JUDGMENT R.S. Verma, Member - The main question before this Full Bench is whether in a case. viz., under Section 122-C. U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, in which revision under Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, is barred, a revision can still be filed with the help of Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act? An allied question is whether Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is a supplemental provision regarding revision and recourse to it can be taken in case Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, is not applicable? A further connected question is whether the use of the word 'propriety' in Section 333-A. U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, is intended to widen the scone of the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue while exercising revisional jurisdiction? 2. Before an attempt is made to answer these questions, it would be relevant to give the brief facts of the case in order to supply the context in which these questions, have been raised before this Bench. In a case under Section 122-C, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act pending in the court of Additional Collector, Gorakhpur, an order against Sewal (revisionist) was passed on January 21, 1982. Sewak filed a revision against that order in the court of the Additional Commissioner, Gorakhpur, but that revision was held to be not maintainable and it was dismissed on February 9, 1982. 3. Section 122-C, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, provides for allotment of Abadi sites to members of Scheduled castes, Scheduled Tribes, agricultural labourers and village artisans. Sub-section (6) of this section empowers the Collector to make enquiry into such allotment and, in case of irregularity in the allotment, to cancel it. Sub-section (7) of Section 122-C, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, lays down that the order of the Collector passed under sub-section (6) will be final, and the provisions of Section 333 (U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act) shall not apply in relation thereto. Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act provides for revisions against the orders of subordinate revenue courts. The learned Additional Commissioner was of the view that Section 122-C(7), U.P. L.A. and L.R. Act, barred revision against the order of the Collector passed under Section 122 C(6), U.P. Z.A and L.R. Act and so he held that the revision was not maintainable. 4. The revisionist (Sewak) was not satisfied by the order of the learned Additional Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner was of the view that Section 122-C(7), U.P. L.A. and L.R. Act, barred revision against the order of the Collector passed under Section 122 C(6), U.P. Z.A and L.R. Act and so he held that the revision was not maintainable. 4. The revisionist (Sewak) was not satisfied by the order of the learned Additional Commissioner. He filed a revision a this Board and it came before one of us (Kaushal Kishore, Member). It was argued before him that there was bar against revision under Section 333. U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, but there was no bar to an application under Section 333 A. U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, which was a separate and distinct provision for revision, and so, by not entertaining the revision, the learned Additional Commissioner failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him. It was also argued that Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, gives a wider power of revision by entitling the revisional courts to interfere with subordinate court's orders even on the round of impropriety. The learned Single Member (Kaushal Kishore) was clear in his mind that in such a case revision did not lie but, nonetheless he found a little substance in the argument, not because of its merits but because of its bold ingenuity and so he referred the sanction to this Larger Bench. 5. As we will have to refer to Section 133 and 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act many a times, it would be convenient to llleep it in the background by citing it here. Section 333, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. - "The board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, and if such subordinate court appears - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit." Section 333-A, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. - "The Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any suit or proceeding referred to in Section 333 decided by any court suo-ordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality of propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding and if he is of opinion that such order should be vailed, cancelled or reversed, he shall refer the case with his opinion thereon for the orders of the Hoard and, the Hoard shall thereupon pass such orders. 6. Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, was inserted in the Act by Section 26 of U.P. Act No. XXX of 1975. Before that Section 333 alone dealt with revisional jurisdiction. Section 122-C. U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, was added by Section 2 of U.P. Ordinance No VIII of 1971, with effect from May 24, 1971, and re-enacted by Sec. 3 of U.P. Act XXI of 1971 - that is, at a time when Section 333-A had not been inserted in the Act and when Section 333 alone was in the Act, dealing with revisional jurisdiction, that by not mentioning Section 333-A in Section 122-C(7), U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, the Legislature intended to keep Section 333-A as a supplemental and alternative forum for revision, will be adequately met by this simple statement that omission of Section 333-A in Section 122-C(7), U.P. Z.A and L.R. Act was due to the sole reason that in 1971 (when Section 122-C was added) Sec. 333-A had not been even conceived. The fact that, afterwards when Section 333-A was added in the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act in 1975. corresponding amendment was not made in Section 122-C(7) was Hue, firstly, to inadvertance and secondly because it was, perhaps, considered unnecessary. 7. The question, then, is why the Legislature indulged in an exercise in futility when it was not its intention to treat Section 333-A as independent and supplemental provision in respect of revisional jurisdiction. corresponding amendment was not made in Section 122-C(7) was Hue, firstly, to inadvertance and secondly because it was, perhaps, considered unnecessary. 7. The question, then, is why the Legislature indulged in an exercise in futility when it was not its intention to treat Section 333-A as independent and supplemental provision in respect of revisional jurisdiction. The answer to this will be clear by recapitulating the law on this point, Rule 182, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules lays down that in hearing and deciding suits, applications and other proceedings, revenue courts shall follow the procedure laid down in Parts I and IV of the Revenue Court Manual, Rules 186, 187, 188 (Part I) Revenue Court Manual provided that revisions shall be presented before the Commissioner who will forward it to the Board, with his recommendation, for dismissing it or for allowing it. The Commissioner had no independent power of any sort in revisional matters. Even when the revision were not entertain able or were frivolous, he had to make a recommendation to the Board to dismiss it. This resulted in delay in disposal of cases and also in avoidable burden on the Board of Revenue. To obviate this difficulty Section 333-A of the U.P. Z.A. and LR. Act was added in 1975. By this new provision the Commissioner was given power to dismiss revision petitions himself and was freed from the responsibility of sending such revision to the Board. But in case the revision deserved to be allowed, the former obligation remained and he was required to refer the case, to the Board with his opinion. Apart from making a little change, as indicated above, no substantial change in revisional jurisdiction was effected. It is wrong to say as the learned counsel for the revisionist said in para 5 of the grounds of revision, that the Commissioner got the power under Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, to vary, cancel or reverse the orders of subordinate courts. 8. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued with great force, on his part, that the difference in the language used in Sections 333 and 333-A, Z.A. Act, is a proof of the fact that the Legislature had clear intention of giving more revisional power to the Commissioner. 8. The learned counsel for the revisionist argued with great force, on his part, that the difference in the language used in Sections 333 and 333-A, Z.A. Act, is a proof of the fact that the Legislature had clear intention of giving more revisional power to the Commissioner. His argument is that while, under Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act the Board has been given revisional power only in cases where (a) a subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law or (b) it failed to exercise a jurisdiction solves or (c) it has acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Section 333-A of the Act enables the Commissioner to interfere in cases of all illegality or impropriety committed by subordinate courts. The argument is attractive anti a bit, formidable not because of its merits, but because it is bold and ingenious. It is true that whenever a Legislature departs from set phraseology and adopts, in its place other words a reasonable suspicion arises that the Legislature intended to make a change in the law. It is this aspect of the matter which has caused considerable anxiety in our minds. We have considered this argument with all the attention it requires, and yet we are not impressed by ill. A little probe will show that the words 'for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order, used in Section 333-A do not widen the revisional not. These were loosely used as epitome of clauses 'a', 'b' and 'c' of Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. The word 'legality' is used therein for covering the cases where a court exercise a jurisdiction not vested in it or where it fails to exercise such jurisdiction or where it commits any illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction - all these cases come within the term illegality'; and so the term is nothing but a gist of clauses (a), (b) and the first limb of clause (c) of Section 333. Likewise the word 'propriety' used in Section 333-A is denotative of the second limb of clause (a) of Section 333, U.P. Z.A, and L.R. Act at means scrutiny in cases of material irregularity committed in exercise of jurisdiction. An act suffering from the defect of mated irregularity is one which is considered improper. 9. Likewise the word 'propriety' used in Section 333-A is denotative of the second limb of clause (a) of Section 333, U.P. Z.A, and L.R. Act at means scrutiny in cases of material irregularity committed in exercise of jurisdiction. An act suffering from the defect of mated irregularity is one which is considered improper. 9. There is no reason to construe Section 333-A. U.P. Z.A. and L.R Act as if it were enacted to widen the act of revision jurisdiction. There is no justification in presuming that the Legislature intended to give the Commissioner more powers than the Board of Revenue or other revisional courts mentioned in Code of Civil Procedure, especially when the Commissioner's power, for revising the orders of subordinate courts, is non-existent, whenever the commission thinks that the order of his subordinate court should be varied, cancelled or reversed, he is helpless in passing any effective order and he must refer the revision to the Board of Revenue for suitable orders. The Commissioner cannot allow the revisionist, that is, he cannot revise the orders of his subordinate courts. Thus the core of the matter, in plain language, is that the Commissioner has got no revisional power at all; he is only empowered to do scrutiny of revision petition - if he, after screening, finds that the impugned order is liable to be revised, he has to refer lie revision to the Board, with his recommendation. He has, of course, the power to dismiss the revisions, but we must be clear that the essence of revisional power is, not in dismissing court's order. The real revisional jurisdiction always remained with the Board and it was not given to the Commissioner by adding Section 333-A in the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 10. Even before enactment of Section 33-A the Commissioner was referring regions to the Board, with his recommendation. The Board continues to exercise its revisional jurisdiction by virtue of Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. The enactment of Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, has not added, diminished or modified the power of the Board in any manner whatsoever. When the reference comes to the Board with the recommendation of the commissioner, the case retains its original character arid nature of revision, and is disposed of by the Board under Section 333, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. When the reference comes to the Board with the recommendation of the commissioner, the case retains its original character arid nature of revision, and is disposed of by the Board under Section 333, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The argument of learned the counsel for the revisionist that, Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is a supplemental revisional provision, giving wider powers to the Commissioner and the Board, is not tenable and docs not stand the test of scrutiny. Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is the only section, which enables the Board to exercise revisional jurisdiction within its constraints. 11. So the position of law is clear. When in 1971 Section 122-C was inserted the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and a provision was made in it that the order of the Collector passed under Section 122-C(6) will be final and Section 333 will not apply to it, the sole intention of the Legislature was to bar revisional jurisdiction of the Board. In 1971 Section 333-A was not in the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and hence it was not mentioned in Section 122-C(7) U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. As at that time, Sec. 333 was the only section conferring revisional powers on the Board, the Legislature by mentioning Section 333, made a categorical intention that no revision will lie. An order mentioned in Section 122-C(6) of the U.P. Z.A. ami L.R Act, where the intention of the Legislature has been made clear, the courts will respect it and interpret the law accordingly. 12. Our answer to the questions involved in this case are that Section 122-C (7), U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act bars revisions against the orders mentioned in sub-section (6) and that Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is not a section with the help of which the law can be circumvented in such a case. It is also our view that Section 333-A is not a supplemental revisional jurisdiction, given to the concerned courts along with or and apart from Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. It is also our view that Section 333-A is not a supplemental revisional jurisdiction, given to the concerned courts along with or and apart from Section 333, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. We are further of the view that the use of the words 'legality and propriety' in Section 333-A, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act are not intended to widen the revisional net, but have been used loosely to mean that which is mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 333, of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 13. With these answers, the case shall go before the Single Member, having jurisdiction. Kaushal Kishore, Member -I fully agree with the justification for considering the bar under Section 122-C(7) extended to Section 333-A, given in the main judgment, and I also agree with the views contained therein, subject to my following observations: The two Sections 333 and 333 A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act have already been reproduced in the main judgment and utilising this ready reference, they can be compared for the benefit of a proper understanding. Section 333 A is not supplemental but only a subordinate provision of Section 333 for the words 'As referred to in Section 333' occurring in Section 333-A put a rider on the scope of suits and proceedings to be considered under Section 333-A. The scope is evidently limited to the suits and proceedings referred to under Section 333, subject to their two qualifications. The words 'suits and proceedings' also occur in Section 333 and are qualified by clauses (a), (b) and (c) as well as by clause 'decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred'. It is obvious that the scope of Section 333-A cannot be outside the scope of Section 333. 15. The area of consideration by the Commissioner under Section 333-A is rather smaller than the area considered by the Board. The Board under Section 333 may pass such order in the cases as it thinks fit' and not merely 'for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceedings', which is the limit of the area of consideration by the Commissioner. The Board under Section 333 may pass such order in the cases as it thinks fit' and not merely 'for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceedings', which is the limit of the area of consideration by the Commissioner. The latter can only satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in a suit or proceeding which fulfils the two qualifications mentioned in Section 333, explained in para 1 above, and has no power to scrutinise anything else in respect of such suits or proceedings, while Board's power of scrutiny in respect of such suits or proceedings and its power to pass order are wider and are limited only by the phrase 'as it thinks fit'. Further, the Commissioner has no power at all to force his views on the Board. 16. However, powers of the Board under Section 333-A are the same as under Section 333 i.e. to pass such order as it thinks fit. 17. Even in Section 333-A itself, it has been made clear that out of the suits or proceedings, decided by any subordinate court in which no appeal lies or where an appeal lies but has not been preferred, and if such subordinate court appears: - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (i.e. as referred to in Section 333 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act) the Commissioner may call for and examine the records for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, and if he is of the opinion that such order should be varied, cancelled or reversed (but he cannot consider about any other order that the Board has power to pass under Section 333 or under Section 333-A, the shall refer the case with his opinion, there on for the orders of the Board, and the Board shrill thereupon pass 'such order a it thinks fit' (not being bound by the limit of just varying, cancelling or reversing the order, as fixed for the Commissioner, bi having power also to pass any additional or different order that the Board thinks fit). 18. 18. The above analysis makes it clear that Section 333-A has neither a wider scope of consideration, nor it is a supplemental provision but is undoubtedly a subordinate and related provision of Section 333, enacted mainly to reduce the burden of the Board in preliminary scrutiny and rejection of revision petitions that are without force and substance. It is further seen that the legislature have made everything clear and have not left anything to chance or vagueness to be interpreted differently. Considering this nature of provision under Section 333-A, the Board cannot reconcile to act under Section 333-A in the face of bar imposed in Section 122-C(7) on the applicability of Section 333, and thereby to wipe out the results achieved by Section 122-C(7). The inconsistency in the application of Section 333 and Section 333-A has to be avoided. I may once again quote from the ruling by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1960 SC 936 : - "If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had, will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used." 19. The Board cannot but deem the subordinate and related provision in Section 333-A also to be barred under Section 122-C(7) to cut the obvious absurdity.