ORDER K.N. Misra, J. - Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Deoria, and the order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner Reghunath Sahai had filed an objection under S. 9-A 12), U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. in respect of plot 780 situate in village Kasaya, Tappa Mainpur. district Deoria, claiming that he is the sole Bhumidhar of the plot in dispute and prayed that the names of the recorded persons be expunged. According to the petitioner the names of opposite parties 4 to 7 were wrongly recorded as tenure-holders of the land in dispute. The consolidation Officer vide order dated 30th July 1979 allowed the objection of the petitioner and ordered his name to be recorded as a tenant over the land in dispute directing the names of the recorded persons to be expunged. Against this order appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by opposite parties 4 to 6 asserting that the said order was passed ex parte as no notice was served upon them after the case was dismissed in default. They prayed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation), after hearing parties, by order dated 18th September 1980, allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer for decision on merits awarding Rs. 15/- as costs. He found that the appellant had shown sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal against the impugned order. The petitioner thereupon filed a revision against the said order-which has been dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 5th January 1982. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has recorded a finding that the notice was not sufficiently served upon the opposite parties and he did not accept the report of the process server to the effect that the notice was refused to be accepted by the opposite parties. Maintaining the order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he has directed the Consolidation Officer to decide the case on merits and the parties were directed to appear before him on 18th January 1982. The petitioner has challenged these orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2 in the present writ petition. 3. Maintaining the order passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he has directed the Consolidation Officer to decide the case on merits and the parties were directed to appear before him on 18th January 1982. The petitioner has challenged these orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2 in the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that since opposite parties had put in appearance in the case but subsequently they absented hence the case was directed to proceed ex parte against them vide order dated 9th May. 1979. Although subsequently it was dismissed in default, but on being restored it was ultimately allowed on 30th July, 1979. Learned counsel contended that since no application was moved by the opposite parties for getting the said order dated 9th May. 1979 set aside, they had no right to file appeal against order dated 30th July. 1979 nor they could claim to contest the case on merits. I am unable to agree with this contention. 4. If a case which was ordered to proceed ex parte was itself dismissed in default, the earlier order directing the case to proceed ex parte against opposite parties automatically lapsed and so upon the restoration of the case and its decision on merits, it was not at all necessary for the opposite parties to have first applied for setting aside of the earlier order by which the case was directed to proceed ex parte against them prior to filing of appeal against the final order passed in the case against them. 5. In the instant case it is evident from record that after the said order dated 9th May, 1979 was passed by the Consolidation Officer directing the case to proceed ex parte against the opposite parties, the objection itself was dismissed in default on 15th June, 1979. Thus in this view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 was incompetent on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next challenged the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Thus in this view of the matter, I am unable to hold that the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 was incompetent on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next challenged the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, condoning the delay in filing the appeal. He urged that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation erred in accepting the contention of the appellants that they were not aware of the ex parte order and that on coming to know about it they filed the appeal. He urged that this was not a sufficient ground for condoning delay. I am unable to agree with this contention. 7. Whether delay should be condoned or not was a matter within the discretion of the Consolidation Authorities. A concurrent finding has been recorded by the two courts below on the matter of condonation of delay in filing appeal and accepting the explanation offered by the appellants to be sufficient and bona fide, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned. 8. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that the word 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice (see Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani, AIR 1978 SC 537 ). No lack of bona fides or inaction can be imputed to the opposite parties 4 to 6, who had shown that no notice was served upon them of the restoration application, hence they were not aware about the restoration of the case and also about the ultimate order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 30th July, 1979 against which they preferred appeal on coming to know about it. 9. It is well settled that the findings recorded about sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds shown for condonation of delay raises no question for jurisdiction and as such the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, by which he has condoned the delay cannot be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and I do not find any infirmity in the said order. 10. 10. Learned counsel next contended that the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 was not maintainable, because if order dated 30th July, 1979 be treated to be ex parte, no appeal could be filed and only an application for restoration could be preferred in view of the provisions contained in S. 201 U. P. Land Revenue Act, read with S. 41, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. He further contended that since one of the recorded co-tenure-holder namely opposite party 7, Ram Prasad had not joined in the appeal nor he was impleaded in the appeal and as such the appeal was incompetent on that ground as well and the same could not be heard and decided on merits. I am unable to agree with these contentions. 11. As no notice was served upon the opposite parties there would be no escape fjom the conclusion that the order dated 30th July, 1979 was an ex parte order passed against them. Against the said order passed ex parte by the Consolidation Of beer, the opposite parties had two-fold remedies available to them. They could either file an application for setting aside the ex parte order before the Consolidation Officer or file an appeal under S. 11, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, against the said decision, learned counsel's contention to the effect that against the ex parte order passed by the Consolidation Officer, no appeal could be filed under S. 11, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, in view of the specific bar provided under S. 201, U. P. Land Revenue Act, read with S. 41, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, does not appear to be correct. Under S. 11, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, every order passed by the Consolidation Officer under section 10 is appealable without any exception. It does not exclude from its ambit ex parte decisions given on merits by the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Simply because the opposite parties could avail the remedy of filing a restoration application before the Consolidation Officer for setting aside the ex parte decision passed ex parte against them, their right to file appeal under S. 11 against the decision would not be barred under S. 201, U.P. Land Revenue Act, read with S. 41, U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 12. 12. Every order passed under S. 10, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, either on contest or in default, without any distinction is appealable under S. 11 of the Act. The provisions of S. 41, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, read with S. 201, U. P. Land Revenue Act, cannot be so construed as to take away right of appeal against the ex parte decision passed by the Consolidation Officer under S. 10 of the Act. Section 201, U. P. Land Revenue Act, would not at all be attracted because S. 41, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, itself provides that : - "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of Chapter IX or X of the U. P. Land Revenue Act shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and..." (Emphasis supplied). Emphasis not found marked in certified copy Ed 13. Since there exists a provision for filing appeal under S. 11 against all orders passed by the Consolidation Officer under S. 10, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. without any exception hence the provision of S. 201, U. P. Land Revenue Act, would not operate as a bar in filing the appeal." 14. Similar question cropped up for consideration in Gokur v. Nirmal (1968 Rev Dec 123) wherein Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) observed that : - "Section 11 provides an appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer within 21 days of the date of the order. Under S. 11 there is no categorisation of the kind of order which alone is appealable. All orders of the Consolidation Officer are appealable." 15. Section 41, Consolidation 4 Holdings Act, opens with the phrase "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act." So far as the applicability of S. 201 is concerned, if any provision of Consolidation of Holdings Act provides for an appeal against an order passed on merits on contest or by default, then S. 201 will not apply. Thus, the applicability of S. 201, Land Revenue Act is excluded by the opening part of S. 41. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 16. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 against the order dated 29th July, 1979 cannot be said to be not maintainable on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 16. In this view of the matter, the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 against the order dated 29th July, 1979 cannot be said to be not maintainable on the aforesaid ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 17. There remains to be considered the second limb of the argument raised by the learned counsel to the effect that since opposite party 7, who was equally affected by the order dated 30th July, 1979 had not joined in appeal along with opposite parties 4 to 6 nor he was arrayed as party to it, hence the appeal was incompetent and no order could be passed setting aside said order. 18. The perusal of the orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2 indicate that no such point was raised on behalf of the petitioner before them. If such point would have been raised, there would have been no difficulty in curing the defect of alleged non-impleadment of opposite party 7, who could, on being apprised of any such omission, be impleaded as respondent,if he was not already arrayed as such. In these circumstances this question cannot be permitted to be raised in the writ petition. However, since it has been averred in the writ petition that this point was in fact raised on his behalf before the opposite parties 1 and 2, but they omitted to consider and refer it in the impugned order, 1 have heard learned counsel on said question but I find no substance in it. 19. In G.P. Kooke v. Equitable Coal Company Ltd. (1904-8 Cal. W. N. 621), the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court considered the question whether restoration application is maintainable or not by one of the several defendants against whom ease been decided ex parte. It was observed that : "When it is said that S. 108 has no application to the case of one of several defendants, and that that section only applies to the case of a sole defendant, or to a case where there are several defendants, all of whom have not appeared. I cannot accept this interpretation of the section. I do not see why because a defendant happens to be one of many, he is less 'a defendant' within the meaning of that section. I cannot accept this interpretation of the section. I do not see why because a defendant happens to be one of many, he is less 'a defendant' within the meaning of that section. If the petitioners' contention were to prevail the result would be that if there be one defendant out of many, against whom a decree has been passed ex parte, he would be deprived of the benefit of the section. There is nothing in S. 106. which conflicts with S. 108. nor is there anything in S. 106 which limits the operation of S. 108 in the way suggested by the petitioner." 20. In view of the above and on parity of reasoning I am of the opinion that where out of several opposite parties only one has appeared and the case was heard and decided on merits against him and ex parte against the other opposite parties, the opposite parties against whom the case has been decided ex parte can apply for setting aside the ex parte decision passed against them, and such application would be maintainable in spite of the fact that one of the defendants was present and has contested the case. Similarly where none of the opposite parties appeared and the case w as decided ex parte against all of them, an application for setting aside ex parte decree or order can be filed by only some of them and it cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that others have not joined in applying for setting aside the ex parte order. They would' also be entitled to file an appeal straightway under S. 11, Consolidation of Holdings Act, against that ex parte decision given against them by the Consolidation Officer under S. 10 of the Act. as already observed above. If no application is filed for setting aside the ex parte order before the Consolidation Officer and only an appeal has been filed under section 11, the same cannot be thrown out to be not maintainable because every decision passed by the Consolidation Officer under section 10, Consolidation of Holdings Act, be it on contest or in default, is appealable LJ s. 11 of the Act without any distinction. It would also be not necessary that appeal should be preferred by all the opposite parties to the case. An appeal under section 11 LJ. It would also be not necessary that appeal should be preferred by all the opposite parties to the case. An appeal under section 11 LJ. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.i filed by some of the defendants against whom an ex parte decision was given by the Consolidation Officer would be maintainable and cannot be rejected merely on the ground that all the opposite parties have not] joined in filing the appeal. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that since opposite party 7 was not impleaded even as a respondent in the appeal, the order appealed against could not be set aside as a whole and the case could not be directed to be decided on merits. 22. It is not disputed that the names of opposite parties 4 to 7 were recorded as co-tenure-holders and the Consolidation Officer had directed to record the name of the petitioner after expunging the names of all the recorded tenure-holders against whom the petitioner had set up a common case asserting that their names were wrongly recorded as tenure-holders and that he is the tenant and in possession over the land in dispute. It is not disputed that the case proceeded on common grounds against all the opposite parties. 23. In Sultan Husain Khan v. Satnarain Lal, AIR 1953 Hyd. 191, the Division Bench observed : "Under O. 9, R. 13 there is no compulsion on one of the defendants against whom an ex parte decree is passed to make his codefendants parties to his application to set aside the decree. Where such an application is made by one defendant only, the under the proviso to the rule discretion has been given to the Court to decide whether the decree can be set aside as against the other defendants also. However, this does not mean that as the decree is against several defendants they all should be made parties. There is no warrant for such a proposition." 24. Interpreting the provisions of O.41 R. 4, Civil P. C. the Supreme Court in Ratan Lal Shah v. Firm Lalman Das Chhadamma Lal ( AIR 1970 SC 108 ) observed that (at P. 109) : "The object of O. 41 R. 4 is to enable one of the parties to a suit to obtain relief in appeal when the decree appealed from proceeds on the ground common to him and others. The Court in such an appeal may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the parties who are in the same interest as the appellant." 25. It was further observed that : - "That the appeal could not be dismissed on the ground that M. (who had not joined as appellant and was arrayed as respondent), was not served with the notice of appeal, not the appeal could be dismissed on the ground that there was a possibility of two conflicting decrees." 26. In another decision in Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram ( AIR 1971 SC 742 ) the Supreme Court observed that (at P. 744) : "Competence of the appellate court to pass a decree appropriate to the nature of the dispute in an appeal filed by one of the several persons' against whom a decree is made on a ground which is common to him and others is not lost merely because of the person who was jointly interested in the claim has been made a party-respondent* and on his death his heirs have not been brought on the record. Power of. the appellate court under Q. 41 R. 4 to vary or modify the decree of a Subordinate Court arises when one of the persons out of many against whom a decree or an order had been made on a ground which was common to him and others has appealed. That power may be exercised when other persons who were parties to the proceeding before the subordinate Court and against whom a decree proceeded on a ground which was common to the appellant and to those other persons who are either not impleaded as parties to the appeal or are impleaded as respondents." (Emphasis is laid on the words are either not impleaded as parties to the appeal.") 27. In Bhura Mal v. Har Kishan Das (ILR 1902-24 All 383). it was observed by the Full Bench that : - "In my opinion the Court must be assumed to have the power to set aside the whole decree, if the decree from its nature is one and indivisible, or if, in order to give the defendants against whom an ex parte decree has been pronounced the relief to which they are entitled, it must be set aside as a whole." 28. Section 54 (1) U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act provides that the State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act and under cl (w) of sub-section 2). rules may be made for the procedure to be followed in all proceedings including applications, filing and disposal of objections and appeals under the Act in cases for which no specific provision has been made in the Act. Although there is a provision in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act contained in S. 11 of the Act under which appeal would lie against all others passed by the Consolidation Officer under S. 10 of the Act, be it an order on contest or in default, as already observed above, but there appears to be no provisions in the Act nor in the Rules prescribing the manner of presentation and disposal of appeal and also the form and its contents. Hence in the absence of any such provision in the IJ. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Rules on the subject, the Rules contained in Chapter VII of the Revenue Court Manual relating to appeals under the U.P. Land Revenue Act would be applicable to appeals under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, in respect of which no provision exists in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Rules in view of S. 41 of the Act. 29. One of the Rules in Chapter VII of Revenue Court Manual, namely, R. 176 provides that : - "The provisions of Rules 2 to 4. 6 to 10. 13 to 29. 31 to 37 of O. XL1. O. XL11 and Sections 99 and 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals from Decree shall apply to appeals from orders under the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act." 30. Thus in view of the aforesaid Rule, the provisions of () XL1 R. 4, Civil P. C. would be applicable to appeals under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as well. 31. Although the Rules contained in Chap. V11. U. P. Revenue Court Manual, have been framed by State Government in exercise of powers under sub-cl (W) of S. 234. which is contained in Chap. XL but the prescribed Rules govern appeals, references and revisions provided, under Chap. X U.P. Land Revenue Act. 31. Although the Rules contained in Chap. V11. U. P. Revenue Court Manual, have been framed by State Government in exercise of powers under sub-cl (W) of S. 234. which is contained in Chap. XL but the prescribed Rules govern appeals, references and revisions provided, under Chap. X U.P. Land Revenue Act. Simply because the power to make Rules is provided under S. 234, which is contained in Chap. XI, U. P. Land Revenue Act, the applicability of aforesaid R. 176 contained in Chap. VII of Revenue Court Manual to the appeals under U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot be negatived on the ground that the power to frame rules is contained in S. 234 in Chap. XI, U. P. Land Revenue Act, which has not been specifically made applicable to proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Since the said Rules have been framed for matters relating to appeals in Chap. X, hence those will be read as forming part of the provisions contained in Chap. X of the Act itself and not to be read in isolation. The provisions in the Act and the Rules on the subject will operate together and govern the proceedings in appeal. 32. It is well settled that Rules form part of the Act and apply with all force to the provisions of the Act in respect of which those have been framed. Thus, in this view of the matter, the application of R. 176 to appeal under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act cannot be excluded simply because the power to frame such Rules is conferred in a different Chap. XI and not under Chap. IX and X of the Land Revenue Act which have been made applicable under S. 41, U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 33. It would also be relevant to mention that regarding filing of revision, there exist R. Ill in the Rules framed under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, but there is no rule regarding appeals. Since there is specific R. 111 in respect of revisions under S. 48 of the Act, hence Rr. 185 to 196, Revenue Court Manual, contained in Chap. VII, would not apply to revisions .under S. 48 of the Act because of the opening words "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act" in S. 41 of the Act. 34. Since there is specific R. 111 in respect of revisions under S. 48 of the Act, hence Rr. 185 to 196, Revenue Court Manual, contained in Chap. VII, would not apply to revisions .under S. 48 of the Act because of the opening words "Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act" in S. 41 of the Act. 34. Thus, in my opinion, in the absence of provisions in the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the Rules regarding filing of appeal and the manner of its disposal, the said R. 176 contained in Chapter VII of Revenue Court Manual will be applicable to appeals under the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act. In this view of the matter, the appellate court would be entitled to reverse or vary the decision in favour of all the parties against whom a decree proceeded on a ground common to all the appellants and to those others who are either not impleaded or are impleaded as respondents, as held by Supreme Court in Mahabir Prasad's case AIR 1971 SC 742 (supra) while construing provisions of O. XLI R. 4, Civil P. C. 35. However, even if it be held that the provisions of O. XLI R. 4, Civil, P. C. would not apply in terms to the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act but in my opinion the salutary principles enunciated therein and the judicial dicta lucidly expounded in aforesaid decisions of Supreme Court and other High Courts on the matter relating to granting appropriate relief to aggrieved party, can best serve as a guideline to be followed while granting appropriate relief to aggrieved party in appeal and revision arising in proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, especially when there is no express provision to the contrary in the said Act and Rules framed thereunder. 36. In view of the above, I am of their opinion that if a decision is given in favour of the objector and against some of the opposite parties on contest and against others ex parte, two courses would be open to the opposite parties against whom ex parte decision is given. 36. In view of the above, I am of their opinion that if a decision is given in favour of the objector and against some of the opposite parties on contest and against others ex parte, two courses would be open to the opposite parties against whom ex parte decision is given. They would be entitled to either file an application for restoration before the Consolidation Officer for setting aside the ex parte decision given against them or file an appeal against that order or adopt both the courses open to them. The Consolidation Officer, on being satisfied with regard to reasons shown for their absence, can set aside the order as a whole and decide the case on merits afresh although application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed only by some of the opposite parties and without impleading others. If instead of filing such an application, an appeal is preferred under S. 11 of the Act, it cannot be held to be incompetent nor it can be rejected on the ground that the appellants had not availed of the remedy of filing an application for setting aside the ex parte decision. The bar of S. 201 U. P. Land Revenue Act, would not be attracted as the appeal filed under S. 11 U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, would be maintainable even against the ex parte decision given under S. 10 of the Act as already observed above. The appellate court would be clothed with the jurisdiction and discretion to set aside the order appealed against as a whole on the principle enunciated above, although some of the opposite parties have not been arrayed as a party in the appeal. 37. In the present case all the recorded tenure holders had the same interest in the land in dispute and the petitioner had asserted Ms claim as a tenant of it on common ground against the recorded tenure-holders. Undisputed respondent 7 had claimed same interest in the land in dispute as that of the appellants. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, therefore, could grant relief in the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 by setting aside as a whole the ex parte decision given by the Consolidation .Officer under S. 10, Consolidation of Holdings Act, even if respondent 7 was not impleaded as a party in the appeal. 38. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, therefore, could grant relief in the appeal filed by opposite parties 4 to 6 by setting aside as a whole the ex parte decision given by the Consolidation .Officer under S. 10, Consolidation of Holdings Act, even if respondent 7 was not impleaded as a party in the appeal. 38. The record of the case was summoned by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, and it was found that proper service was not effected upon the recorded tenure-holders and as such the order passed by the Consolidation Officer appears to have been rightly set aside and the case properly remanded for decision afresh. Thus substantial justice appears to have been done in the case. Parties will still have an opportunity in contesting the case. 39. On the whole, the impugned orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2 do not suffer from any error of fact, law or jurisdiction so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.