JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs Second Appeal in a suit for partition. 2. The plaintiff claims to be the adopted son of Lala Battu Mai. The defendant, Smt.Chawli Devi, was Lala Battu Mai's widow, and having died during the pendency of the Second Appeal in this Court, she is now represented by her heir and legal representative. Lala Battu Mai was murdered on 19th June, 1956. The plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offence. The plaintiff did not claim any share in the property either as the adopted son of Lala Battu Mai or as his heir, vide-statement of his counsel on Paper No.15ka of the trial court's record. The property sought to be partitioned by the suit is only one building premises described at the foot of the plaint, and the basis of the plaintiffs claim to a half share therein was the purchase of that building premises by Lala Battu Mai in the joint names of himself and the plaintiff under a sale deed dated 9th May, 1953. It is undisputed that the entire consideration for the sale came from Lala Battu Mai. 3. The principal question, which arose between the parties, was whether the fact that the entire consideration was paid by Lala Battu Mai made the plaintiff a mere Benamidar for him or whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, Lala Battu Mai purchased the property in the joint names of himself and the plaintiff with the intention of making the plaintiff an equal owner of the property with him. 4. Apart from proof of payment of the entire sale consideration by Lala Battu Mai, and the fact that the purchase was made by him in the joint names of himself and the plaintiff as evidenced by the sale deed, the evidence on the point is scanty and unreliable.Lala Battu Mai was dead. The only evidence, which we have on the point, is that of Shambhu Saran (P.W.l)who was the plaintiffs natural father, Kishan Lal (P.W.2) who was the scribe of the sale deed and Om Prakash (D. W. 1), who was a witness of the sale deed and related to Lala Battu Mai as the wife's brother's son, probably the defendant's brother's son. The defendant, who might have known something about his intention or the circumstances, in which Lala Battu Mai, her husband, joined the plaintiff as a co-purcher with him, refrained from appearing in the witness-box. Shambhu Saran (P.W.l)stated that the plaintiff lived with Lala Battu Mai ever since he was four years old, and that Lala Battu Mai purchased half the property for the plaintiff for the reason that he had great love and affection for the latter. The scribe of the sale deed, Krishan Lal (P.W. 2), did say that he scribed the sale deed on the instructions of Lala Battu Mai who told him that he was purchasing half the property for himself and the other half for the plaintiff, but he could have hardly deposed anything different from that which was written in the sale deed itself. Om Prakash (D.W.l) admitted that the plaintiff was living with Lala Battu Mai. H&, however, said that the plaintiffs name was entered 'by the way'. His Cross Examination shows that he could not have known what the intention of Lala Battu Mai was in joining the plaintiffs name as a co-purchaser of the property with him. 5. We are thus left with the presumptions, which the law says may be raised or may not be raised on these facts and circumstances. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant, I am of opinion that the proper inference to be drawn in this case on the aforesaid facts and circumstances was that Lala Battu Mai intended to make the plaintiff a joint owner of the property with him, and that it was not a case of a Benami transaction. In the sale deed, the plaintiff has been described as the adopted son of Lala Battu Mai and as under his guardianship. It is admitted on all hands that the plaintiff was living with Lala Battu Mai. It cannot be doubted that Lala Battu Mai had love and affection for the plaintiff. P.W.l has said so and D.W.l has not rebutted it. It is admitted on all hands that the plaintiff was living with Lala Battu Mai. It cannot be doubted that Lala Battu Mai had love and affection for the plaintiff. P.W.l has said so and D.W.l has not rebutted it. Lala Battu Mai was said to have been a man of means, and was said to have been engaged in speculative business to acquire and hold property in the names of their wives or minor children or other friends or relatives so as to put them out of the reach of their creditors in case of adversity, but that could not have been the intention of Lala Battu Mai, for he did not do any thing to conceal the fact that he was the purchaser. He even gave his own name as the first name among the two purchasers. The elements of concealment or secrecy, or make-believe which primarily go with Benami transactions, are thus completely absent in this case. It was a clear and straight forward transaction of purchase made by Lala Battu Mai, and the only question was whether by joining the name of the plaintiff as a co-purchaser with him he intended to make and did thus make a gift of an equal share in the property purchased. 6. It is said that the theory of advancement does not apply in India because the habit of making Benami purchases was rampant among the natives which was the name given to us by the British. It is said that the theory applied only in England. 7. It is ture that so long as women did not enjoy equal rights in property or were not so emancipated as in modem India, the men folk did occasionally purchase properties Benami in their names, sometime to cajole them, at others to provide for their maintenance in case of need and occasionally as a shield against the creditors. But times have changed. After the Hindu Succession Act, women inherit equally in the family of their parents and husband. But I do not say that Benami purchases are, no longer made; but the propertied classes, with whom such purchases were mostly associated, have gradually and by and large disappeared with the abolition of zamindari and landlordism in India. The presumptions, which could be raised more than a century ago, can, no longer, be raised in the present day social conditions. The presumptions, which could be raised more than a century ago, can, no longer, be raised in the present day social conditions. The decisions of the Privy Council in Guran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta AIR 1928 PC 172 ; and Lakshmiah v. Kothandarama, AIR 1925 PC 181 , must accordingly be applied with some caution. The true test is that of intention as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, AIR 1980 SC. 727 . The result is that instead of presuming that the purchase made by Lala Battu Mai was Benami in so far as the plaintiff was concerned, and that the theory of advancement not being in India, the plaintiff could not be said to have had an equal share in the property on account of his name having been joined as a co-purchaser by Lala Battu Mai unless it were proved that Lala Battu Mai Had, in fact, made a gift of an equal share in the property when he purchased it in the plaintiffs name, the test to be applied is to look at the surrounding facts and circumstances and to find out the intention, with which Lala Battu Mai joined the plaintiffs name as a co-purchaser with him in the sale deed of the property in question. And if this is the correct test the surrounding facts and circumstances all lead to the inference that when Lala Battu Mai joined the plaintiff as a co-purchaser with him and described him as his adopted son living under his guardianship, he intended to make the plaintiff a joint equal owner in the property with him. & 8. The plaintiff had, besides claiming partition, also prayed for rendition of accounts of the profits of the plaintiffs half share. The trial court had, in addition to the decree for partition, granted the plaintiff a H decree for rendition of accounts of the profits for the three years preceding the suit against the defendant respondent. The defendant respondent was in the position of the plaintiffs mother. On the findings arrived at by me, the property must be deemed to have been held by Lala Battu Mai as coparcenary property. The parties were governed by the Mitakshara. There is not a right to claim accounting by one Mitakshara co-parcener against another. The defendant respondent was in the position of the plaintiffs mother. On the findings arrived at by me, the property must be deemed to have been held by Lala Battu Mai as coparcenary property. The parties were governed by the Mitakshara. There is not a right to claim accounting by one Mitakshara co-parcener against another. May be the plaintiff had given up his claim to a share in the property on the basis of being the adopted son of Lala Battu Mai, because of the fact that the plaintiff was prosecuted and convicted for the heinous offence of having murdered his own father. The plaintiff was in jail when the suit filed in the year 1962 six years after the murder, I1 am, in the circumstances, not prepared to allow the relief for accounting that was claimed by the plaintiff against his own adoptive mother. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the lowed appellate court are set aside. A preliminary decree for partition of the property in suit is passed declaring the plaintiffs share therein to be one half. In the special circumstances of the case, I would direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. The suit was filed in forma pauparis as the plaintiff was in jail. The appeal before the lower appellate court was filed by the defendant-respondent. The plaintiff was permitted to file and prosecute the Second Appeal as an indigent person. That order was, however, withdrawn, and the plaintiff has paid the court fees payable on the memorandum of appeal in this Court. The plaintiff shall pay the court fees payable on the plaint in the trial court, and after the plaintiff has done so, the trial court shall on a proper application being made in this behalf, proceed to divide the property in suit into two equal portion and pass a final decree accordingly. The parties shall thereafter be put into separate possession over the portions allotted to them respectively. In case the Court fee payable on the plaint is not paid within a reasonable time the Collector may proceed to recover it from the plaintiff in accordance with law.