JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal in a suit for cancellation of a sale deed executed by Smt. Sahdei, who was defendant 7, and having died is represented by her daughters who are the defendants-respondents IIIrd set, in favour of the defendants-appellants, who were defendants 1 to 5 in the suit and of whom Bechan Shukla defendant-appellant 1, has died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and is now represented by his heirs and legal representatives. Defendant 6, Daulat was the uncle of the plaintiff, and having died during the pendency of the suit in the trial Court he is now represented by the defendant-respondents second set. The sale deed related to agricultural land and house property both. Only the house property is involved in the suit giving rise to the second appeal. Possession over the house property was also claimed in case the Court found the plaintiff to be out of possession. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court decreed it. 2. The plaintiff alleged that one Deodutt Shukla had two sons Gajraj and Salik. Gajraj had two sons Dalsingar and Daulat. Plaintiff is the son of Dalsingar; and Daulat was defendant 6, since deceased. Salik had son Polhawan, who died leaving a widow Smt. Sahdei, who was defendant 7. So far the facts were not disputed and the pedigree may be set down as follows : 3. The plaintiffs allegations as set out in the plaint were Salik Shukla died in the year 1906 during the lifetime of Deo Dutt, who died in 1912. Polhawan died in 1919. The respondents of Deodutt Shukla lived as member of a Hindu joint family. There was no partition among them. Polhawa died as a member of joint family and the position of Sahdei was merely that of a widow of the family. Some 5 or 6 years after the death of Polhawan, Sahdei remarried Janardan Pandey of another village and has been living with him ever since. All her connection with the plaintiffs family and family property were severed. However, she came under the influence of the plaintiffs enemies, and raised disputes in consolidation of holdings relating to family agricultural land. Some 5 or 6 years after the death of Polhawan, Sahdei remarried Janardan Pandey of another village and has been living with him ever since. All her connection with the plaintiffs family and family property were severed. However, she came under the influence of the plaintiffs enemies, and raised disputes in consolidation of holdings relating to family agricultural land. While the disputes were still pending she transferred on 15th March 1965 by the questioned sale deed all the agricultural land which she claimed to be her own in favour of defendants 1st i.e., defendants 1 to 5 who are the appellants in this Court, and included therein, that is in the said sale deed, an osara and a dalan. The sale of the osara and dalan was null and void and liable to be cancelled on the grounds that the osara and dalan had been constructed by the plaintiffs father and defendant 6, some 30 or 40 years ago after the death of Deodutta, Salik, Gajraj and Polhawan, and belonged exclusively to them, having been constructed by them from their own income. Even if the osara and dalan were regarded to be joint family property, the plaintiff and defendant 6, became owners of the interest of Polhawan also by survivorship, and defendant 7 never had any right or interest therein. Even so, having remarried she had no connection with the family or its property. 4. Defendants 1 to 5, alone defended the suit. The allegation of remarriage of defendant 7 was denied and it was claimed that she was the owner and competent to sell the properties which she did. She has claimed to have continued to be the widow claimed to have continued to be the widow of Polhawan, and to have been the full owner in possession of all the property including the house property sold by her under the sale deed dated 15th March 1965. And defendants 1 to 5 claimed that they were put into possession of all the property, and had continued to be in possession of it ever since. And defendants 1 to 5 claimed that they were put into possession of all the property, and had continued to be in possession of it ever since. The osara and dalan were claimed to be joint family property; and it was further claimed that after the deaths of Salik and Gajraj, there was a partition between Polhawan and Dalsingar and Daulat, and the osara and dalan were at that partition allotted to the share of Polhawan, the zenans house having been allotted to the share of the plaintiff and defendant 6, and defendant 7 has been living and cultivating her land separately ever since. Some technical pleas were also raised. 5. The following were the issues on which the parties went to trial: - (1) Whether the dalan and osara in suit was the joint property of defendants 6/1 and 6/2 and the plaintiff or it was the exclusive property of defendant 7? (2) Whether defendant 7 has remarried Janardan Pandey and lives in his house as his wife. If, so, its effect? (3) Whether the disputed houses were given to the husband of defendant 7 in the private partition as alleged? (4) Whether the suit is barred by estoppel? (5) Whether the suit is barred by time? (6) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6. Certain details of the respective cases of the contesting parties were also elicited on the date of first hearing on which issues were. framed by the trial Court, by statements made by the parties under Order X, Rule 2, C.P.C., but it is not necessary to refer to them here. 7. Issues 1, 2 and 3 were taken up together for consideration by the trial Court. It found that the osara and dalan were the exclusive property of defendant 7, having been allotted to her husband's share on partition; and she did not remarry Janardan Pandey after her husband's death. She was competent to execute the sale deed in question. On issues 4 and 5 which were next taken up for consideration together by the trial Court, it held that in view of its findings that the property in suit was given to the husband of defendant 7 on partition and that she was in possession over it, these two issues were "irrelevant", as there "is no question of bar of estoppel and time in the suit." 8. The only point raised before the lower appellate Court was, whether the plaintiff and defendant 6, have any share in the osara and dalan in suit? According to the lower appellate Court the burden of proving the alleged partition among the members of the family lay on the contesting defendants. Smt. Sahdei, defendant 7, neither filed a written statement nor did she come forward as a witness to prove the partition or her title, to the property. The dispute with regard to the agricultural land was till then decided in favour of Smt. Sahdei, by the consolidation authorities, but some dispute was still pending before the District Judge and that dispute could not be said to have been finally settled. According to the plaintiff, after the death of Deodatt, Gajraj and Salik, Polhawan, the husband of Smt. Sahdei, died in the year 1919 in the state of jointness. Therefore, if the partition set up by the contesting defendants was not proved, the presumption would be that the family continued to remain joint. The only evidence produced by the contesting defendants on this point was that of Chandra Shekhar Pathak, DW 1, son-in-law of Smt. Sahdei. He was an interested witness and even said that he was making his statement on the basis of what he heard from Smt. Sahdei. According to the lower appellate Court there was a registered agreement between Smt. Sahdei and other members of the joint family in the year 1925. It is Exhibit 7. It showed that Smt. Sahdei was given only the right to manage the disputed property in her lifetime. The disputed property continued to be a joint family property. Therefore, under S. 14 (2) Hindu Succession Act, she did not become a full owner. She had no right to transfer the property. The lower appellate Court also referred to Ext. 5 which showed that Daulat and Dal Singar had executed a deed of mortgage in the year 1918 as guardian of Polhawan. That showed that Polhawan was a minor in 1918 and there could not have been any partition between him and the other members of the joint family before his death which occurred in 1919. 9. The lower appellate Court also considered the question whether Smt. Sahdei had remarried after the death of her husband and therefore had no right in the house in suit. 9. The lower appellate Court also considered the question whether Smt. Sahdei had remarried after the death of her husband and therefore had no right in the house in suit. The lower appellate Court found the evidence on that point very weak and unbelievable and also observed that the allegation of remarriage was not believed by the consolidation authorities. 10. The lower appellate Court then observed that Smt. Sahdei had not disclosed the source of the title under which she claimed to be the owner of the property transferred by the sale deed. She did not mention the registered agreement of 1925 at all. In view of all these facts and circumstances, the finding of the trial Court was found to be wrong, by the lower appellate Court. However, the lower appellate Court also found that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property and that since Smt. Sahdei "was living in the disputed property she must be in possession and after taking money from the defendants, she must have transferred possession to them". In the result, the lower appellate Court declared that the sale deed dated 15th March, 1965 executed by defendant 7 in favour of defendants 1 to 5 is not binding on the plaintiff so far as the disputed osara and dalan in suit are concerned. A decree for possession over the dalan and osara in suit was also passed in favour of the plaintiff. 11. Learned counsel for the defendant appellants urged before me that even if the findings of the lower appellate court that there was no partition in the family between Polhawan and Dalsingar and Daulat be accepted the view of the lower appellate Court as to the effect of Ext. 7, the registered deed of agreement of 1925, was erroneous in law and in the light of law declared by the Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma v. Seshareddi; AIR 1977 SC 1944 ; there could be no doubt whatsoever that Smt. Sahdei became the full owner of the osara and the dalan in suit which were given to her in lieu of her right to maintenance, and which she was possessed of when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the point so raised by Mr. P. P. Singh for the defendants-appellants must prevail. 13. 12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the point so raised by Mr. P. P. Singh for the defendants-appellants must prevail. 13. Exhibit 7 shows that the family was joint when Polhawan died and that Smt. Sahdei had a share in the properties in lieu of her right to maintenance but had no right to alienate the same and since Dalsingar and Daulat apprehended that by reason of entry of her name over the agricultural land, Smt. Sahdei might alienate the same, the land being joint sir of the parties succession to which was governed by the personal law at that time. Smt. Sahdei agreed that she would continue, so long as she lived, in joint possession with Dalsingar and Daulat over the property in lieu of her right to maintenance and manage and enjoy it as such and she will have no right to alienate the same but would be entitled only to maintain herself from the produce of the land. Apart from the plot numbers of the agricultural land the description of the property also includes a residential house. 14. It has not been shown to me that osara and dalan now in suit, did not appertain to the house property referred, to in the agreement Ext. 7. The law declared by the Supreme Court in V. Tulsamma's case (supra) ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ) is clear. Sub-section (2) of S. 14, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-s. (1). It excepts certain kinds of acquisition of property by Hindu female from the operation of sub-s. (1), and being in the nature of an exception to a provision which is calculated to achieve a social purpose, it must be construed strictly. It cannot be interpreted in a manner which may rob sub-s. (1) of its efficacy. Subsection (2) must, therefore, be read so as to leave as large a scope for the operation of sub-s. (1) as possible and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is by virtue of a preexisting right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-s. (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award, allotting the property prescribes restricted estate therein. 15. It is undisputed that a widow Smt. Sahdei had a right of maintenance. Property was allotted to her in lieu of that right, that is to say, for maintaining herself from the income of the property. So far as the residential house was concerned, she was to live therein in exercise of her right of residence. The right of residence was a part of her right to maintenance. She could, therefore, be said to be possessed of the property within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, in the light of the Explanation thereto. She must, therefore, be held to have become a full owner thereof and to hold it as such thereafter. 16. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, however, cited a case decided by me : Smt. Ram Devi v. Prakash Narain, 1978 All L R 715 : (1979 All L J NOC 15), A Division Bench decision of our Court in Lalji Maitra v. Shyam Behari Maitra, AIR 1979 All 379 : besides 3 other decisions of the Kerala, Madras and Bombay High Courts, namely Janki v. Govinda; AIR 1980 Ker 218 , Rajammal v. Lakshmi (1980) 1 Mad L J 450; and Narayan Rao v. State, AIR 1981 Bom 271 were also cited before me. In Rama Devi's case, no property had been earmarked or settled on the widow in lieu of her right to maintenance. In Janaki's case the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held that there was no allotment of property in lieu of the right of maintenance under the will in question in that case. The only right given to the appellant in that case was found to be the right to reside in the house with an obligation upon the executor to pay money and paddy to her for her maintenance. The only right given to the appellant in that case was found to be the right to reside in the house with an obligation upon the executor to pay money and paddy to her for her maintenance. In Lajammal's case also it was found that the mere fact of residence in the family house as a member of the joint family after the death of husband could not be equated with acquisition of any property in the house, which might be enlarged into an absolute estate. In Narayanrao's case it was held that a mere handing over of the property by the husband to the wife does not amount to her having acquired the said property. The dichotomy was between possession of the property as full owner on the one hand, and, as limited owner on the other, which postulated that the female Hindu concerned has got vested in herself at least a limited ownership of the property. Her possession must refer to some legitimate claim of title as owner, may be as full owner or as a limited owner. These cases are distinguishable. In the Division Bench decision of our Court, reference was made to paras 61 and 62 of the report, Lalji Maitra v. Shyam Behari, AIR 1979 All 379 at p. 393. After referring to Tulasammas case ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ) (supra) and quoting therefrom, in paras. 59 and 60 of the report, the principle culled out by the Division Bench in para 61 is in these words : "In this case, it was further pointed out that it was only when property is acquired by a Hindu female as a new grant for the first time and the instrument, decree, order or award giving the property prescribes a term on which it is to be held by a Hindu female, namely, as a restricted owner that sub-s. (2) comes into play and excludes the applicability of sub-s. (1). In other words, if an instrument, decree, order or award gives recognition or effect to an antecedent right possessed by a Hindu female, the case would fall under sub-s. (1) of S. 14. On the other hand, if such right is created for the first time, in consequence of such instrument, order, decree or award, the case would be covered by the exception contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 14. On the other hand, if such right is created for the first time, in consequence of such instrument, order, decree or award, the case would be covered by the exception contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 14. In such a case sub-s. (1) will not at all apply". This case only supports the view that I am taking. 17. In this view, it must be held that Smt. Sahdei became a full owner of the osara and the dalan in suit which she was possessed of on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. She was, therefore, competent to sell them to the defendant-appellant by the sale deed dated the 15th March 1965. 18. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiffs suit is restored with costs throughout.