G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by defendants 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9 and 10, is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 12 12 -1974, passed by the Addl. Civil Judge, Bijapur, in RA No. 106/1973, on his file, dismissing the appeal on confirming the judgment and decree, dated 30 5 1973, passed by the Prl. Munsiff, Jamkhandi, in OS No. 28/1969, on his file, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff as prayed for. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS instituted a suit for recovery of the contribution on the charge of the mortgage properties. The defendants contested mainly on the ground that the suit was barred by time. The trial Court, appreciating the evidence on record, answered all the material issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants went up in appeal before the civil Judge, Bijapur, in RA No. 106/1973, on his file. The learned Addl. Civil Judge, bijapur, who heard the appeal raised the following points, as arising for his consideration in the appeal. 1) Whether the suit claim is in time? 2) Whether pronote debts comprised in Ex. P 1 were incurred mainly to save the estate of deceased Usmansaheb or for family necessity ? 3) What order or decree ? ( 3 ) THE learned Civil Judge, re-assessing the evidence on record, answered point No. 1 in the affirmative point No. 2 in the negative and in that view he dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court". Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants have instituted the above second appeal before this Court. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellants mainly argued that in view of ss. 92 and 95 of the Transfer of Property act, the rights of the co mortgagor redeeming the property would not be better than the rights of the original mortgagee and the suit for conribution should be instituted within the time limited to redeem the mortgage. Hence, he submitted that the suit was barred by time. ( 5 ) AS against that the leared counsel for respondents-plaintiffs argued that in addition to the rights of the plaintiffs as subrogee, they have additional rights under S. 92 of the T. P. Act having acquired a charge. Hence, he submitted that the suit was barred by time. ( 5 ) AS against that the leared counsel for respondents-plaintiffs argued that in addition to the rights of the plaintiffs as subrogee, they have additional rights under S. 92 of the T. P. Act having acquired a charge. In that view, he submitted that time starts from the date of payments and as such the suit was in time. The sole point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this appeal is: whether the Courts-below ware justified in holding that the suit was in. time- in Manik Sadashiv v. Krishnabai (1) it is laid down thus:"the right of contribution is quite independent of the right of subrogation conferred by S. 92, T. P. Act while considering the question of limitation in such cases, the important point for consideration would be "what is the nature of the claim in the suit?. That is to be decided on the allegations in the plaint. If the allegations in a plaint "indicate. that it is a suit to enforce rights similar to those of the mortgagee, in that case it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot have higher rights than the mortgagee, even though the plaiitiff may have a right of subrogation. If, however, the allegations in the plain indicate that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce his right to claim contribution along with his right to enforce the charge arising in his favour under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the starting point of limitation would obviously be different and that would be the date on which the plaintiff in. such a suit made payment and redeemed the mortgage. "that is also the view taken by this court in the case in Kenchappa v. Nagappa (2 ). The frame of the suit in the present case is Tor recovery of the amount from the co-mortgagors by way of contribution on the charge of the mortgage properties. Hence the Courts-below were justified in holding that the limitation started on the date of payment of money and the suit was well within time, I have no- reason to differ. ( 6 ) IN the result, the appeal is devoid of merits and it is liable to be dismissed and I dismiss the same. No costs of this appeal. --- *** --- .