JUDGMENT K. N. Goyal, J. 1. KHATA No. 109 in dispute which consists of about 23 plots in all was recorded in the basic year khatauni in the name of Girdhari Lal, the original respondent no. 1 alone. The petitioner Sriram preferred a claim before the consolidation authorities contending that he had one-half share therein. Girdhari Lal and Sriram were descendants of a common ancestor. The Consolidation Officer allowed the petitioner's claim in respect of three plots only. On appeal preferred by the opposite party the Settlement Officer dismissed the claim of the petitioner and held that the entire land belonged to the opposite party. The petitioner filed a revision, and on that revision the Dy. Director upheld the petitioner's claim in respect of one half share over the entire holding and not merely in respect of three plots as had been held by the Consolidation Officer. Aggrieved by this decision of the Dy. Director the opposite party filed a Writ Petition No. 22 of 1975 in this court contending that the opposite party was the sole tenure holder of the land to the exclusion of the petitioner, that the judgment of the Settlement Officer was correct, and that the Dy. Director had wrongly interfered with that order. During the pendency of this writ petition a compromise petition was filed in this Court signed by both the parties and their counsel. A copy of that compromise petition dated 16-8-66 is Annexure C-1 to the counter-affidavit. This compromise petition consists of five paragraphs. The first paragraph recites the subject matter of the dispute ; the second paragraph recites the findings of the Dy. Director. The third paragraph runs as follows :- "That the petitioner and opposite party no. 1 have now agreed that the petitioner be given half share of the half share of opposite party no. 1 in the said plots. The petitioner will thus get three fourth share in the said plots." Para 4 then stated that out of the security money deposited by the petitioner in this court half be paid to the opposite party no. 1. Paragraph 5 stated that opposite parties 2 and 3 were discharged. This was followed by a prayer in which it was prayed that the court may be pleased to order that the compromise between the parties be recorded and. 1. Paragraph 5 stated that opposite parties 2 and 3 were discharged. This was followed by a prayer in which it was prayed that the court may be pleased to order that the compromise between the parties be recorded and. the petition be decided accordingly, and the consolidation authorities be directed to give effect to the compromise in their records. Upon this petition the following short order was passed by this Court :- "In this writ petition a compromise duly verified before the Deputy Registrar has been filed. I am, therefore, of opinion that the writ petition shall be dismissed without any order as to costs. If the parties wish to enforce the terms of the compromise or to get possession, they shall enter into a proper agreement in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Sd. B. N. Nigam 16-8-1966" 2. THE terms of this order seem to have emboldened the petitioner subsequently to repudiate the aforesaid compromise. THEreupon, the opposite party filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the Revenue Court about two years later. THE plaint of this suit has not been placed on the record but a copy of the same has been shown to me during the course of hearing by the learned counsel for the petitioner with the consent of the learned counsel for the opposite parties. THE plaint recites the course of the earlier litigation, and the opposite party ultimately rests his claim on the order of the Settlement Officer which was in his favour and in the alternative on the aforesaid compromise. Thus it was prayed that the opposite party be declared to be the sole , tenure-holder of the said khata or in the alternative to be co-sharer to the extent of three-fourths the share therein. THE suit was contested by the petitioner. It was contended that this court itself had not recorded or given effect to the compromise and the consolidation authorities had also not been approached to do so. As such, according to the petitioner, the suit in the revenue court was barred by section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as the revenue court could not go behind the decision of the Dy. As such, according to the petitioner, the suit in the revenue court was barred by section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as the revenue court could not go behind the decision of the Dy. Director which had become final in view of the dismissal of the earlier writ petition filed by the opposite party against it. The suit was decreed by the trial court. On first appeal the Additional Commissioner dismissed the suit but on second appeal the Board of Revenue decreed the suit to the extent of three-fourths share as per the aforesaid compromise. Aggrieved by this decision of the Board the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has contended that as the compromise had not been given effect to by this court in the earlier writ petition it was not open to the Revenue Court to have given effect to the same. It has also been argued that the so called compromise petition-Annexure C-1 was described in the title as an application under Or. 23 R. 1 CPC. Thus, the opposite party merely wanted to withdraw the writ petition and accordingly this court had dismissed the writ petition. So far as this argument is concerned it has no substance. A mere misdescription of the legal provision under which an application is made is of no consequence. The court has to look at the substance of the application and the prayer contained therein. There was no prayer in the application for withdrawal of the writ petition. Thus the reference to R. 1 of Or. 23 was clearly a misnomer and cannot be taken advantage of. The wordings of the prayer clearly indicated that the application was meant to be under Or. 23 R, 3 CPC or the principle underlying it to the extent the same may be applicable to a writ petition. There are conflicting views on the question whether a writ petition can be decided in accordance with a compromise. In some decisions, as in the instant case, it seems to have been assumed that such a decision is not possible and the only course permissible is to dismiss the writ petition in case the parties do not argue on it on merits. In some decisions, as in the instant case, it seems to have been assumed that such a decision is not possible and the only course permissible is to dismiss the writ petition in case the parties do not argue on it on merits. In other decisions particularly those arising out of civil disputes between private litigants where the validity of any order of administrative authorities relating to governmental functions is not involved, cases have been decided on the basis of compromise. It is however not open to the parties to canvass the correctness of the earlier order in the present case. The order passed by this court was of course binding on the parties. 5. A compromise however stands in the eye of law independently of any order of the court passed thereon. It has thus been held in Jokhan v. Ramdeo, 1966 RD 348 that although a compromise decree has no greater validity than the compromise on which it is founded, yet, even though the decree may be a nullity for want of jurisdiction the compromise may nonetheless survive. Thus irrespective whether any order was passed or not by this court on the basis of the compromise the compromise would still remain for whatever it is worth. It cannot be treated as obliterated merely because no*order in the terms desired by the parties was passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition. 6. WE have, therefore, to see what was the legal effect of the compromise. The contention of the learned counsel for the opposite party, Sri S. C. Misra, is that the compromise amounted to a family settlement. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri A. K. Shukla (followed by Sri R. K. Sharma) has countered this by pointing out that there was no reference to any family settlement either in the compromise petition or in the subsequent plaint under section 229-B. The mere fact that the compromise has not been described as a family settlement in the two documents is however not conclusive of the matter. It is a question of law as to whether the compromise in question did or did not amount to a family settlement. Even though the parties may describe the arrangement as a compromise it may still be treated as a family settlement if the requisite ingredients are found to be present. It is a question of law as to whether the compromise in question did or did not amount to a family settlement. Even though the parties may describe the arrangement as a compromise it may still be treated as a family settlement if the requisite ingredients are found to be present. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the compromise recorded in Annexure C-1 was meant to operate in future and it had not been already given effect to before it was filed in court, and for that reason it should not be treated to be a family settlement. I am not impressed by this argument. Para 3 of the application, already quoted, uses the words "have now agreed". The words "have now agreed" imply that an agreement had already been arrived at before it was placed before the court. There Is nothing In law to require as to how much earlier such an agreement or settlement, howsoever the same may be described, should have been arrived at. Is it necessary that such an settlement should have been arrived at a year, a month, a day or a minute earlier ? No specific time limit can be stipulated in this regard. When anything is put down in writing it is always preceded by an oral agreement. There is no requirement of law that a family settlement should have also been actually implemented outside the court before it is brought to the notice of the court. In the present case the only dispute consequential to non implementation of the compromise was as to whether the petitioner had one-half share in the khata or only one-fourth share therein. The dispute being about the correctness of the shares, the parties being undisputedly (according to the petitioners) co-sharers even according to the decision of the Dy. Director relied on by the petitioner the only way in which a compromise could have been given effect outside the court would be a recognition of the respective shares by the parties. This recognition was already embodied in the compromise petition. 7. IT has then been argued that after this court had passed an order dismissing the writ petition it was open to the parties to have applied for review to this Court asking for a decision of the petition on merits. Possibly it was so open to the opposite party. This recognition was already embodied in the compromise petition. 7. IT has then been argued that after this court had passed an order dismissing the writ petition it was open to the parties to have applied for review to this Court asking for a decision of the petition on merits. Possibly it was so open to the opposite party. But was the opposite party bound to do so instead of continuing to rely on the compromise 1 If the opposite party was advised to continue to rely on the compromise instead of seeking a decision of the writ petition on merits it cannot be held out against him. Again it has been argued that it was open to the opposite party to have applied to the consolidation authorities to give effect to the compromise. IT has however been admitted before me that the notification under section 52 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had already been issued on 7-5-66 i. e. more than three months before the compromise. As this court had not passed any direction to the consolidation authorities, Section 52 (2) was also not attracted and as such the consolidation authorities were clearly functus officio. The only course open In the circumstances was to have approached the revenue court. By giving effect to a family settlement arrived at between the parties subsequently to the close of consolidation operations the revenue court cannot be said to have acted contrary to Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 8. The only course open In the circumstances was to have approached the revenue court. By giving effect to a family settlement arrived at between the parties subsequently to the close of consolidation operations the revenue court cannot be said to have acted contrary to Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 8. NOW as to the ingredients of a family settlement, in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807 , para 10, it has been laid down by their lordships as follows :- "In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a (sic) form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions : (1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family ; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence ; (3) The family arrangements may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary ; (4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of section 17 (2) (sic) (section 17 (1) (b) ?) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable ; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlements. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same ; (6) Even if bona-fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement." In the instant case the parties did belong to a family. There did exist a dispute between the parties about the share. The parties did want to settle it. Under the compromise, each of the parties relinquished part of its claim. While the petitioner was earlier contending that he was co-sharer to the extent of one-half he accepted one-fourth share instead. The opposite party was contending that he was owner of the entire khata but he acquiesced in giving up his claim over one-fourth share out of it. There is nothing to show that the arrangement was not bona-fide or voluntary. Thus all the ingredients of a family settlement were satisfied in the instant case . No transfer of share was involved and as such it cannot be said that the arrangement was bad on the ground that transfar of Sridari rights was involved. A family settlement is a recognition of pre-existing rights, though it may operate in future. Such a mutual recognition of rights and relinquishment of claims does not amount to transfer. As such there was no bar under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to the arrangement being effect to. 9. THAT apart, even if there be any technical flaw in regard to the family settlement or compromise, howsoever the same may be described, the fact remains that the petitioner was voluntarily a party to the same. He had gained by the dismissal of the writ petition, inasmuch as in that writ petition the opposite party had claimed to be the exclusive tenure holder. Thus the position of the opposite party was altered to his disadvantage. It is therefore not open to the petitioner to turn round and now to say that the compromise should not bind him. Thus the position of the opposite party was altered to his disadvantage. It is therefore not open to the petitioner to turn round and now to say that the compromise should not bind him. He is estopped from doing 10. 10. WRIT jurisdiction is an equitable jurisdiction. If the petitioner had agreed to something under the circumstances set out above, and the impugned decision merely gives effect to what he had already agreed to, he cannot now be permitted to invoke the equitable and discretionary jurisdiction of this court on the basis of any technicality. In view of the above I find no force in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.