JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision is filed against the order dated 22-1-1981, passed by Fourth Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior, in Execution Case No. 74-A of 1976-78. ( 2. ) THE facts, out of which this revision arises, are that the non-applicant Uddhav Kumar filed a suit against the applicant Tek Chand for eviction from the suit shop on the grounds of disclaimer and arrears of rent. According to the applicant, the non-applicant was not entitled to bring the suit, as the land, over which the suit shop is situated, belongs to the Municipal corporation, and to evict from the accommodation, which is the property of a local authority, none of the provisions of M. P. Accommodation Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is applicable, as provided in section 3 (b) of the Act. It has been averred in the plaint that the superstructure over the land was constructed by the plaintiff. The learned trial court, on the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiff ? 2. Whether the defendant has denied the status of the landlord of the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction ? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 210 from the defendant as arrears of rent ? 4. Whether the plaintiff has legally terminated the tenancy of the defendant ? 5. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to bring the present suit ? 6. Whether the Municipal Corporation is a necessary party ? ( 3. ) IN spite of the fact that there was no issue regarding the applicability of the Act, the learned trial Court gave that finding and after taking into consideration the evidence produced in the file and documents on record, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. An appeal before the first Appellate Court and second appeal before this Court were filed against the said judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, but before none of the Appellate Court, this point was ever canvassed or decided, whether the provisions of the Act were applicable to the present case or not. The learned appellate Courts, however, confirmed the decree passed by the learned trial Court for possession. ( 4. ) THE decree for possession was put in execution by the decree-holder/ non-applicant. The learned appellate Courts, however, confirmed the decree passed by the learned trial Court for possession. ( 4. ) THE decree for possession was put in execution by the decree-holder/ non-applicant. In the execution proceedings, the applicant has raised an objection that as there is no ground for passing a decree of eviction against the applicant, that decree is a nullity and that cannot be executed. The objection was rejected by the Executing Court. Being aggrieved by that order, the present revision is filed. ( 5. ) IT is clear from the narration of the facts of the case that the main point to be decided is whether the decree passed by the learned trial Court in Civil Suit No. 74-A of 1976 and confirmed by the Appellate Courts also, which is not based on any of the grounds mentioned under section 12 of the act, will amount to nullity or not. The other point to be decided is as to whether the suit premises belong to the Municipal Corporation and as such are exempt from operation of the Act. ( 6. ) FIRST of all, I will decide the point as to whether the suit premises, regarding which there is dispute, are exempt from the operation of the Act. Section 3 of the Act reads as under:- "3. Act not to apply to certain accommodations:- (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a) accommodation which is the property of the Government; (b) accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes. (2) *** *** *** if it is held that the superstructure belongs to the Corporation, then certainly section 3 (b) of the Act will be applicable, but this fact is also disputed. The plaintiff says that he has constructed the superstructure, while the Corporation alleges that the property belongs to it. (2) *** *** *** if it is held that the superstructure belongs to the Corporation, then certainly section 3 (b) of the Act will be applicable, but this fact is also disputed. The plaintiff says that he has constructed the superstructure, while the Corporation alleges that the property belongs to it. The word which is important in the matter, is the word accommodation and it is defined in section 2 (a) of the Act, which is as under:-" (a) "accommodation" means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential and includes,- (i) any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes; (ii) garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of the building: (iii) any fitting affixed to such building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof; (iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building. " Whether the exemption refers to accommodation or to private persons, was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Radheylal v. Ratansingh. 1977 MPLJ 335=1977jlj 200. in which it was held that:- "the immunity from the operation of the Act contained in section 3 (1) (b) is in respect of the premises and is not with respect to the parties to contract of tenancy. If the premises belong to a local authority, the Act, is not applicable to such premises, even if the person letting it out is a private person. AIR 1953 SC 16 relied on. " ( 7. ) THE other aspect of the case is that if Uddhav Kumar has constructed the superstructure of the disputed shop, then he has constructed it when he was in possession of the property as a licencee. If he has constructed the said portion under the licence, then the provisions of section 60 of the Indian easements Act, 1882, will be applicable to the facts of the present case and the complexion of the case will be altogether different one. Section 60 of the indian Easements Act, 1882, reads as under; "60. A licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless- (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. Section 60 of the indian Easements Act, 1882, reads as under; "60. A licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless- (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. " If that construction is made under a licence, then the licence cannot be revok ed. This aspect is also not considered by the Executing Court, which is an important matter to be considered. ( 8. ) FOR getting a decree of eviction against the tenant, there should be a ground as mentioned in section 12 of the Act, and if the Court finds that the plaintiff has not made out any ground mentioned in section 12 of the Act, the decree will be nullity, and that if the decree is nullity and the Court has no jurisdiction to execute, such objection can be taken into consideration in the execution proceedings also. For this proposition, I rely on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Mathura Prasad Sarjoo jaiswal and others v. Dossi bai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 . in which it was held that- "a question relating to jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise because, if those decisions are considered as conclusive, it will assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature. " ( 9. ) FROM the perusal of the impugned order and the discussion made above by me, it is clear that the points, which are mentioned by me in this order, were not considered by the learned Executing Court. " ( 9. ) FROM the perusal of the impugned order and the discussion made above by me, it is clear that the points, which are mentioned by me in this order, were not considered by the learned Executing Court. Therefore, the learned Executing Court is directed to consider as to whether the decree is based on any of the grounds mentioned under section 12 of the Act. For that, the learned Court may call for the record of the original case. Similarly, to decide as to whether the Municipal Corporation is entitled for possession or not, it will have to decide as to whether the construction made was under the licence and whether the licence can be revoked, taking into consideration the implication of section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. For deciding the above points, if the learned Executing Court feels that taking of evidence is necessary, then it may give an opportunity to the parties to lead their evidence and will then decide the matter. ( 10. ) THE result, therefore, is that the revision is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Executing Court is set aside and the case is sent back to the Executing Court to decide the matter afresh, in the light of the observations mentioned above. Till that decision, the parties are directed to maintain the status quo. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this case. Revision allowed.