A suit filed by the appellants has come to be dismissed at the hands of the learned Assistant District Judge, Goalpara, Dhubri on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The suit was for khas possession on declaration of title. The learned Assistant District Judge has agreed with the learned trial Court that the plaintiffs were able to prove their title over the suit land. They have, however, been non-suited because, they had approached the Court beyond 12 years of their dispossession. It may be stated that the case of the plantiffs was that they had been dispossessed in Baisak 1367 B.S. (corresponding to April-May, 1960) and the suit was filed in 1968, and as such was within a period of 12 years from dispossession. The learned first appel­late Court, however, found on an appraisal of the evidence that the dispossession was not in 1960, but sometime in 1955-56, if not in 1950. The further view taken is that as the defendants possessed the land for more than 12 years preceding the filing of the suit, the defendants held the land adversely to the plaintiff for more than 12 years before the latter had approached the Court. The decree of the trial Court was, therefore, reversed and the suit was dismissed with costs. 2. I have heard this appeal with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the appellants only as none appeared for the defen­dants. Before proceeding, I wanted to satisfy myself if notice of this appeal had been properly served on the main contestants who are respondents 1 to 4. The process server's report and the processes showed that notices for these respondents had been served and accepted by Jnanendra Narayan Choudhury on 12.8.77. Notices on other respondents had also been served properly. 3. The point which needs determination in this appeal is whether the suit was covered by Article 64 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned Assistant District Judge after referring to the decisions of this Court in Syed Anowaruddin vs. Abdul Rahim, 1974 ALR 90; H. B. Sarma vs. H. G. Sarma, AIR 1975 Gau. 47 and that of the Supreme Court Nair Service Society vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 came to the following two conclusions in the main regarding the relative scope of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act : "(i). 47 and that of the Supreme Court Nair Service Society vs. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 came to the following two conclusions in the main regarding the relative scope of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act : "(i). The two articles 64 and 65 in their application cannot be placed in two water-tight categories. There may be considerable over-lap of the two articles in a given case. (ii). In a case where there are allegations of title, posses­sion, and subsequent dispossession even if article 65 is to be applied the plaintiff has to prove not only title but an existing title and that he has brought the suit within 12 years of dispossession." While coming to the aforesaid conclusions, the learned Assis­tant District Judge felt that the decision in Anowaruddin (supra) is per incuriam as it has failed to take note of Nair Service Society (Supra). It was also observed that Sharm as case was also open to the charge that it too was per incuriam as it did not notice Anowaruddin. 4. According to me, there is no clash between any of the aforesaid decisions, if they are read in the context of their facts. At first the ratio of the Nair Service Society has to be noted. Therein a suit was filed for possession on the strength of posses­sory title alone. It was, however, beyond the period of six months visualised by the Specific Relief Act. A contention was therefore, made by Shri Nambiar that there could not be two periods of limitations, namely, six months (as visualised by the Specific Relief Act) and 12 years (as fixed by the Indian Limitation Act), for suits based on possession alone and that the longer period of limitation requires proof of title by the plaintiff. This contention was not accepted and the Supreme Court observed as follows. : "The uniform view of the courts is that if section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of 6 months has passed question of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. When, however, the period of 6 months has passed question of title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to poss­ession only in a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. The present amended articles 64 and 65 bring out this difference. Article 64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not op title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. Article 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The ame­ndment is not remedial but declaratory of the law. In our judgment the suit was competent." This decision itself shows that where a suit for possession is based on title, Article 65 applies. When it was observed that the amendment was not remedial but declaratory of the law, what the Court meant was that even prior to the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession on the strength of prior posse­ssion only was maintainable even though it was filed beyond a period of six months. But when the period of six months had expired, the question of title could be raised by the defendant (which could not be done if filed within six months); and when it is so done, the plaintiff must establish a better title of fail. 44. In Anowaruddin's case it was made clear that a suit based on proprietory title attract Article 65 if instituted after the new Limitation Act came into force and it could be defeated only if the defendant could prove his adverse possession for 12 years and not on the footing that the plaintiff had not brought the suit within 12 years of his dispossession. In this context it would not be out of place to state that Articles 64 and 65 are not in pari materia with old Articles 142 and 144. In this context it would not be out of place to state that Articles 64 and 65 are not in pari materia with old Articles 142 and 144. The Law Commission on whose recommendation the changes were made had felt that Article 142 of the old Act was harsh in operation in placing the owner of the property at a disadvantage in an action brought by him against a trespasser. That Article cast a burden on the dispossessed owner not only to establish his title but also to make out that he was in possession at some point of time within 12 years before the date of the suit. This called for legislative action according to the Law Commission. The recommendation of the Commission was, inter alia, to this effect:- "If the defendant wants to defeat the right of the plain­tiff, he must establish his adverse possession for over twelve years which has the effect of extinguishing the title of the owner by the operation of sec. 28 of the Limita­tion Act, read with Art. 144. If he fails to do so, there is no reason for non-suiting the plaintiff merely because was not able to prove possession within twelve years. In our opinion Art. 142 mist be restricted in its application only to suits based on possessory title. We there­fore, suggest that in order to avoids injustice and inequality to the true owner and to simplify the law, Art. 142 Should be restricted to suits based on possessory title and the owner of the property should not lose his right to it unless the defen­dant in possession is able to establish adverse possession." Limitation Act of 1963 was enacted to implement the reco­mmendations of the Commission with one important modification which related to adherence to the scheme of the old Act specifically indicating the running point of the limitation. (See Statement of objects and Reasons). It is apparent that the aforesaid recommendation was accepted as under the new Articles there is a clear-cut distinction between the suits based only on prior posse­ssion, and suit based on title. The former are governed by Art. 64, and to the latter category the provisions of Art. 65 apply. 5. This is the view expressed in Anowaruddin. Now let us see whether in Sharma's case, this court laid down any different legal proposition as felt by the learned Assistant District Judge. The former are governed by Art. 64, and to the latter category the provisions of Art. 65 apply. 5. This is the view expressed in Anowaruddin. Now let us see whether in Sharma's case, this court laid down any different legal proposition as felt by the learned Assistant District Judge. Before this is done, it is worthwhile pointing out that the deci­sion in Sharma's case is by Islam, J. (as he then was) for a Division Bench of this Court. Sitting singly Islam, J. had ren­dered three judgments on this point which are Thokchom Ibopishak Singh vs. Salam Chandra Singh, AIR 1975 Gail. 1; A. T. Singh vs. R. K. M. Singh, AIR 1975 Gau. 12 ; Chandra Kanta Kalita vs. Gokul Kalita, AIR 1975 Gauhati 1-3. In the first two of these decisions, his Lordship had held that a suit for possession based on title would b; governed by Article 65, and not Article 64. Chandra Kanta (Supra) was a case under old Limitation Act and the view expressed was that even under the old Act, a suit for possession based on title would have been governed by Article 144, in which case it would have been the burden of the defendant to prove that he was holding adversely and that his adverse possession had ripened into title. 6. We may now examine the judgment of Islam, J. in H.B. Sarma's case. After referring to Nair Service Society, it was observed: "The law therefore is that when a plaintiff brings a suit for possession of immovable property basing his suit on title and his title is established, then Article 65 of the Act would apply and it will be the defendant's burden to prove that he has acquired title by adverse possession. In other words, he will be required to prove that he is in possession adver­sely to the plaintiff for the statutory period of 12 years. When however a plaintiff brings a suit for possession of immovable property but based his suit on previous posse­ssion but not on title, Article 64 applies. In this case there is a clash between the two kinds of possession of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant and as the defendant is admittedly in possession, the plaintiff cannot get a decree unless he proves existing title. In this case there is a clash between the two kinds of possession of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant and as the defendant is admittedly in possession, the plaintiff cannot get a decree unless he proves existing title. Hence the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that he has instituted the suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession, and that his title has not been extinguished under Section 27 of the Limita­tion Act". (Emphasis supplied). 7. A close reading of the above would make it clear that the question of clash between the two kinds of possession would arise only when Article 64 applies. In such a situation, the plaintiffs shall have to prove that the suit was instituted within 12 years of dispossession and his title had not been extinguished under section 27 of the Limitation Act. 8. It is apparent from what has been stated above that the question of instituting the suit within 12 years of dispossession would arise only when Article 64 is attracted. As stated in Nair Service Society, this Article gets attracted in a suit "based on possession and not on title". Where possession is claimed on the strength of title, it would be article 65 which would hold the field, and a plaintiff would be non-suited only if adverse posse­ssion for a period of 12 years is proved the length of mere dis­possession would not be material in such a case. 9. Thus the learned Assistant-District Judge committed error of law in stating that even where Article 65 is attracted, a plaintiff has to prove that he was in possession within 12 years of the filing of the suit. As the present was a case based on title, there should be no manner of doubt that it is Article 65 which applies. It was, therefore, the burden of the defendants to establish that they were holding the land adversely to the plaintiffs and had done so at least for a period of 12 years. Shri Choudhuri contends that it was not even the case of the defendants that they were holding adversely to the plaintiff. Their case rather was that the suit land was included in the Touzi of their father who possessed it through adhian, after whose death they did so. Shri Choudhuri contends that it was not even the case of the defendants that they were holding adversely to the plaintiff. Their case rather was that the suit land was included in the Touzi of their father who possessed it through adhian, after whose death they did so. The defendants having not claimed adverse possession, the question of the adverse possession having ripened into title does not arise. 10. This being the position, I would hold that the learned; Court below erred in law in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. As the title of the appellants was found established even by the learned Assistant District Judge, there was no other impediment in their way. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the suit is decreed.