JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Aggrieved against concurrent decrees of two Courts below in suit for specific performance defendant has approached this Court by way of second appeal and seeks dismissal of suit for plaintiffs failure of averring, and proving requirement of S. 16 (c) of Specific Relief of Act. 2. In none of the courts below this controversy was raised and contest was confined only to genuineness of deed of reconveyance, its enforcement after commencement of ZA & LR Act and limitation but it cannot be disputed that it goes to root and if accepted shall result in dismissal of suit. Before noticing facts it is worthwhile to notice the provision itself and its elucidation by Supreme Court and this Court. 3. Section 16 : Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a # person - (a) (b)..... (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation - For the purposes of clause (c) : i. where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the Court : ii. the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." While interpreting this provision the Supreme Court in G. Pillai v. P. Nadar, ( AIR 1967 SC 868 ) observed at page 873. "Before he could be awarded a decree for specific performance, the respondent had to prove his readiness and willingness continuously from the date of the contract all the date of hearing of the suit and if he failed in that, his suit was liable to fail". In Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Baijnath Singh ( AIR 1981 All 410 ) it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court. "The requirement of law is twofold (i) that he must aver in the plaint and (ii) that he must prove by evidence that plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Baijnath Singh ( AIR 1981 All 410 ) it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court. "The requirement of law is twofold (i) that he must aver in the plaint and (ii) that he must prove by evidence that plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The plaintiff cannot be allowed succeed if he fails in fulfilling of the obligation enjoined by law". Reliance was placed by learned counsel for respondent on Prag Datt v. Smt. Saraswati Devi, ( AIR 1982 All 37 ) Where a single Judge of this Court relying in Ramesh Chandra Chandak v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal, ( AIR 1971 SC 1238 ) observed that 'requirements of S. 16 (c) are not to be interpreted narrowly and in a hypertechnical manner. May be but what transpires from these decisions is that the provision is mandatory and failure of plaintiff to comply with any of the requirement is fatal. 4. Having dealt with legal aspect it may now be examined how far it is applicable to the facts of the case. In paragraph 5 of the plaint it has been stated that plaintiff was willing and ready to get the property reconveyed and is still willing to purchase it. The first requirement of S. 16 (c) wais, therefore, complete. But there was serious divergence of opinion on the second requirement namely, its proof. In the circumstances of the case, however, fulfilment of second requirement became impossible. Mool Chand, since deceased, the principal actor exploited both defendant-appellant and plaintiff-respondent taking advantage of circumstances as and when they arose. First he transferred Khudkast land on 28th June, 1958 in favour of appellant before abolition of Zamindari in 1965 then sold half of it after abolition of Zamindari on 22nd April, 1970 in favour of respondent. To be accurate he did not sell bhumidhari but litigation (sic) as he filed a suit for specific performance along with them but turned hostile when appeared in witness-box thereby rendering plaintiff helpless and leaving a lacuna which the defendant is keen to exploit. To be accurate he did not sell bhumidhari but litigation (sic) as he filed a suit for specific performance along with them but turned hostile when appeared in witness-box thereby rendering plaintiff helpless and leaving a lacuna which the defendant is keen to exploit. Omission to deny specifically allegations in paragraph 5 of the plaint where it was averred that plaintiff was willing to repurchase the property and is still willing was attempted to be argued as an admission under O. VIII R. 5 of Civil P. C. therefore, discharging plaintiff from liability to prove the same. That, however, appears to be doubtful. But Mool Chand having turned hostile the requirement of proving the willingness to repurchase till the date of hearing became impossible to be proved. The impossibility arose not because of plaintiffs failure but the unbecoming conduct of Mool Chand for which the plaintiff cannot be non-suited. The law does not require impossible to be performed. 5. Failing in his effort to get the suit dismissed on this short ground which was earlier heard as preliminary argument appellant fell back on the plea of limitation which has been decided in negative by two courts below. Reliance was placed on Article 54 of Indian Limitation and it was urged, as was done in Courts below, that agreement of reconveyance having been entered in 1958 and the appellant having refused to reconvey the property in response to notice in 1963 suit should have been filed within three years, particularly when Mool Chand admitted in his statement on oath that after receiving reply of appellant refusing to reconvey the property he remained quiet. Learned counsel maintained that even accepting the terms of agreement that property could be reconveyanced within twelve years this period stood curtailed once the right was exercised but the appellant refused to comply with it. Therefore, the limitation started running from the date of refusal and as the suit was filed much beyond three years it was liable to be dismissed. 6. Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act the limitation to file a suit for specific performance is three years from 'the date fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.' The argument of appellant is obviously founded on latter part of the Article. 6. Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act the limitation to file a suit for specific performance is three years from 'the date fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.' The argument of appellant is obviously founded on latter part of the Article. But it could apply only, if no date is fixed for performance of contract. It has been found concurrently by two Courts below that the term fixed for reconveyancing under -the agreement was twelve years. It was not vague and did not require any probing into the intention of parties. Nor can the argument of curtailment of period be accepted on reply to notice given in 1963. Denial of appellant that no agreement was entered remained of no consequence once it has been found that agreement was entered. And so long the period fixed was twelve years it did not stand curtailed by sitting quiet of Mool Chand. 7. Faced with this problem appellant attempted to assail the finding on agreement and the period fixed under it. It was urged that sale deed having been entered on 28-6-1958 and the deed of reconveyance on 26-6-1958(?), the next day, it does not stand to reason that the date of sale mentioned in it would have been incorrect. The suggestion was that it was a concocted document manufactured or produced for purposes of this suit. Reliance was placed on Bhagwan Din v. Gourishanker, ( AIR 1957 All 119 ) and it was urged that the trial Court acted illegally in adopting the role of expert. According to learned counsel the signature having been denied its authenticity should have been got established by expert evidence. Neither of the submissions appears to have any merit. It has been found by appellate Court that the appellant did not take any step to call any expert and relied on bare denial of his signature. But the execution of agreement was found established after consideration of oral evidence of scribe and one of the witnesses of the agreement. Their testimony was further found corroborated by statement of Mool Chand who although turned hostile had to admit that he had asked appellants to reconveyancing the property. Added to this is the circumstance of notice Ext. A.4 for reconveyancing the property in 1963. Their testimony was further found corroborated by statement of Mool Chand who although turned hostile had to admit that he had asked appellants to reconveyancing the property. Added to this is the circumstance of notice Ext. A.4 for reconveyancing the property in 1963. Without there being any agreement one would not just for the fun of it would have asked the appellant to reconveyance the property. The finding, therefore, that there was an agreement to reconvey appears to be unimpeachable. Its illegality for non-examination of expert evidence also does not appear to have any substance. Expert evidence is for the assistance of Court. If the appellant did not pray for expert evidence and the Court has recorded the finding after examining the signatures it cannot be assailed in second appeal. 8. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed. But parties shall bear their own costs.