Hari Shanker Jain v. M. H. Beg — 1982 DIGILAW 804 (ALL)

JUDGMENT K. S. Varma, J. 1. THIS application under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971) (hereinafter to be referred to as Act) has been moved by Sri Hari Shanker Jain an Advocate practising in this Court. He has stated in the petition that he read a news item published in Hindustan Times of 1st July, 1982 that Mr. M. H. Beg, former Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India, made certain comments on judgments delivered by Mr. H. R. Khanna, former Judge of the Supreme Court and now a candidate for Presidential Election. The petitioner has stated that Hindustan Times has very wide circulation in the country and the comments made by Mr. M. H. Beg which were reported on 1st July, 1982 were uncalled for and unfair. According to the petitioner, the relevant portions which amount to criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act are quoted in para 3 of the application. 2. DURING the course of arguments on the petition, the petitioner stated that he proposes to move an application for amendment of the petition. In the application for amendment he has prayed that Sri Khushwant Singh, Editor of Hindustan Times at New Delhi be added as opposite party no. 2 and Dr. G. S. Hansraj on behalf of Hindustan Times Ltd. at Hindustan Times Press, New Delhi to be added as opposite party no. 3. In the amendment application certain allegations were also added in which it was maintained that Hindustan Times published contemptuous statement of Mr. M. H. Beg and hence the opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 are also guilty of committing contempt within the meaning of the Act. Along with the amendment application the petitioner filed news item which appeared in Hindustan Times on 1st July, 1982. The amendment application has been allowed. The petitioner in this case has appeared in person to argue the case. He has submitted that Mr. M. H. Beg is guilty of Criminal Contempt within the meaning of section 15 of the Act and opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 are also guilty for the same as they published contemptuous matter in their newspaper. During the course of arguments the petitioner clearly stated that he brings his case under section 15 of the Act. M. H. Beg is guilty of Criminal Contempt within the meaning of section 15 of the Act and opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 are also guilty for the same as they published contemptuous matter in their newspaper. During the course of arguments the petitioner clearly stated that he brings his case under section 15 of the Act. The petitioner submitted that the article published in the Hindustan Times brings into contempt the entire judiciary of the country. He submitted that under the Constitution of India the judiciary is responsible for upholding the rule of law and by the news item in question an attempt is made by the opposite parties to denigrate the entire judiciary of the country. The petitioner contends that in these circumstances the opposite parties are guilty of criminal contempt within the meaning of section 15 of the Act. 3. SECTION 2 (c) defines criminal contempt. "2 (c). "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court, or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding : or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 4. SECTION 15 of the Act provides that in the case of a criminal contempt, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by the Advocate General, or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The section also provides that every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty. During the course of arguments, one of the questions that arise was whether the petitioner can move for contempt under section 15 of the Act without consent in writing of the Advocate General. The petitioner drew our attention to the decision reported in Sri C. K. Daphtary v. Sri O. P. Gupta, 1971 (1) SCC 626 . During the course of arguments, one of the questions that arise was whether the petitioner can move for contempt under section 15 of the Act without consent in writing of the Advocate General. The petitioner drew our attention to the decision reported in Sri C. K. Daphtary v. Sri O. P. Gupta, 1971 (1) SCC 626 . In para 87 and 88 of the report that the Bar is vitally concerned in the maintenance of the dignity of courts and the proper administration of justice. In this view of the matter, the Supreme Court observed, there is nothing in law which prevents the Supreme Court from entertaining a petition at the instance of the Supreme Court Bar Association and three other Advocates of the Court In the instant case, an Advocate of this court has drawn our attention to an article written by Mr. M. H. Beg and published by opposite parties 2 and 3. This Court can, suo- moto and also at the instance of any member of the Bar, take notice of the contempt of court committed by any person. The petitioner also drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in S. K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra, 1981 AWC 98. By reference to this decision he submitted that if a contemptuous material is brought to the notice of the High Court, it can on its own motion proceed to determine whether a case of contempt has been made out. A perusal of the said decision would also indicate that the Supreme Court has emphasised that normally the High Court should not entertain petition of contempt without consent in writing of the Advocate General but the tenor of judgment also indicate that if the High Court, of its own motion, takes notice of the contemptuous matter then the proceedings so initiated would not be said to be without jurisdiction. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court referred to above and also having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we have taken notice of the alleged contemptuous matter and proceed to decide whether a case of contempt has been made out or not. 5. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court referred to above and also having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we have taken notice of the alleged contemptuous matter and proceed to decide whether a case of contempt has been made out or not. 5. IN order to determine whether a case of contempt has been made out, certain principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brahm Prakash v. State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 10 have to be borne in mind. IN this respect it would be appropriate to quote certain observations of Hon'ble Mukherjee, J.: "It seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by 'Scandalising' the court itself. IN the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. "The path of criticism" said Lord Atkin Ambard v. Att. Gen. for Trinidad and Tobago, AIR 1936 PC 141 at pp. 145 and 146 (E). "is a public way. The wrong headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune." IN the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is libel on the Judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned does not necessarily make it a contempt. The distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a a committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the Secretary of State in 1892-'IN the matter of Special Reference from Bahama Islands, 1893 Ac 138 (F). The distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a a committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the Secretary of State in 1892-'IN the matter of Special Reference from Bahama Islands, 1893 Ac 138 (F). A man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that he was an incompetent Judge and a Shirker of work and the writer suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing if he were to die. A strong Board constitution of 11 members reported that the letter complained of, thought it might have been made the subject of proceedings for lible, was not, in the circumstances, calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of law and therefore did not constitute a contempt of court. The same principle was re-iterated by Lord Atkin in the case of AIR 1943 PC 202 (D) referred to above. It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Austrlia in-King v. Nicholls, 12 Com W-LR 280 (G), and has been accepted as sound by this Court in Ramakrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 (H). The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrasment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law, Mookerjea, J. IN re Moti Lal Ghose, AIR 1918 Cal. 988 at page 994 (1)". 6. WHILE deciding Brahma Prakash's case B. K. Mookerjea, J. proceeded to decide the question of contempt in the light of the principle indicated above. Relying upon the observations quoted above, we proceed to decide whether the opposite parties are guilty of contempt or not. In our opinion, observations made by Mr. M. H. Beg in the article come within the category of' fair and reasonble criticism' which every citizen has a right in respect to public acts done in the seat of justice. Mr. Beg's allegations about inhibitions of Mr. H. R. Khanna about basic structure of the Constitution and that Mr. Khanna is wedded to romantic ideas of personal liberty is nothing but expression of opinion of an individual in exercise of his right of "fair and reasonable criticism.". In making this statement Mr. M. H. Beg has neither denigrated nor has brought any blot or disrespect to the judiciary of India. He has simply expressed his opinion about that he honestly feels about the view expressed by Mr. Khanna in his judgments. The article further goes on to mention that Mr. Khanna expressed a number of general sentiments about individual liberty but skirted the legal issue which the Supreme Court had to decide. He also states that Mr. Khanna's judgment then made no contribution to law but it made considerable addition to his popularity. In our opinion, all these are just an expression of opinion which can be brought within the category of 'fair criticism' within the meaning of section 5 of the Act which provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided. During the course of arguments the petitioner strenuously contended that the following observations of Mr. M. H. Beg brings the entire judicial system to disrespect. "would he (Mr. During the course of arguments the petitioner strenuously contended that the following observations of Mr. M. H. Beg brings the entire judicial system to disrespect. "would he (Mr. Khanna) be more decisive as a President then he bad been a Judge or only vaguely sentimental and gain popularity when faced with any crucial issue." 7. THE petitioner elaborated his submission by saying that if such an allegation is attributed to a person who held the office of a Judge then such a statement is contemptuous to the judiciary as a whole. On an analysis............of the above comments in the light of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Brahm Prakash's case, we are of the opinion that no case for contempt against the opposite parties is made out. THE Supreme Court has laid down that when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the Judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. If a statement attributed to the Judge is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned, it does not necessarily make out a case of contempt. We have analysed this statement in the light of the distinction pointed out by the Supreme Court in Brahm Prakash's case and we are of the view that a case of contempt has not been made out. Taken at its worst, the statement of Mr. Beg may be defamatory so far as Mr. Khanna is concerned although we do not say that it i6, but that is not enough to make out a case of contempt. In such an eventuality the alleged defamatory act may be challenged by the Judge concerned by proceeding against the libellor in a proper action, if he so chooses. Relying upon the observations made by Mookerjea, J. we feel that taken at its worst the above statement may be disparaging in character and derogatory to the dignity of Mr. Khanna but it does not amount to contempt. If any wrong has been committed by Mr. Beg, it is a wrong done to Mr. Khanna personally. THE statement does not amount to wrong done to the public or to the judiciary so as to make out a case of contempt. 8. Khanna but it does not amount to contempt. If any wrong has been committed by Mr. Beg, it is a wrong done to Mr. Khanna personally. THE statement does not amount to wrong done to the public or to the judiciary so as to make out a case of contempt. 8. THE petitioner during the course of his arguments placed great reliance upon the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in E. M. S. Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, 1970 SCC 325 . A perusal of the said decision indicates that Mr. E. M. S. Namboodripad, former Chief Minister of Kerala, was found by Kerala High Court guily of contempt of court and was sentenced to fine of Rs. 1000/- or simple imprisonment for one month. He filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. THE Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Mr. E. M. S. Namboodripad, A perusal of the said decision would also indicate that Mr. E. M. S. Namboodripad had stated in a Press Conference that the Judges are guided and dominated by class hatred, class interests and class prejudices and where the evidence is balanced between a well dressed pot-bellied rich man and a poor-ill-dressed and illiterate person, the Judge instinctively favours the former. Mr. Namboodripad also stated that many reports had appeared in the Press that Marxists like himself, Mr. A. K. Gopalan and Mr. Imbichi Baba were making statement critical of the judiciary 'presumably with the idea that anything spoken about the court is contempt of Court.' Mr. Namboodripad also stated that judiciary is part of the class rule of the ruling classes and there are limits to the sanctity of the judiciary. THE judiciary is weighed against workers, peasants and other sections of the working classes. According to him, the law and the system of judiciary essentially serve the exploiting classes. He further went on to state that although the judiciary is separated from the executive it is still subject to the influence and pressure of the executive. THE judiciary, he argued, was only an institution like the President or Parliament or the Public Service Commission. He further stated that the Judge is subject to his own idiosyncrasies and prejudices, and they are guided by individual idiosyncrasies, guided and dominated by class interests, class hatred and class prejudices. THE judiciary, he argued, was only an institution like the President or Parliament or the Public Service Commission. He further stated that the Judge is subject to his own idiosyncrasies and prejudices, and they are guided by individual idiosyncrasies, guided and dominated by class interests, class hatred and class prejudices. An statement of this nature is so palpably contemptuous that the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Mr. E. M. S. Namboodripad and found him guilty of contempt of court. In the instant case the position is different. Mr. M. H. Beg has simply criticised the views of Mr. H. R. Khanna. He has neither cast any aspersion on any Judge nor on judicial system as a whole. He has just expressed his own views about the views of Mr. Khanna. In our opinion, statement of Mr. Beg is protected by section 5 of the Act, as expression of his views are nothing more than a fair comment on the merits of the view held by a particular Judge. The petitioner relied upon Shri Baradakanta Misra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374 . In our opinion, this case has no application to the facts of this case. The findings recorded in the said case were that the allegations made against the High Court were contemptuous and found the petitioner guilty of contempt. On the facts of the case under consideration before the Supreme Court, court observed that contemner was guilty of six contempts and he was suitably punished for the contemptuous act. In the instant case we have already held that the statement of Mr. M. H. Beg does not amount to Criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act. 9. FOR the the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this application. Application for contempt, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. 10. I just had the advantage of listening to the judgment dictated by my brother Varma, J. He has recorded a clear finding that the statement attributed to Mr. M. H. Beg does not constitute a criminal contempt, as defined in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. My brother Varma, J. has further held that the statement of Mr. M. H. Beg is protected by the provisions of section (?) of the Act, as it constitutes a fair comment and not a contemptuous article. M. H. Beg does not constitute a criminal contempt, as defined in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. My brother Varma, J. has further held that the statement of Mr. M. H. Beg is protected by the provisions of section (?) of the Act, as it constitutes a fair comment and not a contemptuous article. I respectfully agree with these findings, but I wish to add a few words of my own. Mr. M. H. Beg, who has criticised the conduct of Mr. H. R. Khanna, is an Ex-Chief Justice of India while Mr. H. R. Khanna was a Judge of the Supreme Court. The statement, which is said to have been made by Mr. M. H. Beg and which is the subject matter of this petition, has been reproduced by my brother Varma, J. in his judgment and I need not reproduce the statement again. The questions which, in my opinion, arise in this case are : (1) whether the statement made my Mr. M. H. Beg and published by the Hindustan Times in its issue of July 1, 1982 constitutes a criminal contempt and ; (2) what are the implications of the provisions of section 11 of the Act particularly when it is apparent from a reading of section 14 and 15 that the Supreme Court can itself take cognizance of its contempt. 11. ON the first question I have already stated that I agree with my brother Varma, J. that the statement said to have been made by Mr. M. H. Beg does not constitute a criminal contempt. In this connection I may, however, add that the Supreme Court in the case of Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221 , after reviewing the case law and after considering the case of Brahm Prakash, which has been relied upon by Varma, J., laid down five principles as under : "(1) It will not be right to say that commitals for contempt scandalizing the court have become obsolete. (2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. (2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and justice. (3) It is open to any one to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him because " justice is not a cloistered virtue and she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men. " (4) A distinction must be made between a libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the court. The test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by his court. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable as contempt. (5) Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public. To borrow from the language of Mukherjea J. (as he then was) Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, 1953 SCR 1169 = AIR 1954 SC 10 , the publication of a disparaging statement will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. " 12. THE aforesaid tests came to be considered again by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Dayal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC921. THE Supreme Court on page 927 of the report observed as under : "Fair and reasonable criticism of case which is a public document or which is a public act of a Judge concerned with administration of justice would not constitute contempt. In fact, such fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because after all no one, much less judges, can claim infallibility. In fact, such fair and reasonable criticism must be encouraged because after all no one, much less judges, can claim infallibility. A fair and reasonable comment would even be helpful to the judge concerned because he will be able to see his own shortcomings, limitations or imperfection in his work. THE society at large is interested in the administration of public justice because in the words of Benjamin Cardozo, " the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judge by " Benjamin N. Cardozo -THE nature of the judicial process, p. 168. Such permissible criticism would itself provide a sensible answer to some-times ill-informed criticism of Judges as living in ivory towers. But then the criticism has to be fair and reasonable." If the aforesaid tests, laid down by the Supreme Court in the case referred to above, are applied to the instant case it would be found that statement attributed to Mr. M. H. Beg cannot be said to constitute a criminal contempt nor can it be said to be derogatory of the prestige and honour of Mr. Khanna. 13. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner during the course of arguments had strenuously contended that the latter part of the statement published in the Hindustan Times is highly disparaging in character and that it lowers the prestige of Mr. Khanna as a Judge and further that it amounts to a deliberate and intended unfair attack on the conduct of Mr. Khanna. In the so-called offensive portion of the statement, it has been stated by Mr. M. H. Beg " that the former (Mr. Khanna) then expressed a number of general sentiments about individual liberty but skirted the legal issue which the Supreme Court had to decide. He wanted it to be left for the High Courts to resolve while the Supreme Court itself was seized of it. Mr. Khanna's judgment then made no contribution to law.........but it made considerable addition to his popularity. " The contention is that it amounts to an unfair, deliberate and severe criticism of the conduct of an Ex-Judge of the Supreme Court. Further contention is that the statement of Mr. Beg to the effect that Mr. Mr. Khanna's judgment then made no contribution to law.........but it made considerable addition to his popularity. " The contention is that it amounts to an unfair, deliberate and severe criticism of the conduct of an Ex-Judge of the Supreme Court. Further contention is that the statement of Mr. Beg to the effect that Mr. Khanna's judgment made no contribution to law, would mean that the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court did not make any addition to the legal literature and therefore it would amount to highly derogatory remark. The contention cannot be accepted, it is no doubt true that the statement attributed to Mr. M. H. Beg was made at a time when Mr. Khanna was already a candidate for the Presidentail Election, but the statement, nevertheless, has to be read as a whole. The statement, if analysed, would indicate that although at the time of the hearing of the Habeas Corpus petition Mr. Khanna had expressed a number of general sentiments about individual liberty, he did not decide the legal issue which had arisen in the case and left it to be decided by the High Courts although it could well have been decided by him when the matter itself was before the Supreme Court. What is, therefore, meant is this that if Mr. Khanna had decided those legal issues, it would have made a significant contribution to law but since those legal issues were not decided by him, the judgment could not be said to be derogatory of the prestige of Mr. Khanna and it also cannot be said to constitute a criminal contempt. 14. THE next question concerns the significance of the provisions contained in section 11 of the Act. Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act provides as under :- "11. A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of contempt is within or outside such limits." 15. THE High Court, as a perusal of section 11 of the Act would show, has jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself any court subordinate to it. THE High Court, as a perusal of section 11 of the Act would show, has jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself any court subordinate to it. THE jurisdiction in the matter of its own contempt or of any court subordinate to it extends even to a place outside the local limits of its jurisdiction provided the contempt is alleged to have been committed within such outside area. THE High Court has also power to proceed against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt even if that person was outside the local limits of its jurisdiction. 16. ARTICLE 215 of the Constitution also provides that the High Court shall have the power to punish for contempt of itself. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act gives power to the Supreme Court and the High Court to proceed against a person guilty of contempt in its presence or hearing. Section 15 of the Act gives power to take cognizance of the criminal contempt in other cases. Provisions of section 15 may be reproduced below:- "15. (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by- (a) the Advocate General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate- General, or (c) in relation to the High Court for the Union Territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing of such law officer. (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union Territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty." 17. (3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty." 17. THE provisions of this section indicate that Supreme Court itself can directly take cognizance of a criminal contempt either on its own motion or on the motion made by the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General (vide Clause (a) of the Explanation). 18. SIMILARLY under Articles 129 and 142 (2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to punish for contempt of itself and its jurisdiction extends to the whole of the territory of India, particularly when the parliament has not by any law made by it restricted the territorial jurisdiction. In the present case we are concerned with the statement made by a former Chief Justice of India in respect of the conduct of a person who was a Judge of the Supreme Court. It is clear that the High Court is not in the picture at all and the statement made by Mr. M. H. Beg cannot be said to constitute a contempt of the High Court or of a court subordinate to it. Since the jurisdiction of the High Court, as laid down by section 14 of the Act, extends only to matters of contempt either of itself or of any court subordinate to it, it would be difficult to say that it has also jurisdiction to take cognizance of contempt of any other court or the Supreme Court unless, of course, the entire judiciary of the country was sought to be maligned, as was the case in the case of E. M. S. Namboodripad, 1970 SCC 325 . I am, therefore, of the view that although the Contempt of Courts Act is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law relating to contempt of courts Csee section 22 of the Act) this court in the instant case will have no jurisdiction to proceed against the opposite parties. The statement said to have been made by Mr. M. H. Beg does not in the first instance constitute a criminal contempt and secondly, the statement certainly does not amount to contempt of the High Court or of any court subordinate to it. 19. THE petition, therefore, lacks merits and is hereby dismissed. 20. THE petition fails and is hereby dismissed. M. H. Beg does not in the first instance constitute a criminal contempt and secondly, the statement certainly does not amount to contempt of the High Court or of any court subordinate to it. 19. THE petition, therefore, lacks merits and is hereby dismissed. 20. THE petition fails and is hereby dismissed. After the order was pronounced, the petitioner made a prayer that this court may certify that the case is fit for appeal to Supreme Court on the ground that substantial questions of law are involved. We are of the view that no substantial question of law is involved. The question is one of application of principle laid down for the guidance of courts by the Supreme Court of India. 21. FOR the reasons stated above, we refuse to grant certificate for leave to appeal to Supreme Court of India. Petition dismissed.