JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - The suit giving rise to this Second Appeal was dismissed by the trial Court on the finding that although the relief of injunction was claimed, in substance it was an action for declaration of plaintiffs title to agricultural land, and the suit was as such triable exclusively by the revenue Court. The lower appellate Court confirmed the finding and the decree dismissing the suit. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the view of the two Courts below that the suit was triable exclusively by the revenue court was erroneous, and, at any rate, even if it be so, the proper order to pass was not to dismiss the suit but to direct the return of the plaint for presentation to the Court competent to entertain it. 2. The following are the allegations in the plaint. 2. The following are the allegations in the plaint. The plaintiffs and the defendants second set were zamindars of the land in suit which was situate within the limits of the Nagar Palika of Deoria and the zamindari was abolished there in the year 1961, that there was a complete separation between the plaintiffs and the defendants second set some forty years before the suit and the fields and the houses, every thing, had been divided; that the land in suit was occupied by an Asami who was evicted by a suit under S. 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and possession was obtained by due process of law on the 9th April, 1946 in execution of the decree in that suit and the land was continuously in cultivators possession of the plaintiffs since April, 1946 up to the date of vesting under the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1957, and being the plaintiffs Khudkast they became its bhumidhars; that the defendants second set never had any right or possession in the land in suit; but even if they had any connection, all their right was lost by the plaintiffs adverse possession for over 90 years as the owners of the land and the names of the defendants second set were fictitiously entered thereon; that they became dishonest, the first defendant was their lawyer and his father was a Mukhtar and was an old Mukhtar of the defendants second set, defendant No. 3 was their Munshi and they all conspired together and obtained a collusive decree on the basis of the admission from the revenue Court on the 17th Dec., 1957. That decree was claimed to be null and void on the grounds of collusion, fraud and undue influence. It was then said that when the plaintiffs came to know of the said decree in 1963 by chance, on obtaining a copy of the entry from the revenue records, they applied for setting it aside in the revenue Court and that matter was still pending before the Board of revenue, but even so the present suit was being filed by ignoring that decree as not binding on the plaintiffs as they were not parties thereto. The immediate cause of action for the suit was alleged to be the attempt made by the defendants third set on the 16th July, 1965 to enclose the land by a wall and to raise constructions thereon. The relief originally claimed was that a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit and from raising any construction thereon or changing its character, as also for removal of any building material or constructions on the land that may be found at the time of the passing of the decree. 3. By an amendment of the plaint, it was alleged that from the reply of defendant No. 9, it appeared that he had obtained a fictitious sale deed dated the 4th June, 1965 from the defendants Nos. 1 to 3. That sale deed was alleged to be fictitious, collusive and without consideration and not binding on the plaintiffs and a further relief was claimed for cancellation of that sale deed as null and void. 4. The real cause of action for the suit, as apparent from the plaint, was the decree dated the 17th Dec., 1957 said to have been obtained by the defendants first set under Sections 59/61 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. One could understand the institution of a suit in the civil Court for cancellation of that decree of the revenue Court on the ground that it was fraudulent and collusive and may on this ground be adjudged null and void, but the plaint expressly states that the plaintiffs had applied for setting aside of that decree in the revenue court itself and the matter was pending before the Board of Revenue. In face of that declaratory decree of the revenue Court, it would be difficult for the civil Court to come to a finding that the plaintiffs are the rightful bhumidhars in possession of the land in suit and entitled as such to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession, unless the civil Court adjudges that decree to be null and void, and in effect passes a decree cancelling it. But the plaintiffs have alleged that the decree of the revenue court is not binding on them and they can ignore it. But the plaintiffs have alleged that the decree of the revenue court is not binding on them and they can ignore it. While it may be possible for a court to ignore an instrument, on coming to a finding that the plaintiff is the owner or the person entitled to the property to which the instrument relates and that not being the executant of the instrument or a person claiming under that instrument the plaintiff is not bound thereby, and need not have it adjudged null and void, it is not possible to say the same in respect of a decree of a Court. The decree of the revenue Court declares the defendants first set to be the tenants of the land in suit. The plaintiffs can prove the right claimed by them only on having that decree adjudged null and void and unless the decree is adjudged null and void, the civil Court, and indeed no court can hold that any person has any right in the property contrary to the declaration contained in the decree. The decree stands unless set aside by a Court of appeal or revision, or adjudged null and void and cancelled by a Civil Court. 5. Instead of having the decree adjudged null and void and consequently cancelled, the plaintiffs say that they can ignore it and have prayed for cancellation of a sale deed executed by the defendants first set in favour of the defendants third set. Now, if the decree stands, the sale deed too cannot be cancelled and if the sale deed cannot be cancelled, the plaintiffs cannot get the relief of injunction claimed by them, unless of course they establish that it was not necessary for them to have the sale deed cancelled. 6. The substance of the matter was, as observed by the lower appellate Court, that the plaintiffs want a declaration of their title to the land in suit. That undoubtedly is within the jurisdiction of the revenue Court. It may be that the revenue Court may find it difficult to do so unless the earlier decree is set aside on the application said to have been already made by the plaintiffs. At any rate, the plaintiffs not having claimed a cancellation of that decree, neither of the two reliefs claimed by them could be granted by the civil Court on the cause of action alleged by them. At any rate, the plaintiffs not having claimed a cancellation of that decree, neither of the two reliefs claimed by them could be granted by the civil Court on the cause of action alleged by them. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants did not care to inform the Court of the result of the application made before the revenue Court for setting aside of that decree. May be that decree has already been set aside and the suit reopened and in that case it may be easily possible for the plaintiffs to sue for declaration of their rights in the revenue Court. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants cited Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 Rev Dec 470 (FB). It is the main relief, on the cause of action alleged, which is determinative of the question whether the suit is entertain able by the civil Court or not. If, on the cause of action alleged, relief could be had in the revenue Court, that Court alone has jurisdiction. As demonstrated above, the basic relief, which ought to have been claimed in this case, was the cancellation of the decree of the revenue Court dated the 17th Dec., 1957, under Sections 59/61 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. But .that relief was deliberately not claimed and it was alleged that the decree could be ignored. If the decree could be ignored as alleged by the plaintiffs, the main relief claimable by them was a declaration that they are the bhumidhars of the land in suit and neither of the three sets of the defendants have any concern with the same. The relief of injunction could not be granted in this case without such a declaration, nor could be relief of cancellation of the sale deed be granted unless it were held that the plaintiffs are, and the defendants are not the bhumidhars of the land in suit. 8. As to the contention that the plaint ought to have been returned for presentation to the Court competent to try it, it is sufficient to observe that the plaint, as it stands, is not entertain able by the revenue Court. It will have to be drastically amended and the Gaon Sabha and the State of Uttar Pradesh will have to be impleaded as defendants. It will have to be drastically amended and the Gaon Sabha and the State of Uttar Pradesh will have to be impleaded as defendants. The only advantage of ordering the return of the plaint is the saving on Court fee which the plaintiff has paid and some cases the proof of which the plaintiff gets by way of endorsement on the plaint of the dates on which it was presented and the date on which it was ordered to be returned, for purposes of claiming exclusion of that time in computing the limitation. But neither of these two considerations are material in this case. The Court fee payable on a suit for declaration in a revenue Court is negligible, and no limitation is prescribed for declaration of rights. do not think it worthwhile to dilate upon this part of the case as think it would do no harm to the plaintiffs if they have to present a properly drawn up plaint in a Court of competent jurisdiction. That they can do so admits of no doubt as the suit has not been dismissed on the merits, but on technical grounds relating to jurisdiction and procedure of Courts. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.