Pathak, C. J. (Actg.)- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for an order or Writ of Certiorari to remove into this court a decision of the appellate authority cons­tituted under the Assam Excise Act and Rules for the purpose of quashing it. 2. The material facts are that the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, Sibsagar Invited tenders for the settlement of No.4 Mariani Country Spirit Shop, hereinafter referred to as the 'C. S. Shop' for the term 1981-84. The petitioner along with many others including respondent No. 4 Ambeswar Doley and respon­dent No. 5 Durga Regon submitted tenders for settlement of the said shop. 3. The Deputy Commissioner, hereinafter called the 'Primary Authority" on the advice of the Advisory Committee constituted under Rule 208 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945, hereinafter called the 'Rules' settled the C. S. Shop with the petitioner. Respondents No.4 and 5 preferred appeals under section 9 of the Assam Excise Act, before the Assam Board of Revenue, for short the 'Board' and these appeals were respectively num­bered as Excise Case No. 85E/81 and 57E/81. The Board heard the appeals on 25.2.82. By a judgment dated 12.3.82 allowed the appeal of respondent No. 1. set aside the settlement order of the Primary Authority that had been made in favour of the petitioner and settled the shop to the respondent No.4. Against this judgment dated 12.3.82 the petitioner has filed this petition. 4. The Board while disposing of the appeal found the petitioner and respondent No.5 to be not financially suitable. Accordingly, the order was passed in allowing the appeal of respondent No. 4. It may be mentioned that the primary autho­rity in settling the shop with the petitioner did not give any reason. The order of the primary authority is only to the effect that the settlement was made with the petitioner. No reason was given as to why the tenders of the respondents No. 4 and 5 were not considered. The Board considered the respec­tive merits of respondents No. 4 and 5 as well as the petitioner. On consideration of all the materials, the Board found the peti­tioner as well as respondent No. 5 not to be financially suit­able for the purpose of settlement of the shop. The Board considered the respec­tive merits of respondents No. 4 and 5 as well as the petitioner. On consideration of all the materials, the Board found the peti­tioner as well as respondent No. 5 not to be financially suit­able for the purpose of settlement of the shop. Respondent No. 5 has not filed any petition before this Court and hence our present enquiry will be only to see whether the respective merits of the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 4 have been properly considered in passing the impugned judgment. Mr. R. C. Choudhury who represents respondent No. 5 has been I pointed out by us accordingly. Mr. Choudhury submits that the finding of the Board that the respondent No. 5 is not financially suitable is on a wrong premise. But that is a finding which has not been challenged before us by filing a petition. In considering the respective merits of the respondent No. 4 and the petitioner, the Board found as follows : "Neither the impugned order nor the minutes of the Advisory Committee which formed the basis for the order give any ground for not considering the appellants suit­able or for considering the appellants suitable or for con­sidering the respondent to be the most suitable amongst the tenderers. It has therefore become necessary for us to enter into the individual merits and demerits of the three tenders before us". The Board found the age, educational qualification and the community of the three tenderers to be on equal footing. Their unemployed character is also not denied. Three of the tenderers came from a tribal community and they are found to be educated unemployed youth. In considering the case of the peti­tioner the Board recorded the finding as follows : "The respondent (the present petitioner) states in item II of his tender as his source of finance- (a) Cash in hand ... Rs. 2,000/- (b) Bank balance ... Rs. 3,896.41 (c) Security deposit ... Rs. 5,260/- (d) Assets namely bottles, boxes, liquor and Challan in hand ... Rs.48,000/- (e) Landed property, being 1/4th share of personal property and further house and land at Pacharhat ... Rs. 59,000/- The Officer who enquired into this tender in confirming the statement has almost verbatim quoted the respondent's statement. In his counter affidavit respondent says that at the time of po­ssession of the shop he made an investment of Rs. Rs.48,000/- (e) Landed property, being 1/4th share of personal property and further house and land at Pacharhat ... Rs. 59,000/- The Officer who enquired into this tender in confirming the statement has almost verbatim quoted the respondent's statement. In his counter affidavit respondent says that at the time of po­ssession of the shop he made an investment of Rs. 30,000/-, which he has been managing shop satisfactorily. Appellant Durga Regon, in his memo of appeal refers to a judgment of the Board in No. 75E/81 wherein it was held that the income from the Mariani shop is about Rs. 800/- to Rs. 1000/- per month. He also states that the respondent informed the Board then that It was only income and he was not in a position to open a bank account. It Is further stated in his Memo of appeal that the respondent's capital on the date of enquiry is stated to be Rs. 65,000/-. Respondent himself has stated in para 7 of the counter affidavit that 4 challans dated 15.7.81 and 19.8.81 found by the enquiry officer were for Rs. 47,834.10. Excluding the cost of bottles, boxes and other things the assets thus come to about Rs. 59,000/-. If the cost of bottles, boxes and other things are added the assets should be very near to Rs. 65,000/- as stated by the appellant. After meeting his own expenses and other obligations the respondent has thus made a saving of about Rs. 35.000/- for ploughing back in the liquor business. Even if we accept his personal expenses to be only Rs. 250/- per month as stated by the respondent, his savings during the period of 28 months could not exceed Rs. 15.000/-. It is not denied that during his tenure of 28 months lease of the shop it was dry for about 5 months. To explain as to wherefrom he got the extra Rs. 20,000/- for investment in the shop, the respondent in his counter affidavit dated 29.12.81 stated his two elder brothers gave him Rs. 20.000/- only as share of paternal agricultural land." On examination of the pass book of the petitioner of account No. 14/4851 of the State Bank of India, the Board found that the account was opened on 13.6.60 with Rs. 480/-. Two other deposits of Rs. 20.000/- only as share of paternal agricultural land." On examination of the pass book of the petitioner of account No. 14/4851 of the State Bank of India, the Board found that the account was opened on 13.6.60 with Rs. 480/-. Two other deposits of Rs. 2,500/- on 11.8.80 and Rs 1,000/- on 2.7.81 are the only deposits upto date of the tender, which was filed on 21.8.81. As against these two deposits there were 9 withdrawals between July and October, 1981 of which six were Rs. 100/- and the three others were for Rs. 200/-, Rs. 300/- and Rs. 450/-. This pass book does not lend support to his monthly saving of about Rs.700/- or his permanent annual saving from his paternal pro­perty to make any fund of his own available for investment in the liquor business. When it was urged on behalf of the petitioner before the Board that the financial suitability of the petitioner may not be raised now as on two previous occasions the Board was satisfied with the finance of the petitioner. It was also pointed out that this Court refused to Interfere with the Board's decision in Case No. 67E/79 and 75E/80. In reply to this it was submitted on behalf of respondent No.4 before the Board that the earlier decision of the Board would not operate as res-judicata as respondent No. 4, Ambeswar is a new party and as the unaccounted extra sum of Rs. 20,000/- invested by the respondent has come out as a completely new factor. The explana­tion of getting fund from his brothers being also totally new a careful examination of the finance and suitability of the respondent is essential. The Board agreed with the submission on behalf of respondent No. 4. The Board held: "The story of getting a big amount from his two bro­thers or from his paternal property is not mentioned in the tender. This omission is a suppression of fact parti­cularly by a sitting lessee for whom the genuineness of the source of finance is often taken for granted by the primary settling authority. Had this additional invest­ment been stated in the tender the ability of the brothers to make such sudden payment as well as the fact of actual payment could have been tested in enquiry. Had this additional invest­ment been stated in the tender the ability of the brothers to make such sudden payment as well as the fact of actual payment could have been tested in enquiry. When the howllowness of the new story became apparent during the hearing on 25.2.82 the respondent hurriedly arranged two affidavits by these two brothers residing at Majuli and submitted them with another affidavit of respondent to this Board on 4.3.82. Copies of these affidavits were served on at least one appellant on 1.3.82. These affidavits throw some further light on the repondent's qualities and suitability. From para 2 of respondent's affidavit dated 1.3.82 it is clear that the affidavits from the two brothers were arranged after the hearing on 25.2.82. On 26.2.82 court fee stamps were brought somewhere and the two brothers residing at Jangraimukh, Majuli were brought to Jorhat on 27.2.82 (Saturday) and the two affidavits were sworn by the two brothers before a Magistrate at Jorhat. The same were then served here on 1.3.82 (Monday). Has the respondent who is a new comer to the liquor business got the necessary resources to do all these? As earlier observed, his pass book shows him as no better than a paid petty employee or petty earner for whom the kind of initiative, effort and resources is not ordinarily belie­vable. This itself is indicative of some strong force with big resources working for the respondent." On examination of the two affidavits of the brothers, the Board noted : "Why had the respondent had gone to them on 1 7.8.81 suddenly a few days before the enquiry and came back for depositing In the two Challans for huge amount on 19.8.81 has also remained shrouded in mystery. The brothers also say-lest their statement of being landlord and culti­vator is not believed, that they got house rent of Rs. 900/-p.m. which has enabled them to mike the fund available. But such statements cannot be accepted without a thorough enquiry. The fact as to how this amount of Rs. 20,000/-came into respondent's liquor business in August. 1981 has remained a mystery unexplained by the two affidavits. The belated invention of this story in view of the extra-ordinary circumstances made out in the story itself, has raised a strong suspicion about some undisclosed financier operating the shop. The allegation brought by the appellants cannot therefore be ignored as baseless". 20,000/-came into respondent's liquor business in August. 1981 has remained a mystery unexplained by the two affidavits. The belated invention of this story in view of the extra-ordinary circumstances made out in the story itself, has raised a strong suspicion about some undisclosed financier operating the shop. The allegation brought by the appellants cannot therefore be ignored as baseless". It was submitted before the Board by the counsel for respon­dent No. 4 Ambeswar that he is being financed by his father. It is further submitted that the respondent No. 4, being a son of a first class retired officer and a cultivator's son he should get preference over the former even if they may be otherwise equal. On examination of the pass book of the father of respon­dent No. 4, which was produced before the Board, it was found that the pass book is of the United Bank of India being account No. 1303 in the name of his father, which was opened on 7.4.79 with an amount of Rs, 44,000/-. His father, by an affidavit, stated that he possessed about 48 bighas of cultivable land at Majuli in which he cultivated paddy, mustard seeds, potato peas etc. He also supplied thatch to contractors. He had been keeping his earning at home and it was his son who hiving told him of the benefit of batik deposit made him to deposit the amount of Rs. 44,000/- in the bank in April, 1979. The Board found that this statement has not been refuted. The report of the enquiry officer also states the annual income of the father to be about Rs. 10,000/-. For such a person in a place like Majuli it is not unlikely to come out with cash of Rs. 44.000/- for depo­sits. The intensification by the bank of their deposit mobilisation has resulted in such large captures of rich cultivators and in the absence of anything to the contrary, he found no reason to dis­believe this deposit. It has been further found on examination of the pass book that there has been no withdrawal from his account since its opening on 7.4.79 and the balance in 1981 has exceeded Rs. 50,000/- which is more than adequate for running the shop. Ultimately, the Board came to the conclusion : "From the discussions above it is seen that the respon­dent's (the present petitioner) finance is doubtful. 50,000/- which is more than adequate for running the shop. Ultimately, the Board came to the conclusion : "From the discussions above it is seen that the respon­dent's (the present petitioner) finance is doubtful. The exis­tence of an underhand financer has been made out to be a distinct possibility in his case". Regarding respondents No. 4 and 5 the Board observed : "Appellant Durga Regon's finance cannot be regarded as adequate. The lack of explanation for the large depo­sits made before the tender would also expose him to some doubts. It is the third tenderer, appellant Shri Ambeswar Doley, whose finance is unquestionable and against whom we do not find anything whatsoever. It is therefore a fit ease to interfere with the order of the primary settling authority. Accordingly we set aside the impugned order of settlement. The appeal of Shri Ambeswar Doley is allowed and the shop is settled with him for the remai­ning period upto 31.3.84." 5. This petition is with a prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari. Certiorari is an extra-ordinary remedy. It is not a writ of right but one of discretion. Exceptional facts must arise to call for its use. The object of the writ is to curb the excess jurisdiction, to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within their bounds. It will be granted or denied according to all circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may require (see Extra-Ordinary Legal Remedies by Ferries-Section 155, 157 and 160-1926 Edn.) In order that an order of inferior authority may be quashed by a writ of certiorari, the order must be without jurisdiction or it must be vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding of the authority is perverse or it must be vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice or that the order is malafide. 6. Before we turn to the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, we may refer Rule 223 of Assam Excise Rules of which sub-rules (1) and (2) are relevant. They are : "223 (1) Settlement of country spirit shops shall be made giving adequate representation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 6. Before we turn to the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, we may refer Rule 223 of Assam Excise Rules of which sub-rules (1) and (2) are relevant. They are : "223 (1) Settlement of country spirit shops shall be made giving adequate representation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Of the total number of shops to be settled in a Sub-division, a minimum quota of such shop to be settled with persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be fixed on the basis of population of those communities in the Sub­division. (2) In making settlement to any person preference shall always be given to the educated unemployed youths or to Co-operative and Co-opt. Firms formed by such educated unemployed youth. Preference shall also be given to the persons belonging to the more backward community of other Barkward classes. (3) * * * (4) * * * Admittedly, as noted above the petitioner as well as the other two tenderers who were before the Board belong to the MM tribal community. The Board has correctly held that they are at par for consideration under sub-rule (1) of Rule 223. The only question that concerned before the Board was about the suitabi­lity of the tenderers mainly on the ground of financial sound­ness which had to be considered by the Board. Rule 211 of the Rules states : "211. The Presiding Officer shall be on his guard against combination of tenders at the time of settlement. Benami transactions shall not be permitted. The Presiding Officer may also rufuse to consider tenders submitted by undesi­rable persons". Of the three constrictions mentioned in this Rule, the one dea­ling with Benami transaction is the most important as "guard against combination" has been taken care to some extent by Rule 208(6) & (7), which prohibit granting of more than one licence to one person, and even to one joint family. The primary autho­rity shall have to keep the eyes open so that benamdar's attempt to control the business does not succeed. So far as the "undesirable persons" are concerned, Rule 208(3) prohibits the settlement with persons of bad moral character. The primary autho­rity shall have to keep the eyes open so that benamdar's attempt to control the business does not succeed. So far as the "undesirable persons" are concerned, Rule 208(3) prohibits the settlement with persons of bad moral character. So even if "Benami transactions" have to be kept away while giving settlement, financial giants and tycoons known to be involved in this lucrative business are to be guarded otherwise they would frustrate the noble object behind Rule 223 dealing with the preference for settlement of shop. 7. From a reading of the general scheme and object of the Rules it is seen that the Benami transaction is prohibited, the object being that no unseen hand should pull strings from behind the screen and thereby scuttle the beneficial obje­ctive enshrined in Rule 223. Further, tender form which is now the statutory form in pursuance to the provisions of Rule 206 (2) is the relevant matter in the general scheme of settlement of C. S. shop. That sub-rule reads as : "206(2) The tender must be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed by the State Go­vernment." However, the State Government has prescribed statutory form of tender, in which clause 11 is one of the clauses in the ten­der form, reads as : "11. Whether the tenders is/are capable of financing his/their business himself/themselves. Give detail of source, cash in hand, bank balance, security assets etc." Rule 219 provides certain clauses for the retail sale of any intoxicant. This rule provides that the licenses for the retail sate of any intoxicant shall not be granted to any person who has been convicted by a criminal court of a non-bailable offence involving moral turpitude; to former licenses who are in arrears to Government of whose conduct have been found to be unsa­tisfactory OP who have been found guilty of any serious shop malpractice, or breach of conditions of their licenses; to any per­son who is in arrear in respect of any Government revenue or dues or is defaulter in respect of repayment of any Government loan; to persons suffering from any infectious or contagious disease and to persons below the age of 21 years. 8. The above provisions and the general scheme and object of the rules which are the basic factors that come up for con­sideration at the time of the settlement of the shop. 8. The above provisions and the general scheme and object of the rules which are the basic factors that come up for con­sideration at the time of the settlement of the shop. The scheme of the Rules shows that the settlement of shop is only by selection. As pointed out above, there are two general tests which are to be taken note of by the settling authority. "First, the personal test of the tenderer which is a very important matter as envisaged in different rules of the Rules. The second is the question of suitability test in which the financial back­ing for managing the shop comes for consideration." (see Raj-kumar Dilip Narayan Singha vs. The Assam Board of Revenue and others, ILR (1980) 32 Gauhati 99 at page 155 (Special Bench Case). 9. In this case the question that came up for consideration before the Board was the suitability test within the sweep of which the financial question comes up for consideration. The scope and extent of the power of the Board in an appeal under section 9 of the Act and also the legal position in this regard are no longer res Integra. The scope and extent of the power of the Board in an appeal under section 9 of the Act and also the legal position in this regard are no longer res Integra. In a number of decision of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court, the principles that can be culled are noted below, in which there Is no dispute : “(i) The appellate authority is a statutory authority having quasi-judicial function; (ii) The Board is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court; (iii) the powers of the appellate authority In the matter of settlement is co-extensive with the powers of the primary authority, namely, the Collector Depu­ty Commissioner, Sub-divisional Officer (iv) That one of the grounds on which certiorari may issue is error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error either of law or of fact, which may be corrected by a Court of appeal or revision : (v) That the error in appreciation of documentary evidence or affidavits, errors in drawing infer­ence or omission to draw inference or in other words, which an appellate Court only could have certified, are not ordinarily errors of law apparent on the face of record: (vi) the appellate powers exercised by the appellate authority, the highest authority for deciding ques­tion of settlement of liquor shops, have undefined and unlimited powers and "the highest authority under the Act could not be deprived of the plenitude of its powers by introducing conside­rations which are not within the Act or the rules'. (emphasis supplied ; see Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner of Hills Division, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 ; Tulashi Kumar Dutta vs. State of Assam and others, Civil Rule No. 24 of 1978, judgment dated 15.12.78, in which one of us (Pathak, J. as then he was) was a party. 10. It may be noted that in Tulashi Kumar Dutta (Supra) the primary authority settled the shop in his favour but the appe­llate authority set aside the settlement on the ground that he was not financially suitable holding that it was "a case of benami transaction", which cannot be permitted in view of Rule 211 of the Excise Rules. The petitioner filed a writ in this Court which was rejected upholding the finding of the appellate authority. The petitioner filed a writ in this Court which was rejected upholding the finding of the appellate authority. The petitioner being aggrieved preferred an application for special leave to the Supreme Court, which was also rejected on 8.1.79 on merit in Special Leave Petitions (Civil) No. 114 of 1979. 11. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that the impugned order should be quashed as the Board constituted under the law made a determination exhibiting errors of law on the face of the records that the petitioner was a party to the benami transaction and was disentitled for settlement of the shop. In support of his contention the learned counsel has submitted that the peti­tioner was the sitting licensee since 1979, the Board should not have entertained any doubt and suspicion as to the finance of Rs. 20,000/- taken from his two brothers who have affidavits, although after the date of hearing of the appeals. Shri G. Talukdar, for the respondent No. 4 submits that at the time of filing the tender in clause 11, the petitioner did not mention that his two brothers made over to him as a loan of Rs. 20.000/-, and not even till the filing of his affidavit on 29th of December, 1981. Even on that date the brothers did not file any affidavit. This fact of having Rs. 20,000/- from his two brothers was not made known even to the Board although he submitted his tender on 21.8.81 and thereafter the appeals were filed by respondents No. 4 and 5 against the order of settlement by the primary autho­rity with the petitioner. Nor, the petitioner made this fact known to the officer who made the enquiry after the submission of the tender. Further, the two affidavits of the brothers that they had lent some amount of money to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 8,500/- to the petitioner on 17th or 18th of August, just before the filing of tender was submitted only on 3rd or 4th of March, 1982, few days before passing of the impugned judg­ment. By a reasoned judgment the Board has considered this aspect and a doubt had arisen in the minds of the Board as to the genuineness of this amount of Rs. 20,000/- purported to have been given by the two brothers. By a reasoned judgment the Board has considered this aspect and a doubt had arisen in the minds of the Board as to the genuineness of this amount of Rs. 20,000/- purported to have been given by the two brothers. Hence he was found to be financially unsuitable by the Board. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Board took into conside­ration some extraneous and irrelevant matter, which weighed with the Board in coming to the conclusion that there was unseen hand in giving the finance to the petitioner. The learned coun­sel in this context has referred to the observation of the Board that it took into consideration certain documents pertaining to an appeal in regard to Boisahabi C. S. shop which was pending for disposal. From the judgment of the Board it is seen that the fact of consideration of some documents of that appeal was known to the learned counsel for the petitioner and they were considered with his concurrence and the only fact that came out from these documents on Boisahabi was that (1) house in which the C. S. shop was located belonged to Katang Kaman, the father-in-law of the petitioner and that (2) that the rent for that house was Rs. 500/-. These are factually correct position in which there is no dispute. The C. S. shop has been in that house since long time back. The counsel for the petitioner has submit­ted that td consider by the Board some documents of the pend­ing appeal was in violation of Regulation 17 (4) of the Assam Board of Revenue Regulation, 1963 (for brevity the "Regulat­ion"). The regulation 17 of Regulation provides for fresh evidence. Sub-regulation (1) states that no party to an appeal or an application shall be entitled to adduce fresh evidence, whet­her oral or documentary, before the Board. The Board may, however, at any stage accept documents tendered by a party or call for any document, if it is of opinion that they are nece­ssary for deciding the appeal or application, provided that the other party shall in that case be entitled to produce rebutting evidence. Sub-regulation (3) provides that the Board may direct any authority against whose order an appeal or application ii made, to make such further investigation or to take additional evidence directly or through any subordinate authority, as it may think necessary. Sub-regulation (3) provides that the Board may direct any authority against whose order an appeal or application ii made, to make such further investigation or to take additional evidence directly or through any subordinate authority, as it may think necessary. However, sub-regulation (4) provides that where fresh evidence has been adduced under sub-regulation (1) or a further investigation is made or additional evidence is taken under sub-regulation (3), the parties shall be entitled to address the Board on points arising out of the fresh or additional evidence or further investigation. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was a clear violation of sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 17 inasmuch as when certain documents pertaining to Boisahabi C. S. shop was considered by the Board the petiti­oner should have been given an opportunity of being heard. We do not find any substance in this submission in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the petitioner was present and these documents were scrutinized in consultation with him. 12. The next submission of the learned counsel is that the petitioner having been found financially suitable in the earlier two settlements starting from 1979 till the present settlement, the Board could not have now turned round and disqualified and to record a finding that the petitioner was unsuitable is no by stretch of imagination can be held to be valid. The learned counsel submits that the Board committed an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned counsel further submits that in introducing the name of Katang Kaman, the father-in-law of the petitioner, the Board brought into consideration an unrelated and extraneous matter which had led to perversity in the impugned judgment. It is true that Katang Kaman was a lessee of the same shop for about 23 years from 1953. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the consideration of the name of Katang Kaman in the appeal was extraneous matter and this consideration having weighed in the mind of the Board, the Board's judgment suffers from infirmity. It is submitted that Katang Kaman was the father-in-law of the petitioner, the latter having married the daughter of Katang Kaman in March, 1981, that is, few months before the filing of the tender should not have come for consideration by the Board. It is submitted that such consideration vitiated the finding of the Board. 13. It is submitted that Katang Kaman was the father-in-law of the petitioner, the latter having married the daughter of Katang Kaman in March, 1981, that is, few months before the filing of the tender should not have come for consideration by the Board. It is submitted that such consideration vitiated the finding of the Board. 13. On a perusal of the judgment we do not find that the discussion of Katang Kaman in any way influenced the mind of the Board in coming to the conclusion about the financial suitability of the petitioner. The Board had before it two app­ellants, namely, respondents No. 4 and 5 as well as the petitioner. The only question that fell for consideration by the Board was about the financial suitability of these three tenderers. Having considered all the aspects the Board has given a well-considered and reasoned judgment that among the three tenderers before it, respondent No. 4 Ambeswar Doley was most financially suitable. It also came to the conclusion that the petitioner's finance smacks of some doubts and suspicion. In other words the Board found that the financial source disclosed in the tender of the petitioner did not come from a bonafide source. Hence the genuineness of petitioner's financial capacity to run the shop has not been found suitable. The Board has categorically found the respondent, Ambeswar Doley to be financially suitable. This is the finding of fact recorded by the Board. On such a finding on the materials before it, in a writ petition we do not think that we will be justified in interfering with such a finding. A similar question cams up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mukunda Bora vs. Bangshidhar, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1524. That was also a case arising out of the settle­ment of an Excise shop under the Assam Excise Rules. There the Board's finding as to financial suitability was challenged in a writ in this Court and the petition having been rejected, the aggrieved party went to the Supreme Court in appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court on these facts have made the following significant and binding observations in pragraph 16 of the judgment. "While on facts the order of the Board under appeal is not impeccable, we must remember that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a finding of fact of a domestic tri­bunal cannot be interfered with. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court on these facts have made the following significant and binding observations in pragraph 16 of the judgment. "While on facts the order of the Board under appeal is not impeccable, we must remember that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a finding of fact of a domestic tri­bunal cannot be interfered with. The High Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction does not act as a court of appeal. It interferes only when there is a jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the record communica­ted by the domestic tribunal. Such is not the case here. It is true that a finding based on no evidence or purely on surmises and conjectures or which is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice, may be said to suffer from an error of law. In the Instant case, the finding of the Board that the appellant does not possess the necessary financial capacity, is largely a finding of fact. Under R. 206 (2) of the Assam Excise Rules, an applicant for settlement of a shop to required to give full informat­ion regarding his financial capacity in the tender. Such information must include the details of sources of finance, cash in hand, bank balance, security assets, etc. Then, such information is verified by the Inquiry Officer." We may also with profit quote the following passage from para 18 of the judgment : "It is further correct that the Board did not, in terms, record a finding that the appellant was merely a figurehead or a benamidar, while the real beneficiary was somebody else who was not otherwise eligible for taking the settlement. It was desirable for the Board to have recorded a clear finding against the appellant so as to set aside the settlement in his favour on any of the grounds mentioned in R. 211. But this does not vitiate its order, because such a ground is implicit in the finding by the Board that the money paid to the former lessee by the appellant to get possession of the shop did not come from bona fide sources. But this does not vitiate its order, because such a ground is implicit in the finding by the Board that the money paid to the former lessee by the appellant to get possession of the shop did not come from bona fide sources. At the highest, all that can be said, is that if the High Court or this Court were in the position of the Board as an appellate autho­rity, it might have upheld the settlement in favour of the appellant who was an educated, unemployed youth belonging to the “more backward community." In the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated, we do not find any merit in this application. We do not find that the finding recorded by the Board about the financial suitability of respondent No. 4 in any way suffers from any infirmity calling for our interference in a writ jurisdiction. 14. In the result, the petition is without merit and the same is rejected. The Rule is discharged. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. The stay order granted by this Court on 19.3.1982 stands vacated.