JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by Anand Sugar Mills, Khalilabad, district Basti, challenges the validity of imposition of octroi by the Notified Area Committee, Khalilabad. Further, it has made a prayer for quashing the Notification dated 10th May, 1975 imposing; octroi with effect from 15th Mav, 1975. 2. The petitioner company is one of the units of Swadeshi Mining and Manaufacturing Co. Ltd. having its registered office at Swadeshi House, Civil Lines Kanpur. It carries on the manufacture of sugar in Khalilabad Notified Area. In order to impose non-refundable octroi on goods or animals brought within the Notified Area for consumption, use or sale therein under S. 128 (It (viii) U. P. Municipalities Act, the Khalilabad Notified Area Committee passed a resolution dated 15th January, 1975. On 28lh January, 1975, another extraordinary resolution and bye laws were passed by the said Committee resolving that the proposal dated 15lh January, 1975 be published in the newspaper. Consequently, on the said resolution being passed, a notice was published in 'Grant Doot" which is published from Basli. Subsequently, the resolution was sent to the Commissioner on 22nd March, 1975 for his sanction which was duly accorded on 11th April, 1975. It was, thereafter, that the notification was published on l()th May 1975 imposing the lax with effect from 15th May, 1975. Subsequently on 9th July, 1975, the Notified Committee resolved to reduce the rales at which octroi was to be charged on the goods and animals coming within the limits of the Notified Town Area for consumption, use or sale. The revised rales were published in li. P. Gazette dated 20th September, 1975. Even with regard to the reduction the petitioner felt aggrieved and by means of an amendment application got para37A to 37H added in the writ petition. The petitioner also took a specific ground with regard to the reduction by adding ground 11 to the writ petition which makes a complaint that as no publication in the manner prescribed by S. 94. li. P.Municipalities Act of the proposal of the Notified Area was done the reduction was invalid. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Notified Area and the allegation that the imposition was made against the provisions of the Act was denied as wrong. 4. Before we analyse the provisions of li. li. P.Municipalities Act of the proposal of the Notified Area was done the reduction was invalid. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Notified Area and the allegation that the imposition was made against the provisions of the Act was denied as wrong. 4. Before we analyse the provisions of li. P. Municipalities Act and deal with the points urged before us, we wish to dispose of the complaint of the petitioner about non-observance of the procedural requirement lot reducing the octroi rales from 19 N. P. to 5 N. P. As the reduction was or the benefit of those on whom octroi was leviable, it is beyond our comprehension that the petitioner should have complained even as against it. No prejudice was caused by not inviting objections to the modified proposal of reducing the rates. Moreover, the objection of the petitioner about non-observance of procedure is untenable also on account of the insertion of a Proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 132 by the U. P. Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 1964 (U. P.Act No. XXII of 1964). The proviso reads as under "Provided that no such publication shall be necessary where the modification is confined to reduction in the amount or rate of the tax originally proposed." 5. This proviso does not permit any person to raise objection to the validity of reduction of rate, hence, the complaint about illegal manner of reduction is untenable. In Municipal Board Sitapur v. Prayag Narain Saigal, ( AIR 1970 SC 58 ), the Supreme Court held that omission to invite fresh objections to modified proposals of levying tax at reduced rate, when no prejudice was caused to the inhabitants did not give any cause of action to make a complaint against the same. 6. We then come to the question of imposition of tax by the notification dated 10th May, 1975. Sections 131 to 135, U. P. Municipalities Act lay down the procedure for imposition of tax. Sub-section (1) of S. 131 requires a Municipal Board desiring to impose tax to pass a special resolution framing the preliminary proposal for the tax. The Notified Area, Khalilabad passed the resolution on 15th/28th January, 1975. Subsection (2) of S. 131 requires the Municipal Board to frame a draft of Rules in respect of the proposed tax. The Notified Area had duly framed the Rules. The Notified Area, Khalilabad passed the resolution on 15th/28th January, 1975. Subsection (2) of S. 131 requires the Municipal Board to frame a draft of Rules in respect of the proposed tax. The Notified Area had duly framed the Rules. Sub-section (3) of S. 131 lays down the requirement of publication in the manner prescribed in S. 194, of the proposal and the draft Rules along with a notice in the form set forth in Schedule III. 7. The complaint of the petitioner, in the instant case, was about the non-compliance of sub-s. (3) of S. 131. Counsel pointed out that since neither was the proposal nor were the Rules published in the newspaper, the mandatory provision of sub-s. (3) of S. 131 had not been complied with, hence, the levy was invalid. 8. The next illegality, according to the petitioner's learned counsel, was that the notice published in newspaper gave only ten days instead of fifteen days for filing of objections. 9. Counsel also pointed out that "Gram Doot" the newspaper in which the notice was published is not of wide circulation. Hence, the requirement of publication in the local newspaper as laid down by S. 94 could not be deemed to have been complied with. The allegation that "Gram Doot" had no wide circulation, has been controverted in the counter affidavit. To us, it appears that the ground is untenable and the levy cannot be declared invalid on this ground. 10. About the non-publication of Rules and proposal, the reply given in the counter affidavit is that they were pasted on the Notice Board of the Notified Area, Khalilabad and Collector ate Office, Basti. In the rejoinder affidavit, the fact of pasting of the Rules and the proposal on the Notice Board of the Collectorate Office, Basti has been denied. Be that as it may, the fact of its pasting on the Notice Board of the Notified Area, Khalilabad was not in dispute. Admittedly, the Rules had not been published in the newspaper. The question would be as to whether the levy had to be held illegal or invalid on account of non publication in the newspaper. Sections 131 to 135 have been a subject matter of interpretation by the Supreme Court in serveral cases. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Admittedly, the Rules had not been published in the newspaper. The question would be as to whether the levy had to be held illegal or invalid on account of non publication in the newspaper. Sections 131 to 135 have been a subject matter of interpretation by the Supreme Court in serveral cases. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ), the Supreme Court pointed out that all the provisions were not mandatory. This case was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hapur Municipality v. Raghuvendra, ( AIR 1966 SC 693 ). It observed in para 10 that: - "It was there pointed out that all the sections in spite of the language used in them were not mandatory. The majority opinion considered that the first part of S. 131 (3) requiring publication of proposals was mandatory and the second part which required that publication should be in the manner required by S. 94 (3) was only directory " 11. In Raza Buland Sugar Company v. Municipal Board, Rampur ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ), the majority treated the latter part of S. 131 (3) as directory and held that there was substantial compliance. 12. In Hapur Municipality v. Raghuvendra ( AIR 1966 SC 693 ), the main grounds of objections were (i) that the resolution of the Municipal Board framing the proposal was not published in the newspaper, (ii) that the Rules framed for imposition of the tax did not accompany the resolution which was affixed on the Notice Board at the office of the appellant Board. These defects in the imposition of tax pointed out in the above case found favour with the High Court in the writ petition. But the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and found that none of the two grounds was a tenable ground for invalidating the tax. The Supreme Court held that the defect in the imposition of tax was of the same character as in the case of Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board Rampur and in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee Shegaon ( AIR 1962 SC 420 ). The Supreme Court held that the defect in the imposition of tax was of the same character as in the case of Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board Rampur and in Berar Swadeshi Vanaspati v. Municipal Committee Shegaon ( AIR 1962 SC 420 ). In the case Supreme Court found (at P. 422) : - "This notification therefore, clearly is one which directs imposition of octroi and falls within sub-s. (7) of S. 67 and having been notified in the Gazette it is conclusive evidence of the tax having been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and it cannot be challenged on the ground that all the necessary steps had not been taken." 13. The Supreme Court held that S. 135 (3) U. P. Municipalities Act, lays down that the notification by the Government is conclusive proof that the procedure was correctly followed. That being so, a levy cannot be challenged on the ground of procedural defect. The relevant observations helpful to us in deciding the present writ made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case are quoted below : - "The notification is made conclusive proof that the tax is imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The question arises: Is this rule of conclusive evidence such as to shut out all enquiry by Courts? We have no hesitation in answering the question in the negative. There are certain matters which, of course, cannot be established conclusively by a notification under S. 135 (3)". A tax can only be said to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act, if it is contemplated by the Act. There is a difference between the tax and the imposition of the tax. The former is the levy itself and the latter the method by which the levy is imposed and collected. What the sub-section does is to put beyond question the procedure by which the tax is imposed, that is to say, the various steps taken to impose it. A tax not authorised can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may be challenged, not with reference to the manner of the imposition but as an illegal impost." 14. A tax not authorised can never be within the protection afforded to the procedure for imposing taxes. Such a tax may be challenged, not with reference to the manner of the imposition but as an illegal impost." 14. To us, it appears that the defects pointed out in the instant case fall in the same category as in Hapur Municipality v. Raghuvendra ( AIR 1966 SC 693 ). Even if the Rules and proposal had not been published in the newspaper that would not invalidate the levy. The admitted fact is that the Notified Area had passed a resolution deciding to impose octroi and also had framed the Rules. That being so, the mandatory part had been complied with. The latter part of sub-S. (3) of S. 131 only provides the manner which has been held to be directory. Accordingly, non-publication of one or other or both in the newspaper could not invalidate the levy. 15. In Municipal Board, Sitapur, v. Frayag Narain, ( AIR 1970 SC 58 ) (Supra), the Supreme Court took the same view. It said : - "But all the procedural defects in the imposition of tax are cured by S. 135 (3), whereas in this case, the Municipal Board has the power to levy the tax and has passed the resolution necessary for the imposition of tax and the defects are not of a fundamental character. The procedural defect cannot be regarded as fundamental or as invalidating the imposition, if no substantial prejudice is caused to the inhabitants of the Municipality." 16. The issue of notification under sub-i s. (2) of S. 135 is conclusive proof that all necessary steps for the imposition of tax had been taken. In Tharoomai v. P. C. Pandey, 1978 All L J 25 : ( AIR 1978 SC 306 ) the same view was taken. 17. The next argument of the petitioner's learned counsel was that as the notice published in newspaper did not give fifteen days time, as was required by Schedule III, the notice was invalid. Hence, the entire levy of tax had to be struck down. We do not agree with this submission. A wrong mention of period about filing of objection was inconsequential. The law provided for fifteen days. Hence, the wrong mention of the period would not invalidate the levy which was otherwise valid. Hence, the entire levy of tax had to be struck down. We do not agree with this submission. A wrong mention of period about filing of objection was inconsequential. The law provided for fifteen days. Hence, the wrong mention of the period would not invalidate the levy which was otherwise valid. From the law laid down in Tharoomai v. P. C. Pandey (1978 All. L. J. 25) (SC), it appears that the mention of period within which an objection should be filed is not of any importance. A Municipal Board can consider an objection even if filed beyond fifteen days. If the petitioner would have filed the objection after ten days and the same would have been rejected on the ground of being time barred, there could be some thing to say in his favour but as the petitioner did not file any objection, the complaint made has no merit. 18. The last submission made by the learned counsel was on the basis of the two authorities reported in State of Karnataka v. Hense Corporation ( AIR 1981 SC 463 ), and Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. v. Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, ( AIR 1976 All. 274 ). The contention was that an octroi should be compensatory in character and if it is not so, the same is invalid. The learned counsel did not supply us the ground on which he considered octroi to be invalid, if it was not compensatory. In the two cases relied upon the validity had been challenged on the ground of Article 301 of the Constitution. Article 301 of the Constitution confers freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India and restriction on that freedom could only be justified if the tax was either compensatory or that the levy did not impose an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse. 19. With the help of some of the paras of the affidavit, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a tax is said to be compensatory when the tax payers are compensated or benefited by the utilisation of the tax proceeds and as the petitioner is not benefited although by the amount received as octroi, the tax is not compensatory. The Notified Area Committee has denied the assertion of the petitioner that no benefits were being given to the persons on whom octroi tax was imposed. The Notified Area Committee has denied the assertion of the petitioner that no benefits were being given to the persons on whom octroi tax was imposed. The two cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, do not lay down that an octroi can be valid only when it is compensatory. As said above, dealing with the argument of breach of Article 301 of the Constitution the Supreme Court observed : - "Even apart from this, a levy which appears to be quite reasonable in its impact on the movement of goods and is imposed for the purpose of augmenting municipal finances which suffered a dent on account of abolition of octroi cannot be said to impose an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of interstate trade, commerce and intercourse." 20. To the same effect is the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Elgin Mills Company ( AIR 1976 All 274 ) (supra). In that case the Allahabad Bench found two grounds to repel the argument of invalidity of the octroi challenged on the ground of breach of Article 302. The first was that it was compensatory and the second that the octroi was not a tax impeding the traffic or movement of goods but was on the consumption, use or sale within the local area. A tax is not correlated to a particular service rendered, but it is intended to meet the expenses of the Government. A tax is levied as a part of common burden for a public purpose without being compensatory. For levy of tax to be valid, no specific benefit is required to be conferred. It should only be within the competence of the levying authority. That is not (so) in the present case. 21. In G. K. Krishan v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1975, SC 583), it has been held that the collection of toll or tax for the use of roads, bridges, or aerodromes etc. does not operate as barrier or hindrance to trade. For a tax to become a prohibited tax, it has to be a direct tax, the effect of which is to hinder the movement of goods. If tax is compensatory, it cannot operate as a restriction on the freedom of trade or commerce. 22. For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs.