was no error in the order sought to be reviewed. In that view of the natter also, the order dated July 30, 1976 is not legally sustainable and suffers from an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record. 11. What has been stated above is based on the assumption that a review application under Or. 47 R. 1 C. P. C. against the order dated May 31, 1962 was legally competent. As already indicated above, learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly challenged this position but 1 have deliberately left the matter open. 11. What has been stated above is based on the assumption that a review application under Or. 47 R. 1 C. P. C. against the order dated May 31, 1962 was legally competent. As already indicated above, learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly challenged this position but 1 have deliberately left the matter open. On behalf of the petitioner it has further been contended that the draft compensation assessment roll has assumed finality and all that remained to be done was the actual payment of compensation and a review application at that stage did not lie. It has been further urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority in passing the order dated April 13, 1971 and July 3, 1972 did not apply his mind to the facts of the case and acted mechanically in the matter. For the reasons stated above, I do not propose to enter into these submissions I am, of the view that the controversy with regard to the rights of the petitioner had been finally determined by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated May 31, 1962. and it was not open to the Prescribed Authority to set aside the said order on the ground that the notice issued to the petitioner was an incorrect notice. 12. The result is that this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The orders of the Prescribed Authority dated April. 13,. 1971, July 3, 1972 and June 30, 1976 and that of the District Judge dated Sept. 2, 1977 are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs.