JUDGMENT : 1. Special Leave to appeal granted. 2. This is a peculiar litigation. One Kala Singh is the owner of premises involved in dispute. According to respondent No. 1 he is the Order dated February 15, 1982 in Civil Appeal No. 6460 of 1982. tenant of the premises and when he got a Government contract to run a canteen he appointed respondent No. 2 as the manager to carry on the business which respondent No. 1 was carrying on in the suit premises. 3. Appellant Smt. Devki widow of Shri Rulia Ram alleged that when respondent No. I got a contract to run a canteen in Government premises, he vacated the suit premises and appellant Smt. Devki was inducted as a tenant by Kala Singh, the owner of the premises. We may skip some of the intermediate facts and refer to the suit from which the present appeal arises. It appears that respondent No. 1 filed a suit against respondent No. 2 praying for rendition of accounts of the business of respondent No. 1 carried on in the suit premises under the management of respondent No. 2. In this suit there was also a prayer for recovering vacant possession from respondent No. 2. 4. When the suit was pending in the trial court the appellant Sint. Devki applied to be joined as a party alleging that there is some collusion between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 and that being in actual possession of the suit premises probably an attempt would be made to obtain a decree at her back and her tenancy will be in jeopardy. According to Mr. Girish Chandra, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 there is collusion not between respondent No. 1 and 2 but between the owner Kala Singh and appellant Smt. Devki. We express no opinion on this point because the allegation is under investigation. 5. When the suit was being heard, at one stage the Court called upon the appellant to produce her evidence. It appears as pointed out by Mr. Girish Chandra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that repeated adjournments were sought before producing evidence and the learned Trial Judge having been tired by this dilatory tactics, once declined adjournment and proceeded to hear the suit exparte and decreed the same. A revision to the High Court was dismissed in limini. It appears as pointed out by Mr. Girish Chandra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that repeated adjournments were sought before producing evidence and the learned Trial Judge having been tired by this dilatory tactics, once declined adjournment and proceeded to hear the suit exparte and decreed the same. A revision to the High Court was dismissed in limini. Thereupon Smt. Devki moved this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 6. A notice prior to admission was, served upan the respondents. Mr. Girish Chandra appeared for respondent No. 1. Respondent 3 No. 2 did not appear, and reported that he has nothing to do with the present proceedings. 7. With the consent of the parties we proceeded to hear the matter on merits. The suit in fact has proceeded against Smt. Devki, the appellant, exparte from the stage when she had to produce her evidence. The judgment of the learned trial judge rejecting her application for setting aside exparte decree does indicate that there was some negligence on the part of the appellant in producing her evidence. The learned judge referred to a decision in Mira Rani Das and Another v. Foram Ali and Another, A.I.R. 1971 Assam 157 wherein it is observed 4 that execution of a lawful and subsisting decree cannot be restrained by temporary injunction since its execution cannot be regarded as an injury. Having examined the judgment of the learned judge closely it would be difficult to find out why the learned judge found the reasons assigned by Smt. Devki for remaining absent without force and why the negligence on her part was assessed so gross as to disentitle her to further participation in the proceedings by setting aside the exparte decree. We are not impressed by the reasons assigned by the learned judge. There is always some element of negligence in such situations. The question is, whether it is gross or irreparable as to disentitle the party from vindicating his or her rights. In our opinion, if we do not interfere at this stage, the appellant who had already saved her tenancy in earlier proceedings would suffer irreparable loss. Her default is not that grave as to visit her with such drastic penalty. 8. In our opinion, if we do not interfere at this stage, the appellant who had already saved her tenancy in earlier proceedings would suffer irreparable loss. Her default is not that grave as to visit her with such drastic penalty. 8. Having heard learned counsel for respondent No. 1 we are satisfied that there was no case to proceed exparte against the appellant and at any rate exparte decree ought to have been set aside. We accordingly set aside the exparte decree. The High Court having declined to interfere in revision by dismissing in limine the Revision Petition that order must simultaneously be set aside. 9. We remit the case to the trial court with a direction that Smt. Devki, appellant herein should be permitted to participate in the hearing of the suit from the stage when it proceeded exparte against her. She be allowed to produce whatever evidence she has to produce as early as possible and the suit should be disposed of within four months from the date of the receipt of this order by the trial court. The appeal is allowed to that extent with no order as to costs in this appeal.