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1982 DIGILAW 84 (KAR)

G. D. NAIK v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

1982-03-12

K.A.SWAMI

body1982
K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order dated 11-2-1982 (Annexure-W) passed by the State government, in exercise of the power under sub-rule (1) of the Karnataka civil Services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules ) placing the petitioner under suspension pending enquiry. The impunged order reads as follows: government OF KARNATAKA no. ED 16 DGD 82. Karnataka Government/ secretariat, vidhana Soudha, bangalore dt. 11th Feb 1982 notification in exercise of the powers conferred under R 10 of the Karnata,ka Civil services (C. C. A.) Rules, 1957, Sri g. D. Naik, Principal, Government junior College, Aland, Gulbarga Dt, is placed under suspension with immediate effect, pending inquiry against him and he shall be entitled to subsistence allowance as per the provisions of Karnataka Civil Services Rules during the period of suspension. By Order and in the name of the governor of Karnataka, sd/-V. G. Navalgund, under Secy to Govt Edn, and Y. S. Dept. ( 2 ) SRI Narasimhan, learned High court Government Pleader, was directed to take notice on behalf of the respondents in view of the fact that the impugned order placing the petitioner under suspension was the one passed during the pendency of WP, No. 6287/79 in which an interim order was passed on 8-6-1979 staying the operation of the order dated 21-5-1979 placing the petitioner under suspension. Accordingly the learned High Court Government pleader has appeared for the respondents and has made available all the records of the case. ( 3 ) IT is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is bad because, there is no enquiry pending against the petitioner; that the impugned order is intended to overcome the effect of the interim order passed by this Court in WP No. 6287/79; that the impugned order is passed at the instance of Sri Chillal, Distiict Bharatiya Janata party President and) Sri Sharanappa hatti, Taluk President of Bharatiya janata Party and Sri D. B. Kajamalkar, general Secretary of Congress (i) taluk Congress Committee of Aland taluk. ( 4 ) IT is not possible to accept the contention of Sri Subba, Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order placing the petitioner under suspension is passed with a view to over come the effect of the interim order of stay passed by this Court in the earlier wp. No. 6287/79. The earlier order placing the petitioner under suspension was passed on 21-5-1979 in view of the fact that a criminal case for the offences punishable under Ss. 465, 468 and 471, IPC was pending against the petitioner. This Court, no doubt, has on 8-6-1979 stayed the operation of the order dated 21-5-1979 placing the petitioner under suspension. The records produced before the Court go to show that the present impugned order has been passed on a different ground based on the sab-sequent conduct of the petitioner. There were certain complaints against the petitioner and those complaints were also forwarded to the petitioner for his say in the matter. The petitioner himself has produced those complaints along with the writ petition. By the communication dt. 9-9-1981 (Annexure-N), complaint petition of the students of the college was forwarded to the petitioner to submit his reply within a week That complaint has also been produced by the petitioner as Annexure-O. Thereafter, he sent his reply as per Annexure-P. Still there was another complaint dt 4-9-1981 (Annexure-R) which was also made available to the petitioner as per Annexure -Q. A questionnaire diated 19-y-i981 (Annexure-S) was also sent to the petitioner for eliciting answers relating to several allegations. The petitioner did not reply the questionnaire; therefore another reminder was sent to him as per Annexure-U, dt. 23-10-1081. It was then the petitioner had submitted his replies to the questionnaire as per Annexure-V. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Public instructions made a surprise visit and submitted his report dated 12-11-1981, 'which also contained several allegations against the petitioner. The report also recommended that a detailed enquiry was necessary; therefore the petitioner be placed under suspension pending detailed enquiry and action against the petitioner as per Rules. ( 5 ) I am not referring to these allegations in detail and refrain from making observations in regard to these allegations, lest it may adversely affect the petitioner, as the enquiry has yet to take place. ( 5 ) I am not referring to these allegations in detail and refrain from making observations in regard to these allegations, lest it may adversely affect the petitioner, as the enquiry has yet to take place. After the report has been made by the Commissioner of public Instructions, the matter has been, brought before the concerned minister with a detailed note and thereafter, the Minister has taken a decision to hold a Departmental enquiry and has approved the proposal to place the official under suspension. Thus, it is clear that it is not a case in which the government can be said to have taken action in order to overcome the effect of the interim order of stay passed by this Court. It is a case in which, after holding a sort of preliminary enquiry by affording an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth his say and on receipt of the report made by the Commissioner of Public Instructions to which a reference has already been made, decision is taken to hold a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and to place him under suspension pending a disciplinary proceeding. ( 6 ) IN a case where an official is placed under suspension under the circumstances mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of R. 10 of the Rules, and the operation of that order is stayed by an interim order to this Court, in law, there is no bar tor any one of the authorities mentioned in sub-rule (1) of R 10 of the Rules, to pass an order placing the same official under suspension based on the circumstances coming into existence subsequent to the passing of interim order of stay by this Court and falling under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of R 10 of the Rules. Of course, in such a case, if it is brought to the notice of the Court, it is always open for this court to find out whether the subsequent order placing the official under suspension is passed to overcome the effect of the interim order passed by this court staying the operation of the earlier order passed by the concerned authority placing the official under suspension under sub-rule (1) of R 10 of the Rules. ( 7 ) THE contention of Sri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, that there is no disciplinary proceeding pending against the petitioner, therefore the impugned order placing the petitioner under suspension is bad in law and it is not open for the respondent to substantiate the order by placing the records of the case, before the court to show that actually there is a case for holding a departmental pro ceeding. The validity of the impugned order in the instant case, in opinion, does not very much depend upon the wordings contained in the impugned order, but it depends upon the source of power under which the authority has passed the order As per clause (a) of sub-rule (i) of R 10 of the Rules, it is open for the appointing authoiity or to the authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate or to any other specially em-powered authority to pass an order placing the official under suspension if a disciplinary proceeding against the official is either contemplated or pending in this case, we are not concerned with clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of R 10 of the Rules. I have already pointed out that in this case, a decision, on the basis of the material that has come into existence subsequent to the interim order passed by this Count, in W. P. No. 6287, 79, has been taken by the Government to hold a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. Therefore, only on the basis of the words "pending enquiry' used in the order, it cannot be held that the order is bad in law as long as there is power in the State Government to pass an order placing an official under suspension and that order has been passed after taking a decision to hold a departmental proceeding. Sri Subba rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court in P. R. Nayak v. Union of India (1) and Mohinder singh, v. Chief Election Commr (2) The decision in P. R. Nayak's case cannot be applied to the present case. In that case, the Supreme court was concerned with a rule which was worded quite differently in asmuch as it specifically provided for initiation of the departmental enquiry before placing an official under suspension. In that case, the Supreme court was concerned with a rule which was worded quite differently in asmuch as it specifically provided for initiation of the departmental enquiry before placing an official under suspension. The wordings of R 10 (1) of the Rules with which we are concerned are quite different from the wordings of R 3 of the Rules which are considered by the Supreme Court in p. R. Nayak's case. The decision in the other case in AIR 1978 SC 851 is not of any assistance to the petitioner as it is held by me that the Validity of the impugned order in the instant case does not depend upon the actual words used therein. ( 8 ) THE contention relating to mala fides does not deserve to be enquired into any more because it lacks in material particulars. Further, the order has been passed after forwarding to the petitioner the complaints made against him and after obtaining his say in the matter. In addition to this, there is a report made by the Commissioner for public Instructions. Therefore I do not find any substance in the allegations relating to mala fides. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. ( 10 ) SRI Narasimhan, learned High Court government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within three weeks on behalf of the respondents. --- *** --- .