JUDGMENT P. Mehrotra, J. - These two writ petitions are connected and they arise out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts in brief, are these. One Har Bilash Misra was treated as the tenure-holder. The notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to him and he filed his objections. They were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 31-10-1974. Against the said order an appeal was filed by the said tenure-holder and the appellate court by its judgment dated 6-12-1975 reduced the surplus land and held that it was 1.64 acres. A true copy of the said appellate judgment is Annexure 1 to the tenure holder's writ petition No. 1969 of 1981. The tenure-holder gave in choice the land of plot 138. Subsequently, the ceiling proceedings were restarted against the said tenure holder. A notice was issued on 22-4-1976. The tenure-holder in para 4 of his rejoinder affidavit has stated that a true copy of the statement, which was issued under S. 10(2) of the Act, is Annexure R.A. 1 to the said rejoinder affidavit. On 2-7-1976 a sale deed of plot 50 was executed by the said tenure-holder in favour of Smt. Shiv Piari who is the petitioner in the connected writ petition 5039 of 1981. The Prescribed Authority vide his order dated 17-9-1976 in the later ceiling proceedings declared 2.02 acres of land as surplus. This area included 1.64 acres which had been declared as surplus in the earlier ceiling proceedings and .38 acres were now additionally declared as surplus. Thus a total of 2.02 acres was now declared as surplus in the subsequent ceiling proceedings. Annexure 2 to the tenure holder's writ petition 1969 of 1981 is a true copy of the order dated 17-9-1976 passed by the Prescribed Authority. It seems that the tenure-holder gave the land of plot 16 in choice to be declared as surplus in respect of .38 acres which had been additionally declared as surplus in the subsequent proceedings. This is clear from Annexure-3 to the said writ petition of the tenure-holder. It is the contention of the transferee, Smt. Shiv Piari, that on 26-7-1977 the State had taken possession of the surplus land of plot 138. The tenure-holder, however, contests the correctness of the said statement. This is clear from Annexure-3 to the said writ petition of the tenure-holder. It is the contention of the transferee, Smt. Shiv Piari, that on 26-7-1977 the State had taken possession of the surplus land of plot 138. The tenure-holder, however, contests the correctness of the said statement. A review application was moved by the State of Uttar Pradesh on 12-9-1977 seeking a review of the appellate order dated 6-12-1975. The State's prayer was that the surplus land of the tenure-holder should be taken from some land other than the land of plot 138, as the said plot was recorded in the name of the petitioner's son Ravindra Kumar and that it was not the plot of the tenure-holder. Against the said review application, the tenure-holder filed his objections and he submitted that the surplus land should be taken from plot 50. It has already been stated that the said plot 50 had been sold by the tenure-holder by the sale deed dated 2-7-1976 in favour of the petitioner Smt. Shiv Piari. The said review application of the State was allowed by the appellate court by its order dated 7-5-1979, a true copy of which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition 5039 of 1981 filed by Smt. Shiv Piari. The appellate court thus allowed the prayer of the State and reviewed the earlier appellate judgment dated 6-12-1975 in the manner that instead of 1.64 acres of plot 138, the same area of the land of plot 50 was declared as surplus. On 24-7-1979 Smt. Shiv Piari, who is the respondent 3 in the tenure-holder's writ petition No. 1969 of 1981 and who, as already stated above, is the petitioner in the connected writ petition No. 5039 of 1981, moved an application seeking a review of the order dated 7-5-1979 whereby the State's review application had been earlier allowed by the appellate court. Annexure 4 of the tenure-holder's writ petition No. 1969 of 1981, is a true copy of the said application dated 24-7-1979. The objections were filed to the said application dated 24-7-1979 by the tenure-holder on 22-2-1980 and a true copy of the said objection is Annexure 5 to the petition. The appellate court by its order dated 17-10-1980 allowed the said application dated 24-7-1979. A true copy of the said order dated 17-10-1980 is Annexure 6 to the tenure-holder's writ petition 1969 of 1981. The appellate court by its order dated 17-10-1980 allowed the said application dated 24-7-1979. A true copy of the said order dated 17-10-1980 is Annexure 6 to the tenure-holder's writ petition 1969 of 1981. It is this order which has been questioned in the two cross-petitions. Smt. Shiv Piari is not aggrieved with the main part of the order but the only grievance is that the appellate court should not have remanded the controversy to the Prescribed Authority and should have itself decided the controversy. The tenure-holder, however, in his writ petition 1969 of 1981 has contended that the aforesaid impugned order should not at all have been passed and the application dated 24-7-1979 made by Smt. Shiv Piari should have been rejected. 3. In support of the petitions, I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri R. K. Dwivedi learned counsel for the petitioner tenure-holder contended that the aforesaid sale-deed dated 2nd July, 1976 was a void document under S. 5(8) of the Act. He further contended that possession of the land of plot 138 had not been taken by the State. Lastly, he contended that under S. 12-A of the Act, the choice given by the tenure-holder was bound to be accepted and it was open to the tenure-holder to revise his choice in the facts and circumstances of the case. I have already stated above that earlier plot 138 had been given in choice by the tenure-holder but subsequently when the review application was made by the State, the land of plot 50 was given in choice by the tenure-holder. Lastly, Sri Dwivedi contended that as the sale deed was a void document, therefore, Smt. Shiv Piari transferee of the said document, could have no locus standi to have any say in the ceiling proceedings. 4. Sri B. Dixit, learned counsel for Smt. Shiv Piari, on the other hand, contended that possession had already been taken by the State on 26-7-1977 and in view of such possession having been taken on the said date, in view of the provisions of S. 14 of the Act, the land whose possession had been taken, vested in the State and it was not open to the State to take any other land of the tenure-holder as surplus land. He contended that on the basis of the case law of this Court, it is well established that the tenure-holder can revise his choice till the stage as the tenure-holder continues to have title in the land declared as surplus. If the land has been taken possession of by the State under S. 14(1) of the Act, then as S. 14(3) of the Act stands at present, the rights of the tenure-holder in the surplus land taken possession of, stand extinguished with effect from the date of the taking over possession. In this view of the matter. Sri Dixit contended that as the land of plot 138 had been taken possession of by the State on 26-7-1977, therefore, with effect from the said date, the said land stood vested in the State and it was not open to the State to give up the possession of the said land and pray that the land of some other plot of the tenure-holder be declared as surplus. The learned counsel for Smt. Shiv Piari further submitted that equities in the case were such that no interference should have been made in favour of the tenure-holder. He was seeking to give the land of plot 50 as surplus instead of the land of plot 138 which he had given in surplus at the earlier stage. The learned counsel next contended that S. 5(8) should be interpreted in its context and background. Its real aim was to prevent the State being put to injury on account of transfers during the pendency of the ceiling proceedings. Therefore, the void ness of the document is with reference to the ceiling proceedings. As between the parties to the document it should not be treated to be bad or ineffective. The learned counsel further contended that on a true interpretation of S. 5(8) of the Act, the ceiling proceedings should be deemed to have concluded when the appellate order was passed on 6-12-1975. The subsequent ceiling proceedings, according to the learned counsel, were not initiated by the issuance of a notice under S. 10(2) of the Act. They were proceedings under S. 31(3), U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976, (U. P. Act No. 20 of 1976). The learned counsel submitted that the first ceiling proceedings should not be treated as nonest and they continued to remain effective. They were proceedings under S. 31(3), U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1976, (U. P. Act No. 20 of 1976). The learned counsel submitted that the first ceiling proceedings should not be treated as nonest and they continued to remain effective. According to the learned counsel S. 5(8) of the Act should not be held to be applicable to the subsequent proceedings which are taken in pursuance of S. 31(3) of the aforesaid U.P. Amendment Act No. 20 of 1976. The learned counsel made a reference to Sections 31(4) and 31(5) of the aforesaid U.P. Amendment Act No. 20 of 1976. He made a reference to my own decision reported in Hakim Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 All 426 and the following other cases : (1) Horam Singh v. District Judge Moradabad, 1979 All LJ 85, (2) Smt. Srila Moitra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1981 Calcutta 126, (3) Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 852 . It was further submitted that the review application moved by the State was belated and should not have been allowed. I have considered the aforesaid rival contentions. In my view, the petition of the tenure-holder should succeed and the cross-petition of Smt. Shiv Piari should be dismissed. The State's case was that plot 138 did not belong to the tenure-holder. It really belonged to his son Ravindra Kumar and stood recorded in the latter's name. This plot was not included in the statement under S. 10(2) of the Act when the notice was issued to the tenure-holder in the earlier ceiling proceedings. Due to some inadvertence it was treated as the land of the tenure-holder and when this mistake was detected the State moved the review application on the ground that the land of another tenure-holder could not be given in surplus by a tenure-holder. The tenure-holder could give in surplus his own land and not the land of any other tenure-holder. It did not matter at all that the other tenure-holder happened to be the son. It should be emphasised that it has never been the case that the son was a mere benamidar of the father. If that case had been taken before the ceiling authority, then the position might have been different. It did not matter at all that the other tenure-holder happened to be the son. It should be emphasised that it has never been the case that the son was a mere benamidar of the father. If that case had been taken before the ceiling authority, then the position might have been different. But before me Sri Dixit took the stand on behalf of Smt. Shiv Piari that plot 138 was really included in the ceiling statements which had been issued to the tenure-holder in the earlier ceiling proceedings and the State's case that it was not so included was erroneous. The State filed the counter-affidavit of Sri Ram, Lakhan Singh, the Naib Tahsildar concerned, in the writ petition of Smt. Shiv Piari (Petition 5039 of 1981) and in pars 3 thereof it was stated as follows : "It is also true that Hari Bilash had given plot 138 in his option as the land to be taken as surplus. The said plot was entered in the name of Ravindra Kumar alias Ravindra Babu, the husband of the petitioner and it was not included in the ceiling statement of Hari Bilash. The averments to the contrary made in the writ petition are incorrect. A true copy of Form C.L.H. 3 dated 18-4-74 is filed herewith as Annexure C.A. `1'. It was not open to Hari Bilash to give plot 138 in his choice to be declared as surplus. A true copy of the report of the Naib Tahsildar Ceiling dated 17-11-80 is also filed herewith as Annexure C.A. 'II' to show that plot 138 area 434 acres did not belong to Hari Bilash. It appears that Hari Bilash intentionally frauded the court by giving plot 138 which did not belong to him in his choice of the land to be declared as surplus. Rest of the averments being matters of record need no comments. It appears that Hari Bilash intentionally frauded the court by giving plot 138 which did not belong to him in his choice of the land to be declared as surplus. Rest of the averments being matters of record need no comments. It may, however, be stated that plot 138 was not included in the ceiling statement of Hari Bilash the question of any objection by Hari Bilash in respect of plot 138 being filed, did not arise." In para 4 of the said counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it is further stated as under : "That in reply to the contents of paras 11 and 12 of the writ petition, it is stated that the application for review was moved on the discovery of the fact that plot 138 was although not included in the ceiling statement of Hari Bilash, yet it was given in the choice of Hari Bilash as the plot to be declared as surplus." The said categorical statement was contested in the rejoinder affidavit by Smt. Shiv Piari. She took the stand that the plot 138 had really been included in the ceiling statement relating to the tenure-holder. However, no attempt was made to show that a true copy of C.L.H. Form 3 which had been Annexure C.A.I., was not a correct copy. Admittedly, in the said statement plot 138 is nowhere to be found. It was open to Smt. Shiv Piari to have obtained a certified copy of the aforesaid public document to show that the said plot 138 had been included in the holding of the tenure-holder. Instead of filing the relevant certified copies of C.L.H. Form 3, in the rejoinder affidavit Smt. Shiv Piari merely asserted that the original record should be sent for. In my view, there is no necessity to send for the original record and if the statement made on behalf of the State in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Ram Lakhan Singh was sought to 6e proved as incorrect, it could have been done by Smt. Shiv Piari by getting the certified copy of the C.L.H. Form 3 from the Ceiling Office. Therefore, I have no manner of doubt that the statement which was made on behalf of the State that plot 138 did not stand included in the ceiling statement, which was issued to the tenure-holder in the earlier ceiling proceedings, is correct. 5. Therefore, I have no manner of doubt that the statement which was made on behalf of the State that plot 138 did not stand included in the ceiling statement, which was issued to the tenure-holder in the earlier ceiling proceedings, is correct. 5. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, the controversy is capable of being disposed of without entering into the merits of the various contentions which Sri Dixit has raised. It is obvious that a tenure-holder can give in choice only his own land to be declared as surplus land. He has no right in law to give somebody else's land as surplus land. Irrespective of whether possession had or had not been taken of plot 138, it was open to the State to approach the ceiling authorities and to say that as the tenure-holder had no rights and title in plot 138 inasmuch as the latter plot belonged to some other tenure-holder, therefore, the said plot could not be declared as surplus land by the said tenure-holder. Even if the possession of the said plot had been taken by the State, the position would not change. The rights of a tenure-holder in the surplus land would stand extinguished under S. 14 of the Act only when such land has been determined to be the land of the tenure-holder. Such land may be the land which stands recorded in his own name or it may be some other land which is held to belong to the tenure-holder even though held benami in the names of others. Under the special provisions of the Ceiling Act, the lands of the wife and of certain minor children will also be included in the holding of a tenure-holder. Admittedly, we are not concerned with only such contingency provided under the ceiling law. It is a case where someone else's land, which was not even included in the ceiling statement issued to the tenure holder, was declared as his surplus land. This course was not contemplated in law. I may further mention that SRi B. Dixit in support of his contention that plot 138 had really been included in the ceiling statement issued to the tenure-holder placed before me the discussion in the orders passed by the prescribed authority and by the appellate court. It is true that in these orders plot 138 was being treated as that of the tenure-holder. It is true that in these orders plot 138 was being treated as that of the tenure-holder. However, in view of very categorical case taken by the State that the said treatment was under an erroneous impression and that the mistake was subsequently discovered and further, in the face of the true copy of the C.L.H. Form 3, which has been placed before me and which has not been satisfactorily controverted from the side of Smt. Shiv Piari, I hold that the stand which the State took is a correct stated. When the State discovered the mistake, the review application was made. The land of plot 138 could never vest in the State because it was not treated as the land of the tenure-holder in the ceiling proceedings. It was the land belonging to Ravindra Kumar and he was in no way bound by the ceiling proceedings, which were taken against his father namely, the tenure-holder. It is no body's case that Ravindra Kumar happened to be minor at the relevant time. Obviously, he was an adult and a tenure-holder in his own right. His land could not be given in choice by his father and accordingly the appellate court was right in allowing the review application because every authority and court has always inherent powers to correct its own mistake or error caused due to inadvertence. The appellate court did not have any power to pass the impugned order dated 17-10-1980 recalling its earlier order passed on the review application. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order passed on the review application on 7-5-1979 was the correct order and it was wrongly set aside by the impugned order dated 17-10-1980. 6. In the view which I have taken above, it is really not necessary to examine the other contentions which the learned counsel for the parties raised before me. However, since long submissions were made from both the sides, I should like to express my opinion on the said contentions. I have not been impressed with the contention of Sri B. Dixit that S. 5(8) of the Act will not be applicable to the sale deed in question. I also do not think that he is correct that while the document is void so far as the ceiling authorities are concerned, it is good and effective as between the transferor and the transferee. I also do not think that he is correct that while the document is void so far as the ceiling authorities are concerned, it is good and effective as between the transferor and the transferee. This contention in my view is wholly devoid of merit. When in S. 5(8) of the Act, the legislature has laid down that the document will be void and when an imperative direction is given in the said provision that no tenure-holder shall transfer any land held by him during the continuance of the proceedings for determination of the surplus land, it is clear to me that it is a case where the entire transaction is a complete nullity. The language of sub-s. (8) of S. 5 of the Act is in striking contrast with the language of S. 5(6) of the Act where the legislative injunction is that the document executed after 24-1-1971 would be ignored and not taken into account. If these two sub-sections of S. 5 of the Act are read along with S. 12-A of the Act, the position becomes absolutely clear. In S. 12-A it is laid down that the choice of the tenure-holder shall, as far as possible, be accepted. However, cl. (d) of the proviso lays down that as far as possible, the land which is covered by a transfer deed ignored under S. 5(6) of the Act, shall not be taken as surplus land. In other words, the clear legislative anxiety is that, as far as possible, the transaction under S. 5(6) of the Act should subsist between the parties. However, cl. (d) does not make any such provision for a document under S. 5(8) of the Act because, under the said provision the document has to be treated as void. This clearly leads to the inference that the land which is the subject-matter of a void transaction can certainly be given in choice by the tenure-holler, and such choice, as far as possible, is bound to be accepted. If the legislature had any contrary intention then in cl. (d) while making a reference to transactions under S. 5(6), a reference could also be made to transactions under S. 5(8) of the Act. Therefore, I again repeat that, in my view, inasmuch as the transaction covered by S. 5(8) are declared to be nullities, it is open to the tenure-holder to give such land in surplus. (d) while making a reference to transactions under S. 5(6), a reference could also be made to transactions under S. 5(8) of the Act. Therefore, I again repeat that, in my view, inasmuch as the transaction covered by S. 5(8) are declared to be nullities, it is open to the tenure-holder to give such land in surplus. It is not necessary in this case to examine whether the transferee in such transactions will have any right to seek redress from the transferor, whether he can put a claim to any manner of equity or not, is not necessary to be decided The transaction being wholly void has no existence in the eye of law, and the land covered by such a transaction is free to be given in choice as surplus land by the tenure-holder. 7. I have also not been impressed by the contention of the learned counsel for Smt. Shiv Piari that S. 5(8) is not applicable to the proceedings which took place under S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976, (U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1976). It should be seen that there is no provision for any notice under S. 31(3) of the Act. It lays down that the redetermination of the surplus land has to be done in accordance with the principal Act as amended by the said amendment Act. It is obvious that in view of the said provision, before seeking to redetermine the surplus land of a tenure-holder, the notice under S. 10(2) is to be issued to the tenure-holder. No fresh notice under S. 9(2) is required because the same is a general notice and had to be issued soon after the enforcement of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 1972. The said general notice will hold good for all the subsequent ceiling proceedings including the fresh proceedings which have to be initiated for redetermination on account of certain amendment in the ceiling law. Indeed, it has not been argued before me that any fresh notice under S. 9(2) was required. In this connection. I make a reference to my own judgment in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1980 All LJ NOC 137 which I understand, has been affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court. Indeed, it has not been argued before me that any fresh notice under S. 9(2) was required. In this connection. I make a reference to my own judgment in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1980 All LJ NOC 137 which I understand, has been affirmed in appeal by the Supreme Court. I should further like to say that it was never the case of Smt. Shiv Piari that the subsequent proceedings, which were initiated by the notice dated 22-4-1976, were not initiated by a notice under section 10(2) of the Act but by a notice under S. 31(3) of the Amending Act. Such a case is not there even in her writ petition. As the notice under S. 10(2) was issued on 22-4-1976 and the Prescribed Authority after dealing with the objections of the tenure-holder passed his order on 17th September 1976, the sale deed which was executed on 2nd July, 1976 is clearly hit by S. 5(8) of the Act. It is an untenable contention that S. 5(8) will apply only to the first ceiling proceedings and will not take in the sale deed which is executed during the pendency of subsequent ceiling proceedings which has become necessitated on account of the amendment in the ceiling law. The purpose, which is sought to be achieved by S. 5(8) will stand frustrated if the aforesaid interpretations were accepted. I agree with Sri B. Dixit that the earlier ceiling proceedings could not be treated as non est in the facts of the instant case. He has placed reliance on my own reported decision, in AIR 1981 All 426 , Hakim Khan v. State of U.P. where I distinguished the Division Bench pronouncement in Balwant v. State of U.P., 1980 All LJ 775. In my view, since no fresh notice has to be issued under S. 9(2) in the subsequent ceiling proceedings, the general notice already issued under S. 9(2) of the Act in the earlier ceiling proceeding continues to remain effective even with reference to the subsequent ceiling proceedings, therefore, the Explanation to S. 8(8) will take in the subsequent ceiling proceedings also which are only proceedings meant to bring in some additional land as surplus land in view of the changes in the ceiling law brought about by the Amending Acts. They can be, in a way and broadly speaking, taken to be the continuation of the earlier proceedings and this is one reason why the findings recorded in the earlier ceiling proceedings are not allowed to be reopened in the subsequent ceiling proceedings. In my view, therefore, S. 5(8) of the Act was applicable to the sale deed in question. On the question of possession of plot 138, I have felt that I should not record any categorical finding. The parties have taken inconsistent stands from time to time. The controversy about possession in the ceiling proceedings always a ticklish controversy and while on the one hand it has been contended that at one time the tenure-holder Har Bilash had taken the stand that the possession of the land of plot 138 had been taken by the State, it has been pointed out by the other side that Smt. Shiv Piari herself did not take up any such stand in her application dated 24-7-1979 whereby she sought the review of the earlier order dated 7-5-1979 whereby the appellate court allowed the State's review application. In the said application dated 24th July, 1979 she did not assert that the possession of the land of plot 138 had already been taken by the State and, on the other hand, she stated that the tenure-holder had sufficient other land from which the surplus land could be taken. In this state of affairs, it will not be correct to record any categorical finding on the question of possession but, as I have stated above, in view of the fact that the plot 138 did not belong to the tenure-holder, the question of possession has lost its significance. Even if the possession of the said plot had been obtained by the State, S. 14(3) of the Act did not apply as it was not the surplus land of the tenure-holder. 8. I am not impressed with the contention that the State's review application was belated. When the mistake was discovered, the State was entitled to bring it to the notice of the appellate court and have the appellate order corrected. 9. It is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the tenure-holder, being a party equally in the wrong as the transferee in entering into a void transaction a transaction prohibited by law, should or should not be granted any relief. 9. It is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the tenure-holder, being a party equally in the wrong as the transferee in entering into a void transaction a transaction prohibited by law, should or should not be granted any relief. It should be seen that basically the appellate court was moved by the State and the order was passed at the instance of the State and in its interest. At that stage the State rightly pointed out that plot 138 or any portion thereof could not be given in surplus by the tenure-holder who had no right therein. The State sought that some other land belonging to the tenure-holder should be taken as surplus. I have already held that in view of the legislative mandate as contained in S. 12-A read with Sections 5(6) and 5(8) of the Act, it was open to the tenure-holder to say that the land of plot 50 should be taken as surplus. This choice could not be denied to him on the ground that he was a party to the transaction, which was nullity in law, because the legislative intention is clear, as I have spelled out above, that the land of such void transaction can be given in choice as surplus land by the tenure-holder. This aspect of the matter has already been discussed above. 10. I have not been persuaded that the tenure-holder on account of his conduct or on account of any other circumstances, should not be granted relief in his petition. He is only seeking that the earlier order passed by the appellate court while allowing the review sought by the State, should be allowed to remain intact and the subsequent order passed by the appellate court setting aside the earlier order should be quashed. In my view, the relief which the tenure-holder is seeking to get in the said manner should be allowed to him because the impugned order passed by the appellate court should be set aside and the earlier order dated 7-5-1979 passed in the review proceedings should be restored for the same was warranted by the central position that some land not belonging to the tenure-holder had been declared as surplus which in law could not be done. 11. Both the petitions are accordingly disposed of in this manner. 11. Both the petitions are accordingly disposed of in this manner. The tenure holder's Writ Petition 1969 of 1981, Har Bilash Misra v. Civil Judge is hereby allowed and the order dated 17-10-1980 (Annexure 6) is hereby quashed. The order dated 7-5-79 is directed to be treated as a good and binding order. The Writ Petition 5039 of 1981, Smt. Shiv Piari v. Civil Judge is hereby dismissed. 12. There will be no order as to costs.