JUDGMENT : I.C. Bhatt, J. This appeal has been filed by the widowed mother, widowed wife and four minor children of Dhulaji Dalaji, against the judgment and award dated September 7, 1979 in application (ESI) No. 10 of 1979 and the order dated March 28, 1980 in review application No. 2 of 1979 whereby the review application was dismissed. A few relevant facts are as under: 2. The original application (ESI) No. 10 of 1979 was filed by Dhulaji for setting aside the decision of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation' because the Corporation had rejected his application for commutation of his permanent disablement benefit and to grant him lumpsum amount as commuted value of the periodical payments and for a declaration that the decisions of the Medical Board and the Corporation are illegal, unjust and that the Applicant should be awarded a sum of Rs. 6,264/- against the opponent with 6% interest as commuted value, of the disablement benefit. Pending proceedings the original Applicant Dhulaji Dalaji died and the Appellants before me are the heirs. 3. Deceased Dhulaji was working in the Laxmi Cotton Mills in the year 1967 and he sustained employment injury in the year 1967. The injury was permanent and was assessed at 30 % disability and he was on that basis given permanent disablement benefit and that benefit was more than one rupee per day so he was not entitled to commuted value of permanent disablement benefit according to Regulation 76(B), of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as Regulations). However, some time in December 1977 Regulation 76-B was amended and the maximum ceiling for daily rate for becoming eligible for commuted value was fixed at Rs. 1.50. The said amendment was published in the Government of India Gazette dated December 17, 1977. In view of the amended Regulation 76-B Dhulaji was entitled to get his permanent disablement benefit commuted in lump sum and he was required to exercise option on or before June 16, 1978, i.e., within six months from December 1977-the date of publication of the Notification. But, Dhulaji made the application on July 26, 1978. Thus, the application was beyond the time prescribed and Dhulaji was not permitted to get the benefit of the amended Regulation 76-B of the Regulations. But, Dhulaji made the application on July 26, 1978. Thus, the application was beyond the time prescribed and Dhulaji was not permitted to get the benefit of the amended Regulation 76-B of the Regulations. But Dhulaji was referred to the Medical Board and was examined on 30.11.78 under Regulation 76-B(3). The Medical Board reported that Dhulaji had no normal life as he was suffering from pulmonary T.B. and in view of this Dhulaji was not entitled to commute the value' into lump sum of the periodical payments payable to him. Against the said decision Dhulaji had filed an application being Application (ESI) No. 10 of 1979 before the Employees' Insurance Court at Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the Insurance Court). That application, as stated above, was rejected by an order dated September 7, 1979. Thereafter Dhulaji filed Review Application No. 2/80 and the said application was also dismissed by an order dated March 28, 1980. Therefore, the heirs of the deceased Dhulaji has filed the present appeal against the aforesaid orders. 4. At the time of hearing of this appeal, the Appellants have filed Civil Application No. 2196/82 praying for the condonation of delay in making the original application dated 26.7.1978. This application is given to-day and the grounds that have been made out in this application for the condonation of delay are similar to those which were urged before the lower authorities. There is hardly delay of one month and 13 days and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the grounds for the condonation of the delay made out by the Appellants in this civil application, I think the delay should have been condoned. The grounds which were made out by the insured person were that he was an illiterate and would not know the provisions of the Act and Regulations and he was ignorant about the amendment in the Regulations. It was also urged that because of the letter dated 16.6.78 addressed to the insured person, the application was made and it was within the period of six months. In the present civil application it is mentioned that Dhulaji the insured person did not know anything about the amendment in Regulation 76-B which was published some time in December 1977. It was also urged that because of the letter dated 16.6.78 addressed to the insured person, the application was made and it was within the period of six months. In the present civil application it is mentioned that Dhulaji the insured person did not know anything about the amendment in Regulation 76-B which was published some time in December 1977. A Memo dated 3.3.1978 was issued by the Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, Ahmedabad to display it on the notice board giving information about the amendment with regard to the change in ceiling of permanent disablement benefit for the purpose of getting commuted value of same. Therefore, in view of all these facts it was submitted that the present civil application should be allowed and the delay in making the original application dated 26.7.1978 may be condoned. A specific ground is also made out in the Memo of present appeal at ground (1) that the High Court, in the interest of justice, should condone the delay and award the commuted value of the permanent disablement benefit of the deceased to the Appellants 5. The Workmen's Compensation Act, is a social legislation whereby the workmen and their dependants are being protected and compensated in cases of the accidents. The intention of the Act is to secure workmen and their dependants against becoming objects of charity by making reasonable compensation for all such calamities as are incidental to the employment. The Act is to be construed not in technical but popular sense, because the Act is so clearly remedial measure that the courts will be slow to cut down the remedy given to the workmen under the Act. The statute is made to protect the workmen and it should not be so interpreted so as to reduce or take away the protection which the legislature has thought fit to confer upon them. The Courts have to strike a balance and should not construe the provisions of the Act in such a way so as to defeat the rights of the workmen. The Act should be, as far as possible, interpreted with sympathetic leniency and should not be construed very strictly. The Courts have to strike a balance and should not construe the provisions of the Act in such a way so as to defeat the rights of the workmen. The Act should be, as far as possible, interpreted with sympathetic leniency and should not be construed very strictly. As can be seep, in the present case, the injured person was not given the benefit of amended Regulation 76-B. As per amended Regulation 76-B(2) if the insured person had made an application for his permanent disablement benefit to be commuted into lumpsum within six months of the date on which he could opt for a commutation as per the amended provision, the insured person was bound to get his permanent disablement benefit commuted into lumpsum, but as the insured person made the application late the provisions of Clause (3) of Regulation 76-B were made applicable by the Corporation and the insured person was required to appeal before the Medical Board where his application was not entertained mainly on the ground that it was very difficult to say which diagnosis of the two was correct and an opinion was expressed that the Applicant Dhulaji was not likely to live the normal life span. Therefore, he was not permitted to commute the permanent disablement benefit into lumpsum. If the application would not have been beyond the period of six months, he would have got the benefit of commutation into lump sum as per Regulation 76-B and would not have been required to go before the Medical Board. It is, therefore, clear that merely because the application was treated beyond the period of six months, the Applicant had to undergo all these difficulties and was compelled to go before the Medical Board and the Appellants were compelled to file this appeal before this Court. Apart from the Corporation having taken a view that his application was beyond six months, the Insurance Court could have taken a liberal view and could have condoned the delay in filing the application dated 26.7.1978 and the heirs of the deceased could have been saved from all these hardships and would not have been required to wait for nearly three years for the benefits to which the deceased was entitled to. The Corporation should have treated the application as if it was filed within a period of six months from the date on which the deceased could opt for commutation of periodical payments into a lumpsum in the facts and circumstances of the case. In any view of the matter, the Insurance Court should have condoned the delay as sufficient grounds were made out by the insured person. Merely because the illiterate insured person could not make the application within the prescribed period, the poor insured person and the present heirs of the deceased have to suffer all these difficulties. Considering all these aspects of the case, I allow the civil application for the condonation of delay after hearing both the parties and condone the delay in filing the original application which was made on 26.7.1978 to the Corporation. 6. I may observe that in the present case, the Corporation had taken too technical view of the matter and the Insurance Court should not have been so rigid and technical in rejecting the application (ESI) No. 10 of 1979 mainly on the ground of delay. The Corporation as well as the E.S.I. Court should have been liberal and should have treated the application of the insured person within six months when the insured person had shown sufficient reasons as stated earlier, for the delay in making the application and the delay was hardly of a period of one month and 13 days. It was not just and proper for the E.S.I. Court to take too technical and a rigid view of the matter. As can be seen from the record, the insured person was entitled to this benefit some time in June 1978 and therefore, practically for about four years this benefit has been denied to the insured person or his heirs. In the present case, there was really no justification to deny the permanent disablement benefit to the insured person, except the technical ground on which the insured person was required to appear before the Medical Board. 7. In view of this situation, this matter will have to be remanded because once the delay is condoned, the application dated 26.7.1978 would fall within the purview of Regulation 76-B(2) of the Regulations and therefore, the heirs of the deceased would be entitled to commutation of periodical payments into lump sum. 7. In view of this situation, this matter will have to be remanded because once the delay is condoned, the application dated 26.7.1978 would fall within the purview of Regulation 76-B(2) of the Regulations and therefore, the heirs of the deceased would be entitled to commutation of periodical payments into lump sum. The matter is, therefore, remanded to the Corporation, i.e., the present opponent for calculating this benefit under Regulation 76-B(2) of the Regulations. 8. The E.S.I. Court had considered the issue No. 1 to the effect that whether the order of the opponent Corporation directing the Applicant to present himself for examination by the medical referee for determination of average expectation of life for his age was illegal. This issue was raised on the basis that the opinion expressed showed two different diagnosis. However, in the present case now that question will not survive because the insured person had died some time in December 1979, that is within a period of about 1½ years and therefore, the opinion whether the insured person was likely to lead the normal span of life or not, would not be relevant in the present case. Therefore, this finding of the E.S.I. Court on issue Nos. 1 and 2 will have to be set aside. I am not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the said findings in view of the fact that the insured person died some time in December 1979 and the delay in filing the original application dated 26.7.1978 has been condoned by me. The finding of the Insurance Court in its judgment that the order of the Corporation directing Dhulaji to present himself for examination before the Medical Board for determination of average expectation of life for his age is set aside because once the original application is treated within time, Clause (3) of Regulation 76-B is not attracted but Clause (2) of the said regulation will be applicable in the present case. 9. Under the circumstances this appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the matter is remanded to the Corporation for commutation of the periodical payments of permanent disablement benefit into a lump sum and to make payment of the said lump sum amount with interest at the rate of 6 per cent p.a. from the date of the application till payment. 10. 10. In the present case the Appellants are the widowed mother, widowed wife and four children of deceased Dhulaji. I, therefore, direct the Corporation to invest the commuted amount awarded by it, in a Fixed Deposit Account in the names of Shantaben Dhulaji and the children of Dhulaji for a period of ten years in any nationalised bank. I further direct that the amount of costs and interest on the commuted amount, as directed above, be paid to Shantaben Dhulaji. The periodical interest on the Fixed Deposit Receipt should also be paid to Shantaben Dhulaji. 11. In view of the fact that the present proceedings have taken about more than four years, I direct the Corporation to finalise this matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within three months from today.