Judgement K. N. SINGH, J.:- This appeal under Sec.96 of the Civil P.C. is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21-7-1969, passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants suit. 2. Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee and her two children Tanaji Banerji, son and Kum. Jaisri Banerjee, daughter, filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation from the defendant-respondents with the allegation that Madhusudan Banerji, husband of Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee, was run over and killed by Public Carrier bearing No. US0 9787, of which Biwant Singh Koheli, defendant No.2 was the owner and which was being driven by Jiwan Singh, defendant No. 3. The vehicle was insured with the Premier Insurance Co., defendant No.1. The accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle causing serious injuries to Madhusudan Banerji which resulted into his death. The plaintiffs claimed a decree for damages and compensation for the amount of Rs. 30,000/- against the defendant-respondents for the death of Madhusudan Banerji who was the sole bread earner of the family. Initially the appellants had filed the suit only against the Premier Insurance Company, but later by an amendment application dated 21-4-1966, they impleaded the owner and driver of the vehicle also as defendants to the suit. 3. The defendants filed written statement denying the claim raised by the appellants. The main ground raised on behalf of the defendants was that the suit was barred by time. Defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 3, the owner and the driver respectively filed separate written statements pleading that the vehicle was not being driven in rash and negligent manner and the accident did not occur on account of any default of the driver and as such the appellants were not entitled to any damages. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by time. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed five issues which were to the following effect. 1. Whether defendant No. 2 had given any latitude to defendant No. 3 to drive the truck in any manner even without caring for the public on the road? If so its effect? 2. Whether the suit is barred by time? 3. To what amount of damages, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled and against whom? 4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 5. If so its effect? 2. Whether the suit is barred by time? 3. To what amount of damages, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled and against whom? 4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 5. Whether death was caused by defendant No. 3 during the course of his employment with defendant No. 2? If not, its effect? 5. On appraisal of evidence, the Trial Court answered issue No. 1 against the plaintiffs on the finding that the owner had not permitted the driver to drive the truck without caring for the safety of the public on the road. Issue No. 5 was answered in plaintiffs favour on the finding that Madhusudan Banerji died in the accident on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver who was driving the vehicle in the course of his employment with defendant No. 2, as such the owner and the driver both were liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs. While discussing issue No. 3, the Trial Court held that Madhusudan Banerji was employed in the office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.E. Railway, Gorakhpur as Head Clerk, he was drawing salary at the rate of Rs. 350/- per month. He was aged about 36 years on the date of the accident, and on account of the death of Madhusudan Banerji the plaintiffs were put to a pecuniary loss of Rs. 30,000/- which was payable by the defendants. In spite of these findings the Trial Court dismissed the suit as barred by time. Aggrieved the Plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the Trial Court committed error in holding that the suit was barred by time. He submitted that since Tanaji Banerji and Kum. Jaisri Banerjee were disqualified to file suit as they were minors, limitation could not run against them till they attained majority. The accident occurred on 5-10-1962, according to Art. 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit for compensation and damages should have been filed within two years of that date. The suit in question was filed on 19-10-1965. The Trial Court held that the suit was hopelessly barred by time. The accident occurred on 5-10-1962, according to Art. 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit for compensation and damages should have been filed within two years of that date. The suit in question was filed on 19-10-1965. The Trial Court held that the suit was hopelessly barred by time. Section 6 (1) of the Limitation Act lays down:- "Where a person entitled to institute a suit is, on the date from which the limitation starts running, a minor, insane, or an idiot, then the time will not run against him instead he may institute a suit within the period of limitation after his disability has ceased". Section 7 is as under:- "Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but, where no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased". Section 6 lays down a general rule that time for filing a suit shall not run against a disabled person who may be minor, insane or idiot. Such a disabled person may bring his action in Court of law after his disability ceases to exist. Limitation for filing suit shall commence from the date of cessation of the disability. Section 7 is an exception to the general principle enunciated by S.6. It lays down that it more than one person are jointly entitled to institute a suit and it one of them is disabled, time will not run against any of them until the disability ceases to exist. But it one of the persons entitled to institute the suit is competent to give discharge without the concurrence of the other, then time will run against both In such an eventuality benefit of Sec.6 will not be available. The question then arises as to whether Smt. Usha Banerjee, mother of the two minor plaintiffs was entitled to give discharge without the concurrence of her minor children. 7. The question then arises as to whether Smt. Usha Banerjee, mother of the two minor plaintiffs was entitled to give discharge without the concurrence of her minor children. 7. In A.C. Fields v. Chhotibai, (1973 Lab IC 1410), a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the heirs of a victim of accidental death are tenants-in-common and not joint-tenants. Interest of each one of them is distinct and separate, none of them is competent to give discharge in respect of the right of the other. Where one of such persons is under a disability, S.7 of the Limitation Act would come into play and extend the period of limitation for the entire body of co-heirs who had a joint right to sue. The Bench further held that Sec.7 of the Limitation Act would apply when the right to sue is joint irrespective of whether the substantive right is joint or not section 7 makes a clear distinction between a joint substantive right and a joint right to sue. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench. Similar view was taken in Kamleshwari Prasad Singh v. Shiva Chandra Bose (AIR 1949 Patna 212); Punjabhai Prabhudas and Co. v. Sakinben Mohammadbhai (1977 Acc. C. J. 44) : ( AIR 1977 Guj. 179 ). 8. The question then arises as to whether Sec.7 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the instant case. As discussed earlier, provisions of sec.7 are attracted only in the case where there are more than one person jointly entitled to institute a suit and if one of them is competent to give discharge without the concurrence of other person, in that event time will run against all the persons including the disabled person, but if no such discharge can be given, time will not run against any of them, till the disabled person becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of other or if the disability ceases to exist. The Trial Court held that Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee was the natural mother and guardian of her children, Tanaji Banerji and Kum. Jaisri Banerjee and she was competent to give discharge on their behalf, as such time would run against the minors, also and the period of limitation could not be extended. In our opinion the Trial Court committed error. The Trial Court held that Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee was the natural mother and guardian of her children, Tanaji Banerji and Kum. Jaisri Banerjee and she was competent to give discharge on their behalf, as such time would run against the minors, also and the period of limitation could not be extended. In our opinion the Trial Court committed error. The suit was filed under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, claiming compensation for the pecuniary loss on account of the death of Madhu Sudan Banerji. Section 2 of the said Act lays down that not more than one suit shall be brought in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint. This provision makes it clear that under the Act only one suit can be brought for damages for loss of expectation of life by the persons who may be entitled to damages. The two minor children as well as their mother Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee each of them was entitled to claim compensation for the death of Madhusudan Banerji in their own right. They were entitled to institute a claim in Court of law jointly but they could not file more than one suit. Since the minors were disabled they could not bring any action in Court of law for compensation. 9. The question whether Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee could give a discharge without the concurrence of her two children who were under disability, may now be examined. In case of fatal accidents the interest of legal representatives and heirs is distinct. Each one of them is entitled to claim separate amount of damages. One person can give discharge in respect of his own right but he cannot give discharge in respect of the right of other claimant. Since both the children were minors they were incapable of giving their consent to their mother and she could not without their consent give discharge. Smt. Usha Rani Banerjee could not give a valid and legal discharge on behalf of two minor children who were entitled to the damages in their own right. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the period of limitation could not run against the minors. Admittedly they attained majority much later. The suit was therefore, well within time. 10. Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent urged that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were impleaded on 21-4-1966 when limitation for filing the suit had expired. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the period of limitation could not run against the minors. Admittedly they attained majority much later. The suit was therefore, well within time. 10. Learned Counsel for the defendant-respondent urged that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were impleaded on 21-4-1966 when limitation for filing the suit had expired. We find no merits in this contention. Tanaji Banerji, defendant No. 2 was aged about 17 1/2 years on 19-10-1965 when the suit was instituted. Kum Jaisri Banerjee was aged about 13 Years on the date of institution of the suit as mentioned in the plaint. Tanaji Banerji attained majority in April, 1966. According to Sec.6 read with Art.82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 Tanaji Banerji could have filed suit by April, 1968. Since the amendment was made on 21-4-1966, the suit was well within time even against defendants Nos. 2 and 3. 11. The Trial Court, on appraisal of evidence, held that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver defendant No. 3, who was driving the vehicle during the course of his employment with the defendant No. 2. These findings of the Trial Court have not been challenged before us on behalf of the defendants-respondents. 12. The question then arises as to what amount of damages, the plaintiffs are entitled. This question has been discussed in detail by the Trial Court. On appraisal of evidence the Trial Court held that the plaintiffs had suffered a pecuniary loss of Rs. 30,000/- on account of the death of Madhusudan Banerji, who was the sole bread earner of the family. He was employed as Head Clerk in the N.E. Railway, Gorakhpur and if he would have been alive he would have contributed towards the maintenance of the widow and two children for a period of 12 years at the rate of Rupees 200/- Per month. The Trial Court had further held that on account of premature death of Madhusudan Banerji the gratuity and other emoluments which he would have received on retirement were reduced by Rs. 2,000/-. Thus, in all the plaintiffs-appellants were put to a pecuniary loss of Rs. 30,000/-. These findings have not been challenged before us by the respondents during the course of arguments. We find no good reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 2,000/-. Thus, in all the plaintiffs-appellants were put to a pecuniary loss of Rs. 30,000/-. These findings have not been challenged before us by the respondents during the course of arguments. We find no good reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs suit for Rupees 30,000/- is liable to be decreed. 13. There is no dispute between the parties that the vehicle in question which caused the accident was insured with defendant no. 1, the Premier Insurance Co. Under the terms of the Policy, the Insurance Co. had undertaken to indemnify the owner for the injuries caused to a third party to the extent of Rs. 20,000/-. Since the owner and the driver both were responsible for the accident, the Insurance Co. is liable to indemnify the owner to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- under the terms of the policy as well as under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1969. So far as the remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/- is concerned, the owner and the driver both are liable to pay the same to the plaintiffs jointly and severally. 14. Learned counsel for the owner and the driver of the vehicle urged that in view of the Addl. Policy (Ex.A-1). (Paper No. 77-Ga) the Insurance Co. was liable to indemnify the driver and the cleaner for the injuries caused to a third person and, therefore, the amount of Rs. 10,000/- was payable by the Insurance Co. Ex.A-1 was for the period from 14-3-1963 to 13-9-1963. Even assuming that under the conditions of the said policy, the Insurance Co. was liable to indemnify the driver of the vehicle, the respondants contention cannot be accepted as the accident had occurred on 5-10-1962 when the Policy (Ex.A-1) was not in farce. The Insurance Co, could not have undertaken the risk for a period prior to the date of Commencement of the policy. The owner and the driver are, therefore, jointly liable to pay the amount of Rs. 10,000 to the plaintiffs. 15. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that the accident occurred in 1962 about 20 years ago and till now the claimants have not received any amount as compensation. The owner and the driver are, therefore, jointly liable to pay the amount of Rs. 10,000 to the plaintiffs. 15. Before we part with the case, we would like to observe that the accident occurred in 1962 about 20 years ago and till now the claimants have not received any amount as compensation. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that no deduction should be made for the lump sum payment made to the plaintiffs. 16. The appellants have also claimed interest on the decretal amount. Their claim is genuine. We are, of the opinion that the claimants are entitled to the Interest at the rate of 6% from the dale of suit till the date of deposit. 17. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Court below and decree the plaintiffs suit for a sum of Rs. 30,000 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit. The plaintiffs are entitled to their costs throughout. The plaintiffs are entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 20,000/- with interest from the Insurance Company and the remaining amount of Rs. 10,000/- shall be recovered from defendants Nos. 2 and 3 with interest. 18. Since the suit and the appeal was filed by the plaintiffs in forma pauperis, court-fee should be realised from the defendants. Steps shall be taken for the realisation of the court-fee in accordance with law and a certificate to that effect shall be issued by the Trial Court to the Collector. Appeal allowed.