ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Perused the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue. In the present writ petition dispute is confined to plot 810 situate at village'Nagaria Kalan, Tahsil Faridpur, District Bareilly. Sheo Karan Singh, plaintiff-opposite party 3 filed a suit for declaration under S. 229-B, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Z. A Act) against the petitioner Smt. Raj Kumari and Smt. Ram Pyari in respect of aforesaid plot in suit with the allegation that he was Zamindar of the said plot and one Gokaran Singh, deceased husband of Smt. Ram Pyari, was the tenant who died in 1345 Fasli and after the death of her husband, Smt. Ram Pyari left the village abandoning the land in dispute which was occupied by the plaintiff and he cultivated the same as its Khud Kasht. Smt. Rani Pyari did not remain in possession over the land in suit and whatever rights she had held, the same got extinguished by continuous adverse possession of the plaintiff over the same. Since the plaintiff claimed to be bhumidhar of the land in suit as it was his khud kasht on the date of vesting name of Smt. Ram Pyari wrongly continued in the revenue record and she had no right left in the land in dispute. Hence the sale deed by her in favour of aefendant-petitioner Smt. Raj Kumari was void and she acquired no rights on its basis. The suit was contested by the petitioner denying right and title of the plaintiff and asserting that the land in suit never remained in Khud Kasht of the plaintiff and Smt. Ram Pyari continued to remain tenure-holder and was in possession til the date of execution of sale-deed dated 18-6-1966 in her favour and ever since then she asserted to be in possession over the land in suit. 2. The suit was decreed by the trial court holding that Smt. Ram Pyari lost her rights in the land in suit by adverse possession of the plaintiff who being zamindar became khud kasht holder of it and became bhumidhar of the land in suit on the date of vesting. 2. The suit was decreed by the trial court holding that Smt. Ram Pyari lost her rights in the land in suit by adverse possession of the plaintiff who being zamindar became khud kasht holder of it and became bhumidhar of the land in suit on the date of vesting. It was further held that the sale-deed executed by Smt. Ram Pyari in favour of the petitioner Smt. Raj Kumari was v0id inasmuch as she had already lost her right in the land in suit by adverse possession much prior to the execution of the sale deed in favour of Smt. Raj Kumari. Aggrieved by the said decree Smt. Raj Kumari preferred appeal which was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner vide judgment dated 18-1-1971 affirming the said finding recorded by the trial court after careful consideration of the evidence on record. Still aggrieved by the said orders, Smt. Raj Kumari preferred second appeal which was heard and allowed by Board of Revenue on 24th Feb. 1977 by setting aside the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two courts below and holding that the plaintiff has not acquired rights by adverse possession and he cultivated the land as assami on behalf of Smt. Ram Pyari who succeeded to the interest of her husband and being a widow, she was suffering from the disability of cultivating the land herself and so she was getting it cultivated by the plaintiff Sheo Karan Singh. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24th Feb. 1977 passed by the Board of Revenue Sheo Karan Singh filed writ petition, 1844 of 1977, in this Court which was heard and allowed on 13th May, 1981, and the case was remanded to the Board of Revenue for deciding second appeal on merits and in accordance with the observations made in the order. The order of the Board of Revenue by which it interfered with the findings recorded by the two courts below was set aside holding that in second appeal such finding of fact could not be interfered with by the Board of Revenue under S. 331, Z. A. Act. It was further observed that "obviously, there does not seem to be any perversity as the evidence was available in support of the contentions of both the parties. It was further observed that "obviously, there does not seem to be any perversity as the evidence was available in support of the contentions of both the parties. It also cannot be said that no reasonable person could have come to the finding arrived at by the court of fact on the evidence before it. In the circumstances the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to give its own finding of fact." 3. The Board of Revenue, after hearing the parties, passed the impugned order upholding the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two courts below and it was also held that the possession of the plaintiff was adverse as far back since 1358 Fasli and as such Smt. Ram Pyari had no right to execute the sale-deed in favour of Smt. Raj Kumari. It was further held that the two courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff s possession was adverse and not permissive and the findings recorded being not perverse are binding in second appeal. Smt. Ram Pyari having not filed suit for ejectment of the plaintiff under S. 180, U. P. Tenancy Act, she lost her rights as held by the courts below and the plaintiff became Khud Kasht holder in 1358 fasli being in possession since before 1356, fasli. This order dated. 11th May, 1982, passed by the Board of Revenue has been challenged by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. S. M. Chaturvedi contended that the question whether the plaintiff had perfected rights by adverse possession could be gone into on merits in second appeal by the Board of Revenue as it was a mixed question of fact and law. He further contended that the findings recorded by the courts below deserved to be set aside being erroneous and based on wrong appraisal of evidence on record. Thus, according to him, the Board of Revenue erred in refusing to interfere with the erroneous finding of fact recorded by the courts below which deserve to be set aside in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction by the Board of Revenue. I am unable to agree with these contentions. 5. The findings on the question of adverse possession are findings of fact. I am unable to agree with these contentions. 5. The findings on the question of adverse possession are findings of fact. In Shobha Nath v. Ram Baran ( AIR 1954 All 493 ) Full Bench (LB) of this Court, observed that (at p. 495) : - "The lower appellate court has found as a matter of fact that the plaintiff had been in possession of the plot within 12 years before the suit and that the defendant had not been in possession of the plot for over 12 years when the suit was instituted. This is a finding of fact and is binding on us in second appeal. The point of limitation raised by the learned counsel has also, therefore, no force." In another Full Bench case of this Court in Bhagwana v. Ch. Gulab Kuer (AIR 1942 All 221) it was held that : - "A finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish proprietary title to the suit land by adverse possession is a finding of fact." In Lakshmi Chand v. Seth Bhawani Shanker ( AIR 1945 All 394 ) it was observed that : - "The finding on the question of adoption and also on the question of adverse possession are findings of fact and must be accepted in second appeal." On the parity of reasoning it will equally hold good that a finding to the effect that the plaintiff has established title to the suit land by adverse possession is a finding of fact and is thus binding in second appeal. 6. The question whether the plaintiff was in adverse possession or not is a question of fact and where the trial court and the first appellate court both considered the evidence of both the sides including evidence of witnesses examined by the parties and after consideration of the same concurrently came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has established his adverse possession for more than the prescribed limitation and the title of the defendant thus got extinguished by adverse possession such a finding is binding in second appeal. 7. It is apt to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. 7. It is apt to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jang Bahadur Rai (AIR 1963 S C 1203) wherein it was observed that (at p. 1205) "It is a settled law that a High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact." Referring to the said decision Hon'ble K. C. Agarwal, J., in Usha Singh v. Virendra Kumar Agarwal (1981 All L J 723) in para 13 of the report observed : - "The law settled is that howsoever gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, there is no jurisdiction under S. 100 of the Civil P. C. to correct that error. In fact, counsel could not point out any error of law which could be said to have been arrived at by the lower appellate Court in holding that defendant 2 was not a partner." On the scope of S. 100 of Civil P. C. the Supreme Court in Deity Pattabhirama Swamy v. Hanymayya ( AIR 1959 SC 57 ) observed that (at p. 59) : - "The provisions of S. 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entrain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A Judge of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence." It was further held that : - "But, notwithstanding such clear and authoritative pronouncements on the scope of the provisions of S. 100, Civil P. C. some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of second appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduce, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This introduce, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction under S. 100, Civil P. C. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the decree of the High Court on the simple ground that the learned Judge of the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence." In another case, V. Ramchandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ), the Supreme Court has in detail considered the scope of second appellate power under S. 100, Civil P. C. and it was observed (Para 13) : - "If a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate court without any evidence, that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal, because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence can be questioned under S. 100; and in that connection, it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate Court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate Court. All that it means is that it should be a case where the evidence, which is accepted by the lower appellate Court, no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all." Considering the scope of cl. (c) of ' S. 100(1), Civil P. C. it was observed that . "The error or defect in the procedure to which cl. (c) of S. 100(1) refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. "The error or defect in the procedure to which cl. (c) of S. 100(1) refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to the procedure; it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in dealing with a question of fact, the lower appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result substantially, of this wrong approach, that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower appellate Court fails to consider an issue which has been tried and found upon by the trial Court's decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact or makes out a new case for a party, that I may, in some cases, be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court." Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the scope of S. 331, Z. A. Act, is wider than S. 100, Civil P. C. and the Board of Revenue, in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction would interfere with the concurrent findings of fact if the view taken by the two Courts below is patently erroneous in its opinion on the assessment of evidence on record. I am unable to agree with this contention. 8. I am unable to agree with this contention. 8. Perusal of sub-s. (4) of S. 331, Z. A. Act, would indicate that a second appeal would lie on any of the grounds specified in S. 100, Civil P. C. from the final order or decree passed in appeal under sub-s. (3) mentioned against it in col. 6 of Sch. 2. Thus the scope of second appeal before the Board of Revenue under S. 331 sub-s. (4), Z.A. Act, is confined to grounds specified in S. 100, of Civil P.C. The Board of Revenue, therefore, in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below even if the same appear to be erroneous or a different view could be taken on the material on record. In second appeal, findings of fact can be interfered with if the same are based on altogether inadmissible evidence or the findings are based on no evidence. The findings can also be interfered with if the conclusion arrived at by the courts below are based on misstatement of some material fact on the basis of which the findings on material facts have been arrived at. In the absence of these, in my opinion, the second appellate court cannot reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the question of fact by setting aside concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below on the ground that the same are erroneous and a different view should have been taken on the assessment of evidence on record than the one taken in the matter. It is now well settled that in second appeal, the High Court as well as the Board of Revenue is bound by the findings of fact recorded by lower appellate Court and the same cannot be interfered with, howsoever erroneous they may appear to be, and a different view could possibly be taken on the basis of evidence on record. 9. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the findings recorded by the courts below on the question whether plaintiff has perfected right by adverse possession or not could not be interfered with by the Board of Revenue in second appeal in exercise of powers under S. 331 (4) of the Z.A. Act. Thus, the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be said to be erroneous. Thus, the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be said to be erroneous. The Board of Revenue, after considering the evidence on record has now come to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the two courts below are justified and has maintained the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff, holding that he has perfected Sirdari rights by adverse possession. I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Board of Revenue so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed in limine.