JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Keshav Nandan, the second respondent, an employee of Cawnpore Textiles, Ltd., Kanpur (briefly, the company), carrying on manufacture and sale of cotton textile, piece goods and yarn, was found sleeping during the night shift. The company felt that it was a dereliction of duty by Keshav Nandan and misconduct on his part falling within the certified standing order 23 (x) for the operatives. The management charge-sheeted Keshav Nandan and a detailed domestic inquiry was held. As the punishing authority for the category of workmen, to which Keshav Nandan belonged, the mill manager directed that Keshav Nandan be dismissed from service after fulfilling the necessary requirements of law. Permission for dismissing Keshav Nandan was necessary under Section 6E (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter the Uttar Pradesh Act) as Keshav Nandan was a protected workman within the meaning of that Act. Labour Court, Allahabad, before which proceedings took place in pursuance of an application made by the company, refused permission to the company to dismiss Keshav Nandan by its order, dated 30 April 1975. This order has been assailed by the company in the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Labour Court has taken the view that there were some irregularities in the domestic inquiry against Keshav Nandan and the inquiry officer was not fair in its conduct. Also, that Keshav Nandan was not afforded due opportunity during the inquiry which was a breach of the principles of natural justice. The Labour Court, however, did not accept the allegation of the workman that the action against Keshav Nandan was mala fide. 3. Sri V.B. Singh, for the company, urged that the Labour Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction in dealing with the application of the company for according permission for the dismissal of Keshav Nandan because it did not confine itself only to an examination of the question whether the company had made out a prima facie case for permission being accorded to it for dismissing Keshav Nandan but proceeded, as it were, like a Court of appeal, to judge the propriety of the action of the company in proposing to dismiss Keshav Nandan. This according to the submission, could not be done, for the workmen, if aggrieved by the permission given to the company to dismiss Keshav Nandan, could reagitate the matter upon a reference under Section 4K of the Uttar Pradesh Act in its entirety. Proceeding under Section 6E (3) being summary in nature precluded the Labour Court from examining anything more than the prima facie case about the legality for the proposed action of dismissal by the company. Alternatively, it was urged that the conclusion recorded by the Labour Court in its order under challenge were perverse in the sense that on the material on record no reasonable person could have arrived at it in so far as it related to that alleged failure of the company to establish that Keshav Nandan had committed the misconduct attributed to him or that he had not been afforded opportunity, due to him, in the domestic inquiry. 4. Sri K. P. Agarwal, appearing for Keshav Nandan, on the contrary, contended that the Labour Court was fully justified in the view taken by it on pure questions of fact in regard to the fairness of the inquiry and about the failure of the company to establish that Keshav Nandan had committed the misconduct attributed to him. The Labour Court, according to Sri Agarwal, had confined itself to the limits of jurisdiction in the proceedings resulting in the order which it passed on 30 April 1975. It was entitled to go into the evidence led before it by the parties which included the record of the inquiry proceedings, and to have come to a conclusion of its own about the propriety of the proposed action of the company. 5. What then is the true scope of the proceedings before the Labour Court in a matter like the present? It is not in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, while dealing with an application under Section 6E (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act, is akin to the one on an application under Section 33 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brief, the Central Act). 6. It is not in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, while dealing with an application under Section 6E (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Act, is akin to the one on an application under Section 33 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brief, the Central Act). 6. Section 6E of the Uttar Pradesh Act, like Section 33 of the Central Act, imposes a ban on the ordinary right of an employer of dispensing with the services of an employee at his sweet will by subjecting it to a ban, removable, in appropriate cases, in the manner contained in the provisions. An authority, like the Labour Court in the present case, is given the power to grant or withhold permission for the intended action and thus to lift or maintain the ban. See Automobile Products of India, Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala, [A.I.R. 1955 S. C. 258]. The Labour Court, in proceedings before it under these provisions has to limit its inquiry only to the question as to whether a prima facie case has been made , out or not for according the requisite pert mission, where, a proper inquiry has been made by the employer into the alleged misconduct of the employee and when the proposed dismissal does not amount to victimisation or an unfair labour practice. It cannot consider whether the order proposed to be passed is proper or adequate or errors on the side of excessive severity. Permission granted by the Labour Court only removes the ban and the validity of the order of dismissal can still be challenged by the workman by raising an industrial dispute in that behalf. See Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation and another [A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 160]. The Labour Court cannot act as on appellate authority and judge the adequacy, sufficiency, and satisfactory character of the evidence on which the employer proposes to base his action: See Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, [A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 860] and Swatantar Bharat Mills v. Rattan Lal, [A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 1156]. 7. Where an application for permission is made to the Tribunal, it has initially a limited jurisdiction to see whether a prima facie case is made out in respect of the misconduct charged. 7. Where an application for permission is made to the Tribunal, it has initially a limited jurisdiction to see whether a prima facie case is made out in respect of the misconduct charged. Where, however, the Tribunal finds that there is violation of the principles of natural justice it would give opportunity to the employer to produce evidence, if any, and also to the workman to rebut it if he so chooses. The Tribunal will then be entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on merits on the evidence produced before it with regard to the proof of misconduct charged and will not be confined merely to consider whether a prima facie case is established against the employee. In other words, in such an event the employer's findings in the domestic inquiry will lapse and these will be substituted by the independent conclusions of the Tribunal on merits. See Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel and others, [1976-I L.L.N. 19]. 8. The employer, even where he seeks permission for the proposed action, has to plead in the alternative that if the Court comes to the conclusion that either there was no inquiry or the one held was defective, he would adduce evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct alleged against the workman. This pleading has to be made either at the initial stage or during the pendency of the proceedings. If the opportunity to substantiate the case is not sought nor is there any pleading, the Labour Court is under no obligation to call upon the employer to adduce additional evidence to substantiate the charges before it. See Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Company, Ltd., and another, [1979-II L.L.N. 72]. 9. In Martin Burn, Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, [A.I.R. 1958 S. C. 79], the Supreme Court observed in Para. 27 of the report that A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. While determining whether prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering the question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record." 10. The Labour Court, according to Sri Agarwal, had found on facts in the present case that - (i) the domestic inquiry was not fair and proper ; and (ii) that the proposed action was an act of victimisation of the workman, Keshav Nandan. As such, the Labour Court was not confined to looking into a prima facie case being out for the proposed dismissal of the workman. It could and rightly did, go into the evidence brought before it by the parties to find out whether the misconduct attributed to the workman had been established by cogent evidence. Further that on its conclusion that it was not, the Labour Court was entitled to refuse permission to the employer to dispense with the services of the workman. 11. A copy of the order passed by the Labour Court refusing permission is annexure 7 to the writ petition. Its reading reveals that the parties were not at issue on the fact that Keshav Nandan was a protected workman. Further, the Labour Court was of opinion that the action of the company in placing him under suspension without obtaining the permission for it from the Court, did not evidence any mala fides on the part of the company. The Court, however, was of the view that the domestic inquiry was not fair. This conclusion had been recorded but the Labour Court since, according to it. The Court, however, was of the view that the domestic inquiry was not fair. This conclusion had been recorded but the Labour Court since, according to it. (i) the inquiry officer did not record statements of the other workmen by the name of Chaggan, Hafiz and Rameshwar for which a request had been made by Keshav Nandan ; (ii) that the inquiry officer did not seek clarification from the company's representative about the cuttings existing on exhibit 25 (report made by K. R. Jog, a company's official) to the mill manager to the effect that he had found Keshav Nandan sleeping while on duty) though he made it a part of the record of the inquiry proceedings; (iii) that he did not require the representative of the company to produce copies of the statements referred to in the deleted portion of exhibit 25 nor afforded opportunity to Keshav Nandan to cross-examine the persons to whose statements a reference was contained in the deleted portion of exhibit 25 ; (iv) he did not make any inquiry about the annexures to the explanation submitted by Keshav Nandan nor gave him an opportunity to prove them though he had made two documents (exhibits E8 and E9) part of the record of the inquiry proceedings even though they were not referred to at all in the charge-sheet and relied upon them in coming to a conclusion about the guilt of Keshav Nandan ; (v) the inquiry officer did not exercise due caution in recording the statements inasmuch as he wrongly noted down in the statement of Keshav Nandan that Hafiz and Chaggan were not present there though Keshav Nandan had said that they were present and incorrectly mentioned the presence of Ranbir at the time of the incident though he had stated that Ranbir was not there ; and (vi) that as a consequence, Keshav Nandan was compelled to record his objection on the various statements while signing them. 12. The company has brought on the record of the writ petition the copy of the record of the inquiry proceedings along with a supplementary affidavit sworn by its Assistant Labour Officer, Uttar Pradesh, Shukla, on 8 August 1975. Copies of the statements made by the witnesses before the Labour Court have also been filed either with the writ petition or with the supplementary affidavit. Copies of the statements made by the witnesses before the Labour Court have also been filed either with the writ petition or with the supplementary affidavit. The inquiry proceedings show that apart from himself, Liaqat Ali, Khardushan, Nathu and Subedar, whose statements were recorded during the inquiry, Keshav Nandan did not wish to examine any other witness in his defence. This was recorded by the inquiry officer on 5 October 1970, and Keshav Nandan affixed his signature below the statement to the effect that day. While the inquiry officer (P. Chandra) was in the witness box before the Labour Court, the correctness of the aforesaid endorsement by him was not questioned on behalf of Keshav Nandan. Even in the reply filed on behalf of the workmen before the Labour Court, it was not mentioned that Keshav Nandan wanted to examine these witnesses but they were not examined by the inquiry officer inspite of it. The Labour Court did not consider this circumstance at all while considering the alleged failure of the inquiry officer to record the statements of Chaggan, Hafiz and Rameshwar and the so called request of Keshav Nandan for their statement being recorded as one of the reasons which vitiated the inquiry. 13. Exhibit 25 (annexure SA 2 to the supplementary affidavit of U. C. Shukla which was exhibit in the proceedings before the inquiry officer) which contains a report that Keshav Nandan was found sleeping at 3.50 A.M. on 15 August 1970 (night shift of 14 August 1980), made to the manager of the mill by K. R. Jog, recited (in Para. 2) that "statement of witnesses has been taken in whose presence Keshav Nandan was found sleeping which is attached herewith." This was scored out by Jog himself who appeared as a witness during the inquiry proceedings. From the copy of the statement of Jog in those proceedings, forming part of annexure SA 1 to the supplementary affidavit of U. C. Shukla, it is clear that not a word was suggested to him that he had sent any enclosure with this report to the mill manager or that the second paragraph had been scored out by him subsequently and not before it was sent by him to the mill manager originally. In his statement before the Labour Court, the inquiry officer was cross-examined at length by the workman. In his statement before the Labour Court, the inquiry officer was cross-examined at length by the workman. During it he said that when he had received this document along with the letter appointing him as the inquiry officer, the second paragraph had already been scored out and that it did not contain any annexures. Also that there was no question of his separating the annexures from the original report as they were in favour of Keshav Nandan as was suggested by the workman. The Labour Court has not considered the statement of the inquiry officer made on oath before it at all. While taking the view that it was not proper for him to have made it a part of the record of the inquiry proceedings and having failed in requiring the management to produce the statements contained in the enclosures referred to in the second paragraph of the report, the question of giving opportunity to Keshav Nandan to cross-examine the scribe of these statements could hardly arise in these circumstances and the alleged failure on the part of the inquiry officer to give that opportunity was clearly an irrelevant consideration for holding the inquiry to be unfair without a categorical finding, based on the material on record, that such statements were in fact there and had been made use of by the inquiry officer in arriving at his conclusions against Keshav Nandan. 14. The observation of the Labour Court that no inquiry was made by the inquiry officer in regard to the enclosures to the explanation of Keshav Nandan nor was Keshav Nandan given an opportunity to prove them has been made without considering the statement of the inquiry officer, elicited in his cross examination before it on behalf of the workman, that upon question by him Keshav Nandan stated that he had not brought the originals of these letters and further that he did not ask the inquiry officer to summon the originals of those documents. It also ignored to take into account the entries in the order sheet of the inquiry proceedings (exhibit 10 before the Labour Court) indicating several adjournments of the case to enable the workman to prove the documents as well as the statement of the inquiry officer on oath before the Labour Court (during his cross-examination) that he did not make these enclosures parts of the inquiry proceeding as they had not been proved by the workman. 15. The statement on oath of the inquiry officer before the Labour Court that exhibits E8 and E9 (in inquiry proceedings) though produced by Jog on behalf of the company stood proved from the statement before him of Keshav Nandan and were, consequently, made part of the inquiry record and considered in his report, has not been looked into at all by the Labour Court while opining that inclusion of these documents in the inquiry report and their consideration, even though they had not been referred to in the. chargesheet, was an irregularity committed by the inquiry officer in holding the inquiry. 16. The grievances that statements were not correctly recorded by the inquiry officer was never put out to the latter when he was in the witness box before the Labour Court in his cross-examination. The fact that even during the inquiry proceedings the inquiry officer had made an endorsement on 1 September 1970, that it was incorrect that statements were not being recorded correctly and further that even about his own statement, an endorsement was made by Keshav Nandan that he was affixing his signatures under objection, has not been considered by the Labour Court before concluding that irregularity was committed in that regard by the inquiry officer. 17. It is obvious that the Labour Court did not consider the material evidence on record before coming to the conclusion that the inquiry proceedings were not fairly concluded. 18. Victimization on the part of company had to be properly and adequately pleaded, giving all the particulars upon which the charge was based, to enable the employer to fully meet them. Mere allegations, vague suggestions and insinuation on the part of the workman cannot form the basis for a conclusion about victimization. The Tribunal must consider the particulars brought out in the evidence on record and weigh them and thereafter record a conclusion on the totality of the evidence produced. Mere allegations, vague suggestions and insinuation on the part of the workman cannot form the basis for a conclusion about victimization. The Tribunal must consider the particulars brought out in the evidence on record and weigh them and thereafter record a conclusion on the totality of the evidence produced. See Bharat Iron Works v. Biragubhai Balubhai Patel [1975-I L.L.N. 19] (ride supra). The observation made by the Labour Court in the instant case that the action proposed by the company against Keshav Nandan was on account of the unhappiness of the employer with him on account of his trade union activities does not amount in law to a finding of victimisation of the workman and in any case has been made without due regard to the pleadings of the parties and the entire material on the record. 19. A finding arrived at without taking into consideration the material pieces of evidence on record, is not sustainable as binding upon a High Court even under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code. See Damadilal and others v. Baras Ram and others, [A.I.R. 1976 S. C. 2229]. The principle applies with equal vigour to decisions, like the one under challenge in this petition, of Labour Courts. The failure to advert to the material and relevant evidence on record of the Labour Court on the question of the fairness of the domestic enquiry and about the so-called victimisation of Keshav Nandan by the company vitiates its findings of those questions. 20. The absence of a legally sustainable finding about there being an improper domestic inquiry and of the proposed action being by way of victimisation of Keshav Nandan limited the Labour Court to examine whether the employers had a prima facie case for the action proposed by them. In other words, it was confined to an examination of the question whether the evidence brought on record during the domestic inquiry was such which could lead to a possible conclusion that Keshav Nandan was guilty of the misconduct of sleeping while on duty attributed to him, and no more. The Labour Court seems to have transgressed this limit in proceeding, as it were, to weigh the evidence in regard to the alleged misconduct itself. Its order refusing permission to the company to dismiss Keshav Nandan is untenable in law. It deserves to be and is quashed. 21. In consequence, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The Labour Court seems to have transgressed this limit in proceeding, as it were, to weigh the evidence in regard to the alleged misconduct itself. Its order refusing permission to the company to dismiss Keshav Nandan is untenable in law. It deserves to be and is quashed. 21. In consequence, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Labour Court, dated 30 April 1975 (annexure 7 to the writ petition), is quashed. The Labour Court is directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with law. 22. Cost on parties.