ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The brief facts are these. The petitioners are tenants and the respondent No. 3 is the landlord. Suit No.1 of 1981 was filed by the landlord against the tenants for the latter's eviction. It was a suit based on S. 20 (2) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Under S. 20 (4) of the Act, an application was given by the tenants praying that as they had complied with the conditions laid down in the said provision, they were entitled to the benefit of the same. In other words, they prayed that the decree for eviction should not be passed against them. The Trial Court framed an issue on the said controversy and held that as the tenants had not deposited the entire amount in accordance with the S. 20 (4) of the Act at the first hearing of the suit, therefore, the benefit of the said provision was not available to the tenants. A true copy of the said order dated 16-10-1981 is Annexure 2 to the petition. Thereafter, a revision was filed against the said order before the District Judge, Deoria, but the same was dismissed by the revisional court (Vth Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Deoria) by his order dated 25-1-1982, a true copy of which is Annexure 3 to the petition. A certified copy of the said judgment is also on the record. 2. Feeling aggrieved, the tenants have come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the authorities below were in error in holding that S. 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the provisions of S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It was further contended that if there was substantial compliance and the short deposit was insignificant the Court had the power to condone the delay in depositing the deficient amount. It was further contended that if there was substantial compliance and the short deposit was insignificant the Court had the power to condone the delay in depositing the deficient amount. In this connection, the learned counsel submitted that the judgment of Justice N.D. Ojha in Sri Chand Gupta v. Madan Lal, 1973 All LJ 635 could no longer be considered to be good law on the ground that the said learned Judge had placed reliance on a Full Bench Decision of this Court in Janta Cycle and M. Mart v. Assistant Commr., 1968 All LJ 547 : AIR 1969 All 200 (FB) and the said Full Bench decision had been subsequently upset by the Supreme Court in Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner, AIR 1972 SC 401 . The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the correctness of the aforesaid decision of Justice N. D. Ojha, was involved in a reference which was made by a learned Judge of this Court on 21.1.1978 in Civil Revision No. 1167 of 1974 Sri Har Swarup v. Smt. Sita Devi. It was brought to my notice that when the said reference came up before a Division Bench, the said Bench referred the controversy to a larger Bench as the Division Bench doubted the correctness of the aforesaid Full Bench decision of this Court in Janta Cycle & Motor Mart, Kanpur ( AIR 1969 All 200 ). It seems that the larger Bench of 5 Judges could not proceed to dispose of the controversy because, in the meanwhile, the law became settled that the aforesaid revision in which the reference was made, was itself not maintainable in this Court under S. 115 C. P. C. 4. The learned counsel contended that the view of Mr. Justice N. D. Ojha in the aforesaid case was directly in opposition to the view of Justice Prem Prakash in Dinesh Chand Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth, 1976 All LJ 124. I have considered the aforesaid submissions but in my view, looking to the consistent law laid down by the Supreme Court, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 , the controversy was regarding the correct interpretation of S. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The relevant part of the said section is reproduced below : 13. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 , the controversy was regarding the correct interpretation of S. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The relevant part of the said section is reproduced below : 13. Eviction of tenants. (1) - ---- (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, against the applicant, is satisfied-(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable: Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid, (ii) - ----- (iii)------- the Controller 'may' make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he `shall' make an order rejecting the application: Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in aggregate." The Court held that when there was a failure to pay rent in accordance with the provision contained in the said section then an order for eviction should have been passed. This interpretation was placed on the aforesaid Punjab provision despite the use of the expression `may'. It should be seen that even though the expression `may' has been used in S. 20 (4) of the b. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the said provision has been used in a manner which is contrary to the aforesaid provision in the Punjab Act. It should be seen that even though the expression `may' has been used in S. 20 (4) of the b. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the said provision has been used in a manner which is contrary to the aforesaid provision in the Punjab Act. Under S. 13 (2) of the Punjab Act the landlord could apply for the eviction of his tenant and if the controller felt satisfied that the tenant had not paid or tendered the rent due by him within the period mentioned in S. 13 (2) (1), then the controller "may" make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The contention in the Punjab case was that the controller was not bound to grant the landlord's application for eviction as the expression 'may' had been used in S. 13 (2) (iii). The position is just the reverse in S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act. It is the tenant who seeks to be relieved under the said provision after complying with the conditions laid down in the same and it is provided that the court `may' in lieu of passing of decree for eviction, relieve the tenant against his liability for eviction on the ground of default. While in the Punjab enactment the contention was made that the controller was not bound to grant the landlord's application for eviction even if the tenant remained in default, under the U.P. enactment the contention may be raised by the landlords that even if the tenant has complied with the provisions contained in S. 20 (4), still, the court is not bound to relieve him of his liability to be evicted in view of the use of expression 'may' in the said provision. Of course, I am not suggesting that the said contention will be accepted. It has been very often held that despite the use of expression `may', the court is bound to act in a particular manner. I am only emphasising that the setting in the Punjab case was more onerous for the landlord than the setting in S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This aspect of the matter however is not much relevant. I am only emphasising that the setting in the Punjab case was more onerous for the landlord than the setting in S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. This aspect of the matter however is not much relevant. What is the real crux of the matter is that the Supreme Court in the, aforesaid pronouncement clearly held that if a default was there on the part of the tenant, then the order of eviction should have been passed. It was laid down as follows : "The learned Judicial Commissioner held that in view of the admitted failure to pay the rent as provided by the rent deed or at the first hearing of the Court under the proviso to S. 13 (2) (1), the Courts below had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for ejectment against the tenants who had not done what was incumbent on them to do under the law and that such a situation called for interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority." 5. Further, the Supreme Court went on to lay down as follows : "The lower Courts, realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by S. 13 (2) (1) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It is, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Courts of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so." 6. In Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1994 , the Supreme Court followed its earlier aforesaid pronouncement and laid down as follows (at P. 2000) : "The decision is binding on us and as pointed out by Kapur, J. (as he then was) in (1954) 56 Pun. LR 284: (AIR 1954 Punj 231), the ruling of this Court makes it incumbent on the Rent Controller to order eviction. In this view of the matter there is no relief possible to the appellant." It may be stated that the short amount deposited by the tenant in the aforesaid Punjab case was a very very insignificant sum. The Controller had found the short amount to be only Rs. 4-12/- . 7. In this view of the matter there is no relief possible to the appellant." It may be stated that the short amount deposited by the tenant in the aforesaid Punjab case was a very very insignificant sum. The Controller had found the short amount to be only Rs. 4-12/- . 7. In Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, AIR 1978 SC 955 , the controversy was examined with reference to the parallel provision contained in Bombay Rent Control Statute. The Court placed reliance on its earlier decisions reported in Shah Dhansukh Lal Chhagan Lal v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff, AIR 1968 SC 1109 and Harbans Lal Jagmohandas v. Prabhudas Shivlal, AIR 1976 SC 2005 . It was laid down as follows (at Pp. 959-60) : "It is clear to us that the Act interferes with the landlord's right to property and freedom of contract only for the limited purpose of protecting tenants from misuse of the landlords' power to evict them, in these days of scarcity of accommodation, by asserting his superior rights in the property or trying to exploit his position by extracting too high rents from helpless tenants. The object was not to deprive the landlord altogether of his rights in property which have also to be respected. Another object was to make possible eviction of tenants who fail to carry out their obligation to pay rent to the landlord despite opportunities given by law in that behalf. Thus, S. 12 (3) (a) of the Act makes it obligatory for the Court to pass a decree when its conditions are satisfied as was pointed out by one of us (Bhagwati, J.) in Rati Lal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchodbhai Shankerbhai Patel, AIR 1968 Guj. 172 . If there is statutory default or neglect on the part of the tenant, whatever may be its cause, the landlord acquires a right under S. 12 (3) (a) to get a decree for eviction. But where the conditions of S. 12 (3) (a) are not satisfied, there is a further opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against eviction. He can comply with the conditions set out in S. 12 (3) (b) and defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. But where the conditions of S. 12 (3) (a) are not satisfied, there is a further opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against eviction. He can comply with the conditions set out in S. 12 (3) (b) and defeat the landlord's claim for eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions, he cannot claim the protection of S. 12 (3) (b) and in that event, there being no other protection available to him a decree for eviction would have to go against him. It is difficult to see how by any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found in S. 12 (3) (b), even where the conditions laid down by it are satisfied, to be strictly confined within the limits prescribed for their operation. We think that Chagla, C. J. was doing nothing less than legislating in Kalidas Bhavan's case, (1958) 60 Bom LR 1359 (supra), in converting the provisions of S. 12 (3) (h) into a sort of discretionary jurisdiction of the Court to relieve tenants from hardship. The decisions of this Court referred to above, in any case, make the position quite clear that S. 12 (3) (b) does not create any discretionary jurisdiction in the Court. It provides protection to the tenant on certain conditions and these conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant who seeks the benefit of the section. If the statutory provisions do not go far enough to relieve the hardship of the tenant the remedy lies with the legislature. It is not in the hands of Courts." 8. In Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapa Lal Mohan Lal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 ., the Supreme Court again followed its preceding decision in Ganpat Ladha's case (supra). The aforesaid passage from the said judgment was extracted and it was laid down as follows (at P: 956): "The above enunciation, clarifies beyond doubt that the provisions of cl. (b) of S. 12 (31) are mandatory, and must be strictly complied with by the tenant during the pendency of the suit or appeal if the landlord's claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent is to he defeated. 9. Sri Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, placed reliance on Rajendra Nath Kar v. Gangadas, AIR 1979 SC 566 . In my view, this case is distinguishable. 9. Sri Yatindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, placed reliance on Rajendra Nath Kar v. Gangadas, AIR 1979 SC 566 . In my view, this case is distinguishable. It does not support the contention that where a tenant in default is to be granted a relief against the eviction on the compliance of the deposit of the arrear of rent etc. within a certain period, then the Court can apply S. 5 of the Limitation Act to extend such period for the deposit of arrears of rent. The provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 fell for consideration. The court had to consider the effect of S. 17(b) which had been added in the said Act by an Ordinance. To quote the words of the Supreme Court, "By that Section, the tenants were given the right, if the proceeding for eviction was not yet disposed of, to apply within thirty days of the commencement of the ordinance, for setting aside the order of striking off the defence." It may be stated that the aforesaid ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act which retained the said provision but the section was numbered as S. 17 (a). On the basis of the said new provision contained in S. 17 (a), the appellant filed an application for getting rid of the earlier order whereby his defence had been struck off. The said application under S. 17 (a) was accompanied with an application under S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act will be applicable to the application under S. 17 (a) of the said Act. It seems to me that this ruling has no application to the provisions contained in S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which provides for the deposit of the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation along with the costs and interest by the date of the first hearing of the suit. The said provision does not prescribe any period of limitation for any application. In fact, the said provision does not lay down that an application is bound to be given for getting relief under the same. The said provision does not prescribe any period of limitation for any application. In fact, the said provision does not lay down that an application is bound to be given for getting relief under the same. The mere fact that an application is sometimes given by the tenant claiming the relief under S. 20 (4) of the Act, will not mean that the said provision makes it imperative or mandatory for giving an application for claiming the relief under the said provisions. In my view, it is open to a tenant to claim the said benefit without moving any written application by pointing out that he has complied with the conditions laid down in the said provision. 10. So far as the Supreme Court decision in Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner, AIR 1972 SC 401 is concerned, I think that the same has no application to the present controversy. It should be seen that the Supreme Court had examine the true interpretation of Section 9 (6) of the U P. Sales Tax Act. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Janta Cycle and Motor Mart v. Assistant Commissioner, 1968 All LJ 547 : AIR 1969 All 200 (FB) was overruled in the following words (at p. 403) : "We are wholly unable to comprehend and appreciate the above reasoning or the conclusion of the Allahabad High Court on the point under consideration. It is true that an appeal filed under S. 9 of the Act cannot be entertained by the appellate authority unless satisfactory proof is adduced of the payment of tax admitted by the appellant to be due but in a case where the amount of admitted tax is deposited after the period of limitation has expired all that will happen is that the appeal will become entertain able only on the day on which satisfactory proof of payment of that amount is produced. In other words the appeal will be deemed to have been properly filed on the date on which the amount of admitted tax is paid. If that is beyond the period of 30 days the appeal will be barred by time. S. 9 (6) will immediately become applicable to that appeal and it will be open to the appellant to apply for condonation of delay under that provision. If that is beyond the period of 30 days the appeal will be barred by time. S. 9 (6) will immediately become applicable to that appeal and it will be open to the appellant to apply for condonation of delay under that provision. We are wholly unable to follow the argument that the deposit of the amount of admitted tax must be made within 30 days even though the delay in filing the appeal can be condoned under sub-s. (6). A proper and correct reading of S. 9 cannot justify such an approach. If a petition of appeal has been filed without proof of payment of tax accompanying it that appeal can be said to have been preferred only when proof of payment of tax is furnished. Such furnishing of the proof may take place within the period prescribed for preferring the appeal or after the lapse of that period. If the proof of payment of admitted tax is furnished within the period prescribed the appeal must be entertained. If the furnishing of that proof is done after the expiry of the period of limitation the question will arise whether the appeal should be entertained or not. In such cases S. 9 (6) will come into operation and the question will arise whether there has been sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the statutory period. The correct approach is to treat the appeal as having been preferred on the date on which proof of payment of the tax was furnished and then to see whether under sub-s. (6) of S. 9, there was sufficient cause for excusing the delay in preferring the appeal." 11. The aforesaid observation will make it clear that the considerations involved in the interpretation of section 9 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act providing for the maintainability of an appeal have no relevance while interpreting the provision contained under S. 20 (4) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The said provision does not provide for any appeal and does not lay down that an application is bound to be given for claiming the relief under the said provision. 12. I would not like to say anything regarding the apparent conflict between two learned Judges of this Court in regard to t interpretation of S. 39 of the said Act. 12. I would not like to say anything regarding the apparent conflict between two learned Judges of this Court in regard to t interpretation of S. 39 of the said Act. In 1973 All LJ 635 Sri Chand Gupta v. Madan Lal, N.D. Ojha, J. held that the time deposit the amount under section 39 of the said Act cannot be extended either invoking the inherent powers of the Court or with the aid of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. In 1976 All LJ 124 Dinesh Chandra Gupta v. Kashi Nath Seth, Prem Prakash, J. made certain observations which seem to suggest that if there is substantial compliance on the part of the tenant then if there is some trivial shortfall in making the deposit due to some clerical error or accidental omission, then the same can be condoned by the Court. It has been suggested that the observations of Prem Prakash, J. were really obiter and were not called for in the view which he had already taken while deciding the first appeal from order. While the provisions contained under S. 39 may have many points o similarity with S. 20(4) of the Act,it cannot be held that both of them are in pari materia with each other. S. 20(4) is meant to put an end to the suit for eviction. On the other hand S. 39 of the Act lays down that if the necessary deposit is made within time, then the parties will be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary. The suit shall be then tried and decided with reference to the provisions contained in S. 20(2) of the Act. This necessarily involves that applications shall be moved under S. 39 seeking the amendment of the pleading. A debate may be raised that when an application is necessarily bound to be made under an enactment which also prescribes for deposit as a condition precedent for making such an application, then the approach laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner AIR 1972 SC 401 (supra) is attracted. I wish to make it clear that I do not suggestion that such a contention is to be held as tenable. I wish to make it clear that I do not suggestion that such a contention is to be held as tenable. I am only suggesting ostensibly that such a contention may be raised even though it may ultimately be found to be lacking in substance. However, under S. 20(4) there is no requirement which necessarily involves the making of an application for invoking benefit of the said provision. In any case, whatever might be the correct legal position with reference to the interpretation of S. 39 of act, so far as S. 20(4) is concerned no case has been cited before me in support of the contentions which were raised by the learmed counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, as I have pointed out above, there are a number of Supreme Court's pronouncements which may be treated as almost direct on the point inasmuch as analogous provisions in the Rent Control legislation of other-States were considered by the Supreme Court and the ratio was laid down that the court did not have any power to relax or condone the requirements laid down in such statutes to enable a tenant in default to get relief from eviction. Lastly, I may make a reference to the latest pronouncement of N. D. Ojha, J., which is directly with reference to S. 20(4) of the Act. It is reported in 1982 All WC 40 : 1982 All LJ NOC 34 Gopal Das v. Addl. District Judge. The said learned Judge has distinguished the observations of Prem Prakash, J. in the aforesaid case and has made a reference to Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapa Lal Mohan Lal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 which has already been discussed above. For the foregoing reasons I reject the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. The learned counsel next wanted to contend that the trial court was wrong in holding that the full amount had not been deposited under S. 20(4) of the Act. His contention was that the interest had not been correctly calculated and in this connection he sought to place reliance on an unreported decision in Second Appeal No. 1718 of 1972 Dinesh Chand v. Shah Mohd. decided on 1.3.1979. His contention was that the interest had not been correctly calculated and in this connection he sought to place reliance on an unreported decision in Second Appeal No. 1718 of 1972 Dinesh Chand v. Shah Mohd. decided on 1.3.1979. I have declined to entertain this contention because it was never pressed in the trial court or the revisional court and within the ambit of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I do not think that I should allow this question to be raised when it cannot be described to be a pure question of law. 14. The learned counsel next contended that there were two tenancies involved and this aspect needs to be considered. Again this contention was never raised before the trial court or before the revisional court and I cannot allow it to be raised at this stage. 15. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed in limine.