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1982 DIGILAW 8 (PAT)

Balmiki Prasad v. State of Bihar

1982-01-28

HARI LAL AGRAWAL, S.S.HASAN

body1982
JUDGMENT : Hari Lal Agrawal & Shamsul Hasan, JJ. This batch of fifteen writ applications raises common questions of fact and has been heard together and is being, disposed of herewith. All the fifteen writ petitioners were appointed in 4th grade in the Bihar State Dairy Corporation, Patna in its Muzaffarpur Unit in between the period of 27.9.1980 on an ad-hoc basis for a period of six months from the date of their respective appointments vide the letter of appointment issued to each of them separately by the Managing Director of the Corporation (respondent no. 2). Copies of those appointment letters have been annexed separately to each of the writ applications as Annexure 2. Before expiry of the said period of six months, another ORDER :was passed by the Managing Director on 28.3.1981 and on 30.3.1981, copies of which have been annexed as Annexure 3 to the writ petitions regularising their services. Inspite of the said ORDER :of regularising the services of the petitioners, the General Manager of the Muzaffarpur Unit State Dairy Corporation (respondent no. 3) served a letter of termination on each of the petitioners dated 2nd July, 1981 (Annexure-1) informing them that their services were terminated in the light of the Head Office ORDER :no. 3401 dated 30.6.1981 a copy of which is Annexure-4 to each of the writ applications. Annexure-4 was a confidential letter issued to the Plant Manager at Patna by the Corporations main office informing him that no payment should be made to all those employees who were employed by the erstwhile Managing Director on different posts on ad-hoc basis, As their services would be deemed to have automatically ended in accordance with the period of the service mentioned in the appointment letters. 2. The main thrust of the challenge on the termination ORDER :s on behalf of the petitioners was that, inasmuch as their services had been regularised, they ceased to be ad hoc appointees as such and therefore there was no basis for terminating the services. 3. Two counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondents. One counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and the other on behalf of respondent no. 3. The main defence that has been set up in support of the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) is that the Managing Director had no authority to make any appointment at all. Mr. One counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and the other on behalf of respondent no. 3. The main defence that has been set up in support of the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) is that the Managing Director had no authority to make any appointment at all. Mr. T.K. Jha, who appeared on behalf of the respondents with reference to the memorandum and articles of the Corporation as well as on the basis of resolution of the Corporation dated 23rd July, 1978 (Annexure-B) contained that the power of appointment of grade three and four employees was vested in an Establishment Committee or for that matter in the Board of Director and therefore the appointment of the petitioners were void ab initio and the ORDER :or the regularisation of their services did not confer any better right on them. In support of his contention he also placed reliance upon the case reported in 1972 S.L.R. 94 : AIR 1972 SC 767-R.N. Nanjundappa vs. T. Thimmaiah and another Reliance was also placed by Mr. Jha on a resolution of the share holders, adopted at the extraordinary, annual general meeting of the Corporation on 29th April, 1980 (Annexure-C) in which it was resolved that no appointment should be made against the post falling vacant in class three and four cadres as the Corporation had already excess staff• and, that excess should be adjusted against the post falling vacant in future. 4. A simple reply which was advanced by Sri S.P. Mukharji appearing for the petitioners was not this was not the ground which has been advanced by respondent no. 3 while issuing the impugned letter of termination. Rather it assume that the appointments by the Managing Director for the period of six months was valid and the incumbents, were entitled to all their salaries till that period. On the authority of a decision reported in A.I.R. 1952. SC 16-Commissioner of Police vs. Gordhandas Bhaji, he argued that public ORDER :, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanation subsequently given by the officer making the ORDER :of what he meant, or of what was in his mind or what he intended to do. The writ petitioners have also asserted in the reply to the counter affidavit of respondent nos. The writ petitioners have also asserted in the reply to the counter affidavit of respondent nos. 1 and 2 that the Managing Director of the Corporation being its Chief Executive Officer, apart from being its Chief Executive Officer and responsible for general control and its management, the power of appointment of certain posts carrying salary of Rs.660/- per month, was fully delegated or conferred upon the Managing Director. This assertion has not been controverted nor Mr. Jha was in a position to wriggle out from the delegation of authority in the Managing Director in course of his arguments. He however tried to convince us that the Managing Director has not conducted him properly in making the appointments and had committed bunglings by making such and similar appointments for which he has already been sacked. That may be a matter quite different with which we are not concerned at the moment. The question that arises is as to whether the ORDER :of termination can be upheld. We have already said that the ORDER :is based upon the assumption, that the appointment was made only for a period of six months and the same came to an end by efflux of time without taking Into account the intervening action of the Managing Director regularising the post under the sale appointments which apparently put an end to the period fixed for which the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis. It may will be that the status of the petitioners was still precarious but certainly in view of that letter Annexure-3 they cannot be said to be merely ad hoc appointees for a period of six months only. The very foundation for issuing the letter of termination is entirely misconceived and erroneous. 5. We do not find much substance in the argument of Mr. Jha on the larger question also that the appointments were void ab initio in view of the complete delegation of the Corporation to the Managing Director. The very foundation for issuing the letter of termination is entirely misconceived and erroneous. 5. We do not find much substance in the argument of Mr. Jha on the larger question also that the appointments were void ab initio in view of the complete delegation of the Corporation to the Managing Director. It may the (sic) well be that the services of the petitioners and obviously so were under the general control of the Board of Directors of the Establishment Committee, but so far the right of making appointment to the posts carrying monthly salary not exceeding Rs.660/- is concerned, it is patent and obvious that the Corporation as such has bestowed complete authority unto the Managing Director and this is also obvious from the fact that the impugned letters of termination do not speak with respect to any illegality in the initial appointments. All the applications, therefore, must succeed and the impugned ORDER :s be quashed. We, accordingly, quash the letters terminating the services of each of the petitioners (Annexure-1 in all writ applications). In the circumstances, however, there will be no ORDER :as to costs.