M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions coming up for preliminary hearing after notice to respondents are disposed of by the following common order as both of them involve common questions of law and fact. ( 2 ) THE two petitioners applied to the 2nd respondent-Regional Transport authority, DK, Mangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the RTA) under S. 57 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for grant of stage carriage permits on the routes Mangalore to Thottum and Hangarkatte to Mangalore respectively. These two routes were among the several other routes opened by the RTA under sub sec. (3) of S. 47 of the act. The 2nd respondent RTA passed that resolution opening those routes on 19-7-1980. It was on 14-8-1980 that the 2nd respondent-RTA published under S. 57 (2) of the Act, the opening of the routes inviting applications from intending stage carriage operators. Soon thereafter on 1-10-1980 respondent 3 Hanuman Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd,, one of the existing stage carriage operators in the region filed a revision petition before the 1st respondent-Karnataka State Transport Appellate tribunal, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) challenging the legality of the resolution passed by the RTA opening the six routes as per its resolution dated 19 7 1980. Similarly, respondents 5 to 8 also filed revision petitions before the Tribunal challenging the legality of the resolution passed by the RTA under sub sec. (3) of S. 47 of the Act. On 6-9- 1980 the petitioner in WP No. 23610/1980 filed his application under S. 57 (2) (latter part) of the Act. Similarly, the petitioner in WP No. 23806/1980 filed his application before the 2nd respondent- rta also on 6 9 1980. These applications along with other applications were duly advertised in accordance with the requirement of sub-sec. (3) of S. 57 of the act. On 9 10 1980 the 2nd respondent-RTA published the applications inviting objections On 21-10 1980 among others the 3rd respondent filed its objections. While doing so, it brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent-RTA as well as the applicants that a revision petition was pending before the Tribunal under S. 64a of the Act challenging the very opening of the routes, including other objections as well. While doing so, it brought to the notice of the 2nd respondent-RTA as well as the applicants that a revision petition was pending before the Tribunal under S. 64a of the Act challenging the very opening of the routes, including other objections as well. When the matter stood thus for consideration on 5-12-1980 by the RTA, on 4-12-1980 it received a communication indicating that the Tribunal had set aside rta's resolution No. 12/so 81 (Annexure A) and the matter was remanded to the RTA for fresh consideration and decision in accordance with law. In that circumstance on 5-12 1980, the RTA dropped further proceedings under S. 57 (2) of the act. Aggrieved by the dec sion of the rta not to proceed further in the matter of granting permits on the six routes opened, the petitioners have approached this Court being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal setting aside the aforementioned resolution of the 2nd respondent- rta on the sole ground that the order passed by the Tribunal dated 4-12 1980 was illegal and unsustainable in law in as much as the same was passed without hearing the parties who were likely to be affected by it as enjoined in the 3rd proviso to S. 64a of the Act. ( 3 ) THE respondents have entered appearance and have resisted the prayer made by the petitioners for quashing the order of the Tribunal dated 4-12 1980, a true copy of which is produced as Annexure C to the petition. The learned High court Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 has produced the records of the case. ( 4 ) THE records bear out that in the objections filed by the 3rd respondent-Hanuman Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. , it was brought to the notice of the RTA that a revision was pending before the Tribunal against the resolution of the RTA dated 19- 7- 1980 opening the new routes under, sub-sec. (3) of S. 47 of the Act. Even otherwise, Mr. Viswanath, the learned counsel, squarely conceded that the petitioners were aware of the pendency of the revision petitions before the Tribunal. (3) of S. 47 of the Act. Even otherwise, Mr. Viswanath, the learned counsel, squarely conceded that the petitioners were aware of the pendency of the revision petitions before the Tribunal. Therefore, the questions which fall for determination are : (1) Whether respondents who had preferred revision petitions before the tribunal ought to have impleaded the petitioners and others before the Tribunal and failure to do so would vitiate the order of the Tribunal at Annexure-C to the petition ? (2) Whether the mere fact of making an application in response to the advertisement published by the 2nd respondent rta under sub sec. (2) of S. 57 of the Act, the petitioners and the like of them acquired legal right to contest an order passed by the Tribunal though not parties to the proceedings before the tribunal, under Art. 226 of the Constitution before this Court ? (3) Whether the petitioners themselves should have moved the Tribunal to implead themselves as parties before final order was passed on 4-12-1980 by the Tribunal in the revision petitions pending before it ? ( 5 ) THIS Court in more than one case has held that proceedings under S. 47 (3) of the Act are administrative in character and the order passed by the RTA under sub-sec. (3) of S. 47 of the Act is an administrative order indicating the policy of the State Government. That resolution having the force of an order passed by the rta is not an appealable order and therefore it can only be revised in terms of s. 64a of the Act. S. 64a of the Act is as follows:"64a. (3) of S. 47 of the Act is an administrative order indicating the policy of the State Government. That resolution having the force of an order passed by the rta is not an appealable order and therefore it can only be revised in terms of s. 64a of the Act. S. 64a of the Act is as follows:"64a. The State Transport Appellate tribunal may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final : provided that the State Transport appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order : provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time ; provided also that the State Transport appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to to any person, without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard". ( 6 ) THE scope of power to be exercised by the Tribunal under the above section is two fold: (1) It can on its motion call for records of a non-appealable order passed by any authority under the Act which is subordinate to it, and set aside or modify the same. (2) Even others aggrieved by any order passed by such authorities may also move the Tribunal for revision of that order. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, respondents 3 to 8 were existing stage carriage operators in the region and they felt aggrieved by the opening up of the routes by the 2nd res- pondent-RTA contrary to the procedure contemplated under sub sec. ( 7 ) IN the instant case, respondents 3 to 8 were existing stage carriage operators in the region and they felt aggrieved by the opening up of the routes by the 2nd res- pondent-RTA contrary to the procedure contemplated under sub sec. (3) of S. 47 of the Act and they preferred the revision application. It should not be lost sight, that the 3rd respondent also filed an application for stay of further proceedings pursuant to the resolution opening the six new routes in respect of which applications were called for by the intending stage carriage operators under S. 57 (2) of the act. However, the Tribunal did not grant the stay of further proceedings. The only respondent before the Tribunal in the revision petitions filed by the respondents 5 to 8 was the 2nd respondent-RTA. One should not fall, to notice that a revision petition could have been filed immediately after the resolution by the RTA was passed i. e. , any time after 19 7 -1980 or well before the same was published in the Gazette by the 2nd respondent-RTA on 14-8 1980. That would be a date long prior to any intending stage carriage operators filing an application for grant of a stage carriage permit on one or more of those routes after the publication by the 2nd respondent under S. 57 (2) of the Act inviting applications. If the Tribunal could be moved under S. 64a of the Act in the period I have mentioned above, the only necessary party would be the RTA and none else. In the instant case, the revision petition was filed on 1- 10-1980 by the 3rd respondent though after the publication by the 2nd respondent of the fact of opening up of the new routes on 14-8-1980 but before 9 -10-1980 when the petitioners applied in response to the advertisement under s. 57 (2) of the Act. On the date the 3rd respondent filed the revison petition he could not be presumed to imagine who all would be responding to the advertisement and apply for grant of stage carriage permits on the new routes. Therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine how all such persons who were likely to make applications should be made parties to the revision petition. Therefore, it is almost impossible to imagine how all such persons who were likely to make applications should be made parties to the revision petition. Even otherwise, the procedural irregularities committed by the rta in passing a resolution under sub-sec (3) of S. 47 of the Act does not create a lis between the future aspirants and another class of aggrieved persons, the the existing stage carriage operators in the region. If no lis exists between the two classes of persons who may be affected, then the intending operators on the new routes opened cannot be said to be necessary parties in the proceedings before the tribunal 5n revision. If they are not necessary parties, then they cannot be said to be aggrieved by any order that may be passed by the Tribunal, as in the instant case, because their pending applications before the 2nd respondent RTA could not be considered, as the resolution opening the new routes itself had been set aside by the Tribunal. ( 8 ) IN the view I have taken, the petitioners were not necessary parties before the Tribunal and therefore they cannot be said to be aggrieved persons. ( 9 ) BUT Sri Viswanath, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has strenuously urged that having regard to the 3rd proviso to S. 64a of the Act, the petitioners should be considered as aggrieved persons as their right to prosecute the applications had come to an end by virtue of the impugned order. In the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act such a thing is bound to happen and such persons aggrieved remotely cannot be said to be the persons aggrieved under the 3rd proviso to s. 64a of the Act. The persons aggrieved by the order that is likely to be passed by the Tribunal should be persons who are directly aggrieved by such an order, that is to say, in the case of suo motu order persons who are likely to be affected and in the case of a revision on the application of other aggrieved persons, those persons and those who are respondents to those proceedings. Many a time an order passed under revision may affect the public at large. Many a time an order passed under revision may affect the public at large. If the construction attempted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is accepted, then every time an order is passed affecting the public, then a public notice must be issued by the Tribunal inviting the views of the members of the public. Such is not the scheme of the act. Therefore, that contention is liable to be rejected and it is so rejected. ( 10 ) IN so far as the 2nd question is concerned, the learned Counsel has relied upon the decision in the case of Ramautar lai Jain v. Maya Kaur (I) and urged that his right to prosecute his application under s. 57 (2) of the Act before the 2nd respondent having been affected by the order of the Tribunal allowing the revision petition of respondents 3 to 8, should be considered as a person aggrieved and having locus standi to prosecute this petition under art. 226 of the Constitution, as the same could not be agitated before the tribunal itself. In the case relied upon by the learned Counsel, what was decided was that in the event of death of an applicant when proceedings for grant of stage carriage permit was pending, the legal heirs of the deceased applicant could be brought on record and permitied to prosecute the applications of the deceased applicant if they so desired. This was no more than recognising the well established principles in adversary litigation where a deceased party's representatives are permitted to continue the proceedings commenced by the deceased person. In other words, that right of prosecuting an application for grant of a stage carriage permit is merely held as a heritable legal right and no more. The Supreme Court also has taken the caution to point out, such a step permitted by the concerned authority under the Motor Vehicles Act is one of discretion and not an absolute right of the parties. I do not see how that supports the argument advanced by the learned Counsel. The facts of these cases are that the very basis for consideration of the application of not only the petitioners but of other applicants were knocked out by the setting aside of the resolution of the RTA dated 19- 7 -1980. I do not see how that supports the argument advanced by the learned Counsel. The facts of these cases are that the very basis for consideration of the application of not only the petitioners but of other applicants were knocked out by the setting aside of the resolution of the RTA dated 19- 7 -1980. Once the very foundation in the proceedings disappeared, then all applications pursuant to the resolution became non est in law and none had a right to prosecute what did not exist in law. ( 11 ) IN that view of the matter, the petitioners cannot be said to be aggrieved persons or to have locus standi to prosecute these petitions under Art. 226 of the constitution. ( 12 ) THE last question should not detain me long. Admittedly, the petitioners knew of the pending proceedings before the tribunal in revision. If they' wanted to sustain the order of 1980 (resolution) passed by the 2nd respondent, they should have taken the precaution to implead themselves and support the order. Having failed to do that, they cannot now be permitted under Art. 226 of the Constitution to challenge the order of the Tribunal in a proceeding to implead themselves as parties. The law cannot be stretched in order to and indiligent litigants. Even this contention of the petitioners should fail. ( 13 ) IN the light of the findings I have given in answering the questions set out for determination, these petitions do not survive for consideration and they are rejected without rule being issued. ( 14 ) BUT in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Mr. M. L. Pandurangaswamy, learned High Court Government Pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. --- *** --- .