Judgment :- 1. This unfortunate litigation centres round a temple and a trust. The suit itself was filed for settling a scheme for the management and administration of Pazhukkamattom Devaswom near Chelamattomkara in Perumbavoor which is claimed to be a public trust. The prayers include removal of the 1st defendant from the management of the properties, appointment of new trustees and other incidental reliefs. It was instituted initially in the District Court of Ernakulam where it was numbered as O. S. No. 4 of 1979. Leave to sue under S.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was obtained from that court by the order passed in I. A, No 443 of 1979. Later the suit was transferred to the Sub Court, Parur, the court which has now passed the order sought to be revised. The suit was renumbered in the Parur Sub Court as p. S. No. 187 of 1980. Against the order granting leave to sue, a revision petition was taken to this court CRP. No. 1500 of 1979. It is admitted by both parties that the revision petition was dismissed on 20-6-1979 as it was not pressed. The respondents in the revision plaintiffs would contend that this court was not inclined to admit the civil revision petition and it was in those circumstances that the civil revision petition happened to be not pressed. Whatever that be, the fact remains that the earlier challenge to this court against the order granting leave had been unsuccessful or not pursued. The acrimony between the parties appears to have manifested in diverse forms. It is unfortunate that even counsel had not been spared However, having regard to the limited question raised in this civil revision petition and argued before me it is unnecessary to refer to those matters. 2. The 13th plaintiff filed I. A. No. 189 of 1981 before the court below on 12-2-1981, alleging that he did not sign the vakalath, the plaint or the application for leave to sue. This petition was linked with another interlocutory application, I.A No. 193(a) of 1981 at the instance of the defendant for a declaration that the suit was not maintainable in view of the fact that the suit as instituted did not have the junction of the 15th plaintiff. This petition was linked with another interlocutory application, I.A No. 193(a) of 1981 at the instance of the defendant for a declaration that the suit was not maintainable in view of the fact that the suit as instituted did not have the junction of the 15th plaintiff. During the pendency of this petition yet another change in the attitude of the 13th plaintiff was disclosed by the petition, I A. No. 273 of 1981 by the plaintiffs praying that the 13th plaintiff may be allowed to withdraw from the suit. It was stated therein that the 13th plaintiff had not signed I A. No. 181 of 1981. The withdrawal from the suit by the 13th plaintiff was sought on reasons of old age and ill health. The court below refers to that petition in the following terms: "After the institution of the suit and pending suit, the 13th plaintiff on reasons of old age and ill-health sought to withdraw from the suit and that was allowed and he was removed from the party array." 3. The withdrawal of the 13th plaintiff from the suit led to the filing of another petition I A. No. 429 of 1981 invoking S.151, C. P. C. and praying for dismissal of the suit on the ground of its not being maintainable in the light of the withdrawal of the 13th plaintiff from the suit. I. A. No. 451 of 1981 was filed by the 2nd defendant, the wife of the 1st defendant for a similar declaration 4. The three petitions - I. A. Nos. 193 (a), 429 and 451 of 1981-were disposed of by the court below by a common order on 7-1-1982. This revision petition relates to and challenges only the order in I. A No. 429 of 1981. 5. The court below while dismissing I A.No. 429 of 1981 observed that the suit had been instituted properly as all the three plaintiffs were parties to the suit, that subsequent developments in the suit after its institution did not affect the maintainability of the suit and consequently there was no substance in the defence contention that the suit was not maintainable. In so holding it referred to and relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Narain Lal & Another v. Seth Sunderlal Tholia Jorhi (dead) and others, A. I. R.1967 S.C.1540. 6. In so holding it referred to and relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Narain Lal & Another v. Seth Sunderlal Tholia Jorhi (dead) and others, A. I. R.1967 S.C.1540. 6. Counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated the contention urged unsuccessfully by the Ist defendant in the court below. He placed reliance on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court to contend that the fading away of the 13th plaintiff from the party array was fatal to the continuation of the suit. Particular emphasis was placed by him on the following observations of the Supreme Court: "An authority to sue given by the Advocate General under S.92 to several persons is a joint authority and must he acted upon by all jointly. A suit by some of them only cannot be in conformity with the provisions of S.92(1). Where, therefore, sanction is given to four persons and one of them dies before the institution of the suit, the suit by the remaining three is incompetent. Ia such a case a fresh sanction must be obtained by the survivors for the institution of the suit." 7. According to counsel, the same reason should follow when in the course of the trial, one of the plaintiffs withdraws from the suit Counsel for the revision petitioner also relied on the observations of this court in Achuthan Pillai v. Mohanan Unnithan,1979 K.LT. Short Notes 53, relating to the interpretation of S.92, C.P.C. That decision is, however, not of much relevance in the present case. It only stated that an interlocutory petition in a suit coming under that section can be considered and orders obtained thereon only after leave is granted under S.92. In the present case the grant of leave had been given as early as on 6-4-1979 and the revision challenged against that order was dismissed on 20-6-1979, There is much difference between the institution of a suit and continuation thereof, as regards the consequences resulting from the withdrawal of a party in the institution and conduct of the suit covered by S.92 of the Civil Procedure Code. Sanction of leave granted under S.92. C.P.C. to two or more persons for the institution of the suit is a joint and integral one. Sanction of leave granted under S.92. C.P.C. to two or more persons for the institution of the suit is a joint and integral one. If, therefore, any one of the parties in whose favour the leave is so granted, is absent on the party array at the time of the institution of the plaint, the absence would be fatal. Once, however, the suit is instituted, the vicissitudes undergone by that litigation would not affect the institution which has already taken effect and the continuation of the suit. This is more or less clear from the later observation of the Supreme Court in the same judgment which may for convenience be extracted below: "The suit as instituted must conform to the consent. Once the representative suit is validly instituted, it is subject to all the incidents of such a suit, the subsequent death of a plaintiff will not render the suit incompetent, see Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram, 48 Ind. App. 12: (AIR 1921 P.C.123), and an appeal by some of the plaintiffs impleading the remaining plaintiff as a respondent is not incompetent because all did not join as appellants, see 65 Ind. App. 1968: (AIR. 1938 P.C.184)." It is clear from the above passage that events subsequent to the suit, such as death of one of the plaintiffs will not in any manner render the suit incompetent. The same principles must apply to a withdrawal of one of the plaintiffs or a removal ordered by the court in respect of one of the plaintiffs. The observations contained at page 124 in the decision of the Privy Council in Raja Anand Rao's case, must on principle, be applicable to the case of the removal of one of the plaintiffs after the institution of the suit. In that view of the matter, the removal of the 13th plaintiff from the party array, in the circumstances mentioned above, will not in any manner affect the continuity of the suit. The contention to the contrary raised in the revision petition is unsustainable. The dismissal of I. A.No. 429 of 1981 and the finding that the suit can proceed with are perfectly correct and legal. There is no scope for interference with that order in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this court. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Dismissed.