Saikia, J.:- This is an application under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure impugning the and of the Executive Magistrate refusing to start a pro­ceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. The petitioner is a tenant of the opposite party No. I occupying a room and he alleges that earlier there was electri­city and water supply in that room provided by the landlord opposite party No, 1. In the month of December, 1981 the petitioner along with his family went to Kinput keeping the room under lock and key, but on his return on 5-6-82 he found himself deprived of the essential services of electricity and water supply causing great inconvenience to aim and his family in the use and occupation of the slid room. On the petitioner's application, copy whereof has not been annexed to The petition, police report was called for. The learned Executive Magistrate fixed 16-6-82 for hearing of the petition and the parties were asked to produce documents in support of their claims. The learned Magistrate Heard the learned advocates of both, the parties OB 19-6-82 and upon hearing the arguments he was satisfied that there could not be any breach of peace which might fall under section 144 Cr. P.C. and hence no proceeding under Section 144 Cr- P.C. could be drawn up. Mr. J. M. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under Section 6 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 the landlord is bound to give electricity and water supply to the tenants and as such the petitioner has the light to be supplied with electricity and water-ID Md. Gulam Abbas vs. Md. Ibrahim, AIR 1978 SC 422 it has been observed : "The kind of orders mentioned in Section 144(3) are obviously intended only to prevent dangers to life, health, safety or peace and tranquility of members of the public. They are only tem­porary orders which cannot last beyond two months from the making thereof as is clear from Section 144(6) of the Code. Question of title cannot be decided here at all". It has further been held : "It may sometimes happen that a person may be prevented from doing something even upon his own property provided the doing of perfectly legal act constitutes a danger to human life, health or safety of others or to public peace and tranquility". Question of title cannot be decided here at all". It has further been held : "It may sometimes happen that a person may be prevented from doing something even upon his own property provided the doing of perfectly legal act constitutes a danger to human life, health or safety of others or to public peace and tranquility". It may, however, be noted that the Magistrate is not concerned with individual rights in performing his duly under Section 144 Cr. P.C. but he has to determine what may be reasonably necessary or expedient in a situation of which he is the best judge. Conflicting assertions on questions cannot be decided in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr. P.C. and when public peace and tranquility or other objects mentioned in the Section are not in danger the Magistrate concerned cannot act under Section 144. He can only direct parties to go to the proper forum, on the other hand, if the public safety, peace or tranquilly are in danger, it is left to the Magistrate concer­ned to take proper action under section 144 Cr. P. C. No hard and fast rules can be laid down for guidance in exercising a power on which decisions must necessarily be governed by the existing situation in each case. It has to be judged on facts and circumstances existing at a particular place at a particular time. The same principles have further been enunciated in Gulam Abbas vs. State of U.P. AIR 1981 SC 219S. An order made under section 144 Cr. P. C. is amenable to writ jurisdiction cither under Article 32 or under Article 226 of the Constitution if it violates or infringes any fundamental right. The question whether an order under section 144 Cr. P. C. is a judicial order or an order in exercise of the executive power in exercise of the executive function will have to be decided in the instant case by reference to the old Crl. Proce­dure Code, 1973 and not by reference to the old Crl. Procedure Code. It has been observed that the position under the 1898 Code, wherein separation between the judicial function and the executive or administrative functions of Magistrates did not obtain was quite different ; under the new Cr. Proce­dure Code, 1973 and not by reference to the old Crl. Procedure Code. It has been observed that the position under the 1898 Code, wherein separation between the judicial function and the executive or administrative functions of Magistrates did not obtain was quite different ; under the new Cr. P.C. 1973 the scheme of separation of judicial functions from executive functions of the Magistrates has been implemented to a great extent by allocating judicial functions to the judicial Magistrates and the executive functions to Executive Magistrates; and it shows that the order passed by a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate under Section 144 Cr. P. C. is not a judicial order or quasi-judicial order, the function there under being essentially an executive (Police) function. It is true that before passing the order hearing is to be given to the parties except in cases of emergency when exparte order can be made under Section 144 (2) without notice to the party against whom it is directed, but in which cases on an application made by the aggrieved party the Magistrate has to give hearing to such person under section 144(5) whereupon he can rescind or alter his earlier order. Though made by an executive Magistrate an order under Section 144 Cr. P.C. is revisable under Section 397 Cr. P. C. because under the explanation to that section all Magistrates whether judicial or executive are deemed to be inferior courts for the purposes of the High Court's or the Session Courts' revisional powers. The hearing given to the aggrieved party ensures fair play and conforms to the audi alterant par tern principle of natural justice and safeguards against arbitrariness. However, all these aspects cannot make the order passed under section 144 Cr. P.C. a judicial or quasi-judicial order; and the same has to be regarded as an executive order passed in performance of an executive function where no his as to any rights between the parties it adjudicated; but only an order for preserving peace is made. The Magistrate derives his jurisdiction from the need for preserving public peace and tranquility. The Executive Magistrate has no power to adjudi­cate upon or decide disputes as to title to or rights over the properties involved. The Magistrate derives his jurisdiction from the need for preserving public peace and tranquility. The Executive Magistrate has no power to adjudi­cate upon or decide disputes as to title to or rights over the properties involved. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case it is found that the parties were given opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their claims and the learned Executive Magistrate upon hearing the learned Advocates for the parties clearly came to the conclusion that this was not a case which would result in breach of the peace. Once the Magistrate held that there was no likelihood of breach of the peace he had no jurisdiction to decide whether the landlord had the obligation to supply electricity and water to his tenant or the tenant had the right to obtain electricity and water from his landlord. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, though a batter speaking order was to be expected, yet it is apparent that the learned Magistrate clearly decided that there was no likelihood of any breach of the peace for the purpose of Section 144 Cr. P.C. and accordingly he refused to draw pro­ceeding under that section. It will be unreasonable for this Court to revise that order and direct the Magistrate to hold that there was likelihood or apprehension of breach of the peace. For the foregoing reasons this petition is found to be without merit and it is rejected in limine.