ORDER N. D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 2 Tara Chand Rohiley is the landlord of house No. 11/277 Souterganj, Kanpur. Each of the petitioners 1 to 4 was tenant of an independent portion of the said house on behalf of respondent No. 2 when an application was made in the year 1969 by respondent No. 2 under section 3 of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947) for permission to file a suit for ejectment against the petitioners on the ground that he bona fide needed the accommodation occupied by the petitioners for his own use. This application was contested by the petitioners and was dismissed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. A revision filed by respondent No. 2 also failed but on a representation made by him under section 7-F of U. P. Act 3 of 1947 his application under section 3 aforesaid was allowed. The state Government took into consideration the circumstances that respondent No. 2 was himself occupy log an accommodation as a tenant and a notice had been served on him by the landlord thereof requiring him to vacate that accommodation. In view of this fact that State Government took the view that since respondent No. 2 was likely to be evicted from the house occupied by him as a tenant his need for his own house was bona fide. The order of the State Government was challenged by the petitioners in this court in writ petition No. 3752 of 1973. The writ petition was allowed on the ground that the State Government has not given reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to meet this case of respondent No. 2 that there was apprehension of his being evicted from the house which he was occupying as a tenant. The State Government was enquired to decide the case afresh after giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to contest the case set up by respondent No. 2. In pursuance of the order passed by this court the state Government decided the matter afresh and again allowed the application of respondent No. 2 for permission to file suit for ejectment against the petitioners. In pursuance of the order passed by this court the state Government decided the matter afresh and again allowed the application of respondent No. 2 for permission to file suit for ejectment against the petitioners. The state Government reiterated its earlier view that respondent No. 2 was facing the risk of being evicted from the house occupied by him as a tenant and consequently his need was bona fide. At this place it may be pointed out that landlord of the house which is being occupied by respondent No. 2 as a tenant had made an application for release of the said accommodation under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Building Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U. P. Act 13 of 1972) on the ground that he needed the said accommodation for his own use. A certified copy of the order passed by the 2nd Additional district Judge, Kanpur, on 16th February, 1982, in Rent Appeal No. 174 of 1979 (Kaushal Kishore Gupta and others v. Tara Chand) has been produced before me by counsel for respondent No. 2 which indicates that the release application made by the landlord of the house occupied by respondent No. 2 as tenant has been allowed and respondent No. 2 has been directed to vacate that accommodation within a period of six months from the date of that order. this period of six months is about to expire on 16th August, 1982. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition against the impugned order of state Government dated 13th July 1979, allowing the application of respondent No. 2 again, as referred to above. 2. Before dealing with the submissions made by counsel for the parties on merits of the writ petition it may be pointed out that Smt. E R. Parker, petitioner No. 2 died on 18th July 1981. An application was made by her four sons on 9th July 1982, for being substituted as her legal representatives. Counter and Rejoinder affidavits have been filed. This application having been made after about a year of the death of Smt E.R. Parker is obviously highly belated. An application was made by her four sons on 9th July 1982, for being substituted as her legal representatives. Counter and Rejoinder affidavits have been filed. This application having been made after about a year of the death of Smt E.R. Parker is obviously highly belated. In view of Rule 38-A of Chapter VIII of the rules of the court the provisions contained inter alia in rules 3, 4 and 9 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A division bench of this court while interpreting rule 38-A aforesaid has held in Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director 1968, A.L.J.1062 that limitation of 90 days for filing an application to substitute the legal representatives of a deceased party applies to a writ petition also. In H.P. Khan v. Pooran 1966, A.L.J. 281, a Full bench of this Court has held that abatement in such a situation comes into effect automatically on the expiry of the period prescribed and no specific order by any court is enquired in this behalf. As such it is apparent that this writ petition stands abated in so far as Smt. E.R. Parker is concerned. 3. The question is whether the delay in making the application for substitution aforesaid has been sufficiently explained as contemplated by section 5 of the Limitation Act. Indeed no separate application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay and setting aside abatement has been made. However, a prayer for condonation of the delay has been made in the application for substitution itself which purports to be under Order 12 Rule 3 read with section 151 Civil Procedure Code and section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. In Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd AIR 1962 Supreme Court 261, it has been held that in cons- truing section 5 it is relevant to bear in mind that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light hearted disturbed. It was further held that even if sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fill for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. 5. What has been held in the above case in regard to condonation of delay in filing an appeal which has been filed beyond time will in my opinion apply with equal force to an application for substitution and for setting aside abatement which has been filed beyond time. It cannot be denied that with the abatement of the proceedings a legal right accrues automatically in favour of the decree holder and the said right cannot be disturbed light hearted as observed by the Supreme court in Ram Lal's case (Supra) 6. In Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 215 while construing the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9 Civil Procedure Code it was held there is no question of construing the expression sufficient cause liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. The provisions of the code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over strict is expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain tact established both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merit of the dispute can be determined while if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the court readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. (Emphasis supplied). 7. Coming to the fact of the instant case it would be seen that the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of the delay is of Ashley Parker, one of the four sons of Smt. E.R. Parker. The relevant facts are contained in paragraphs 3,4 and 5 of the affidavit filed in support of that application. They read : "(3)That the advice that was given to deponent local counsel, Kanpur, Mohd. Azam Nazmi was that application by the legal representatives in a petition under article 226 of the constitution need not be necessarily filed within 90 days as provided for by Indian Limitation Act in respect of suits and other proceedings. (4) That the dependent and his brothers, therefore, precluded from filing application within the period of 90 days. (5) That the advice given by the local counsel was due to the fact that at one time some courts had taken the view that the period of limitation under Indian Limitation Act was not applicable to writ petition. It is, therefore apparent that the advice given was a bona fide one." It is true that bona fide advice given by a counsel after due care and attention a may constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay if acted upon by a party in good faith but it is not the law that the delay should invariably he condoned simply because it is asserted that it was caused on account of some wrong legal advice given by a counsel. In Municipal Board Lucknow v. Kali Krishna Narain and others, AIR 1944 Oudh 135 an application sought condonation of delay on the basis of the advice given by a counsel. It was held by a Division Bench that it is not sufficient for the applicant to show that he acted on the advice of a counsel but the court must be further satisfied that the advice was given with due care and attention. In that case the delay in filing an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was sought to be condoned on the ground of misapprehension in the mind of the counsel that a period of six months was provided which misapprehension was due to the counsel's failure to notice that the editions of Mulla's Civil Procedure Code and Limitation Act which he consulted were old ones. It was held that the fact that the counsel consulted the old editions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act published presumably prior to 1920 established beyond doubt utter negligence and carelessness on the part of the counsel who had been appearing in the Chief Court for many years and the negligence of counsel in the circumstances of the case did not entitle the applicant to urge that hew as prevented by any sufficient cause from filing the application for leave within time. In Sarmukh Singh v. Chanan Singh AIR 1960 Punjab 512. delay was sought to be condoned on the ground of wrong advice of the counsel in relation to the provisions of section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act. A division bench of that court held : "Had the learned counsel cared to look up this section there could have been no reasonable doubt that the appeal could, on no conceivable ground be competent in the Court of the learned District Judge. This was not an error liable to be committed by a reasonably prudent lawyer exercising due diligence and caution. Indeed any mistake due to negligence or misconduct or want of reasonable skill can by no stretch be considered to fall within the definition of good faith as contained in section 2,(7) of the Limitation Act. This was not an error liable to be committed by a reasonably prudent lawyer exercising due diligence and caution. Indeed any mistake due to negligence or misconduct or want of reasonable skill can by no stretch be considered to fall within the definition of good faith as contained in section 2,(7) of the Limitation Act. It was also held that tee view taken by the legal adviser, if reasonable, though mistaken, may well justify protection by section 5, but where the view taken is wholly unsupportable on the express language of well known provision of law it is difficult to apply section 5 to such a case. 8. In Chand v. Tripat Singh AIR 1963 Jammu and Kashmir 53, it was held that a general rule of lar cannot be laid down that a mistake of pleader, however, obvious it may be J can always and under every circumstances afford ground for extension of time under section 5. The counsel must show that there was bona fide mistake on his part and in spite of care and attention he could not avoid the mistake which was committed by him. 9. In Mariambai v. Hanifabai, AIR 1967 Madhya Pradesh 107,. It was held that advice given by counsel being based only on his impression and without reading relevant provisions of law it could not be said that counsel had acted with reasonable care nor could it he said that advice was founded on view which could have been taken by any other competent and careful legal practitioner so as to make it ground for extending time. 10. On a consideration of the explanation for the delay in the instant case in the light of the principles enumerated in the aforesaid case I am of opinion that the cause shown for the delay is not at all sufficient. My reasons for taking this view are these : 1. The writ petition was taken up for hearing on 12 May, 1982. On that date counsel for the landlord respondent made a statement that since Smt. E.R. Parker had died and no steps had been taken to substitute her legal representatives the writ petition had abated. Counsel for the petitioner thereupon prayed for and was granted one week's time to verify this fact and the writ petition was ordered to be listed for hearing on 20th May, 1982. Counsel for the petitioner thereupon prayed for and was granted one week's time to verify this fact and the writ petition was ordered to be listed for hearing on 20th May, 1982. That on 12th May, 1992 counsel for the petitioner prayed for time to verify the correctness of the statement made by counsel for the landlord respondent clearly indicates that by that date even though the writ petition was listed for hearing neither the surviving petitioners nor the heirs of the deceased petitioner Smt. E.R. Parker had informed their counsel about the death of Smt. R.R. Parker. If counsel for the landlord respondent had not made the aforesaid statement the writ petition would have been heard and decided on 12th May, 1982 even without the heirs of Smt. E. R. Parker being brought on the record. Even if it may be accepted that the local counsel at Kanpur had advised Ashley Parker, the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of the application for substitution that a substitution application in the writ petition need not be filed within 90 days no cause has been shown way the heirs of Smt. E.R. Parker did not even inform the counsel for the petitioners in this court about her death till the date fixed for hearing. It is not their case that the local counsel had told them that in a writ petition it was not at all necessary to make an application for substitution. As such, they should have filed the substitution application within a reasonable time. (2) Ashley Parker has not given the date and time when be sought the advice of the local counsel at Kanpur about the period of limitation for filing an application for substitution. If the advice was itself sought after the expiry of 90 days of the death of Smt. E.R. Parker it does not show any bona fide on his part. If the advice was sought before the expiry of 90 days no cause has been shown as already stated above why the application for substitution was not made within a reasonable time thereafter. (3) The standing at the bar of the local counsel has not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by Ashley Parker. (4) No affidavit, nor even a letter of the local counsel concerned has been filed stating that he did give such advice as alleged by Ashley Parker. (3) The standing at the bar of the local counsel has not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by Ashley Parker. (4) No affidavit, nor even a letter of the local counsel concerned has been filed stating that he did give such advice as alleged by Ashley Parker. In Chand's case (supra) it had been emphasised that the counsel must show that there was bona fide mistake on his part and in spite of care and attention he could not avoid the mistake which was committed by him. (5) The advice given by the local counsel, as alleged, was apparently not given after due care and attention, the same being directly in the teeth of Rule 38A of Chapter VIII of the rules of the court and the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Nand Kishore's case (supra). The local counsel was apparently not aware of these provisions of law nor did he make any effort to look into them. It was all the more necessary for him to do so when he was giving his opinion in regard to a matter which was pending in the High Court and not in the district court, namely a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and which was thus not within his usual domain. In view of the decision in the cases of Municipal Board, Lucknow, Sarmukh Singh and Mariam Bai (supra) such an advice could not constitute sufficient cause of for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. (6) Nothing has been shown as to why Ashley Parker thought it fit to seek advice from a local counsel and not from the counsel for the petitioners in the High Court. For seeking this advice it was not even necessary for him to come to the High Court. He could have sought this advice by just dropping a post card. (7) It is not clear as to how the contents of paragraph 5 of the affidavit filed by Ashley Parker have been sworn on personal knowledge. Even if it may be accepted that the local counsel had told him the facts stated in paragraph 5 as aforesaid it did not help the heirs of Smt. E.R. Parker. (7) It is not clear as to how the contents of paragraph 5 of the affidavit filed by Ashley Parker have been sworn on personal knowledge. Even if it may be accepted that the local counsel had told him the facts stated in paragraph 5 as aforesaid it did not help the heirs of Smt. E.R. Parker. The reason for taking this view is that even if at one time "some courts" (not this court) had taken the view as alleged in paragraph 5 this should not have been made the basis of him advice by the local counsel ignoring the provisions of rule 28A of Chapter VIII of the rules of the court and the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Nand Kishore's case (supra). Giving such an advice indicates complete lack of care and attention on the part of the local counsel. The alleged advice was on the face of it a cavalier one and did not make out sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. Taking a contrary view will result in nothing but light hearted disturbing the valuable right occurred in favour of the landlord-respondent on account of the abatement of the writ petition as against Smt E.R. Parker. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion the application dated 19.7.1982 to substitute the heirs of Smt E. R. Parker is dismissed with the result that the writ petition stands abated in so far as Smt. E.R. Parker, petitioner No. 2, is concerned and the impugned order has become final in so far as her heirs are concerned and is binding on them. 12. Coming to the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners on the merits of the writ petition it may be pointed out that the application under section 3 of the U. P. Act 3 of 1947 for permission to file suit for ejectment against the petitioners has been allowed by the State Government on the ground that the landlord respondent, who was himself occupying a house as a tenant was facing eviction from the said house at the instance of the landlord of that house. As already noticed earlier the application for release made by the landlord of that house has actually been allowed and respondent No. 2 has been granted six months' time to vacate the said accommodation and the time is about to expire on 16th August, 1982 In this background it cannot be said that the finding record by the State Government in regard to the need of the landlord respondent suffers from any such error which may justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. It may further be pointed out that the finding as to whether the need of the landlord respondent is bona fide is essentially a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed under Article 226 of the Constitution. If authority were needed reference may be made to Mattulal v. Radheylal, 975 R.C.J. 86 (S.C ) and India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin, 1978(I) R.C.J. 41 (S.C.). 14. Counsel for the petitioners then urged that even though the finding recorded by the State Government that the need of the landlord respondent was bona fide could not be assailed the writ petition still deserves to be allowed on the ground that the State Government had not applied its mind to the fact as to whether it was necessary to grant permission prayed for against all the four petitioners who were occupying independent portions of the same house or granting of the permission only against some of them could have met the requirement of the landlord respondent. In my opinion there is substance in this submission and even though the order of the State Government does not call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution so far as the finding that the need of the landlord respondent was bona fide is concerned, the impugned order yet deserves to be set aside and a direction deserves to be issued to the State Government to consider this aspect of the matter. At this stage Shri K. L. Grover, counsel for the landlord-respondent, made a statement that since the application for permission to file a suit for ejectment was made in the year 1969 i e. about 13 years back and the landlord respondent has already been sufficiently brassed he will some how adjust himself with the accommodation which was at the disposal of Smt. E.R. Parker and which would now be available to him as the writ petition as against her has abated. He states that in this view of the matter the case may not be sent back to the State Government for consideration of the question as to whether the permission should be granted against all the petitioners or only against some of them. 15. In the result the writ petition is held to have abated in so far as petitioner No. 2 Smt. E.R Parker is concerned. It is, however, allowed in so far as the remaining petitioners Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are concerned. The impugned order as against these petitioners is quashed. The said order dated 13th July, 1979, passed by the State Government in so far as it is against Smt. E.R. Parker petitioner No. 2 will be binding on her heirs in view of the abatement of the writ petition as aforesaid. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.