JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the, petitioner challenges the validity of the appellate order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Bareilly, dismissing petitioners appeal against the assessment of the Circumstance and Property Tax by the Zila Parishad, Bareilly, for the years 1968-69 and 1969-70. 2. When the appeal came up for hearing before the additional Commissioner, learned counsel appearing for the Zila Parishad took following preliminary objection:- (1) That the appeal was barred by time ; and (2) That no deposit as required by Section 136 has been made. Both the preliminary objections raised by the counsel for the respondents prevailed and the Additional Commissioner vide his order dated 29th September, 1976, dismissed the appeal as incompetent. While passing the order the Additional Commissioner also made certain observations which go to show that in his opinion there was no merit in the appeal as well. 3. Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court for remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and contends that both the reasons given by the Additional Commissioner for dismissing the appeal are not tenable. So far as the question with regard to the appeal being barred by time is concerned, Section 136 of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam provides that no appeal shall be heard and determined unless it is brought within thirty days next after the date of the receipt of the notice of assessment order or alteration of assessment, or if no notice has been given within thirty days next after the date of the first demand under the assessment or alteration of assessment. It may be as claimed by the petitioner, that no notice of the assessment was given to it. However, in paragraph 3 of the petition it is admitted that a notice of demand was served upon him on 18th of December, 1974. Accordingly an appeal should have been filed within thirty days of the 1 8th of December, 1974. But then the petitioner filed the appeal only on 24th of June, 1975, much beyond the period of thirty days. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-contended that the said notice dated 18th of December, 1974, did not specify the year in respect of which the demand had been raised. No copy of the demand notice has been filed along with the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner-contended that the said notice dated 18th of December, 1974, did not specify the year in respect of which the demand had been raised. No copy of the demand notice has been filed along with the writ petition. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit it has been mentioned that the notice of demand specifically provided that the assessment of Rs. 2,000 was made for each year. There was, thus, no ambiguity about it. In our opinion the notice dated 18th December, 1974, sufficiently conveyed to the petitioner that for each of earlier assessment years it was being subjected to Circumstance and Property Tax at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per year and that demand was, accordingly, being raised against it. Merely because there was an omission to mention the year in the notice dated 18th of December, 1974 it does not mean that it ceased to be the first demand under the assessment for the years 1968-69 and 1969-70 and that the limitation for filing the appeal did not run from that date. The petitioner also had moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The appellate authority has pointed out that each days delay has not been explained and as such the petitioner was not entitled to have his appeal, filed about six months after the date of service of the notice of demand upon him, as being within time. 5. Section 136 (b) lays down that no appeal filed by an assessee shall be heard and determined unless where the amount claimed from the appellant is above twenty five rupees, half of that amount has been deposited by him in the office of the Zila Parishad. In the instant case admittedly the half of the amount was not deposited by the petitioner before the appeal was taken up for hearing. In the circumstances there was no option to the appellate authority but to refuse to hear the appeal on this ground as well. 6. In our opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any error of law which could justify this Court to interfere with the same in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. The interim stay order is discharged.