JUDGMENT : 1. "Shocking scarcity of a chhappar, roof to rest" results in stretching of the bones on payment of Chopati Kalba Devi, Bada Bajar, Dharam Tala, Chandni Chowk, Panch Batti and Sojati Gate, the prestigious shopping Centres, exposing the gyprocratic flooded lights over dark dry shopping skeletons of poor, down trodden pavement dwellers India, have compelled the 'patrogonists of social justice' to adopt beneficial interpretation for protecting tenants from evictions under the Rent Control laws of the land. But the ingenuity of the legislators sat and resourceful segment of landlord lawyers want to overstep intention of the legislators and crusadors of 'social justice' by enacting 'Merchant of Venice and Portia' to make tenants defenceless and deprive them from the valuable right of defence against the ejectment, by hyper technical interpretation of sub-sections (2), (3) & (5) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950. 2. The point of debate in the instant case therefore is between the interpretation of rent laws in consonance with 'social justice' against the hair splitting interpretation based on blind law by accepting "Pound of flesh and not a drop of blood", Shakespeare's Portia's obsolete and outdated classics. 3. I am far from having attraction of being theoretic, when I recapitulate what Mahabharat's Abhimanyu said when he was locked unarmed in Chaker-Vyuh. National poet Maithli Sharan Gupt in his famous verse Jaydath Vadh' depicts what Arjun's son exclaimed to armed Kaurvays:- nks 'kkL= igys rqe eq>s] fQj ;q) rqe eq>ls djks] nks LokFkZ lk/ku ds fy,] er iki iFk esa ix /kjks Give me the arms first and then fight with me. For your selfish motive, do not commit the sin of killing me unarmed." 4. Dharam Shastras emphasised Dharam Yudh. Are we to revert back to stone age in space age by interpreting rule of law to mean denial of defence on hyper technicalities, and hair splitting unreal and antisocial legal gimmics and gymnastics. 5. The tenant has been left 'high and dry' by accepting 'blind justice' interpretation by the lower Courts, leading to his eviction, by depriving him of his basic right of defence. Should this Court 'Ditto it or Veto it", is the billion dollar question in this controversy where two unequals are pitched against each other. 6. 5. The tenant has been left 'high and dry' by accepting 'blind justice' interpretation by the lower Courts, leading to his eviction, by depriving him of his basic right of defence. Should this Court 'Ditto it or Veto it", is the billion dollar question in this controversy where two unequals are pitched against each other. 6. The acid test for interpreting sub-sections (2), (3), (4) & (5) of Section 13 after introduction of Section 13-A would be "Voices of Graves" v. "Writing on wall" "Station" v. "Pragmatism and Dynamism", and "Portia's Pound of Flesh Drama" v. Felt necessities of times", "Social Justice v. Bind Justice", the latter many a time partakes the character of denial of justice and not only makes the phrase justice misnomer but makes a mockery of it. 7. The battle lines of interpretation on law have now become patent on the legal horizon where one terms it as legislation in the name of interpretation or expanding new dimension of social justice. It is visible that two divergent Schools of Interpretation can safely be termed as Krishna Iyer, J. Gajendragadkar, J., Homes J., v. Hidayatullah, J. Lord Denning School. The Iyer, J. Schools tries to be radical dynamic and pragmatic as crusaders of 'social justice'. Hidayatullah, J., School emphasises static and precedents oriented strict legal approach by preferring to remain blind to the social needs and socio-economic or revaluation warrants of the country. 8. And now the traditional facts. The plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment with regard to a shop, against the defendant on the ground of non-payment of rent, material alteration, sub-letting and nuisance. The defendant contested the suit on all counts. Regarding non-payment of rent, the defendant admitted that six months rent was due against him but his plea was that he offered the rent to the plaintiffs but they refused to accept it. The appellant, therefore, sent the rent by money order but that too was refused. The defendant was therefore not a defaulter. On 8.11.1967, the Court ordered the appellant to deposit arrears of rent and also future rent by the fifteenth of every month. The appellant deposited the arrears and also continued depositing the rent monthly. The trial Court framed issues on 19.12.1967 but no issue regarding default was framed. The defendant was therefore not a defaulter. On 8.11.1967, the Court ordered the appellant to deposit arrears of rent and also future rent by the fifteenth of every month. The appellant deposited the arrears and also continued depositing the rent monthly. The trial Court framed issues on 19.12.1967 but no issue regarding default was framed. The plaintiffs filed an application on 25.9.1968 under Section 13(6) stating therein that the defendant has not deposited rent within time for the months of June, July and August 1968 and so his defence should be struck off. The defendant submitted that since 4.8.1968 he had been suffering from peptic Ulcer and was an indoor patient in the Hospital. He has deposited the rent and the delay be condoned. The trial Court condoned the delay and dismissed the application of the plaintiffs. On appeal the learned District Judge held that the rent for the month of August has been deposited late by one day, so he struck off the defence of the appellant. Therefore, the defendant moved an application for framing an issue regarding the plea of default and the trial Court framed the same. The plaintiffs filed revision petition in this Hon'ble Court and the issue regarding default was deleted. The trial Court then recorded the evidence of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit on all counts. The defendant went in appeal, and the learned appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial Court on the issue of sub-letting, but confirmed the finding on other issues and dismissed the appeal. 9. In this second appeal Mr. Tikku, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the defence of the defendant was wrongly struck-off. It was pointed out that the respondent was indoor patient in the hospital on 17.9.1968. The monthly rent was to be deposited by 15.9.1968. The cash-challan was presented on 13.9.1968, but was signed by the Munsarim on 14.9.1968, 15.9.1968 was Sunday, so the challan was given to the defendant on 16.9.1968. As the respondent was indoor patient in the hospital, the rent was deposited on 17.9.1968. 10. Mr. Tikku also submitted that in any case since his application under Section 13-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, has been accepted and the amount of arrears of rent, cost, interest have been deposited now the order striking off the defence has become nugatory and cannot be given effect to. 10. Mr. Tikku also submitted that in any case since his application under Section 13-A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, has been accepted and the amount of arrears of rent, cost, interest have been deposited now the order striking off the defence has become nugatory and cannot be given effect to. According to Mr. Tikku the effect of compliance of Section 13-A is that the order striking off defence should also be treated as nullity and ineffective. On this hypothesis Mr. Tikku argues that since he was not allowed to lead defence evidence on various other grounds of nuisance etc., the case should now be remanded to the trial Court after setting aside the decree of eviction. 11. Mr. Bhandari has controverted the above submissions of Mr. Tikku. According to Mr. Bhandari the defence of medical certificate was never pressed before the trial Court and the trial Court condoned the delay on the ground that there were two holidays and this has been found to be wrong by the first appellate Court. 12. Mr. Bhandari then contended that this Court in Jagdish Prasad v. Firozibai, 1981 RLW 171 has held that the Amending Act of 1965 would not affect the liability created on the tenant by the earlier law so far sub-sections (4), (5), (6) of the Act is concerned. It was observed as under : "A combined reading of the provision of sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 of the Act as they existed prior to the amendments of 1975 and 1976 and which have been reproduced above would show that if a tenant fails to deposit or pay the rent for any month by the fifteenth of the succeeding month the Court has no option but to strike out the defence and proceed on with the hearing of the suit. In other words, the tenant by committing a default in that behalf incurs a liability of his defence against eviction being struck out mandatorily under sub-section (6) reproduced above. In view of the provisions of Section 6, Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 it is obvious that the tenants defence against eviction in the present case could be struck out under sub-section (6) of Section 13 as it existed before the amendments enacted herein during the pendency of the suit. In view of the provisions of Section 6, Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 it is obvious that the tenants defence against eviction in the present case could be struck out under sub-section (6) of Section 13 as it existed before the amendments enacted herein during the pendency of the suit. There was no dispute between the parties on the present rate at which rent was payable by the tenants. They admitted the rate to be Rs. 25/- per mensem and deposited the amount of arrears calculated at that rate on April 5, 1973. They had by that token alone incurred a liability under sub-section (4) of Section 13... continue to deposit or pay month by month by the fifteenth of each succeeding month the rent at the rate of Rs. 25/- per mensem. The repeal of sub-section (4) of Section 13 and its replacement by a new provision during the pendency of the suit could not, to quote the language of Section 6(c) Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955, "affect any liability incurred under any enactment so repealed" and it could not as Section 6(c) further provides; 'affect any legal proceeding for remedy in respect of any such liability... any such... legal proceeding or remedy may be continued or enforced as if the repealing law had not been passed." These quotes from Section 61 leave no manner of doubt that in the absence or any thing to the contrary in the Rajasthan Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 of the Amending Act No. 14 of 1976 which repealed and replaced sub-sections (4), (5) & (6) of the then existing Section 13 by substantially altered provisions, the rights and the liabilities of the parties as they existed at the time of repeal and re-enactment had to be enforced and the suit had to be continued as if the repealing law had not been passed. There is nothing in Ordinance No. 26 of 1975 or Amending Act No. 14 of 1976 which may be legitimately construed as destructive of old rights and liabilities acquired and incurred under Sections 13(4), (5) and (6) of the Act prior to the supersession of these provisions by the Amending and Repealling enactments aforementioned. 13. Mr. Tikku learned counsel for the appellant controverted this submission by Mr. Bhandari. Mr. 13. Mr. Tikku learned counsel for the appellant controverted this submission by Mr. Bhandari. Mr. Tikku pointed out that the amendment introduced by incorporation of Section 13A was expressly meant to provide benefit to the tenant as would be evidence from its objects and reasons. It was pointed out that Section 13A provides a complete remedy and protective umbrella to a tenant against ejectment on the ground of default in case he avails of the opportunity of moving an application as contemplated under sub-clause (b) of Section 13A and pays the amount in compliance of order. Emphasis was laid on the following words : proceedings shall be disposed of if tenant has not committed any default contained in sub-section (b) of Section 13A. 14. Mr. Tikku also pointed out that Section 13A was not under consideration and adjudication in the decision of (1) Jagdish Prasad v. Firozibai (supra) referred by Mr. Bhandari. The learned counsel pointed out that the provisions contained in Section 13A were aimed at providing benefit and protection to the tenants and since it is a beneficial legislation this Court should not interpret it strictly in such a manner that while on the one hand the Legislature intended to give benefit and provide protection the interpretation done by this Court takes that by holding that although he would not be evicted on the ground of default, yet, there is no remedy for his eviction on the other ground for which he had no opportunity to lead defence evidence and cross-examination solely because his defence was struck off for non-payment of rent as contemplated by sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Section 13. Mr. Tikku pointed out that sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) come into play only if there is a bedrock and ground (a) of Section 13, which means that unless there is ground of default sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 cannot be invoked. On these premises it was argued that once that ground disappeared on account of effect of Section 13A and the tenant complying with the requirement of the legislation by paying the rent within the time prescribed under sub-clause (b) thereafter sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 will have no application at all. 15. Mr. On these premises it was argued that once that ground disappeared on account of effect of Section 13A and the tenant complying with the requirement of the legislation by paying the rent within the time prescribed under sub-clause (b) thereafter sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 will have no application at all. 15. Mr. Bhandari confronted with the above situation that rights and liabilities incurred under sub-sections (3), (4), (5) and (6) were never intended to be taken away by the introduction of Section 13A by the Amendment Act of 1976. It was argued that it was intended that protection must be provided against default and nothing more. It was also argued that if the view as canvassed by Mr. Tikku is taken then it will also become nugatory and tenant would be protected even from ejectment in case of second default. 16. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have given my thoughtful consideration to the issue involved, as there is no precedent on this particular point as it has emerged during argument in this case. It is note-worthy that Section 13(1)(a) provides for evicting tenant on the ground of non-payment and non-tendering of rent for six months. Sub-clauses (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) and (l) provide different grounds for eviction. The present one is a composite suit in which there were various grounds in addition to the ground of default. 17. In this composite suit on the basis of the finding of the first appellate Court it can be assumed that default was committed by the tenant and that the tenant further did not comply with the requirement of sub-clause (4) in as much as he failed to deposit the rent by fifteenth of the next month, the logical consequence was that under sub-section (6) his defence was struck off, this striking of the defence was not limited to the ground of default only; but it was depriving tenant from an opportunity to lead defence evidence in respect of other grounds viz. sub-letting, nuisance material alteration etc. 18. sub-letting, nuisance material alteration etc. 18. In a situation like this it is not in dispute that if the ground of default would not have been there the defendant would not have been deprived of that opportunity to lead defence evidence and there would not have been occasion of striking off the defence. In other words the situation of striking of defence arises only because there was a ground of default and on account of sub-clause (4) it became applicable. 19. The crucial question which requires consideration is whether in a case where there are a number of grounds for eviction in addition to the ground of default if a tenant fails to deposit the rent and interest etc. (sic). 20. In order to test the proposition advanced by the learned counsel for the parties which are divergent it would be proper to take an illustration of a case in which the suit remains pending. The tenant takes the benefit of Section 13A, then the entire amount with interest is deposited and on account of that the ground of default disappeared but the evidence continues for other issues regarding subletting, nuisance and material alterations. After sometime, he fails to deposit the rent on 15th of the next month as per the earlier order passed and as per the effect of sub-section (3). In a situation of this nature whether the Court would be competent to strike off the defence now ? In other words the question posed above raises a serious question whether after the main ground of default has gone and disappeared the subsidiary and secondary sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) would continue to apply. 21. It is to be noted that this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in interpretation of beneficial legislation like the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, or any such Rent Control Laws, the approach of the Court should be liberal so to protect the tenant from eviction. In Santosh Mehta v. Omprakash, AIR 1980 SC 1664 their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under:- "Striking out defence of a tenant is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. In Santosh Mehta v. Omprakash, AIR 1980 SC 1664 their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under:- "Striking out defence of a tenant is a harsh extreme and having regard to the benign scheme of the legislation this drastic power is meant for use in grossly recalcitrant situations where a tenant is guilty of disregard in paying rent. That is why a discretion is vested not a mandate imposed. Striking out a party's defence is an exceptional step, not a routine visitation of a punitive extreme following upon a mere failure to pay rent. First of all there must be failure to pay rent which in the context indicates wilful failure deliberate default or volitional non-performance. Secondly, the section provides no automatic weapon but prescribes a wise discretion, inscribes on mechanical consequence but invests a power to overcome intransigence. Thus if a tenant fails or refuses to pay or deposit rent and the Court discerns a mood of defiance or gross neglect the tenant may forfeit his right to be heard in defence. It will be noted that Section 15(7) is not couched in mandatory language. It uses the word may there is no indication whatsoever in the Act to show that the exercise of the defence under tenant failed to deposit or pay any amount as required by Section 15. The provisions contained in Section 15(7) of the Act are directory and not mandatory the effect of striking out of the defence under Section 15(7) is that the tenant is deprived of the protection given by Section 14 and therefore the powers under Section 15(7) must be exercised with the circumspection. In Jagannath v. Jodha Ram, 1980 RLW 42 I had an occasion to discuss this aspect of the case. It was observed as under:- "15. This Act has been made for providing protection to the tenants against ejectments merely on whom or caprice of landlord permitting the ejectments on certain grounds is only and on the basis of the certain condition only. "16. This legislation on the urban areas is analogous to the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance wherein protection was provided to cultivators of agricultural fields in village. The problem of getting a roof over the head, is problem of serious magnitude. The housing problem and the fast changing notions of social economic philosophy in this country gave rise to various rent control legislation. The problem of getting a roof over the head, is problem of serious magnitude. The housing problem and the fast changing notions of social economic philosophy in this country gave rise to various rent control legislation. Hon'ble Justice Iyer in B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan, has described it as problem of shocking scarcity of a roof to rest" Lakhs of down trodden poor labourers, workmen stretch their bones on footpaths, pavements of Chopati & Kalba Devi in Bombay Bada Bazar and Dharamtalla in Calcutta, Chandni Chowk & Connaught at Circus of Delhi, Panchbatti, Mizra Ismail Road of Jaipur and Sojati Gate of Jodhpur whether it is chilling cold of December or scorching heat of June, after working for the whole day like chattels and struggling for two square meals. "17. "Calcutta or Cochin for the urban people of India the shocking scarcity of a roof to rest one's an unhappy problem of social justice for that enactment of control of rent and eviction laws", observed Hon'ble Justice Iyer of Supreme Court. 18. The Rent Control Legislations are therefore beneficial legislations to protect tenants from being thrown on roads merely on the wagers, whims, fancy and greed of landlords. Such being the beneficial nature of legislation aimed for social justice the interpretation and construction of such statute should also be beneficial & liberal" in favour of tenants, of course, without doing any violence to statute. It is also on account of this that I have taken the view that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply for counting the period of payment of rent in compliance of provisions of Sections 13(3) and (4) of the Act." 22. It is also on account of this that I have taken the view that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply for counting the period of payment of rent in compliance of provisions of Sections 13(3) and (4) of the Act." 22. Almost similar view was taken by another Hon'ble Judge of this Court in Sal Chand v. Sant Ram, 1978 RLW 119, in which it was observed as under:- "Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 - Section 13(4) Amendment in the provisions of Section 13(4) have been made so as to remove the hardships to the tenant where he is unable to deposit the rent month by month within the specified time on account of some genuine difficulties of unforeseen obstacle in his way or for reasons beyond his control and beneficial construction should be given to the amended provisions of sub-section (4) in the light of the purpose for which the amendment has been introduced in this section of Act." 23. Even if strict interpretation is taken of Section 13 and its various clauses, I have not got the slightest hesitation in holding that the entire pyramid of sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 which provides for determination of arrears of rent, giving of time for payment of it requiring the tenant to pay the rent by fifteenth of the next month and consequent default in such compliance is based on and has been built on the bedrock of sub-clause 13(1)(a) which reads as under:- "(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor-tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months." The amended Section 13A later introduced is as under : "13A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters:- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law : (a) No Court shall in any proceeding on the date of commencement of the amending Ordinance pass any decree in favour of landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord or deposits in Court; within such time such aggregate of the rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the Court under and in accordance with that clause." 24. If in a given case on account of the application of Section 13A the effect of sub-clause 13(1)(a) disappears and which in the eye of law becomes non-existent for all intents and purposes then the entire pyramid falls flat on the floor. It is difficult to imagine a situation where a tenant can be deprived of the opportunity of leading evidence in defence for sub-letting or for other grounds even after the ground of default under sub-clause (a) disappeared on account of compliance of sub-clause (b) of Section 13A of the Act. In my considered view sub-clause (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 of the Act ceased to apply in a composite suit which was based also on the ground of default but that ground of default disappeared and has become non-existent in the eye of law on account of payment of rent after its adjudication under Section 13A of the Act. I am of the opinion that sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) are subsidiary and sub-servient and corollary to sub-clause (a) of Section 13(1) and they are dependent and not independent. I am of the considered view that they have no separate existence of their own. Once the ground (a) disappears and becomes non-existent on account of legislative mandate of Section 13(a)(b) then an order passed under sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) will not adversely affect the rights of the tenant. 25. I am in agreement with the submissions made by Mr. Tikku while deciding the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Firzobai (supra) neither Section 13A was under debate nor it was adjudicated upon. 25. I am in agreement with the submissions made by Mr. Tikku while deciding the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Firzobai (supra) neither Section 13A was under debate nor it was adjudicated upon. It would be too much to read in this judgment that Section 13A has been discussed and decided by implication. 26. In view of the above I am not required to consider whether the principle laid down in Jagdish Prasad v. Firozibai lays down good law, although Mr. Tikku has termed it, 'bad law". 27. So far as the present case is concerned I am convinced that both on the principle of beneficial interpretation as well as strict interpretation the only judicial and legal interpretation which is possible is that the moment the tenant complied with the order of Section 13A(b) and deposited the rent etc., the ground of default disappeared and along with it all these corollaries and subsidiaries in the form of sub-clauses (3), (4), (5) and (6) the liabilities arising from them disappeared for all intents and purposes. 28. It is not in dispute in this case the defence was struck out and the tenant was not allowed to lead the evidence in defence on the ground of material alteration nuisance and sub-letting. 29. Before parting with this case I must state that if the legislature wanted or wants that a tenant who cannot pay rent has got on right to stay then it should amend Sections 13(2), (3) & (4) in explicit terms to apply them to all suits for eviction under Section 13 of the Act. In other words, sub-section (2) should not be kept related to only ground of default under sub-section (a) but it should be extended to all sub-clauses from (a) to (i) to cover all grounds viz., material alteration, sub-letting, denial of title etc., unless that is done the interpretation which I have taken of sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5) of Section 13 is the only possible interpretation. 30. The result of the above discussion is that this appeal succeeds, the judgments and decrees of both the lower Courts are set aside and the suit is remanded to the first appellate Court with the direction that treating the order of striking out the defence as ineffective, as the tenant has taken advantage of Section 13A of the Act the trial Court should decided the case according to law. 31. The parties would bear their own costs of this appeal as well as of the first appellate Court as this would be the first case of interpretation of the sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 13 and there was no precedent.Appeal allowed.