ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - In the basic year the contesting opposite parties in the present case were recorded and the petitioners had claimed half shared in the disputed land on the ground that the disputed property was ancestral property and per pedigree she was entitled to half share. 2. The Consolidation Officer through his judgment dated 10-1-1974 accepted the claim of the petitioner as is evident from Annexure 'A' attached with the writ petition. Thereafter the contesting opposite parties preferred an appeal which was partly allowed and the share of the petitioner was fixed as 1/4 (see Annexure 'B' attached with the writ petition). Thereafter both the parties preferred revision petitions and the revision filed 'by the contesting opposite parties has been allowed and that of the petitioner has been dismissed as is evident from the judgment of the revisional court dated 14-5-1974 (see Annexure 'D' attached with the writ petition). Now aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional court the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Before start of the consolidation in the village the petitioner's husband had filed a suit under S. 229-B of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act which was dismissed on 5-1-1972. Thereafter an appeal was preferred which was pending before the appellate Court. A controversy had arisen as to whether the appeal against the judgment dated 5-1-1972 was within time and a competent one or not. According to the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties in the present writ petition there "was no proper and competent appeal hence the order dated 5-1-1972 negativing the claim of the petitioner's husband was final and that the revisional court rightly held so; whereas according to the learned counsel for the petitioner the revisional Court has patently erred in the Circumstances of the present case in holding that the order dated 5-1-1972 was final and operative as res judicata between the parties. He also stressed that ultimately the appeal along with the suit has been abated by the appellate Court through its order dated 5-8-74 (see Annexure RA-2 attached with the rejoinder affidavit). 4. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the revisional Court has patently erred in treating the order passed by judicial officer on 5-1-1972 as final between the parties. 4. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the revisional Court has patently erred in treating the order passed by judicial officer on 5-1-1972 as final between the parties. According to him an appeal, though barred by time, had been filed and was pending on the date when the revisional Court decided the claims of the parties. In that view of the matter the order had not become final because it was under consideration before the appellate Court and ultimately when the delay in preferring the appeal was condoned the matter become sub judice and the observation of the revisional Court regarding finality of the order dated 5-1-1972 is not correct. Moreover, it has also been stressed that during the pendency of the writ petition in this Court the suit, in which the order dated 5-1-1972 was passed against the petitioner's husband, has stood abated, hence the impugned judgment could not be sustained and the matter should be sent back to the revisional Court for consideration regarding the claim of the petitioners. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted in reply that as the appeal against the order dated 5-1-1972 was beyond time, hence it was no appeal in the eye of law and the revisional Court was fully justified in treating the order dated 5-1-1972 as final between the parties and has rightly negatived the claim of the present petitioner. Secondly he has stressed that the impugned judgment was a good judgment on the date it was delivered. Subsequent events cannot be taken into account to hold that the impugned judgment suffered from patent error of law. 6. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties invitedmy attention to the ruling reported in 1975 ALL WC 290 :( AIR 1975 ALL 214 ) Shambho Nath v. Radhey Shyam wherein a learned Single Judge has observed as below (Para 4) : " The legality of the order of the District Judge has to be judged with reference to the circumstances as they existed at the time the order was passed This Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot act like a court of appeal and take into consideration the subsequent events." 7. Another ruling cited by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties is 1977 ALL WC 289 Chetanya Rai Singh v. Ilnd Addl. Another ruling cited by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties is 1977 ALL WC 289 Chetanya Rai Singh v. Ilnd Addl. Civil Judge, Aligarh wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court in para 13 of his judgment has observed as below : "In exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not the appellate authority and, therefore, it could not take into consideration either the subsequent change of fact or law and has to find out whether the impugned order suffers from any main fest error of law or from excess or want of jurisdiction." 8. The third ruling cited by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties is 1977 All WC 440 : (AIR 1977 NOC 227 Jagdish Prasad v. Union of India wherein a learned Single Judge has observed as below in para 5 of his judgment : - "....Here, it has only to be seen if the judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from any manifest error of law Subsequent events particularly which, require to be ascertained on evidence, f cannot be taken into account for holding that the District Judge had committed any manifest error of law in applying Rule 18 to the circumstances of the present case." 9. In this connection it is note worthy that in 1976 All WC 542 : (1977 All LJ 70) 452 Raj Narain v. 4th Addl. Dist. Judge. Allahabad a learned Single Judge has held that this court can in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution take note of events that have taken place during the pendency of the writ petition. 10. In 1980 All WC 365 :(1981 U. P. L. T. NOC 62) Lakshmi Prasad Gupta v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur different learned Single Judge than mentioned in the above paragraph has also held that this court can take into consideration subsequent events, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. The learned Single Judge has also quoted the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409 P. Venkataswarlu. v. Motor and General Traders (Para 4) : - "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date suitor instituted the legal proceedings. The learned Single Judge has also quoted the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 1409 P. Venkataswarlu. v. Motor and General Traders (Para 4) : - "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date suitor instituted the legal proceedings. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies pending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other dis entitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can be contemplated any limitation on this power to take note of undated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice." 11 -A.. A caution was of course given and it was that : "The court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of the events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." 12. No doubt there are conflicting views on the question whether in writ jurisdiction this Court can take subsequent events into account while judging the apparent (conflict) of law in the impugned judgment. But in my opinion this Court exercises equitable jurisdiction and when on facts presented before this Court it is evident that the basis of the impugned judgment has vanished, it is bounden duty of this Court to take into account such facts and grant relief to the petitioner without indulging into technicalities. The hands of this Court are quite large to grant appropriate relief to the petitioner and no technicality can stand in the way of this Court in granting the appropriate relief to the petitioner. The hands of this Court are quite large to grant appropriate relief to the petitioner and no technicality can stand in the way of this Court in granting the appropriate relief to the petitioner. In the instant case find that the very basis of the order of the revisional court regarding finality of the order passed by the trial court in a revenue case on 5-1-1972 has vanished, as the appellate Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal against the judgment of that trial Court and ultimately abated the appeal together with the suit through its order dated 5-8-1974 hence the impugned judgment is evidently erroneous because it has negatived the claim of the petitioner only due to the order dated 5-1-1972, which no longer exists. Moreover, the revisional Court was in error in treating the order dated 5-1-1972 passed by the Trial Court against the husband of the petitioner as final in the circumstances of the present case when a time barred appeal along with an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was pending. The appeal had not been dismissed when the revisional Court decided the claims of the parties. The revisional Court assumed that the appellate Court in the revenue case would not condone the delay and treat the order passed by the trial Court as final, whereas in reality the appellate Court condoned the delay and ultimately abated the appeal together with the suit under S. 5 of the U. P. C. H. Act. 13. In my opinion the revisional Court has patently erred in treating the order passed against the order of the Court as no appeal existed in the eye of law and this function rested with the revenue appellate Court which rightly decided the appeal in the circumstances of the case by condoning the delay and entertaining the claim and thereafter abating the appeal together with the suit. 14. I think that in the circumstances of the present case the petitioner is entitled to have her claim decided by the revisional Court in the light of the changed circumstances prevailing today. It has not been seriously challenged before me that the order of abatement of the earlier suit filed by the petitioners husband has become final between the parties. I think that in the circumstances of the present case the petitioner is entitled to have her claim decided by the revisional Court in the light of the changed circumstances prevailing today. It has not been seriously challenged before me that the order of abatement of the earlier suit filed by the petitioners husband has become final between the parties. According to me it is but necessary and proper for the court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to take into account the subsequent events if they entitled the petitioner to the relief claimed provided the petitioner is not guilty of any fraud, interpolation etc. 15. For the foregoing discussions the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional Court dated 14-5-1974 is hereby quashed and the case sent back to the revisional Court for deciding the claim of the petitioner in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.