JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition pertains to declaration of vacancy u/s 12(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. XIII of 1972 in respect of non-residential accommodation and its subsequent release in favour of the owners. The fact about which either there is no dispute between the parties or stand proved may first be stated. 2. Admittedly opposite parties 3 and 4 Radhe Lal and Smt. Kaushalya are landlord and landlady of the shop in dispute. Again admittedly the Petitioner Hakeem Agha Mohd. Afsar Shirazi was the tenant of the said shop on behalf of opposite parties 3 and 4. The Petitioner carried on his profession of a Hakeem in the said premises. On 16-5-78 Annexure No. 1, opposite parties 3 and 4 moved an application before the District Supply Officer, Rent Control, Lucknow, opposite-party No. 1 u/s 16(1) for the release of the shop in their favour. In this application it was stated that the Petitioner had taken up a shop on rent at Hathipur District Lakhimpur Kheri and had "substantially removed" his effects from the said shop to the tenanted shop at Lakhimpur Kheri five days ago. Again it was stated in paragraph 5 that the shop in dispute was "practically" lying vacant under the lock and key of the Petitioner who was negotiating with persons to get good premium for the shop. On these facts it was stated that the shop in question is vacant u/s 12 of the Act and is available for release to the landlords. On 5-6-78, Annexure C-l to the counter affidavit, the Inspector, Rent Control, submitted his report. At the time of his inspection the shop was closed and he could not inspect the shop internally. He, however, made enquiries from certain persons and came to the conclusion that the shop was lying locked for the last several months and the shop was, therefore, vacant. He, however, recommended that notice be issued to the Petitioner in order to obtain his version. On 1-7-78 the Petitioner's brother Masood Agha lodged First Information Report at Police Station Hasanganj at 8-20 A.M. to the effect that the opposite parties with the assistance and active connivance of certain persons had broken open the lock of shop in dispute and taken illegal possession thereof as also of the goods lying in the shop. On 1-7-78 the Petitioner's brother Masood Agha lodged First Information Report at Police Station Hasanganj at 8-20 A.M. to the effect that the opposite parties with the assistance and active connivance of certain persons had broken open the lock of shop in dispute and taken illegal possession thereof as also of the goods lying in the shop. On 2-7-78 at 11-20 A.M. another First Information Report was lodged at Police Station Hasanganj by the Petitioner himself complaining of the same act about which the compliant had been made by Masood Agha. On 6-7-78, Annexure II, the Petitioner filed objection against the release application of the landlords. On 17-10-78 the opposite parties filed their reply to the Petitioner's objection. The opposite parties invited the attention of the District Supply Officer to their application for release dated 6-5-78 and reiterated the facts stated in the said application. It was further stated in paragraph 5 of the reply that' the Petitioner had given vacant possession of the shop in question to opposite party No. 3 on 29th June, 1978. It was further stated that no almirah much less several almriahs belonging to the Petitioner were there in the shop in question. In support of their case the landlord-opposite parties filed affidavits of Tulsi Ram Saxena, Chakravarty Rajgopala Charya Tiwari, Advocate and one of the landlords namely Radhe Lal. In all these affidavits it was stated that the Petitioner carried on his business in the shop in dispute up to about 1st week of May, 1978 and thereafter all the effects in the shop were removed from there, keeping the shop under the lock and key of the Petitioner and thereafter on 29th June, 1978 the Petitioner handed over vacant possession of the shop to Radhe Lal, one of the landlords. The Petitioner did not file any affidavit of any person living in the locality but he filed his won affidavit. There is some controversy with regard to filing of this affidavit. On behalf of the opposite parties, landlords, it was asserted that the affidavit was not filed on the date fixed, in the presence of the opposite parties but was filed behind their back and the same could not, therefore, be taken into consideration. This controversy is not material at this stage. On behalf of the opposite parties, landlords, it was asserted that the affidavit was not filed on the date fixed, in the presence of the opposite parties but was filed behind their back and the same could not, therefore, be taken into consideration. This controversy is not material at this stage. The matter was fixed for arguments before District Supply Officer on 27-3-1979 but it appears that on this date no appearance was put in on behalf of the Petitioner and an order was passed declaring the shop to be vacant. Thereafter on 12-4-1979 the District Supply Officer passed an order releasing the shop in question in favour of opposite parties 3 and 4. A copy of this order is Annexure No. VII to the writ petition. Aggrieved by the order of the District Supply Officer the Petitioner filed a revision before the learned District Judge, Lucknow, who transferred the same for hearing to the Vth Additional District Judge, Lucknow, who by his judgment and order dated 7-3-80, Annexure 8, dismissed the same. While these proceedings were going on before the District Supply Officer, proceedings u/s 145 were initiated at the instance of the Petitioner. The Petitioner's complaint in the said proceedings was that he had been illegally disposessed from the shop in question and there was apprehension of breach of peace. These proceedings terminated in favour of the Petitioner by the order of the learned Magistrate dated 23-7-79, Annexure-9. The order of the Magistrate has been confirmed in revision by the learned Sessions Judge by his judgment and order dated 30th July, 1980. The orders passed in proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been challenged by the landlords through a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Crl. Misc. Case No. 1561 of 1980). This case is also listed before me but it would be heard and decided by a separate judgment. 3. A perusal of the order passed by the District Supply Officer would show that while declaring the vacancy of the shop and releasing the same in favour of opposite-parties 3 and 4 he did not take into consideration the affidavit filed by the Petitioner on the ground that the same had been filed behind the back of the landlords. 3. A perusal of the order passed by the District Supply Officer would show that while declaring the vacancy of the shop and releasing the same in favour of opposite-parties 3 and 4 he did not take into consideration the affidavit filed by the Petitioner on the ground that the same had been filed behind the back of the landlords. He recorded the finding that the Petitioner had opened a shop in the name of Hakim Agha Mohammad Afsar Shirazi Daliganjwale at Hathipur, District Lakhimpur Kheri, and, therefore, the shop in question was vacant. The order dated 27-3-79 by which the vacancy has been declared has not been placed on record by either party but reference to this order has been made in the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner is justified in arguing that merely on the basis of the Petitioner opening a shop at Kheri, the shop in dispute could not be treated as vacant u/s 12 of the Act which provides as follows: 12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases- (1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a) He has substantially removed his effects there from, or (b) He has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, (c) In the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. From the above language it is apparent that u/s 12(1)(a) a shop can be deemed to be vacant only if the tenant has substantially or completely removed his effects there from. Mere acquisition of another shop as tenant or as owner does not result in vacancy under this clause. The Supply Officer inferred vacancy merely from the fact of the Petitioner having acquired a shop at Kheri. In doing this he committed manifest error. On the facts of the present case he was further required to record the finding that the Petitioner had substantially or completely removed his effects from the shop. His order therefore cannot be sustained. I may now consider whether the error committed by the District Supply Officer stands rectified by the order of the learned Additional District Judge. 4. On the facts of the present case he was further required to record the finding that the Petitioner had substantially or completely removed his effects from the shop. His order therefore cannot be sustained. I may now consider whether the error committed by the District Supply Officer stands rectified by the order of the learned Additional District Judge. 4. One of the grievances of the Petitioner before the learned District Judge was that the District Supply Officer committed manifest error by ignoring the Petitioner's affidavit. This affidavit has been taken into account by the learned District Judge. The Petitioner's grievance on this score, therefore, stands satisfied. After referring to the affidavits filed by or on behalf of the parties the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that it had been clearly proved that the Petitioner had opened a shop at Kheri. Thereafter the learned District Judge observed. It is not the case of the Petitioner that new furniture was obtained for the shop at Kheri and, therefore, it is established that effects in the shop had been removed to the shop at Kheri. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner Sri. G.K. Mehrotra argued that the finding regarding removal of effects is based on conjectures. He has invited my attention to this observation in the judgment of the learned District Judge "if Sri. Agha Shirazi had opened a shop at Lakhimpur Kheri, he must have removed his effects from the shop in dispute unless it is the case of Sri. Shirazi that he managed for the new furniture etc. for the new shop". The learned District Judge has presumed that some furniture had been acquired for the shop at Kheri. It was not stated in any of the affidavits filed by the parties that the shop at Kheri had already been furnished. The learned Counsel, therefore, is justified in arguing that the finding of removal of effects is based on conjectures. The learned Counsel also pointed out that in fact there was no evidence on record on the basis of which the finding could be recorded regarding substantial removal of the effects from the shop in dispute. The learned Counsel, therefore, is justified in arguing that the finding of removal of effects is based on conjectures. The learned Counsel also pointed out that in fact there was no evidence on record on the basis of which the finding could be recorded regarding substantial removal of the effects from the shop in dispute. He has pointed out that the initial case of the opposite parties was that substantially effects had been removed but this case was later changed in the affidavit filed on their behalf and in the said affidavit it was stated that all the goods had been removed. According to the learned Counsel no importance has been given by the learned District Judge to this variation in the case. Sri. M.S. Kotwal, learned Counsel for the landlords opposite parties, however, submitted that there was no variation in the case and that the averments made in the affidavits filed on behalf of the landlords reflected the position that came to be on or after 29th June, 1978. According to the learned Counsel when the affidavits were filed, the Petitioner had already handed over possession to the opposite parties and, therefore, it was stated in the said affidavits that all the effects had been removed from the shop. There is much that can be said in respect of this argument but I am refraining from making any observation as the case is being remanded to the trial authority for fresh decision. It may only be observed that the averments made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the application for release are as follows: 4. That the said Afsar Agha has taken a shop on rent at Hathipur, Lakhimpur Kheri, and has substantially removed his effects from the aforementioned shop in question to the said tenanted shop at Lakhimpur Kheri, five days back. (Emphasis supplied) 5. That the aforementioned shop in question is practically lying vacant under the lock and key of Sri. Afsar Agha, who has been negotiating with different persons to get a sizeable premium for the same, (emphasis supplied). It will be noticed that in paragraph 4 the word "substantially" has been used and in paragraph 5 the word "practically" has been used. As against this in the affidavit of Tulsi Ram in paragraph 2 the averment made is thus: 2. That Sri. It will be noticed that in paragraph 4 the word "substantially" has been used and in paragraph 5 the word "practically" has been used. As against this in the affidavit of Tulsi Ram in paragraph 2 the averment made is thus: 2. That Sri. Hakim Afsar Agha Shirazi had carried on his Hakimi business in the shop in question situated on the ground floor of house No. 488/112 at Sitapur city Branch Road, Daliganj, Lucknow, owned by the applicants, up to about the first week of May, 1978 and there after had removed all his effects there from keeping the same under his lock and key. (Emphasis supplied). I have only emphasised what has been stated in the application for release and what has been stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords. It will be for the authorities below to draw the necessary inference. It is also not clear from the judgment of the learned District Judge as to which finding recorded by the District Supply Officer, he considered to be final so as to be immune from challenge in revisional jurisdiction of the Court. As observed earlier the District Supply Officer had recorded no findings of fact on the material controversy viz., substantial or complete removal of effects, still the learned District Judge observed as follows: The present is the revision which has got a limited scope. If the order of the learned District Supply Officer and view held by him is also possible and is supported by the evidence on the record, the revisional court cannot take a different view. In view of the fact that the relevant findings of fact had not been recorded by the District Supply Officer, the above observation carries no meaning. Before the authorities below, as noticed earlier, the case of the landlords was that on 29th June, 1978 the Petitioner himself voluntarily vacated the shop in dispute and handed over vacant possession to them. The landlords' case was disputed by the Petitioner. On this dispute no finding has been recorded by either of the two authorities below. If necessary it would be open to the authorities below to record a finding in respect of this dispute also. 5. The landlords' case was disputed by the Petitioner. On this dispute no finding has been recorded by either of the two authorities below. If necessary it would be open to the authorities below to record a finding in respect of this dispute also. 5. In view of the above the petition is allowed and the order dated 27th March, 1979 by which the vacancy was declared, the order dated 12-4-1979, Annexure-7, passed by the District Supply Officer and the order dated 7-3-1980, Annexure-8, passed by the learned Additional District Judge are hereby quashed. The matter shall go back to the District Supply Officer, Rent Control, Lucknow or to such other authority as may now be dealing with cases of this nature for deciding the dispute afresh in accordance with law taking into consideration the observation made herein above after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidence. The costs of this petition shall be easy. 6. Sri. M.S. Kotwal, learned Counsel for the landlords, opposite parties, submitted that direction may be issued to the authorities concerned not to disposses the landlords from the shop in dispute on the basis of the judgment passed in the present writ petition. The prayer is misconceived. The Petitioner was not dispossessed under any order passed by the Rent Control Authority and, therefore, there is no question of restitution proceeding being taken by the Petitioner under the provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, until the dispute is finally decided. 7. Sri. G.K. Mehrotra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner has prayed that a date may be fixed for the appearance of the parties before the trial authority. The parties shall appear before the trial authority on 31st August, 1982. 8. Petition allowed.