JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore and G.S. Tewari, Members - This is a review application against the Board's order dated 7-12-1978 by which the orders of the learned trial court dated 9-7-1970 and 11-9-1970 and the order of the learned Additional Commissioner dated 1-2-1972, were set aside, and after restoration of the suit, it was remanded for fresh hearing and decision. 2. We have heard the learned counsels for both the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the suit of the applicant plaintiff was decreed ex parte on 9-7-1970, the restoration application of Kiran Singh defendant was dismissed ex parte on 11-9-1970 and another application of Kiran Singh filed with an affidavit same day, that he was sitting outside the court and had gone to call his counsel when the case was called, was also dismissed the same day. In the first appeal against the order dated 11-9-1970, the learned Additional Commissioner considered the merits of the first order dated 11-9-1970 only and dismissed the appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the Member, Board of Revenue had exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with the finding of facts by the trial court (in the order dated 11-9-1970) that the cause shown was not sufficient. He further argued that the Member had restored the suit without calling the other party, he could only remand the case to the trial court for reconsidering restoration application and could not decide it himself. The learned counsel has cited rulings reported in A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1336 for the scope of the review application, A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 186, holding that an error of law can be demonstrated by a binding decision and such error can be a ground for review, and A.I.R. 1931 Alld. 294 (F.B.) to show that the court had no jurisdiction to restore unless the conditions mentioned in Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. existed. The last ruling is, in fact, in support of the revisional jurisdiction of the Board, since in the first appeal the learned Additional Commissioner had failed to exercise jurisdiction by not considering both the orders passed on 11-9-1970. The last ruling is, in fact, in support of the revisional jurisdiction of the Board, since in the first appeal the learned Additional Commissioner had failed to exercise jurisdiction by not considering both the orders passed on 11-9-1970. It is material that the trial court merely said that the cause was not sufficient and in spite of the fact that no counter-affidavit had been filed against the affidavit of Kiran Singh that he was sick for the past 3-4 months, was 80 years of age and infirm, was alone and had none else to help, the trial court obviously did not rely on this affidavit. It is again strange that the learned Additional Commissioner did not consider at all the other order of 11-9-1970 rejecting the restoration of the restoration order. There was an affidavit that Kiran Singh had gone to call his counsel and this uncontroverted affidavit was also deemed incorrect in the second order of 11-9-1970 without any reason. The learned counsel for the opposite party has cited ruling reported in 1980 R.D. 251 to show that an uncontroverted affidavit has to be relied upon. This is a settled view. The trial court had rejected the restoration application, without hearing the applicant and in the name of merit just saying that the cause was not sufficient. The Member, Board of Revenue found that both these orders of 11-9-1970 could not be sustained. The learned counsel for the applicant has not shown as to how this amounts to an error of law. In revision here, the matter of jurisdiction was under investigation and it is incorrect to call it interference with the finding of fact. There is no finding of fact as such by the learned trial court in the words, "Koi Makul Wajah Nahin Hai", since it was not based on any appraisal of evidence which consisted of affidavit of Kiran Singh alone, between the two parties. The only logical conclusion is that the learned Additional Commissioner had failed in the exercise of his jurisdiction in not considering all aspects of the first order passed on 11-9-1970 and not considering all the second order passed on 11-9-1970 and the Member, Board of Revenue has duly exercised jurisdiction and so no error apparent on the face of the record has been made out. In the circumstances discussed above, the rulings cited are not applicable. 5. In the circumstances discussed above, the rulings cited are not applicable. 5. Coming to the setting aside of the ex parte decree, it is wholly connected with the first order passed on 11-9-1970. When the order dated 11-9-1970 is set aside on consideration of certain circumstances and the same considerations warrant setting aside the ex parte decree, there is no reason to make a part decision only and leave the other part again to the trial court to decide. The evidence in the matter of restoration was very limited, consisting of affidavit of Kiran Singh alone. The fact of service is not disputed. When the decision about the cause not being sufficient is not upheld, the only decision left is that the cause was sufficient, taking duly in consideration that deficiency or lack of evidence of opportunity to produce evidence by any party has not been pleaded so far. When evidence on record indicate a clear decision, there can be no justification to postpone it and remand the case for decision by a lower court. 6. In view of the above considerations, we find that no error apparent on the face of the record has been made out in the order under review and the application is, accordingly, rejected.