JUDGMENT Gopi Nath, J. - This is a defendant s appeal from a judgment and decree passed by the Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur, decreeing the plaintiffs suit for demolition, possession and injunction in respect of the plots in dispute. The plaintiffs filed the suit for the reliefs mentioned above on the allegations that they were the owners in possession of abadi plot No. 148 1 measuring .07 acre and plot No. 151/1 measuring 14 decimals of village Lakhauri tappa Sikandarpur pargana Chillpupar tahsil Bansgaon district Gorakhpur : that in the year 1961 the defendant No. 1, the appellant in the instant appeal, had filed a suit No. 120 of 1961 which had been disposed of in terms of a compromise, under which the plaintiffs had been accepted to be the owner of the land in suit and the Lekhpal was found to have made wrong entries in the revenue records in respect of the aforementioned plots : that the land in dispute belonged to the plaintiffs and the defendant had wrongly encroached upon it to the extent shown in the site plan marked by letters EFGHL; the contesting defendant was alleged to have raised unauthorised constructions over the disputed plots and by the instant suit he was required to remove the same and to deliver possession for the vacant land to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs prayed that the defendant-appellant be restrained by means of an injunction from interfering with the plaintiff s possession and use of the said two plots after removal of the encroachments made thereon. 2. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 alone. He denied having filed any suit against the plaintiffs or to have entered into any compromise as alleged by them. His case was that he had acquired a half share in the plots in suit under registered sale deeds dated 4-7-1956 and 17-8-1959 executed by Smt. Raja and Smt. Sarmukhi respectively who were the co-sharers of the two plots. The defendant, accordingly, claimed to be the Bhumidhar of the land in dispute and that the constructions raised were so raised on the basis of the title acquired to the disputed land. It was further pleaded that the constructions had been raised four years prior to the institution of the suit and the suit was barred by time as also by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. 3. It was further pleaded that the constructions had been raised four years prior to the institution of the suit and the suit was barred by time as also by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit on the findings that the plaintiff was the owner of the plots in dispute; that the defendant-appellant had filed Suit No. 120 of 1961 which was disposed of in terms of compromise between the parties where-under the plaintiffs title to the property was accepted by the contesting defendant, that the defendant had illegally raised constructions over plot No. 151/1; that the defendant-appellant had no title to the land in dispute and the constructions raised by him were unauthorised. The trial Court relied upon the compromise decree passed in Suit No. 120 of 1961. It found that the appellant's case that he had never filed such a suit was wholly wrong and that he was bound by the decree passed in that suit. The suit was not found barred either by time or by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. The plots in dispute were found to be abadi plots and the wrong entries made by the Amin were found to have been corrected by the Assistant Collector in the year 1963. The trial Court further made an observation that the issues relating to estoppel and acquiescence were not pressed by the defendant. The suit was accordingly decreed for removal of the constructions complained of and for possession of the land covered by them to the plaintiffs. The defendant was further restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the plots in dispute as prayed. 4. On appeal the appellate Court affirmed the decree and concurred in the findings recorded by the trial Court that the contesting defendant had in Suit No. 120 of 1961 accepted the plaintiffs as the owners of the land in dispute under the compromise entered into between the parties and he was bound by the compromise decree passed in that suit. It was found that the compromise bore the signature of the appellant and it was verified in the presence of his counsel who had identified him; that the defendant had set up a wrong case that no suit as numbered 120 of 1964 had been filed by him or that he had entered into any compromise in the same. It was found that the compromise bore the signature of the appellant and it was verified in the presence of his counsel who had identified him; that the defendant had set up a wrong case that no suit as numbered 120 of 1964 had been filed by him or that he had entered into any compromise in the same. It was further found that the defendant-appellant had admitted in Suit No. 120 of 1961 that the plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed land which was their Sehan and it appertained to their house. It was further found that the Lekhpal had made wrong entries in the revenue records in respect of the plots in dispute and they had been corrected by the Assistant Collector. The learned Judge further found that this defendant-appellant had forcibly entered into possession over the disputed land and had made unauthorised constructions over the same. 5. Aggrieved, the defendant has come up in appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant raised the following points : 1. that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the suit as framed could not be decreed; 2. That the encroachments having been found to lie in plot No. 151/1 and not in plot No. 148 the suit could not be decreed in respect of both the plots; 3. that the previous compromise did not relate to the land in dispute i.e. the land in dispute over which the alleged unauthorised constructions are said to stand did not form part of the compromise decree in the earlier suit, hence that decree could not bind the appellant in the instant suit; and 4. that in any view of the matter the suit could not be decreed for demolition as adequate compensation could have redressed the grievance of the plaintiffs. lt was further urged that the Court below decided the appeal in a summary manner and did not adjudicate upon the controversy involved as required by law, in that it did not discuss the evidence and gave no reasons for its findings. 6. We shall deal with the points seriatim. 7. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court was challenged on the ground that effective relief could be obtained from the revenue Court i.e. for possession of the land in dispute forming part of plots Nos. 148/1 and 151/1. 6. We shall deal with the points seriatim. 7. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court was challenged on the ground that effective relief could be obtained from the revenue Court i.e. for possession of the land in dispute forming part of plots Nos. 148/1 and 151/1. These plots have been found to be abadi plots by the courts below. The suit was for demolition and an injunction restraining the defendant-appellant from interfering with the plaintiffs use of the land after possession of the same had been delivered to them. The principal relief accordingly was one for demolition and prohibitory injunction. In Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, (1968 All L J 1108); ( AIR 1969 All 526 ) (FB), it was held that if the main relief in the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court the joining of ancillary reliefs which could be granted by the revenue Court would not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It was held that a suit for injunction and demolition in respect of an agricultural holding was cognizable by the Civil Court. No objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was raised in the Courts below. The provisions of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as regards cognizance of suits was amended and S. 331 (1 A) was added after S. 331. These sections read as follows ; "331. Cognizance of suits etc. under this Act. (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no Court other than a Court mentioned in column 4 of schedule II, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil P. C. 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. Provided that where a declaration has been made under S. 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Sch. II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Provided that where a declaration has been made under S. 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Sch. II in so far as they relate to suits, applications or proceedings under chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof. Explanation : If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the revenue Court would have granted. (1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub section (1), an objection that a Court mentioned in column 4 of Sch. II, or, as the case may be, a Civil Court, which has no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or proceeding, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional Court unless the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order or decree passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid. (3) An appeal shall lie from an order passed under Sections 47, 104 and O. 41, R. 1, Civil P. C., 1908 or any final order or decree passed by a Court mentioned in Column No. 4 in the proceeding mentioned in column No. 3 to the Court or authority mentioned in column No. 5 thereof. (4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in S. 100 of the Civil P. C., 1908 from the final order or decree passed in an appeal under sub-sec. (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 6 of the schedule aforesaid". 8. In Raj Bahadur Singh v. Smt. Gaura alias Ram Piari, (1977 All W C 165) : (AIR 1977 NOC 149), it was held that if a question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit is not taken in the trial Court the same would not be allowed in second appeal. 9. 8. In Raj Bahadur Singh v. Smt. Gaura alias Ram Piari, (1977 All W C 165) : (AIR 1977 NOC 149), it was held that if a question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit is not taken in the trial Court the same would not be allowed in second appeal. 9. Learned counsel invited my attention to Smt. Bhagwati Devi v. Radhey Shyam, (AIR 1977 NOC 72) : (1977 All L J 74) and Jangi Mishra v. Muneshar, (1969 All L J 222) to contend that a question of jurisdiction could be raised even at the second appellate stage. 10. He further contended that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit which was in respect of a Bhumidhari holding and the revenue Court could give a declaration as to title in respect of it. It was further submitted that the suit could be maintained for demolition only after a declaration had been obtained under S. 143 of the U: P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It may be observed that the suit was for demolition, possession and injunction on the basis of the plaintiffs title which had been accepted by the defendant-appellant under the compromise decree passed in Suit No. 120 of 1961. The suit was, accordingly, maintainable in the Civil Court. Further in view of the provisions of S. 331 (1 A) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the contention has no force. 11. The next contention was that the encroachment having been found to lie in plot No. 151/1 and not in plot No. 148, the suit could not be decreed in respect of both the plots. This contention also has no force. The suit was for declaration and injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the land in dispute. The plaintiffs case was that the defendant had encroached on a part of the plaintiffs land and was interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the other part Although unauthorised constructions lay in plot No. 151/1 the plaintiffs could claim the reliefs they did in respect of the land in dispute. The plaintiffs prayed that after demolition the defendant be restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the land in dispute. The land in dispute was covered by plots Nos. 151/1 and 148. The plaintiffs prayed that after demolition the defendant be restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the land in dispute. The land in dispute was covered by plots Nos. 151/1 and 148. The relief of injunction could accordingly be granted in respect of both the plots and the suit decreed accordingly. This point was further never taken in the Court below and has no merits as well. 12. It was then contended that the previous compromise did not relate to the land in dispute and hence could not be taken advantage of by the plaintiffs in the instant suit From a reading of the judgments of the two Courts below it is apparent that the plots in dispute were the subject matter of Suit No. 120 of 1961 and the compromise related to them. The plaintiffs' title was accepted by the defendant appellant in the earlier suit under the compromise. Since the plaintiffs' title to the land in dispute was accepted by the defendant in Suit No. 120 of 1961 the compromise and the decree following thereon could well be relied upon by the plaintiffs to establish their title and to claim the reliefs of demolition and injunction. The lower appellate Court held that the title of the plaintiffs over the land in dispute was established from the material on record. It further referred to the written-statement of the defendant and observed "the defendant No. 1 has not denied in his written statement that the disputed portion of his construction lies in the said 21 decimal area or in other words plot Nos. 148/1 and 151/1. the compromise decree evidenced the title of the plaintiffs over plots Nos. 148 and 151/1 and was rightly relied upon by the courts below to adjudicate upon the rights of the plaintiffs and the claim laid by them. The question now sought to be raised was never raised in the Courts below. The defendant's case in the Courts below was that he had never entered into any compromise. This contention was rejected and it was found that th'_ defendant had entered into a compromise and had accepted the title of the plaintiffs over the plots Nos. 148 and 151/1. The point now sought to be canvassed involves a question of fact and having not been raised in the Courts below and in the light of the discussion above has no force. 13. 148 and 151/1. The point now sought to be canvassed involves a question of fact and having not been raised in the Courts below and in the light of the discussion above has no force. 13. It was then urged that the suit should not have been decreed for demolition. A number for authorities were cited for the submission that instead of decreeing the claim for demolition compensation could be awarded to meet the ends of justice. Reliance was placed on the decision in Second Appeal No. 3048 of 1967, (Pitam Singh v. Ranvir Singh), decided on 16-9-1976, Chedi Lal v. Chotey Lal, (1951 All L J 196): ( AIR 1951 All 199 ) (FB), Trilok Chand Nathu Mai v. Dhundiraj Madhava Rao, (AIR 1957 Nag 2), and Shushilendra Pal Singh v. B. Kailash Chand, ( AIR 1945 All 395 ). 14. The case of Pitam Singh v. Raghubir Singh does not support the contention of the appellant Hon'ble M. P. Mehrotra, J. in that case observed as follows : "Learned counsel has placed reliance on Shushilendra Pal Singh v. B. Kailash Chand, ( AIR 1945 All 395 ), Kalyandas Gopal Das v. Hira Lal Karsendas, (AIR 1954 Sau 139), Tirlok Chand Nathu Mai v. Dhundiraj Madhava Rao, (AIR 1957 Nag 2) and Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal (1951 All LJ 196) : ( AIR 1951 All 199 ) (FB). These authorities, I am afraid, are not of much assistance in the facts of the case and they are distinguishable on the facts of their case. I felt some doubt whether in a suit for possession where the plaintiff is legally entitled to his land the Court has any discretion in the matter to refuse possession and to award damages in lieu of possession". This observation clearly suggests that the "award of damages is no substitute for the legal right which vests in the plaintiff for possession over his land. The learned Judge further observed that the main relief in the case was not for possession. This observation clearly suggests that the "award of damages is no substitute for the legal right which vests in the plaintiff for possession over his land. The learned Judge further observed that the main relief in the case was not for possession. In the body of the judgment it was observed that since no one appeared on behalf of the respondent to contest the appeal and the trial Court had decreed the suit only for compensation and had refused the relief of demolition and injunction and a long time had elapsed between the raising of the costly construction a decree for damages in lieu of demolition might satisfy the ends of justice. Each case depends on its own facts. This case does not lay down any general law that in a suit for demolition, possession and injunction a decree for compensation should invariably be passed. The defendant-appellant in the instant case went behind the compromise decree passed in suit No. 120 of 1961. He went to the extent of denying the compromise entered into by him. Both the Courts below found that this defence was palpably false. The constructions raised were found to be unauthorised and in derogation of the title of the plaintiffs, accepted by the defendant-appellant in suit No. 120 of 1961. Both the Courts below further on an appraisal of the evidence on record recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiffs-respondents had fully established their title to the land in suit and the constructions raised by the defendant were wholly unauthorised and in the teeth of the compromise entered into by him in suit No. 120 of 1961. In the circumstances ai decree for compensation only in lieu of demolition would not meet the ends of justice. 15. In Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal ( AIR 1951 All 199 ) (FB) the question related to the rights of co-sharers in respect of joint land. It was observed that while a co-sharer is entitled to object to another co-sharer exclusively appropriating land to himself to the detriment of other co-sharers, the question as to what relief should be granted to the plaintiff in the event of the invasion of his rights will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The right to the relief for demolition and injunction will be granted or withheld by the Court according as the circumstances established in the case justify. The right to the relief for demolition and injunction will be granted or withheld by the Court according as the circumstances established in the case justify. Each case will be decided upon its own peculiar facts and it will be left to the Court to exercise its discretion upon proof of circumstances showing which side the balance of convenience lies. 16. The case of co-sharers stands on a different footing than the case of a trespasser. The instant is a case of a trespasser. Chedi Lal's case ( AIR 1951 All 199 ) (FB) is accordingly distinguishable on facts and does not apply in the iostant case. So are the cases of Shushilendra Pal Singh v. B. Kailash Chand, ( AIR 1945 All 395 ), Kalyandas Gopal Das v. Hira Lal Karesendas, (AIR 1954 Sau 139), Tirok Chand Nathu Mai v. Dhundiraj Madhava Rao, (AIR 1957 Nag 2). They relate to the rights of co-sharers in joint land and are distinguishable on facts. If a person has no title to land it seems to me very doubtful if he can resist a claim to possession or demolition of an unauthorised construction on the ground that a decree for damages in lieu of demolition and possession would meet the ends of justice. A party cannot be deprived of his right to possession. A proprietary right has to be protected and the choice of reliefs is with the plaintiff who is a dominus litus in a litigation. The discretion vested in a Court to grant a relief has to be exercised keeping in view the right claimed and the circumstances attending. In a case of proprietary right as against a trespasser, award of compensation may not relieve a breach. Further, the award of compensation in lieu of the reliefs claimed was never canvassed before the Courts below.I accordingly find no force in the contention and reject the same. 17. It was then contended that the lower appellate Court had disposed of the appeal in a summary manner as it had neither discussed the evidence nor adjudicated upon some of the controversies involved. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is a detailed one. It has set out the case of the parties, discussed the evidence in detail, recorded the findings on an appraisal of the material on record and dealt with the arguments advanced before it. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is a detailed one. It has set out the case of the parties, discussed the evidence in detail, recorded the findings on an appraisal of the material on record and dealt with the arguments advanced before it. It did not dispose of the appeal in a summary manner. The findings of fact recorded by the Court below are based on an assessment of the evidence and they do not suffer from any error of law. The contention raised has no force and is rejected. 18. No other point was pressed. 19. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant has on his behalf prayed for three months' time to remove the constructions. Time prayed for is allowed. The decree for demolition may not be executed for a period of three months.