JUDGMENT :- This is a 2nd appeal by Smt. Sunder Bai, defendant No. 3 (since deceased), from a decree of possession over a house with damages at Rs.15/- per month from 15th Feb. 1963 onwards till the date of possession. The defendants were three in number. The decree for possession was passed against all of them, but the decree for damages has been passed only against the defendants Nos 1 and 2. The plaintiff claimed to have purchased the house from the defendant No. 2 under a sale deed dated 15th Feb., 1963. The Trial Court had decreed the suit for refund of the sale consideration of Rs. 8,500/- against defendant 2 alone on the finding that the sale deed was invalid. Defendant 2 did not appeal from the trial courts decree, but the plaintiff appealed and contended that sale deed was valid, and that he was entitled to the decree for possession and mesne profits as claimed by him instead of the relief for refund of Rs. 8,500/which had been claimed by him only in the alternative, on the allegation that if, for any reason, the court took the view that there was some defect in the right of defendant 2 to sell the house, then in that case he was entitled to a refund of the sale consideration of Rs. 8,500/-. 2. The relevant facts may now be stated. One Rajju had three daughters, namely, Hira, Mulla and Dhanwanti, Hira had a son Kashi Prasad and a daughter Smt. Sunder Bai. Smt. Sunder Bai is defendant 3 and her son Kishori Lal is defendant 1. Kashi Prasad had no son. He had two daughters, Smt. Girja Bai and Smt. Janak Kishori, Smt. Janak Kishori is defendant 2. It was claimed that Kashi Prasad had been adopted by his maternal grandfather Rajju, and otherwise too, by a registered gift-deed dated 28th April, 1913, he had gifted all his property to Kashi Prasad. Rajju died in 1930. Kashi Prasad made a will dated 24th October, 1948, and died subsequently on the 9th November, 1948. Under his will, he gave the property to his daughter, Janak Kishori, defendant 2. Janak Kishori was a minor when Kashi Prasad died. Sunder Bai, defendant 3, was appointed the guardian of her person, while Kishori Lal defendant 1 was appointed the guardian of his property. Under his will, he gave the property to his daughter, Janak Kishori, defendant 2. Janak Kishori was a minor when Kashi Prasad died. Sunder Bai, defendant 3, was appointed the guardian of her person, while Kishori Lal defendant 1 was appointed the guardian of his property. After marriage and attaining majority, Janak Kishori sold the house to the plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 3 had however, been living in the house it suit. According to the plaintiffs case, they were living as licensees and the licence having been terminated, the plaintiff was entitled to possession. 3. The two basic questions, which arose in the case, were whether Kashi Prasad was the adopted son of Rajju and secondly whether the gift which he purported to make in favour of Kashi Prasad by registered deed dated 28th April, 1913, was valid. 4. The adoption has been found by both the Courts below to be not proved, and that finding has not been questioned before me. On the question about the gift-deed, the Trial Court held that the original gift-deed was not produced and, therefore, no reliance could be placed on it. It was in view of these two findings that the Trial Court found that Kashi Prasad was not the owner of the house and Janak Kishori too did not have any right to the property, rather the succession opened in 1954 on the death of Smt. Dhanwanti. According to the Trial Court, Smt. Janak Kishori did not have, in these circumstances, any right to sell the house and passed a decree for the refund of the sale consideration. 5. On appeal before the lower Appellate Court, a fresh issue was framed, namely, whether the will dated 24th October, 1948, set up by the plaintiff, was duly and validly executed by Kashi Prasad. That was remitted to the Trial Court for a finding. The finding was that the will had been duly executed, but that it was not valid because Kashi Prasad had no interest in the property. The lower Appellate Court found that the gift-deed dated 28th April, 1913, was duly registered. A certified copy of it had been filed, being Paper No. 64-C. At the death of Kashi Prasad, his daughters, Girja Bai and Janak Kishori, were minors. There was considerable trouble in the matter of the guardianship of their person and property. The lower Appellate Court found that the gift-deed dated 28th April, 1913, was duly registered. A certified copy of it had been filed, being Paper No. 64-C. At the death of Kashi Prasad, his daughters, Girja Bai and Janak Kishori, were minors. There was considerable trouble in the matter of the guardianship of their person and property. Ultimately, defendant 3, Smt. Sunder Bai, was appointed the guardian of the person of Janak Kishori, and Kishori Lal, defendant 1, was appointed the guardian of her property. It had come in evidence that Kishori Lal had taken away the original papers of Kashi Prasad on his death. During the trial, the plaintiff had called upon the defendants to produce the original gift-deed, but they did not do so in spite of taking time for the same. Under the circumstances, the lower Appellate Court held that the secondary evidence of the gift was admissible in the form of a certified copy, and, further, in view of the amendments made in Uttar Pradesh by insertion of sub-sec.(2) in S.90 and the addition of S.90A in the Evidence Act, the gift-deed was proved to have been duly executed by Rajju in favour of Kashi Pd. Further, according to the lower Appellate Court, there was evidence to show that it was acted upon inasmuch as the name of Kashi Pd. was mutated in the Municipal papers. The lower Appellate Court also referred to the admission made by Smt. Dhanwanti, daughter of Rajju, and by the defendants Smt. Sunder Bai and Kishori Lal of the fact that Kashi Prasad was the owner of the house in suit. These admissions were made in the guardianship proceedings. The relevant admission of Smt. Sunder Bai defendant 3, is contained in Ext.17, and it was even admitted that she and her son Kishori Lal were living in the houses as licensees. In the result, the lower Appellate Court held that the gift-deed dated 28th April, 1913 was duly executed by Rajju and acted upon, and further that the will dated 24th October, 1948 was duly and validly executed by Kashi Prasad. It further held that defendants 1 and 3 were mere licensees and their licence having been terminated, they were liable to make over possession of the house to the plaintiff. 6. It further held that defendants 1 and 3 were mere licensees and their licence having been terminated, they were liable to make over possession of the house to the plaintiff. 6. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that the gift could be proved by producing a certified copy, and that the execution of the deed was duly proved was not seriously assailed before me. It was contended that there was no proof of acceptance of the gift by Kashi Prasad, and that being so, the mere execution of the deed did not bring about a gift in law. Reliance was placed on S.122, T.P. Act, in support of this contention, Lastly, it was contended that the Trial Court having decreed the suit for an alternative relief of recovery of Rs. 8,500 claimed by the plaintiff, and the defendants not having appealed from that decree, it was not open to the plaintiff to appeal therefrom to the lower Appellate Court. That being so, the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to modify the Trial Courts decree and to pass a decree for the relief of possession and mesne profits which had been refused by the Trial Court. 7. As to the first point raised by the learned Counsel, a perusal of the gift-deed shows that Kashi Prasad was a minor aged about eight and a half years, and, according to Rajju, the donor, he had brought up Kashi Prasad, and Kashi Prasad was living under his care. There was no such question of acceptance as the minor was under the care of the donor himself. The exact terminology used in the gift-deed is:- "Musammat Hiriya meri bari larki hai. Uska larka umri sarhe aath saal musammi Kashi Prasad vald Boche......ko maine chhote se misl larka ke parvarish kiya aur kanchhedan yaghaira hasb rawaj biradari maitre Kashi Prasad ka kiya aur kul rasumat anjam din ......... Lihaza ab aaj ke roz minmukir ne.. ... .... do qita makanat....... banam Kashi Prasad mazkur basarbarahi khud heba kardiya aur bakhsh diya aur qabza dakhal makanat mahboobelah mazkur ka shai mahuba per karadiya Ab aaj ki tarikh se jo istehoaq mujhko hasil tha vah jumla banam mahboobelah mazkur ko hasil huva......." 8. Lihaza ab aaj ke roz minmukir ne.. ... .... do qita makanat....... banam Kashi Prasad mazkur basarbarahi khud heba kardiya aur bakhsh diya aur qabza dakhal makanat mahboobelah mazkur ka shai mahuba per karadiya Ab aaj ki tarikh se jo istehoaq mujhko hasil tha vah jumla banam mahboobelah mazkur ko hasil huva......." 8. In support of his contention that the appeal before the lower Appellate Court by the appellant, who had been granted the alternative relief that was claimed by him was not maintainable, learned counsel cited two decisions : one of the Calcutta High Court in Reajuddin Patwari v. Abdul Jobbar, AIR 1924 Cal 445 and Sakku Bai v. R.B. Reddiar, AIR 1977 Mad 223. In the Calcutta case, it was observed after dismissing the defendants appeal that: "The plaintiff has preferred cross-objections and he claims that he is entitled to khas possession on the ground that the defendants were trespassers. But he made an alternative claim under S.157, Bengal Tenancy Act, for assessment of a fair and equitable rent and the learned Judge in the Court below has given him relief under that section. It seems to me that he is not entitled to say that he does not want that alternative relief which has been granted to him, and that he desires to have the other relief which he claimed by way of ejectment. In effect, the plaintiff expressed that he would be satisfied with either of the two prayers which he made in his plaint, and he succeeded in getting one and, therefore, he has no real cause for complaint. The cross-objections also fail and they are, therefore, dismissed." In the Madras case (supra), it was observed in para 15 that : "It is, therefore, clear to us that as the choice of the reliefs is always with the plaintiff, who is the dominus litis in a litigation, he could seek for more than one relief, seek for more than one independent relief or ask for alternative reliefs. If he asks for the last of such reliefs, then he is placing the reliefs so sought for by him on a par with each other and if the Court trying the subject-matter grants him one relief, then it follows that he has the benefit of the relief and he cannot throw overboard such a benefit with a design or motive or to further his own cause by seeking umbrage in an Appellate Court and ask for the relief not granted to him, which, as already stated, be only asked for in the alternative. Alternative is an expression, which indicates a choice of the person and if that choice is exercised by him, then he cannot afterwards blow hot and cold and seek for reliefs as he desires by throwing overboard the benefits which he has secured on a full trial in the Trial Court. This would be encouraging, as we said, the whims and fancies of a litigant. We are, therefore, of the view that having regard to the trend of decisions here and elsewhere and on the basic reasonable principle that a man cannot approbate and reprobate, this appeal is not maintainable." 9. I find myself unable to subscribe to the view expressed in either of these two decisions. The effect of the decisions is that in a case, where a plaintiff seeks a relief in the alternative, and the Trial Court grants the relief claimed in the alternative, the plaintiff is precluded from saying before the Appellate Court that he is entitled to the main relief claimed by him. Their could be no such estoppel. The true principle would seem to be that enunciated by the Patna High Court in Union of India v. Garbhu Sao, AIR 1972 Pat 341 . The right to appeal is allowed to a person aggrieved from a decree or appealable order. The question, whether a plaintiff, who claimed alternative reliefs and is granted one of them, can appeal for getting the other reliefs, would, therefore, depend on the answer to the question whether the plaintiff could be said to be a person aggrieved in spite of the grant of a relief to him by the trial court. The question, whether a plaintiff, who claimed alternative reliefs and is granted one of them, can appeal for getting the other reliefs, would, therefore, depend on the answer to the question whether the plaintiff could be said to be a person aggrieved in spite of the grant of a relief to him by the trial court. In the words of the learned Judges of the Patna High Court (at P. 343):- "If the plaint read as a whole discloses that the plaintiff will be satisfied with either of the reliefs claimed by him, he cannot be allowed to appeal, if one of the reliefs is granted. One who gets what he wants cannot be said to be a "person aggrieved". On the other hand, if the plaint read as a whole gives an impression that of the alternative reliefs claimed one is the main relief and the other one is claimed only if it is found that the main relief cannot possibly be granted and the main relief is refused, it is open to the plaintiff to appeal and urge that on the facts and in law he is entitled to the main relief and should have been granted that. In such circumstances claiming alternative reliefs is no bar to appeal by the plaintiff." 10. The case in hand is one where the relief for possession with mesne profits was the main relief claimed by the plaintiff. The relief for refund of consideration was claimed in the alternative only in case the court found that the sale, on the basis of which the plaintiff was claiming to be entitled to possession, was invalid. The primary case of the plaintiff was that the sale was valid, and he was entitled to possession. When the Trial Court found gainst him on that point, although it granted him the alternative relief of the refund of the sale consideration, he was aggrieved by the decision because he wanted the property which he had purchased and not his money back. The question of a refund of the sale consideration could arise only if the Court found that the sale-deed was invalid. There was no question of the plaintiff being satisfied with the refund of the sale consideration which was decreed in his favour, for he contended, and successfully so, before the lower Appellate Court that the sale in his favour was valid. There was no question of the plaintiff being satisfied with the refund of the sale consideration which was decreed in his favour, for he contended, and successfully so, before the lower Appellate Court that the sale in his favour was valid. The wrong decision of the Trial Court on this point could not deprive the plaintiff of his right of appeal therefrom. I am also supported in my view, by the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Gopalan Nair v. Madhavan, AIR 1964 Ker 153. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.