JUDGMENT N. N. Sharma, J. - This appeal is directed against an order dated 8-7-1974 by Sri. P. N. Roy, IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Allahabad who dismissed Civil Appeal No. 56 of 1970 arising out of Original Suit No. 403 of 1965 by the impugned judgment and decree. 2. Jugdamba Prasad whose heirs are respondents Nos. 1 to 7 was employed as a teacher in Zila Parishad, Allahabad from 1928 up to 30-9-1965. The dispute related to his salary for the period in between 1-10-1962 and 30-9-1965. He filed Suit No. 403 of 1966 in the court of Munsif, Allahabad. Unfortunately date of institution of the suit is not available as the record of the Case has been burnt up and could not be reconstructed. Appeal was argued by learned counsel for the paries on the basis of judgments of the courts below. 3. The Suit was filed for recovery of Rs. 2600/- as arrears of salary for the aforesaid period, which remained unpaid despite service of notice on defendants. Interest pendente lite and further along with costs of the suit was also claimed. 4. Zila Parishad raised various points including point of limitation. 5. Learned Munsif repelled the contention of defendants and decreed the suit with proportionate costs for recovery of Rs. 2007.06 Paise. Rest of the claim was dismissed. 6. Zila Parishad filed an appeal which was dismissed by impugned judgment and decree. 7. The simple point which was pressed before me by Sri. Rajendra Kumar, learned Advocate for the appellant was about the plea of limitation. His contention was that the suit was not filed within six months of the accural of the cause of action and so was barred by limitation. It was not to be governed by general law of limitation made applicable to it by the courts below. 8. Rajendra Kumar, learned Advocate for the appellant was about the plea of limitation. His contention was that the suit was not filed within six months of the accural of the cause of action and so was barred by limitation. It was not to be governed by general law of limitation made applicable to it by the courts below. 8. In this connection reliance was placed upon S. 257 of Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam which is worded below : - "(1) No suit shall be instituted against a Parishad or a Kshettra Samiti, or against a member, officer, or servant of a Parishad or a Kshettra Samiti in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity until the expiration of 2 months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Parishad, or a Kshettra Samiti left at his office, and in the case oi a member, officer, or Samiti delivered to him or left at his office, or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode, of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been delivered or left. (2) If the Parishad or Kshettra Samiti, or a member, officer or servant, before Act is commenced, entered sufficient amends to the plaintiff the plaintiff shall not recover any sum in excess of the amount so entered and shall also pay all costs incurred by the defendant after such tender. (3) No action such as is described in sub sec. (1), shall, unless it is action for the recovery of moveable property or for a declaration of title thereof, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." 9. Thus the contention was that as nonpayment of salary was an official act of Zila Parishad so the suit must have been filed within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly based himself upon the stand as it AIR 1952 All 382 (FB) but gave up the stand as it was overruled by Zila Parishad v. Smt. Shanti Devi reported in AIR 1965 All (FB) 590. 11. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly based himself upon the stand as it AIR 1952 All 382 (FB) but gave up the stand as it was overruled by Zila Parishad v. Smt. Shanti Devi reported in AIR 1965 All (FB) 590. 11. He based himself on Sita Ram Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur, ( AIR 1958 SC 1036 ). It appears that in that case Sita Ram Goel appellant who was a municipal Overseer was dismissed by a resolution of the Municipal Board on 5-3-1951; the order of dismissal was communicated to him on 19-3-1951. He appealed to Government against that order on 7-4-1951. The Government dismissed his appeal on 7-4-1952 and its order was communicated to plaintiff on 8-4-1952 when he filed a suit for compensation for wrongful dismissal. It was held that the claim was barred by special rule of limitation as provided under S. 326 U. P. Municipalities Act (U. P. Act No. 2 of 1916) which laid down a period of six months for such omission. It was further pointed out that the language emploued in S. 326 of U. P. Municipalises Act was in pari materia (sic) with the provisions of S. 257 of Kshettra Samitis & Zila Parishad Adhiniyam. 12. It was also pointed, out that this authority was the law of land. In that case relief sought was for declaration against wroungful dismissal and damages and arrears of salary, etc. 13. Learned advocate for respondents as well as appellate Judge has distinguished this ruling on the ground that the case did not relate to non-payment of wages but it was a claim against wrongful dismissal which was clearly an official act of Municipal Board. It was not an omission. The omission to do an act came up for consideration in Zila Parishad v. Smt. Shanti Devi reported in AIR 1965 All 590 (F B). That was a case by a contractor who filed an action for recovery of Rs. 800/- for the work done by aim under the Act. The Board contested the suit on the ground that it was not instituted within six months aforesaid and so it was barred by time according to S. 192. sub-cl. (3) of U.P. District Boards Act. 14. This contention of the Board was repelled by the Full Bench. 800/- for the work done by aim under the Act. The Board contested the suit on the ground that it was not instituted within six months aforesaid and so it was barred by time according to S. 192. sub-cl. (3) of U.P. District Boards Act. 14. This contention of the Board was repelled by the Full Bench. It was held at page 596:- "(18) AIR 1952 All 382 (F B) was a case which attracted the provisions of Section 326 of the Municipalities Act but the plaintiff was a municipal servant and the suit was for recovery of arrears of salary, Malik, C. J., and Bhargava and Brij Mohan Lall, JJ. held that the Board's omission to pay the salary was an act within the meaning of Section 4 (2) of the General Clauses Act and that it was done in the official capacity; payment of salary is an official act but with great respect to the learned Judges find it difficult to agree that non-payment of salary also is an official act or even an act. The former is an official act because there are provisions in the Municipalities Act (including the Rules) which require the Board to pay the salary and there is no provision in it requiring or permitting it not to pay it. An omission to do an act does not become official merely because the act, if done, could be official. Where one has to determine the capacity in which an act is done one has necessarily to consider the rights and the duties of the doer, if he is bound or expressly permitted to do a positive act he does it in the official capacity and similarly if he is prohibited from doing an act or permitted not to do it his omission to do it is an official act (if the omission can be said to come within the definition of ' act" in the General Clauses Act) but not otherwise. The learned Judges have not considered in this connection the above-mentioned decisions." In view of this authority find that omission to pay salary does not amount to an act done or purported to have been done by Zila Parishad in its official capacity. 15. It is also obvious that AIR 1958 SC 1036 is clearly distinguishable. 16. In Zila Parishad, Agra v. Dr. 15. It is also obvious that AIR 1958 SC 1036 is clearly distinguishable. 16. In Zila Parishad, Agra v. Dr. R. P. Singhal reported in 1981 All L J 573 a similar point arose. It was held that in such a case limitation to file a suit for arrears of salary would be governed by limitation of three years as provided for in Article 102 of Limitation Act and not by S. 257, sub-cl. (3) of the Adhiniyam which simply provided a time of six months from the date of accrual of cause of action. In that case a Medical Officer employed by Parishad had submitted his resignation which was accepted by Parishad; he filed a suit on 31-7-1967 for recovery of emoluments till 4-1-1966. It was observed at page 577 : " There was no question, therefore, of there being any adjudication of an act done by the Parishad being involved in the matter. Consequently the rule of limitation provided for in Section 257 of the Adhiniyam was not attracted. The view of the lower appellate court in this regard is not erroneous as canvassed by the counsel for the Parishad. The rule of limitation which would govern the instant case was rightly held to be one of three years provided for in Article 102 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Thus viewed, the plaintiffs suit could not be thrown out on the ground that it was barred by limitation." 17. No other point was argued before me. 18. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Impugned judgment and decree are affirmed.