JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of Sri Chandra Prakash, learned Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur in Civil Appeal 292 of 1970 who dismissed the appeal on 23-1-1974; however, the parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal. 2. That appeal arose out of original suit, 14 of 1970, filed by Bibi Shehar Bano against Smt. Bugli and two others. 3. Dispute relates to an enclosure situated in Meerkot Street, Saharanpur City as detailed at the foot of the plaint. The suit was filed on 28-3-1967. 4. It was a suit for recovery of possession and a sum of Rs. 1,560/- as mesne profits at Rs. 43-5-4 pai per month pendente lite and future mesne profits were also claimed at the same rate from defendants 1 and 2. However, relief for eviction and costs was sought against all the three defendants. 5. This enclosure belonged to late Justice Syed Agha Hyder and plaintiff happened to be his daughter who also died pending this appeal and her heirs are on record now. 6. It was laid in the plaint that this enclosure was taken on rent on 1-11-1940 at Rs. 34/8/10 pai per month by one Raja Ram on terms and conditions laid in rent-note Ext. 1. The rent was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 43/5/4 pai by Rajaram who died on 3-1-1967 leaving his widow Smt. Bugli Devi and daughter Smt. Jeevni. Smt. Bugli Devi also died pending this appeal and her heirs are on record now. 7. Defendant 3 is Lala Bishan Chand who is admittedly a sub-tenant of Raja Ram. 8. It was laid in the plaint that there was an express prohibition about sub-letting the property wholly or in part under the rent note. Defendant 3 has been illegally inducted on a portion of tenement by Raja Ram. Thus it was prayed that defendants could be validly sued in ejectment by virtue of S. 3, sub-cl. (e) of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act (Act 3 of 1947). 9. All the defendants contested the claim. 10. The defence put forward on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 was that upon the death of Raja Ram his tenancy rights devolved on them. Raja Ram had every right to sub-let the premises in dispute. (e) of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act (Act 3 of 1947). 9. All the defendants contested the claim. 10. The defence put forward on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 was that upon the death of Raja Ram his tenancy rights devolved on them. Raja Ram had every right to sub-let the premises in dispute. He did sub-let a portion of the property in favour of one Shyam Lai. As Shyam Lal was a bad paymaster so Rajaram brought an action for ejectment of Shyam Lai. Pending that suit Shyam Lal was adjudged as insolvent; he also inducted Bishan Chand on the premises in dispute who procured an order of allotment in his favour from Rent Control authorities on 9th April, 1957 (Ext. Bl) Raja Ram had acquiesced in this sub-tenancy. 11. After death of Raja Ram defendants 1 and 2 accepted defendant 3 as sub-tenant. They were ever ready and willing to pay the rent. Plaintiff herself refused to accept the rent as and when tendered to her. 12. Similar case was put forward on behalf of defendant 3. He also maintained that his sub-tenancy was not determined by means of a valid notice. 13. Learned trial judge framed eight issues in this case. However, he found that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of possession or ejectment on the ground of illegal sub-letting against defendants 1 to 3. Remaining portion of the claim was allowed. Plaintiff was made to pay costs to defendants 1 to 3. 14. Plaintiff went up in appeal, 292 of 1970, which failed as given above. 15. Aggrieved by that decision plaintiff has preferred this appeal in this Court. 16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 17. The main contention put forward on behalf of the appellant was that S. 3, sub-cl. (e), Control of Rent and Eviction Act, does not distinguish a statutory sub-letting as well as a voluntary sub-letting. Any subletting of the premises by tenant-in-chief without permission of the landlord exposed the tenant and the sub-tenant to liability of ejectment. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent strenuously urged before me that the suit was not filed during lifetime of Raja Ram; a major portion of the disputed premises was in occupation of Shyam Lal. Landlord or landlady never objected to this sub-letting. 19. Sri Mohd. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent strenuously urged before me that the suit was not filed during lifetime of Raja Ram; a major portion of the disputed premises was in occupation of Shyam Lal. Landlord or landlady never objected to this sub-letting. 19. Sri Mohd. Naim, P.W. 1, pairokarof the plaintiff expressed ignorance in the matter; he conceded that the residence of plaintiff was at a distance of about 200 yards on the same road on which lay the disputed enclosure and under such circumstances his statement that he was ignorant about these sub-tenants does not appeal to common sense. His statement, that Bishan Chand was allotted a portion of this premises was not, to his knowledge, cannot inspire confidence. 20. Jagdish Prasad Pairokar and husband of defendant 2 testified that Rajaram objected when Bishan Chand sought allotment of disputed premises and he filed that application of Raja Ram which is on record Ext. Al, dated 24-4-1957. He conceded that Raja Ram used to realise rent from Bishan Chand; after death of Raja Ram, defendants 1 and 2 were realising the rent from sub-tenant Bishan Chand. Raja Ram treated Bishan Chand as sub-tenant. He could not deny consent of Shyam Lal for allotment of the premises to Bishan Chand, Rajaram and Shyam Lal all worked as commission agents in this enclosure. He could not give the date when Bishan Chand entered into possession. 21. In his statement Bishan Chand, D.W. 2, claimed his possession from 1957. He procured allotment order Ext. B1 in his favour. Previously that portion was occupied by Shyam Lal; he denied that he was sub-tenant of Raja Ram. He denied that plaintiff or her father had seen him working in this enclosure although P.W. 1 had seen him so working. He conceded that Shyam Lal was his cousin. He paid rent to Raja Ram and secured receipts. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon Mahabir Singh v. Anant Ram reported in 1965 All WR (HC) 504 : ( AIR 1966 All 214 ). In that case a presumption was drawn about acquiescence of the landlord when sub-tenancy lasted for four years and the sub-tenant paid rent to the tenant-in-chief in presence of landlord. 23. 22. Learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon Mahabir Singh v. Anant Ram reported in 1965 All WR (HC) 504 : ( AIR 1966 All 214 ). In that case a presumption was drawn about acquiescence of the landlord when sub-tenancy lasted for four years and the sub-tenant paid rent to the tenant-in-chief in presence of landlord. 23. This ruling is distinguishable for the simple reason that the plaintiff is a Pardah Nasheen Muslim lady and she or her father were not aware of the sub-tenancy as stated by Bishan Chand, D.W. 2, in his own statement. She also served a notice Ext. 2 dated 10-2-1967 alleging ignorance about this sub-tenancy which rendered the tenants-in-chief liable in ejectment. 24. Defendants 1 and 2 in their statements alleged that they had a right to sub-let the premises. Shyam Lal was the first tenant and during the eviction proceedings initiated against him by tenant-in-chief he handed over the possession to his brother Bishan Chand who procured the allotment order in his favour subsequently on 9-4-1957. Raja Ram had to compromise with Bishan Chand in view of the allotment order. 25. In the written statement defendant 3 denied to have been a sub-tenant of Raja Ram but alleged to be an allottee. It was not the case put forward in this statement that plaintiff was estopped from bringing an action in ejectment on account of any conduct on her part which amounted to acquiescence. So on the evidence on record it is not possible to raise presumption of acquiescence against the plaintiff so far as the sub-tenancy is concerned. 26. There was an express prohibition on sub-letting vide Ext. 1. There is not a single document on record to show that the subletting was done with the consent of the landlady. Learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that no written permission of the landlord for sub-letting the premises in dispute was essential under S. 3, sub-cl. (e) of the aforesaid Act. Both the courts below also found that defendant 3 was sub-tenant in the disputed premises. However, this sub-tenancy could not expose the defendants to liability in ejectment as it was not a voluntary act of tenant-in-chief. Had the tenant-in-chief not complied with this order of Rent Control & Eviction Officer, he could have been punished under S. 8 of the aforesaid Act. 27. However, this sub-tenancy could not expose the defendants to liability in ejectment as it was not a voluntary act of tenant-in-chief. Had the tenant-in-chief not complied with this order of Rent Control & Eviction Officer, he could have been punished under S. 8 of the aforesaid Act. 27. Learned appellate court himself observed that such allotment as relied upon by defendant 3 in this case could not serve much purpose. In para 13 and onwards of his judgment he observed : - " This brings us to the validity of the allotment order, although I feel that it should not serve much of a purpose for the defendants-respondents in upholding their contention on this count. The allotment order has already been adverted to above and as we find it (vide Ex. Ba-1) it was issued on April 9, 1957 and it would be in the nature of a directive to Raja Ram to place the accommodation within the property in suit formerly occupied by Shyam Lal at the disposal of the allottee, Bishan Chand (defendant 3). The allotment order was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Saharanpur in exercise of the statutory powers conferred by S. 7(2), U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Patently this allotment order would treat the tenant-in-chief, as Raja Ram admittedly was, as the landlord and the order was in the nature of a direction to the said tenant-in-chief to sub-let such portion in his tenancy which was formerly in the occupation of the admitted sub-tenant, Shyam Lal in favour of Bishan Chand, allottee. The landlord was not in the picture and no intimation of the allotment order is supposed to have been given to her. At least that has to be the impression to be gained from the contents and body of this order, which would though direct that a copy of the order be issued to the allottee, no such directions were issued for transmitting another copy to the owner i.e. the plaintiff. 14. The Scheme of law as contained in S. 7 of the said Act which provision dealt with the control of letting, was that the landlord had to acquaint the parties as and when the accommodation falls vacant. Similar obligation was cast on the tenant as and when he would vacate the subject of tenancy. 14. The Scheme of law as contained in S. 7 of the said Act which provision dealt with the control of letting, was that the landlord had to acquaint the parties as and when the accommodation falls vacant. Similar obligation was cast on the tenant as and when he would vacate the subject of tenancy. Sub-section (2) confers powers on the District Magistrate to issue order either general or special, requiring a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or which has fallen vacant or which is about to fall vacant. The allotment order now before us was professedly passed under these provisions. Sub-section (3) provides that no tenant shall sub-let any portion of the accommodation in his tenancy except with the permission in writting of the landlord and of the District Magistrate previously obtained. This being the scheme of law, one may reasonably say that sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (3) have to be so construed and applied as to result in harmonious reading and application. Under sub-s. (3) a tenant was expressly prohibited from sub-letting any portion of the subject of tenancy unless he would obtain in that behalf the consent of the landlord and the permission of the District Magistrate. The law further enjoins that such consent and permission has to be procured by the tenant-in-chief in writing and the same must be so obtained before the actual sub-letting is made in favour of a subtenant. That being so, it appears difficult to conceive, either within the frame of sub-s. (2) or independently of the same, if any sub-letting could be legitimately made in the absence of these permissions from the District Magistrate and from the landlord. In other words, one only out of the two permissions required would not serve the purpose of law. In order to validate sub-letting, the landlord must also condescend to it and the District Magistrate must also permit the same. In case the District Magistrate permits sub-letting, which, it may be said, he could do by issuing an allotment order under sub-s. (2), the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) will be rendered nugatory if such permission could hold good and rendered the sub-letting valid even in the absence of a similar permission in writing by the landlord. In case the District Magistrate permits sub-letting, which, it may be said, he could do by issuing an allotment order under sub-s. (2), the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) will be rendered nugatory if such permission could hold good and rendered the sub-letting valid even in the absence of a similar permission in writing by the landlord. Necessarily, therefore, the domain and scope of sub-s. (2) could not be so extended as to include an order of allotment by the Prescribed Authority to a tenant-in-chief directing him to let a portion of the subject of tenancy to another man, who may be termed as sub-tenant. Such an order must be in direct violation of the essential conditions which constitute sub-s. (3). Moreover an allotment order could follow only in the event of actual vacancy or expected vacancy of the accommodation. And since the term, "accommodation" must refer to the subject of demise as a whole, I do not think a portion of such accommodation could be classed as a distinct and separate accommodation, that too without the consent of the landlord. This should naturally amount to splitting the lease, which may not be permissible. That being so and the rest of the accommodation being in the occupation of the tenant-in-chief, it is difficult to construe that the portion allotted to the prospective subtenant is vacant. For this reason also the allotment order of this kind may not be sustained to be valid. This was the view laid down by a Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad in Mohd. Ishaq v. State Government (1966 All L J 397) : ( AIR 1966 All 280 ). Hon'ble the Chief Justice was pleased to lay down that a District Magistrate could not split an accommodation and order the letting of one portion to one person and of another portion to another person and summing up the whole thing it was observed that in case if tenant-in-chief vacates an accommodation by sub-letting it an order under S. 7(2) of the Act has to be issued to the owner of the accommodation to let it and not to the tenant-in-chief to sublet it. 15. Applying the principle laid down in Mohd. 15. Applying the principle laid down in Mohd. Ishaq's case (Supra) it may be said and that is being urged on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the allotment order was invalid and could not be issued within the sphere of S. 7(2). But then what is the ultimate effect of this finding. The impact must necessarily be that no statutory tenancy right have accrued in favour of defendant 3 on the strength of this allotment order. In other words defendant 3 could not be deemed to be a sub-tenant on its basis. He could not claim to be a statutory subtenant." These observations made by learned appellate court are perfectly sound. 28. However, learned appellate court learned when he found that defendants were well protected by this allotment order which was void and inoperative. A void order is safely ignorable and could not clothe defendant 3 with any status. This order was never sent to the land-lady or her father. A bare look at S. 7 of the aforesaid Act shall go to disclose that it was simply a direction which must have been issued to landlord and not to tenant-in-chief to let out the premises to defendant 3. That direction was never sent to the landlord or landlady in this case nor their permission in writing as contemplated by S. 7 sub-cl. (3) of the aforesaid Act was obtained. Moreover, according to defendants 1 and 2 he had already been inducted on a disputed portion by his cousin Shyam Lal and the allotment order was procured subsequently by him. Thus this sub-tenancy of defendant 3 did not even commence with this void direction of Rent Control and Eviction Officer but had commenced earlier. Defendant 3 denied to be a sub-tenant of Raja Ram, although the evidence on record falsifies his case. Section 3, sub-cl. (e) of the aforesaid Act reads as "That the tenant has, on or after the 1st day of October, 1946, has sub-let the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord." The language employed in this Section does not extend any protection to a subtenant who entered into possession on the premises without written consent of the landlord under S. 7 (sub-cl. 3) aforesaid. Section 3, sub-clause (e) of the aforesaid Act can be validly pressed into service on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants. 29. 3) aforesaid. Section 3, sub-clause (e) of the aforesaid Act can be validly pressed into service on behalf of the plaintiff-appellants. 29. Thus it is obvious that tenant-in-chief successively inducted sub-tenants on a portion of the disputed premises despite the prohibition in rent-note Ext. 1, it was on account of his illegal sub-letting of the premises to Shyam Lal that the Prescribed Authority wrongly issued the direction under S. 7 to the tenant-in-chief to allot a portion of the premises in dispute to Bishan Chand; possession of Bishan Chand is not traceable to that direction also; landlady was totally ignorant about these successive and illegal sub-lettings which could not protect the sub-tenancy as discussed above and rendered all the defendants liable in ejectment also. 30. No other point was argued before me. 31. In the result the appeal is allowed. Plaintiffs' suit is decreed with costs throughout. The impugned judgment and decree of the court below are modified accordingly. 32. Three months' time is allowed to defendants from today to vacate the disputed premises failing which plaintiff-appellants can get them ejected through court in execution department at their own expense. Amin's map paper No. 46C1 dated 14-4-1970 shall form part of decree.