JUDGMENT 1. - The above special appeals under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 are directed against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 31-7-1981. 2. The respondents in the above cases were temporary lecturers in the University of Rajasthan appointed after 25-6-1975. In 1978 an Ordinance was promulgated by the Governor of Rajasthan known as the Rajasthan University (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordirance, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1978). This Ordirance provided for regularising the cases of those temporary lecturers who had been appointed on or before 25-6-1975 and were continuing as such on 12-6-1978. The Ordivance provided for screening of all such temporary lecturers in case they fulfilled the academic qualifications. After promulgation of this Ordinance, the University started the process of screening. The University authorities took the view that only those temporary lecturers. who were contiguously in Service before 25-6-1975 to 12-6-78 were only eligible to be screened under the Ordinance and if there was a break of one single day in between the aforesaid period, then such temporary lecturers would not be eligible. As there was a practice in the University to break the services of the temporary lecturers and not to allow them to work continuously, a large number of temporary lecturers were affected on this account. O.Y.K. Tiwari aggrieved against the above interpretation given by the University, filed a writ petition S.B. Civil Writ petition No. 446/78 in this Court, which ultimately came up for consideration and was decided by one of us on 29-8-1978. In that case it was held that under the language used in clause (3) of the Ordinance, all such temporary lecturers were eligible to be screened who were appointed on or before 25th June, 1975 and who were working in such capacity at the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12th June, 1978. The following direction was given in the above case:- "The result is that the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to declare the result of the petitioner as screened by their screening Committee under Clause (3) of the Ordinance No. 5 of 1978 and appoint him substantively in case he is found suitable by such screening Committee in accordance with the Rules. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case." As a result of the above decision, about 106 temporary lecturers working temporarily were screened and having been found suitable became permanent. The Ordinance was ultimately placed before the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and a bill was introduced, which, after undergoing some amendments became the Act of 1979 and is known as Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1979). This act received the assent of the Governor on 17-4-1979 and was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 18-4-1979. The Act gave second opportunity to those temporary lecturers who were rejected after screening under the Ordinance of 1978. It was also provided in the Act that the entire process of screening and appointments which was to be completed by 31-8-1978 under the Ordinance, was allowed to be extended upto 31-8-1979, under the Act. It would be appropriate to mention at this stage that an Act known as the Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers Special Conditions of Service) Act (No. 18) 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 18 of 1974) was already in force for making regular selection of teachers and officers in the University. It appears that as regular selections could not be made by the University under the Act No. 18 of 1974 as such to provide for the absorption to temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan, the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 were brought into force. 3. The respondents were appointed as temporary lecturers after 25-6-1975, though working as such on 12-6-1978, were not found eligible to be screened under the Ordinance of 1978 as such they filed writ petitions in this Court challenging the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979. It may be mentioned that in the mean time posts were advertised for the appointment of lecturers in various faculties and interviews were held some time in July, 1979 for making regular appointments under the Act No. 18 of 1974. The respondents though appeared before the Selection Committee but were rot selected and some other persons were selected and appointed substantively and are working on such posts. The respondents though appeared before the Selection Committee but were rot selected and some other persons were selected and appointed substantively and are working on such posts. The case now put forward by the respondents in the present writ petitions was that the fixing of date 25-6-75 in the Ordinance of 1978 as well as the Act of 1979, was arbitrary as such it should be struck down and the respondents should also be allowed to be screened under the provisions of of 1978 and Act of 1979. It would be profitable to quote clause (3) of the Act of 1979 as the entire controversy rests on the validity and fixing Ordinance day of June, 1975 in the aforesaid clause : "Substantive appointment of Temporary Lecturers:- All lecturers as were a All temporary June, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) the Universitie Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) shall be considered by the University concerned for their absorption and substantive appointment on the recommendation of the screening Committee constituted under Section 4 or Section 5, as the case may be subject to their fulfilling the conditions of eligibility including minimum qualifications prescribed by the University concerned under the relevant law as applicable on the respective dates of their temporary appointments and subject also to the availability of substantive vacancies of lecturers in the department concerned." Clause (5) and (6) are the other provisions of the Act of 1979, which are relevant for the purposes of determining the controversy, are reproduced as under:- Clause 5. "Re-Screening (I) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section or any other provision of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978. (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978), the services of temporary lecturer, who was considered for substantive appointment by a Screening Committee but was not found suitable, shall be deemed not to have terminated and he shall continue to be a temporary lecturer till he is again considered for substantive appointment under Section 3 after his re-screening under Sub-Section (2) of this Section. (2) A temporary lecturer who was considered for substantive appointment by the Screening Committee referred to in Section 4, but was not found suitable shall be again considered by the Screening committee reconstituted in the same manner as is provided in that Section." Clause 6 "Appointment to be under the Act No. 18 of 1974 -The lecturers appointed to the substantive provisions of the Rajasthan Universities in pursuance of the Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) or of this Act shall be deemed to have been appointed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 (Act No. 18 of 1974)" 4. Learned Single Judge while considering the question whether fixing of 25-6-1975 was arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, enquired from the learned Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the State to defend the validity of the Ordinance and the Act and also from the learned counsel of the University of Rajasthan as to what prompted the fixing of the date as 25-6-1975. Learned Single Judge thereafter observed as under:- "the learned Advocate General submitted that it was at the instance of the Rajasthan University, and its Vice Chancellor. The Standing counsel for the University initially took the stand that so far as the University is concerned, it never suggested the above date of 25-6-1975 and he has got no reason to justify the fixing of this date. However, when the Secretariat file was summoned by the court and perused, it was revealed to the great surprise of the Standing counsel of the University that the date was fixed precisely on account of the suggestion of the Vice Chancellor of the University. The record submitted before this court for perusal, clearly shows that when the Vice Chancellor sent letter dated 30-1-1978 (contained at page 54 of the file No. F. 3 (28) Edu/C/Gr. 111/77 subject-Education Gr. The record submitted before this court for perusal, clearly shows that when the Vice Chancellor sent letter dated 30-1-1978 (contained at page 54 of the file No. F. 3 (28) Edu/C/Gr. 111/77 subject-Education Gr. 111), which contained the following suggestion : (d) "It is proposed that all the temporary lecturers appointed of or before 25-6-75 be screened by a Screening Committee appointed by the University concerned and on the recommendation of Screening Committee they be absorbed subject of course to the availability of the vacancies in the department and the candidate fulfilling the prescribed qualifications, 25th day of June, 1975 has been suggested as crucial date taking into account the fact that we could take care of all appointments made before the national emergency which was clamped with effect from 26-6-75. Learned Single Judge also referred to the reply of the University in para No. 21, sub-clause (1) and further sub-clauses (I) and (2). Learned Single Judge then took the view that the classification based on pre-emergency and post emergency in the educational field in the matter of giving benefit of a scheme of regularisation of temporary teachers has got no nexus whatsoever with the objects of the Ordinance. While dealing with this question the learned Single Judge also observed that "I am impressed by submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the discrimination against post emergency teachers, appears to be a "brain child" of a few Vice Chancellors, who in 1978 were having the anti-emergency State Government and seemingly thought that the `appointees of emergency' period were "blue eyed boys" of emergency bosses and should be penalised by a mass "sack". The mass sacking of emergency appointees, is worst type of arbitrariness and it is outrageous and borders on "malafides. As watch dogs of the Constitution, this Court cannot allow laws co templating "mass sacking" of employees on grounds of change of ruling party, as long as Articles 14 and 16, continues to have pride place in Part III for this Court, it is irrelevant whether emergency was clamped by one party or the other and whether it was hailed or condemned." 5. We have quoted above passages from the judgment of the learned Single Judges, as Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the University has raised serious objections with regard to the above observations made by the learned Single Judge. We have quoted above passages from the judgment of the learned Single Judges, as Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the University has raised serious objections with regard to the above observations made by the learned Single Judge. In this regard, it is contended by Mr. Mehta that no such objection was raised in the writ petition and the learned Single Judge was not justified in making such observations without giving an opportunity to the University to submit any explanation in this regard. It is submitted that if the University had been given an opportunity it would have explained various administrative reasons for not convening the meetings of the Selection Committee. Learned Single Judge also observed as under:- "The Ordinance was published on 12-6-78 and if the Statement of objects and reasons is to be taken as correct, I have no reason to disbelieve the correctness of it, the object was that the appointments upto about ten years were to be regularised. It is not only surprising but almost shocking as to how these ten years were computed to exclude those teachers who were appointed after 25-6-75 and before 12-6-78. The rational and logical enactment to give effect to statements and objects would have been to include all those teachers who were appointed in the Universities after 12-6--68 and upto the date of 12-6-78 in case 10 years period was to be computed. It is not for me to say whether 10 years period was rational or not but even on the assumption that the object clause contained in the "statement of objects" and reasons was not justifiable, the logical and legal consequence would have been to compute 10 years from the date of commencement of the Ordinance, and in any case the day when it was being processed or approved by the cabinet or the Governor. Of course, a few months here and there would have been explained on the ground that the drafting was in process. It was thereafter held by the learned single Judge that on both the counts, namely, that the grouping of pre-emergency and post-emergency teachers separately is not based on any intelligible differentia and because this classification has got no rational nexus with the object of the Ordinance of 1978 or the Act of 1979, there was no hesitation in striking down and quashing the date fixed in the Act and the Ordinance as 25-6-1975. Learned Single Judge then considered the question whether offending portions should alone be struck down and the other provisions should be allowed to stay. In this regard the learned Single Judge observed as under : "On the basis of the above observations and the well known doctrine of Severability, the learned Advocate General has submitted that the Court should not strike down the entire Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979, but the only date 25th June 1975 should be struck down. Mr. Singhvi has prayed for striking down the entire Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979." 6. After considering various authorities in this regard the Doctrine of Severability was applied. The date 25th June 1975 was struck down from Section (3) of both the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 and the same was read down as under : "Sec. (3). Substantive appointment of temporary lecturers. All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Rajasthan Universities Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) shall be considered by the University concerned for their absorption and substantive appointment on the recommendations of Screening Committee constituted under Section 4 or Section 5, as the case may be subject to their fulfiling the conditions of eligibility including minimum qualifications prescribed by the University concerned under the relevant law as applicable on the respective dates of their temporary appointments and subject also to the availability of substantive vacancies of lecturers in the department concerned". The learned Single Judge then held that the result of all this would be, that all these lecturers, who were in employment of the University on the date of Commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 12th June, 1978, would become eligible for being considered by the Screening Committee irrespective of their date of appointment. This would cover the cases of the temporary lecturers, who were in employment on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance and that would be in consonance with the preamble and the statement of objects of the Legislation, which was to provide for the regularisation of the temporary lecturers, who were in service and were appointed earlier during the period of about 10 years. 7. 7. Learned Single Judge then considered another difficulty, which came in the way of formulating the relief, which was that in case this is done, then the period during which the Screening was to be completed by 31st August, 1979 under the Act of 1979 had already expired. Striking down the date 25th June, 1975 in Section 3, the legal and logical corollary was that the date of 31st August, 1978 in Sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance of 1978 and the same date 31st August, 1979 in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1979 are also struck down. Since these two dates were inseverable in Section 6 and 7, the Doctrine of severability cannot be applied and both the Sections 6 and 7 as a whole of the Ordinance of 1978 and Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1979 are struck down. The learned Single Judge finally observed that "Resultant position would be that all post emergency temporary lecturers of all Universities in Rajasthan will have a right to be considered by the Screening Committee under Section 3 and if they are found suitable they will be absorbed substantively and treated as substantive permanent lecturers under the Regular Act of 1974. The respondent University of Rajasthan should hold this Screening Committee within a period of six months after notifying the date and during that period the petitioners in this writ petition will have a right to be reinstated within a period of 15 days from today. The same principle would apply for the other Universities of Rajasthan." 8. The following direction was ultimately given in all the six writ petitions:- The net result of the above discussion is that all these six writ petitions succeed and they are accepted. It is held as under : 1. In section 3 of the Rajasthan University (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) and the University Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Act, 1979 (Act No. 7 of 1979), the date "25th June 1975", offends against the provisions of article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is consequently declared invalid, ultra vires and struck down. The remaining part of the above section would be read as under:- "(X) 3. The remaining part of the above section would be read as under:- "(X) 3. Substantive appointment of temporary lecturers-All temporary lecturers as were appointed as such and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Rajasthan Universities Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1978) shall be considered by the University concerned for their absorption and substantive appointment on the recommendations of the Screening Committee constituted under Section 4 or Section 5 as the conditions of eligibility including minimum qualifications prescribed by the University on the respective dates of their temporary appointment and subject also to the availability of substantive vacancies of lecturers in the department concerned." 2. As a legal and logical consequence of the above striking down Sections 6 & 7 of the Ordinance of 1978 and 7 & 8 of the Act of 1979 are declared invalid and struck down being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 3. The respondent, University of Rajasthan, is directed to reinstate all the petitioners on the posts which they were holding, i.e. Lecturers, within a period of fifteen days from today, and grant them all the consequential relief and benefits as if termination has not taken place in pursuance of the above provisions, which have been declared invalid and ultra-vires. 4. The respondent University of Rajasthan is further directed to convene a meeting of the Screening Committee within a period of six months from today and screen all the eligible Lecturers who were post emergency appointees but whose cases were not considered on account of the above provisions of law, which have been declared ultravires. After screening them, the University of Rajasthan should further appoint them as permanent Lecturers, if found suitable, under the regular Act of 1974 and while doing so give them all counsel quential benefit of seniority etc., as if the above invalid provisions of the Ordinance and the Act were not there. 5. All the six petitioners should further be given all consequential relief which may flow from the above directions. 6. Since the State of Rajasthan promulgated the impugned Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 at the instance, primarily of Vice Chancellor of University of Rajasthan, respondent, and made the untenable distinction of post emergency and pre-emergency, all the petitioners would get the costs of their petitions from the University of Rajasthan only. 6. Since the State of Rajasthan promulgated the impugned Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 at the instance, primarily of Vice Chancellor of University of Rajasthan, respondent, and made the untenable distinction of post emergency and pre-emergency, all the petitioners would get the costs of their petitions from the University of Rajasthan only. All the six writ petitions, are, therefore, accepted as indicated above." 9. The University of Rajasthan has filed all these six special appeals aggrieved against the above judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 31.7.1981. It may be mentioned that the State of Rajasthan has not filed any appeal challenging the decision of the learned Single Judge. It was contended by Mr. Mehta on behalf of University that the learned Single Judge misconstrued the objects and reasons given in the Ordinance of 1978. The primary object of the Ordinance was to provide for the absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan. The reference to the continuance of such appointment for the last 10 years was never meant for the purposes of screening the temporary lecturers from 12th June, 1968 to 12th June, 1978. What was intended by this reference was that the temporary teachers of long standing should be screened. It was also argued that the learned Single Judge wrongly drew conclusion that the date 25th June, 1975 was fixed to classify the temporary teachers of pre-emergency and post emergency groups. While interpreting a provision of the Act, it is the intention of the Legislation, which has to be found out, and not the view of the Vice Chancellor or any other Officer or authority who might have put a note to such bill. It is contended that the intention of fixing the date as 25-6-1975 should be spelled out from the reasons of the Ordinance alone and it was not proper to decide this question on the basis of any stand taken by the University or its counsel. Even if a wrong stand was taken by the University in its reply to the writ petitions to find out the reason of fixing the date as 25th June, 1975, the University is not precluded from taking a different stand to justify this date in an appeal before this Court. Even if a wrong stand was taken by the University in its reply to the writ petitions to find out the reason of fixing the date as 25th June, 1975, the University is not precluded from taking a different stand to justify this date in an appeal before this Court. It was also argued that even in the writ petitions no such case was set up that the date 25-6-1975 was fixed to classify the two groups of teachers as those of pre-emergency and post emergency. Reliance is placed on the following observations in (1) Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 . "Learned Counsel drew attention to the speeches made by several members of the Assembly on the floor of the House for explaining, as he put it, the "historical back-ground". A speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental processes lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord. The court could only search for the objective intent of the Legislature primarily in the words used in the enactment, aided by such historical material as reports of statutory committees, preambles, etc. I attach no importance, therefore, to the speeches made by some of the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of the debate on Article 15 (Now Article 21)." Gopalan's case (Supra 1) was followed in (2) State of Travencore Cochin v. Bombay Co. Limited, AIR 1952 SC 366 and it was held that the use made by the learned Judges of speeches made by the members of the Constituent Assembly in the course of debates on the draft constitution is unwarranted. These form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statute is not admissible has been generally accepted in England, and the same rule has been absolved in the construction of Indian statute. Reliance is also placed on (3) State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 . 10. Mr. These form of extrinsic aid to the interpretation of statute is not admissible has been generally accepted in England, and the same rule has been absolved in the construction of Indian statute. Reliance is also placed on (3) State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 . 10. Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the University in its reply to the writ petitions in para No. 21 (f) (ii) took the stand as follows: "That sub-clause (ii) of sub-para (f) of para No. 21 of the writ petition is mis-conceived. The emergency was imposed on 25-6-1975 and the legislature was fully competent to take into consideration the date on which the emergency was imposed and to enact law keeping in view the date". In view of the aforesaid stand taken by the University and the letter of the Vice Chancellor of Rajasthan University to the then Education Minister Rajasthan dated 30th January, 1978 in which 25th day of June, 1975 had been suggested as crucial date taking into account the fact that care could be taken of all appointments made before the national emergency which was clamped with effect from 26-6-1976. There hardly arise any question of taking a different stand by the University now in the appeals. It is also submitted that the State Government has not filed any appeal against the Judgment of the learned Single Judge and University is bound by its own pleadings and the stand taken before the learned Single Judge. It is also argued that the preamble of a statute may, no doubt, be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one meaning, but it can however be not used to eliminate as redundant or unintended, the operative provisions of a statute. Reliance in this regard is placed on (4) State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 . 11. Reliance in this regard is placed on (4) State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain, AIR 1965 SC 1296 . 11. It is also argued that according to the statement of objects and reasons of the Ordinance the main object of the Ordinance was that though in the Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions of Services) Act, 1974 specific provisions had been made for the selection of teachers and Officers in the Universities, but for one reason or the other, the regular Selection Committees in the Universities could not meet to hold regular selections before and after the commencement of the Act. Therefore, temporary appointments against such vacant posts were made by the Universities. Such appointments had been continuing in some cases for the last 10 years. With a view to solve this long standing problem, it was considered necessary to regularise the appointments through specially constituted screening committee. Mr. Mridul thus con tended that the main object of the Ordinance was to give benefit to all temporary lecturers in view of the fact that the University had not made selections under the Act No. 18 of 1974 and in these circumstances there was no rational basis for fixing the date of 25-6-1975. It was also submitted that in view of the decision given in V.K. Tiwari's case (supra) even temporary lecturers having, worked for 8 months only had become entitled to he screened under the Ordinance of 1978 and Act of 1979, but lecturers like respondents who had put in services as temporary lecturers for nearly two years have been deprived. To illustrate, Shri Jagmohan Sharma was in the University services from December 1973 to May, 1974 and then he left the University. He was again appointed in February, 1978 and was in service up to 15-6-78. Though there was a gap of 31/2, years in between, and he had hardly an experience of one year and four months, yet he became eligible. Similar were the cases of Dr. P.C. Triwedi, Dr. Rekha Kamal, Dr. Nagendra Bhardwaja, Dr. C.K. Raghuwanshi. Dr. (Mrs.) Suman Lata and many others. Though there was a gap of 31/2, years in between, and he had hardly an experience of one year and four months, yet he became eligible. Similar were the cases of Dr. P.C. Triwedi, Dr. Rekha Kamal, Dr. Nagendra Bhardwaja, Dr. C.K. Raghuwanshi. Dr. (Mrs.) Suman Lata and many others. These examples would show that some of the teachers who worked some where in 1973 or 1974 but they remained out of employment of the University for various terms ranging upto 3 years, were considered simply because they were given appointment in the service before the Ordinance of 1978 came into force and they became eligible for screening and rescreening, but in contrast of it the respondents, each of whom had about two years experience and who were in service of the University on the date of coming into force of the Ordinance of 1978 were declared ineligible and thrown out of consideration, merely because they were not appointed as such on or before 25th day of June, 1975. Y.K. Tiwari's case (supra) was decided on 30-8-78 and the Act of 1979 was passed by the Legislature and received the assent of the Governor on 17th day of April, 1979 aid as such the Legislature must be presumed to be aware of the view of this Court taken in Y.K. Tiwari's case. If the legislature which is deemed to be aware of the declarations of law by this court, did not alter the law, it must be deemed to have accepted the interpretation of this court, even though the correctness of it may be open to doubt. If doubts had arisen, it was for the legislature to clear those doubts. Reliance in this regard is placed on (5) Sakal Deen v. Union of India, 1974 (I) SLR 411 . 12. Mr. Mridul also argued that the University had not challenged Y.K. Tiwari's case it even acted on the basis of the interpretation given in the aforesaid case and gave appointments to 106 temporary lecturers and now cannot be permitted to retrieve the lost ground and take the stand that the intention in promulgating the Ordinance and the Act was to provide for the absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan. Reliance in this regard is placed on (6) Chief Secretary to the Govt. Reliance in this regard is placed on (6) Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. V. D. Cornelius, AIR 1981 SC 1099 . It was further submitted that once the object of the Ordinance is taken to be that the University did not perform its obligations from 1974 to 1978 to make selections under the Act No. 18 of 1974 all temporary lecturers working at the commencement of the Ordinance become entitled to be screened under the Ordinance of 1978. The date 25-6-75 loses all its force and has no rational nexus with the object of the Ordinance to be achieved. It is contended that if a date is fixed in an arbitrary mariner to make a distinction in between similar class of temporary lecturers then such date has to be struck-down. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following cases:- (7) D. R. Nim v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1301 ; (8) Brij Lal & ors. v. Raj. State Electricity Board, Jaipur; 1979 WLN (UC) 221 ; (9) Virendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1775 (1) (10) A. I. Zambre v. Kartar Krishna Shashtri, 1981 SCC (1) 561 Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the University contended that there cannot be any estoppel on a question of law. The legislature is not bound by any letter written by the Vice Chancellor and even though in the mind of the Vice Chancellor the date 25-6-75 might have been fixed keeping the distinction of pre- emergency and post emergency temporary lecturers, but it cannot be taken into consideration for finding out the intention of the legislature in fixing 25-6-75 as it date in the Ordinance and the Act. The real object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan as is clear from the preamble to the Act of 1979. The date 25-6-75 & 12-6-78 were fixed in order that the temporary lecturers of about 3 years standing or more could only become eligible to be screened and not all those temporary lecturers who might be working as such for a shorter period. The date 25-6-75 & 12-6-78 were fixed in order that the temporary lecturers of about 3 years standing or more could only become eligible to be screened and not all those temporary lecturers who might be working as such for a shorter period. It is contended that in the view taken by the learned Single Judge even such temporary lecturers who might have been appointed a month earlier to I2-6-78 would become eligible and this can never be the object and intention of the legislature in enacting the Act of 1979. It is also submitted that the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 were enacted as a stop gap arrangement, otherwise the Act No. 18 of 1974 is already there for making regular selections of teachers in all the Universities on permanent basis. All the respondents have already faced the selection Committees constituted under Section 4 of the Act No. 18 of 1974, in 1979, and have been rejected and thereafter they had no right or justification to file these writ petitions and get another opportunity of being screened by the Screening Committee under Section 4 of the Act. It is further submitted that a date can be fixed by the legislature and 25-6-75 fixed in the present case has a rational nexus with the object of absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing only. Reliance in this regard is placed on (11) Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 510 . It was a matter exclusively for the legislature to decide from what date law should be given operation and the propriety of such determination is not open to question in courts. Reliance is also placed on (12) Hathi Singh Manufacturing Co. v. the Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 923 , (13) Union of India v. P.M. Works AIR 1974 SC 2349 . In Union of India v. P.M. Works (13) it was observed that the choice of the date as a basis for classification could not always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is worth coming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. In Union of India v. P.M. Works (13) it was observed that the choice of the date as a basis for classification could not always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is worth coming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is only mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. Reliance is also placed on (14) D. G. Goose & Co. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 271 and (15) Shrimali Lal Kasliwal, v. Advocate General and others, AIR 1955 SC 166 . Reliance is also placed on the following observations in. (16) Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 591 :- "If there is a quality and uniformity within each group, the law will not be condemned as discriminative, though due to some for tuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment." 13. It was also argued by Mr. Mehta, Learned counsel for the University that the doctrine of severability has been wrongly applied by the learned Single Judge in this case. If the date 25-6-75 is struck down as done by the learned Single Judge, then the entire object of absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan falls to the ground and the remaining provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1979 cannot stand as read down by the learned Single Judge. Reliance is placed on the following principles deduced by their Lordships of the Supreme Court with regard to doctrine of severability in (17) R. M. D. C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628 : (g) Constitution of Indiz, Preamble, Articles 13 and 245 Doctrine of severability-Scope and extent of Rules for construction in applying doctrine summarised. When a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. When a statute is in part void, it will be enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of this rule whether invalidity of statute arises by reason of its subject matter being outside the competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions. Case law discussed. Certain rules of construction laid down by the American courts where the question of severability has been subject of consideration of numerous authorities, may be summarised as follows:- 1. In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid (vide Corpus Juris Secundum v. 82 P. 156; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, pp 176-177). 2. If the valid and invalid provisions are so in-extracably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate that after striking out what is invalid, what remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest has become unenforceable. (Vide Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vo. I at pp 360-361 Crawford on Statutory Construction, pp. 2 1 7-2 18). 3. Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and separate from those which are invalid. If they all form part of a single scheme as intended to be operative as a whole, then also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole. (Vide Crawford on Statutory Construction pp. 218-219) 4. Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are independent and do not form part of a scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, then also it will be rejected in its entirety. 5. 5. The severability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend on whether the law is enacted in the same section or different sections (vide Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1 pp 361-362), it is not the form but the substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be ascertained on examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein. 6. If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down as void, as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation, (Vide Sutherland on Statutory Construction Vol. 2 pp. 177-178). 7. In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to take into account and history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it (vide Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 2 pp 177-178). 14. It cannot be disputed that the University in its reply to the writ petitions had taken a clear stand to justify the date 25-6-75 on the basis of pre-emergency and post emergency temporary lecturers. The letter of the Vice Chancellor also clearly indicate that the date was fixed on this account. Had it been a matter resting within the power and authority of University alone, in that case the University was bound by its own pleading and conduct and the University could have been estopped to make any submission in the appeals. However, the main question is to strike down or not to strike down a law made by the Legislature on the vice of discrimination. In this regard the conduct or any stand taken by the University had no relevance. It is the intention of the Legislature which has to be found out while dealing with the question. The preamble to the Act of 1979 is a key to unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law. In this regard the conduct or any stand taken by the University had no relevance. It is the intention of the Legislature which has to be found out while dealing with the question. The preamble to the Act of 1979 is a key to unfold the intention of the legislature to make this law. It lays down-"an act to provide for the absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan." The objects and reasons of the Ordinance of 1978 also read as under:- "An Ordinance to provide for the absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan." "In the Rajasthan Universities Teachers and Officers (Special Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 (Rajasthan Act No. 18 of 1974) specific provisions have been made for the selection of teachers and officers in the Universities. But for one reason or the other, regular selection committees in the Universities should not meet to hold regular selections before and after the commencement of the Act. Therefore, temporary appointments against such vacant posts were made by the Universities. Such appointments have been continuing in some cases for the last ten years. With a view to solve this long standing problem, it was considered necessary to regularise the appointments through specially constituted Screening Committees. Since, the academic session was about to commence and since the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly was not in session and the Governor was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action, he made and promulgated the Rajasthan University Teachers (Absorption of Temporary Lecturers) Ordinance, 1978 on 8th day of June, 1978." This Ordinance was published and came into force on 12-6-1978. The main object of this legislation therefore, was that temporary lecturers of long standing that is appointed on or before 25-6-75 and working as such on 12-6-78 should be screened by screening committee constituted under the Ordinance and the Act, as regular Selection Committees in the Universities could not meet to hold regular selections before and after the commencement of the Act No. 18 of 1974. In Y.K. Tiwari's case the validity of fixing 25th June, 1975 was not challenged. In that case the question was the interpretation of the words and are continuing' used in clause (3) of the Ordinance. In Y.K. Tiwari's case the validity of fixing 25th June, 1975 was not challenged. In that case the question was the interpretation of the words and are continuing' used in clause (3) of the Ordinance. It was held in that case that in the English translation of this Ordinance in clause (3) the words used are `and are continuing'. This did not seem to be the correct translation of the Hindi version in this clause in which the language used was". HINDI MATTER 373461 15. In this view of the matter it was held that the petitioner Y.K. Tiwari was a temporary lecturer appointed before 25 June, 1975 and was also working as such on the date of commencement of this Ordinance i.e. 12th June, 1978, came within the purview of clause (3) of the Ordinance and was eligible for being considered by the Screening Committee. As the services of temporary lecturers were terminated by the Universities for some periods in between the view taken was that under the aforesaid clause (3) of the Ordinance, it was not necessary that a temporary lecturer should be working continuously for the entire period between 25th June, 1975 and 12-6-78. In the present appeals the respondents are those lecturers who were admittedly not appointed on or before 25th June, 1975, but working as such on 12th June, 1978. If the intention of the legislature in fixing 25-6-75 is taken to be on the basis of pre-emergency and post-emergency temporary lecturers, then there is no difficulty in agreeing with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. However, such intention cannot be spelled out from any of the provisions of the Ordinance and the Act or from the preamble or the statements of objects and reasons. It would, therefore, not be correct to strike down a piece of legislation made by a legislature on the ground which has no connection with the intention of the legislature. Even a speech made in the course of debate of a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. The court can only search for the objective intent of the legislature primarily in the words used in the enactment, aided by such historical material as reports of the statutory committees, preamble etc. The court can only search for the objective intent of the legislature primarily in the words used in the enactment, aided by such historical material as reports of the statutory committees, preamble etc. It has been laid down in West Bengal v. Union of India (3) that a statute, as passed by the Parliament is the expression of the corrective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual albeit a minister of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute. In the statement of objects and reasons to the Ordinance, it has further been made clear that for one reason or the other, regular selection Committees in the Universities could not meet to hold regular selections before and after the commencement of the Act, (Rajasthan Act No. 18 of 1974). Therefore temporary appointments against such vacant posts were made by the Universities. Such appointments had been continuing in some cases for the last 10 years. With a view to solve this long standing problem, it was considered necessary to regularise the appointments through specially constituted Screening Committees. It is thus clear that the intention of the Ordinance was to give benefits to the temporary lecturer of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan. It has come on record that initially it was proposed to cover the cases of temporary lecturers appointed on or before June, 1973 but on a representation made by the temporary lecturers the benefit was extended to those temporary lecturers who were appointed on or before 25-6-75. Such benefit to the temporary lecturers had to be fixed on or before a particular date and it cannot be said that 25-6-75 fixed in this case had no rational nexus with the object which was to give benefit of absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities. This covered the cases of such temporary lecturers who had been appointed near about 3 years before the coming into force of such Ordinance on 12-6-78. There is yet another aspect of the matter that if 25-6-75 is taken out, the result would be that every temporary lecturer even appointed a month before the coming into force of the Ordinance will become eligible for being screened under the Screening Committee constituted under the Ordinance and the Act. There is yet another aspect of the matter that if 25-6-75 is taken out, the result would be that every temporary lecturer even appointed a month before the coming into force of the Ordinance will become eligible for being screened under the Screening Committee constituted under the Ordinance and the Act. In that case there remains no question of enacting this legislation which only wanted to give benefit of absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing working in the Universities in Rajasthan. A regular Act namely the Rajasthan Universities (Teachers and Officers Special Conditions of Service) Act (No. 18 of 1974) is already there under which regular appointments are made on the recommendations of the selection Committee constituted u/s 4 of such Act. Any person duly qualified and eligible under the Rules including the temporary lecturers can appear and be selected under this Act. There cannot be two parallel Acts to cover the same field of legislation. All respondents have admittedly faced the selection committee constituted u/s 4 of the Act No. 18 of 1974 and have not been recommended for being appointed to the post of lecturers before filing of the writ petitions. The very object of the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 was to absorb temporary lecturers of long standing as the selection committees were not constituted under the Act No. 18 of 1974. The respondents have already appeared before such selection committees constituted u/s 4 of the Act No. 18 of 1974 and not selected and on this score also they cannot make any grievance. The main object of the Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 was to absorb temporary lecturers of long standing working in the various Universities in Rajasthan and if 25-6-75 is struck down then keeping 12-6-78 alone serves no purpose. Without fixing an earlier date to 12-6-78 the question of enacting this Ordinance of 1978 and the Act of 1979 does not arise. 16. Much emphasis was laid by Mr. Mridul that if Y.K. Tiwari's case (supra) is taken to be correct then it would cover even such temporary lecturers who might have taught for a much shorter period than the respondents in the present appeals. It might be true in some cases but on this ground alone the law cannot be invalidated. 16. Much emphasis was laid by Mr. Mridul that if Y.K. Tiwari's case (supra) is taken to be correct then it would cover even such temporary lecturers who might have taught for a much shorter period than the respondents in the present appeals. It might be true in some cases but on this ground alone the law cannot be invalidated. The criteria was not the period of experience of the temporary lecturers but it was a problem of temporary lecturers who had been working for a long period. The result of Y.K. Tiwari's case is that at-least a temporary lecturer must have worked on or before 25-6-75 and also working as such on 12-6-78. This means that atleast such lecturers had worked temporarily three years prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance and for want of selection committee constituted under the Act No. 18 of 1974, their cases were going in default for being appointed on a permanent basis. The University in that case was taking the stand that even though there was a gap of days in the services of temporary lecturers between 25-6-75 and 12-6-78, such lecturers would not get the benefit of being screened under the Ordinance. As the University was adopting such practice of terminating the service of temporary lecturers for a short period, the view taken was that it was not necessary within the meaning of clause (3) of the Ordinance of 1978 to have remained continuously in service from 25-6-75 to 12-6-78. Thus the aforesaid decision does not give any benefit to the respondents in the problem posed in these cases. 17. It is also pertinent to mention that persons have been selected by the selection Committees constituted u/s 4 of the Act No. 18 of 1974 in 1979 and the University has submitted that there are no posts lying vacant on which the respondents could now be appointed. Learned Single Judge has given a direction that after screening them the University of Rajasthan shall further appoint them as permanent lecturers if found suitable under the regular Act of 1974 and while doing so, give them all consequential benefits of seniority etc. as if he above invalid provision of the Ordinance and the Act were not there. Learned Single Judge has given a direction that after screening them the University of Rajasthan shall further appoint them as permanent lecturers if found suitable under the regular Act of 1974 and while doing so, give them all consequential benefits of seniority etc. as if he above invalid provision of the Ordinance and the Act were not there. Unless the posts are available it is difficult to give a direction to the University to make appointment of the respondents as permanent lecturers as already such posts Stave been filled up by giving appointments to the persons who have been selected on a regular basis by the Selection Committee under Act No. 18 of 1974, which according to us is the main Act for the purpose of making regular substantive appointments of teachers in the Universities. 18. In the result, these special appeals are allowed, the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 31-7-1981 is set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout. *******