JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal, J. - In the Revenue Department of this State there are several echelons of subordinate services. The lowest category of the posts with which we are concerned in these writ petitions is that of Supervisor Qanoongos and Collection Amins from which promotion is made to the post Naib Tahsildar. The posts of Sadar Qanoongos and Naib Tahsildars are equivalent in rank. From these posts promotion is made to the post of Tahsildar. The next higher post is that of Deputy Collector. There are two main sources of recruitment for posts of Deputy Collectors-one, by direct recruitment through Public Service commission (hereinafter to be referred to as the Commission) and the other, by promotion of Tahsildars. There are separate service rules in respect of these three grades of posts. The Naib 1 ahsildar Service Rules are of 1944 and the Tahsildar Service Rules are of 1966. Originally, the Tahsildar Service Rules of 1966 laid down a detailed procedure in regard to promotions of Naib Tahsildars to the posts of Tahsildars. Public Service Commission was associated with the selection process for promotion. 2. Later on, with effect from October 6, 1970, the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution made the U. P. Promotions by Selection in Consultation with Public Service Commission (Procedure) Rules. 1970. Rule 2 of these rules states that these rules shall apply to all services and posts in connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh to which recruitment by promotion is required to be made by the selection Committee in consultation with the Public Service Commission otherwise than on the results of a competitive examination. Rule 3 lays down that the provisions of these rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any service rules in force immediately before the commencement of these rules. 3. In this manner these rules (hereinafter to be referred to as the 1970 Rules) came to govern the procedure for promotion from the posts of Qanoongos to the posts of Naib Tahsildar and also from the posts of Naib Tahsildar to the posts of Tahsildar and from the posts of Tahsildar to the posts of Deputy Collector, in supersession of the specific provisions that were earlier contained in the respective service rules. - 4. - 4. A selection took place for the posts of Tahsildars by promotion from amongst the Naib Tahsildars in 1966 under the Tahsildar Service Rules of 1966. As many as 148 persons were selected for substantive appointment against permanent posts and 300 persons were selected for appointment against temporary and officiating vacancies. The 1966 Rules provided for selection based on merit. The Board of Revenue according to those rules, would prepare an eligibility list of candidates who may be considered for promotion. The main eligibility list will contain the names of twice the number of permanent vacancies while the supplementary eligibility list will contain the names of persons to be considered for temporary and officiating vacancies. The number to be included in the supplementary eligibility list will be equivalent to the number of vacancies likely to occur during the year of recruitment. It is so provided in sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 9. These eligibility lists, along with the gradation list of officers and their character-rolls, are forwarded by the Board of Revenue to the Commission. A Selection Committee is constituted consisting of a representative of the Commission who will be the Chairman, a member of the Board, and a Commissioner of the Division nominated by the State Government. The Selection Committee interviews the candidates and examines their character-rolls and makes the selection. The recommendations of the Selection Committee are placed before the Commission and the Commission then forwards its final recommendations to the Board. The commission may prepare a list in order of merit but it is provided in sub-rule (6) that the Board on receiving the recommendations from the Commission is to re-arrange the names in the two lists in accordance with the seniority of the candidates in their parent cadre, namely, that of Naib Tahsildars and Sadar Qanoongos. The persons who are placed in the first list are to be appointed against substantive vacancies. The persons who were included in the first list but cannot be accommodated against substantive vacancies shall then be carried to the second list. The remainder of the first list and the names of the second list will together constitute a select list. This list will be in order of merit and the persons included in that list shall be given appointments against officiating and temporary vacancies during the course of the year. The remainder of the first list and the names of the second list will together constitute a select list. This list will be in order of merit and the persons included in that list shall be given appointments against officiating and temporary vacancies during the course of the year. This select list will remain in force for a period of one year or until it is reviewed at the next selection. Sub-rule (7) provides that if for two years successively there are no permanent vacancies and it becomes necessary to make selection for only temporary and officiating vacancies then also the aforesaid procedure shall be followed. 5. In accordance with this provision 148 persons were duly appointed against permanent vacancies on the basis of the selection which took place in the year 1966. The remaining 300 persons who were included in the select list were appointed against various temporary and officiating vacancies. 6. The Tahsildar Rules 1966 describe these lists as the first list and the select list respectively. However in various official documents they have also been described for the sake of convenience as lists `A' and `B' respectively, though the rules do not so describe them. 7. No fresh selection of Naib Tahsildars and Sadar Qanoongos for the posts of Tahsildars took place after 1966 until sometime in 1979. 8. The 1970 Rules adopt to a considerable extent the procedure laid down in the Tahsildar Rules of 1966. Part III of the 1970 Rules consists of rules 7 to 19. These rules lay down in what manner promotions shall be made in case where any service rules provide for promotion on the basis of merit. Under Rule 8 the appointing authority is required to prepare an eligibility list. The number of the candidates to be included in the eligibility list is in proportion to the number of vacancies. The proportion laid down in this rule 8 is however substantially different from that laid down in rule 9(1) and (2) of Tahsildar Rules. Rule 8 of 1970 Rules defines the number of vacancies as including the total number of substantive, temporary or officiating vacancies occurring during the year of recruitment, after taking into account the probable absorption of the candidates of list B against substantive vacancies. Rule 8 of 1970 Rules defines the number of vacancies as including the total number of substantive, temporary or officiating vacancies occurring during the year of recruitment, after taking into account the probable absorption of the candidates of list B against substantive vacancies. It may be mentioned here that the 1970 rules described the two lists that are ultimately prepared for promotion against permanent and temporary vacancies respectively as list `A' and `B'. They also provide for absorption of persons from list `B' against substantive vacancies as well, vide Rules 18 and 19 which will be referred to in greater detail later. The number of persons to be included in the eligibility list under rule 8 is five times the total number of vacancies when the vacancies are 1 to 5 in number, four times the number of vacancies if the vacancies are 6 to 12 in number and three times the number of vacancies if the vacancies are over 12 in number. Certain mini ma are also provided but they are not being referred to as nothing turns on them in this case. There are three provisos to rule 8, but we may notice only the first proviso which alone is relevant in these cases. It reads as follows : "Provided that if recruitment is to be made for vacancies occurring during more than one year of recruitment, separate eligibility lists will be prepared in respect of each such year. In such a case while preparing the eligibility list for second and subsequent years of recruitment, the number of candidates to be included in the eligibility list shall be (a) for the second year . . . the number according to the said proportion plus the number of vacancies in the first year; (b) for the third year .... the number according to the said proportion plus the number of vacancies in the first and second years ; and so on." 9. These rules also provide that the appointing authority shall forward to the Commission the eligibility list together with the gradation list and the number of different types of vacancies taken into account for the purpose of preparing the lists, vide rule 9. Rule 11 provides for a Selection committee the composition of which is practically identical with that of the committee mentioned in the 1966 rules. Rule 11 provides for a Selection committee the composition of which is practically identical with that of the committee mentioned in the 1966 rules. Rule 12 provides for interview of the candidates and for examination of their character rolls by the selection committee. Rule 13 provides for preparation for the two lists `A' and `B'. The proviso to sub-rule (1) lays down that if recruitment is made for vacancies occurring during more than one year of recruitment the selection in respect of each such year shall be made from the eligibility list prepared for that year. Sub-rule (2) lays down that list `A' need not be prepared in case the number of permanent vacancies has not exceeded the number of candidates remaining to be absorbed in such vacancies from list `B'. Under rule 14 the final recommendation is made by the Commission which has to forward the two lists as approved to the appointing authority. Rule 15 provides for rearrangement of both the lists in order of seniority by the appointing authority. In this respect, there is a departure from the Tehsildar Rules of 1966, because in the latter there was no re-arrangement of the `select list' in order of seniority, the rearrangement being confined to first list. Rule 16 lays down that the names of candidates included in list `A' for whom permanent vacancies cannot be found during the year of recruitment shall, at the end of the year, be transferred to the top of list `B' in the order in which their names appear in the list `A' as re-arranged under rule 15. It further provides that the names of candidates included in list `B' for whom vacancies cannot be found during the year shall be reviewed at the time of every succeeding selection and in case the selection committee considers that the work and conduct of any candidate since the preceding selection justifies so, it may remove his name from that list. This provision is more elaborate and express than that contained in rule 9 (6) which did not spell out the scope of review of the select list in so many words. A proviso to rule 16 lays down that the candidates who are selected for the list `B' for the first time shall be placed below those already on that list. This is again what was contained in the 1966 Rules. A proviso to rule 16 lays down that the candidates who are selected for the list `B' for the first time shall be placed below those already on that list. This is again what was contained in the 1966 Rules. Rule 17 provides that candidates included in list `A' shall be appointed against permanent vacancies and those for whom permanent vacancies are not immediately available shall be appointed against temporary or officiating vacancies in preference to those included in list 'B' This provision is virtually identical with that contained in Rule 9 of 1966 Tahsildar Rules. Rule 18 provides for appointment of candidates included in list `B' against temporary and officiating vacancies. It contains a further provision which was not contained in Tahsildar Rules 1966 to the effect that the candidates included in list `B' shall be appointed "after list `A' is exhausted, also against permanent vacancies." Rule 19 then goes on to lay down as follows : "absorption of List B Candidates in substantive vacancies. 19. Subject to the provisions of rule 18 candidates remaining in List B shall be appointed against fresh substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected for List A at the succeeding year of recruitment for the first time.". 10. It would appear that while the latter part of Rule 18 which provides for appointment of candidates included in list B against permanent vacancies operates during the period before the next selection takes place, Rule 19 operates after the next selection has taken place. The purport of the two provisions is thus similar though they operate over different periods of time. 11. While, as noted earlier, the 1966 Tahsildar Rules did not contain the description of the two lists as `Lists A and `B' the 1970 Rules did not contain any description of list B as `select List.' While the 1970 Rules did provide for absorption of persons included in list B against permanent vacancies, no specific provision was made for absorption of persons of any earlier `select list' that may have been prepared under any pre-existing rules governing any particular service, such as the Tahsildar Service Rules, 1966. The Government seems to have thought fit to extend the benefit of the latter part of Rule 18 (minus the proviso to that rule) and Rule 19 to candidates whose names were included in `select lists' prepared under earlier rules as well. The Government seems to have thought fit to extend the benefit of the latter part of Rule 18 (minus the proviso to that rule) and Rule 19 to candidates whose names were included in `select lists' prepared under earlier rules as well. Accordingly on July 4, 1972 it promulgated certain amendments to the 1970 Rules: In the definition clause (Rule 4) a new sub-clause (dd) was added to define "select list". Select list now means the list of candidates selected for temporary or officiating appointment in accordance with the rules or orders in force prior to the commencement of those rules, namely, 1970 rules. Two new rules-7A and 7-B were also inserted as follows : "7-A. Re-arrangement of the Select List - Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, but subject to the proviso to rule 18, the names of candidates on the select list appointed in temporary or officiating vacancies prior to the date of issue of this notification shall be re-arranged in order of seniority. 7-B. Appointment for Select List - The candidates of the select list, as re-arranged in accordance with rule 7-A, shall be appointed against substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected in accordance with the provisions of these rules." 12. The definition of "number of vacancies" for the purposes of Rule 8 was also amended consequentially. Earlier there was a reference only to the taking into account of the probable absorption of candidates of list B against substantive vacancies. Now this reference was expanded to cover the probable absorption of candidates of select lists as well. A- similar consequential amendment was made in Rule 13 (2). We are not concerned in these cases with other amendments made in Rules 4 and 6 of the 1970 Rules. All the amendments were made retrospective from October 6, 1970 which was the date of promulgation of the 1970 Rules. 13. The effect of the 1972 amendment was that the 300 persons who were included in the select list of 1966 for promotion against officiating and temporary vacancies on the posts of Tahsildar became entitled to be absorbed against permanent vacancies as well. We have already noted that no fresh selection had taken place after 1966. 14. On March 3, 1975 a Naib Tahsildar who had not been selected at the 1966 selection filed a Writ Petition No. 524 of 1975 in this court. We have already noted that no fresh selection had taken place after 1966. 14. On March 3, 1975 a Naib Tahsildar who had not been selected at the 1966 selection filed a Writ Petition No. 524 of 1975 in this court. His grievance was that he had failed to get selected in 1966 because of an adverse entry against him. That adverse entry was subsequently expunged. If any succeeding selection had taken place after 1966 he would have got a chance to be selected. But because of the 1972 amendments all the 300 persons of the select list of 1966 would have to be considered for absorption against permanent vacancies. Because of this no fresh selection was being held and he was being denied of the right to be considered for promotion in accordance with the 1966 Rules. He contended that Rules 7-A and 7-B, as inserted in 1972 in 1970 Rules, were discriminatory inasmuch as persons who may have been unsuccessful at an earlier selection or who may have become eligible subsequently to the last selection were being discriminated against in favour of the persons who were fortunate to get selected for officiating and temporary vacancies at the last selection under the old service rules. He prayed inter alia for the quashing of the said rules 7-A and 7B,. The record of the writ petition was sent for during the course of hearing and it appears from a perusal thereof that he had also prayed for the quashing of the 1966 selection though this relief was not pressed at the time of hearing of the writ petition. The writ petition was partly allowed by this court on March 29. 1979 to the extent that the Government and the Board were directed not to give effect to the said rules 7-A and 7-B while making substantive appointments to the posts of Tahsildar or while determining the seniority of the officers promoted to those posts. The other reliefs were refused. The State Government went in appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court which on February 11, 1980 stayed the operation of the judgment of this court till the disposal of the appeal. Ultimately however the appeal was dismissed on April 10. 1981 and their Lordships agreed with the decision of this court. The Supreme Court decision is reported as State of U. P. v. Rant Gopgal Shukla, AIR 1981 SC 1041 . Ultimately however the appeal was dismissed on April 10. 1981 and their Lordships agreed with the decision of this court. The Supreme Court decision is reported as State of U. P. v. Rant Gopgal Shukla, AIR 1981 SC 1041 . 15. In pursuance of the aforesaid rules 7-A and 7-B a large number of officers who at the last selection (which took place in 1967) for promotion to the posts of Naib Tahsildars had been placed in the select list were confirmed as Tahsildars on 23-8-78 and as many as 107 Tahsildars were likewise confirmed by various orders, the last of which was dated March 26, 1979. It seems that the rest of the candidates had either died or retired or were facing disciplinary proceedings and as such could not be immediately promoted. As no selection had taken place for such a long time a fresh selection for only temporary and officiating vacancies in the posts of Tahsildar was also held. The process started with the letter of the Board of Revenue to the Public Service Commission on December 17, 1977. In this letter it was stated that the number of permanent vacancies available was less than the number of persons available from the select list of 1966 and accordingly only 220 officiating and temporary vacancies were to be filled through a fresh selection. In view of the aforesaid rules 7-A and 7-B. Ultimately however a larger number of vacancies (275) was intimated, and the Commission selected as many as 271 persons for appointment against officiating and temporary vacancies. 16. All these steps had been taken either before the judgment of this court or during the period while the operation of the judgment of this court had been stayed by the hon'ble Supreme Court. In the selection held by the Commission in 1979-80 the officers whose names were included in the select list of 1966 were not considered. They ware not included in the eligibility list because they were being confirmed against substantive vacancies and accordingly the question of considering them for officiating and temporary vacancies did not arise. 17. As a result of this selection of 1979-80 some Naib Tahsildars who had not already been officiating as Tahsildars but were selected by the Commission were issued posting orders against officiating and temporary vacancies. 17. As a result of this selection of 1979-80 some Naib Tahsildars who had not already been officiating as Tahsildars but were selected by the Commission were issued posting orders against officiating and temporary vacancies. Consequentially some others who had been officiating on the posts of Tahsildars on an ad-hoc basis on the basis of their seniority but were not selected by the Commission were ordered to be reverted to the lower post of Naib Tahsildar. It may be mentioned here that under a general rule of the State Government ad hoc promotions are made on the basis of seniority subject to rejection as unfit and not on the basis of merit. The commission having selected persons junior to those who were working on ad hoc basis the ad hoc appointees were thus adversely affected. These ad-hoc appointees who had failed at the selection of 1979-80 then filed writ petitions challenging their reversion. These writ petitions were filed at Lucknow and also at Allahabad. At Allahabad two such writ petitions which had been filed by the officers were dismissed by a Division Bench. On November 4, 1980 and on November 17, 1980, the petitioners in these writ petitions had contended that the selection of 1979-80 was bad because it had been held on the assumption that Rules 7-A and 7-B were valid. Rules 7-A and 7-B were contended to be bad on the basis of the reasoning's given in the judgment of this court in Ram Gopal Shukla's case ( AIR 1981 SC 1041 ) on 29-3-79. The Division Bench at Allahabad dismissed these writ petitions on the ground that the petitioners had an alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal constituted under the I'. P. Public Services Tribunals Act. Against these orders of the Division Bench at Allahabad the unsuccessful petitioners went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court on 10-4-81 and quashed Rules 7-A and 7-B on the basis of the decision of their Lordships in Ram Gopal Shukla's case (supra). The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in these special leave petitions is reported in AIR 1981 SC 1575 and a copy of the same has also been filed in some of the writ petitions before us. The effect of this order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court will have to be considered hereinafter. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in these special leave petitions is reported in AIR 1981 SC 1575 and a copy of the same has also been filed in some of the writ petitions before us. The effect of this order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court will have to be considered hereinafter. Similar writ petitions before us are writ petitions nos. 1905 of 80; 1906 of 80; 1908 of 80; 1911 of 80; 1912 of 80; 1913 of'80; 1914 of'80; 1924 oi 80; 1925 of 80; 1963 of 80; 1964 of 80; 1996 of 80; 2031 of 80; 2081 of 80; 2085 of 80: 2093 of 80; 2141 of'80; 3955 of'80; In these writ petitions the petitioners have also taken other grounds individual to them for showing that the selection was not fairly held in so far as they were concerned. These writ petitions will hereinafter be referred to as the first set of petitions. 18. In the aforesaid first set of petitions the petitioners obtained interim orders staying the orders of reversion passed against them. The consequence of these stay orders was that some other officers who had been approved by the Commission at the aforesaid selection of 1979-80 and had been appointed as Tahsildars were ordered to be reverted. These officers have challenged the reversion orders passed against them in writ petitions numbers 2699 of 80; 2738 of 80; 2739 of 80; 2752 of 80; 2753 of 80: 2754 of 80; 2755 of 80; 2782 of 80; 2851 of 80; 2876 of 80; 2877 of 80; 2935 of 80; 3052 of 81; 3213 of 81; 2332 of 82; These petitions will hereinafter be referred to as writ petitions of the second set. 19. In the meantime the Supreme Court decision having been rendered on April 10. 1981 in Ram Gopal Shukla's case ( AIR 1981 SC 1041 ) the Government reviewed the entire situation. It felt that the decision of the Supreme Court having finally invalidated Rules 7-A and 7-B the selection of 1979-80 on the assumption of validity of the said rules could not stand either. Accordingly they passed an order on July 18, 1981. This was communicated in a D. O. letter of that date from the Special Secretary to the State Government addressed to the Secretary Board of Revenue. Accordingly they passed an order on July 18, 1981. This was communicated in a D. O. letter of that date from the Special Secretary to the State Government addressed to the Secretary Board of Revenue. This says that as Rules 7-A and 7-B had been held to be void, the Tahsildars confirmed on the basis that their names had been included in the select list of 1966 should be de-confirmed. It was further observed that rules 16 (2) and 13 of the 1970 rules still remained in force. The selection held in 1979-80 had also become void. Accordingly the orders of reversion of the ad hoc Tahsildars passed on the basis of their non-selection by the Commission at the 1979-80 selection were also to be cancelled and immediate steps were to be taken for fresh selection to be held for different years on the basis of separate i. e. year-wise eligibility lists. The officers whose names were included in the select list of 1966 and who had been confirmed in pursuance of that selection and were now being de-confirmed by the order-July 18, 1981 then filed writ petitions challenging the validity of these orders. Their contention is that their confirmation was valid dehors the impugned rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 rules. According to these officers they had been rightly confirmed by virtue of various provisions contained in the Tahsildar Services Rules of 1966. It was only rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 rules that had been invalidated by this court and thereafter by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and not the relevant rules of 1966. Indeed, even the selection of 1966 had not been challenged or at any rate the challenge was not pressed in Ram Gopal Shukla's case. The selection of 1966 thus remained valid notwithstanding the striking down of rules 7-A and 7-B. The Government had failed to consider the question as to whether the said confirmation would survive the invalidation of rules 7-A and 7-B. The Government had not given any opportunity of representation to the officers concerned before de-confirming them, nor had it consulted the commission, nor had it given valid reasons for its view that the invalidation or rules 7-A and 7-B. automatically invalidated the i979-80 selection and also the confirmation of officers whose names had been included in the select list of 1966. These writ petitions are Nos. These writ petitions are Nos. 5661 of 81; 5663 of 81; 5897 of 81; 6050 of 81; These petitions will hereinafter be referred to as the third set of writ petitions. 20. There is a separate writ petition (No. 3246 of 79) in which the eligibility list prepared for 1979-80 selection was challenged. The petitioner was Sadar Qanoongo. His grievance was that in the said eligibility list no Sadar Qanoongo was included although he was the seniormost amongst Sadar Qanoongos. Under rule 5 (4) of Tahsildar Rules, 1966 Sadar Qanoongos also constitute a source for promotion standing at par with Naib Tahsildar. The eligibility list contained names of only Naib Tahsildars. The eligibility list could not be so prepared as to exclude totally one of the sources of recruitment. Apparently the Board had prepared a combined seniority list for Sadar Qanoongos and Naib Tahsildars and on that basis prepared the eligibility list. The grievance of the petitioner is that in the case of Naib Tahsildars the seniority was counted from the date of their approval while for the Sadar Qanoongos seniority had been counted from.the date of confirmation, and that there was no basis for such discrimination against Sadar Qanoongos. This fact has however been factually denied by the Government and the Board. In this writ petition and also in some others of the first set filed by the candidates who were unsuccessful at the 1979-80 selection the extent of reservation in favour of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes as implemented by the Government has also been assailed as inconsistent with the standing Government orders on the subject. This is again controverted in the counter-affidavits. This writ petition may be. treated as a writ petition falling under the fourth set. 21. The Government decision as contained in its order dated July, 18, 1981 was extended even to Naib Tahsildars who had been promoted from the posts of Supervisor Qanoongos on the basis of the last selection held in 1967. As many as 417 persons' names had been included in the select list of 1967 under the Naib Tahsildar Rules of 1944. These officers were confirmed on August 23, 1978 on the basis of rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 Rules. They were ordered by Government to be de-confirmed after the Supreme Court decision. These Naib Tahsildars have also assailed their de-confirmation in writ petitions Nos. These officers were confirmed on August 23, 1978 on the basis of rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 Rules. They were ordered by Government to be de-confirmed after the Supreme Court decision. These Naib Tahsildars have also assailed their de-confirmation in writ petitions Nos. 4485 of 1981 and 92 of 1982. (hereinafter to be called as writ petitions of the fifth set). 22. It may be mentioned here that none of the 107 de-confirmed Tahsildars has challenged the de-confirmation order. It appears that earlier in the State Civil Services (Executive) Rules it had been provided that only confirmed Tahsildars could officiate as Deputy Collectors, but the Government has recently amended the rules in order to permit even unconfirmed Tahsildars to officiate on the post of Deputy Collectors. Thus it appears that these 107 officers, in spite of their de-confirmation on the post of Tahsildars, are continuing to officiate as Deputy Collectors. Thus these officers are not experiencing any immediate diminution in their position and as such they seem to be taking their de-confirmation easily. 23. We may first take up the first set of writ petitions filed by those officiating tahsildars who were unsuccessful at the 1979-80 selection and have challenged their non-selection on various grounds. Their contention inter alia is that the State Government's order dated July 18, 1981 quashing the selection is good and valid. The correctness of this contention will be examined separately while considering the other sets of writ petitions. Indeed, if that contention were to be upheld then the selection as a whole having itself been set aside by the Government this set of writ petitions could.be treated as having become in fructuous inasmuch as the petitioners would be getting another chance at a fresh selection. However, it would be expedient to examine also the other contentions of this set of writ petitioners in so far as their individual cases are concerned. 24. Raghottam Shukla petitioner No. 1 in Writ petition No. 1905 His contention is that he had received two entries of commendation by the District Magistrates Sarvasri P. D. Chaturvedi and Har Mohan Singh. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar by the Board of Revenue from 1-1-1980. His annual entry for the year 1978-79 was not placed before the Selection Committee. 25. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar by the Board of Revenue from 1-1-1980. His annual entry for the year 1978-79 was not placed before the Selection Committee. 25. S. N. Misra petitioner No. 2 in the same writ petition had been officiating as Tahsildar since 1-8-1973. He was given some adverse entries. His representations against them were pending inasmuch as no orders thereon had been communicated to him. So far as the two adverse entries Annexures A3 and A4 to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2 are concerned he says that these entries were never communicated to him. He further says that the adverse entries for the years 1975-76 mentioned in para 12 of the counter had been expunged by the Commissioner. The counter also shows that his integrity has not been certified by the District Magistrate Allahabad for the year 1978-79. The petitioner's representation against this remark of the District Magistrate was still pending. 26. Bishambhar Nath, petitioner No. 3 in the same writ petition had been officiating as Tahsildar since 1971, He had received commendatory entries in the various years. Although his representation against adverse remarks given to him at the close of certain departmental proceedings in 1977 had been rejected by the Board of Revenue, he had filed a claim petition against that decision before the U. P. Public Service Tribunal. That claim petition is still pending. 27. R. P. Sharma, petitioner No. 4 in the same writ petition, has, we were informed, expired during the pendency of the writ petition. 28. S. R. Tiwari, petitioner in writ petition No. 1996 of 1980 had been officiating as Tahsildar since 1966 and he contends that there was no good ground for not selecting him in spite of his continuous officiation for such a long period. 29. V. N. Singh, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1924 of 1980, states in para 5 of the writ petition that there was no adverse entry against him. In para 4 of the counter, however, adverse entries for the years 1958-59 and 1969-70 are mentioned but it is not stated whether these adverse entries were communicated to the petitioner. 30. Gopichand Vishnoi, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1911 of 1980, has assailed the selection only on general grounds like S. R. Tiwari (supra). 31. In para 4 of the counter, however, adverse entries for the years 1958-59 and 1969-70 are mentioned but it is not stated whether these adverse entries were communicated to the petitioner. 30. Gopichand Vishnoi, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1911 of 1980, has assailed the selection only on general grounds like S. R. Tiwari (supra). 31. T. S. Saxena petitioner of writ petition No. 1906 of 1980 officiated as a Deputy Collector from 1-6-74 to 6-1-76. He was given an adverse entry by the Commissioner in 1975-76 which mentions, inter alia, his reversion from the post of Deputy Collector. A claim petition of the petitioner against this entry was pending before the Public Service Tribunal. Another adverse remark for the year 1977-78 given by the District Magistrate was expunged by the Commissioner on 30-11-1979 i.e. after the date of his interview by the Selection Committee. His contention is that the selection was vitiated because the fact that the adverse entry for the year 1977-78 had been represented against and was ultimately expunged, was not before the Selection Committee. The Commission was not intimated about the pendency of his representation before the higher authorities or his claim petition before the Tribunal. 32. Bhikhari Pandey, petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3955 of 1980, had been officiating as Tahsildar since 1976. He was awarded adverse entry in the year 1976-77 by the District Magistrate and a representation against the same was pending before the Commissioner. He was asked at the interview about some other adverse entries also and he told the interviewing board about his representation against the entry for the year 1976-77 and about non-communication of other adverse entries. 33. As regards S. P. Gupta petitioner of Writ Petition No. 1914 of 1980, Sri M. R. Misra, learned counsel intimated that he had no instructions in regard to this writ petition. 34. Sri Mannan, learned counsel for D. S. Kashyap petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1908 of 1980 has contended that there were at least nine persons mentioned in para 38 whose record was worse than that of the petitioner who have been selected while the petitioner had been rejected. This shows the arbitrariness of the selection. 34. Sri Mannan, learned counsel for D. S. Kashyap petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1908 of 1980 has contended that there were at least nine persons mentioned in para 38 whose record was worse than that of the petitioner who have been selected while the petitioner had been rejected. This shows the arbitrariness of the selection. This contention is however not open to any unsuccessful candidate, particularly when the selection is made by an autonomous body like Public Service Commission which has a special constitutional status and which has been charged with the responsibility of making such selections. It is not open to this court to sit in judgment over the comparative appraisal of merit made by the commission or by the Selection Committee comprising participation of the Public Service Commission. 35. So far as the other writ petitions of this set are concerned the remaining learned counsel only adopted general arguments of other counsel in which the validity of the selection as a whole was assailed and did not advance any argument individual to the respective petitioners. 36. Having given careful consideration to the submission made before us in regard to the individual cases we are of the opinion that the grievances are not such so as to vitiate the selection. The matter is covered by the decisions of the two Constitution Benches of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in R.L. Butail v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 876 and Prakash Chandra Sharma v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission, 1970 Serv LR 116. It is true that in Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1622 : 1979 Lab IC 1186 it was held that it was contrary to the principles of natural justice for a selection Committee to take into consideration adverse entries which were not communicated to the concerned official and against which he had no opportunity of making representation or in respect of which his representation was pending and had not been disposed of. The officer concerned in this case, namely, Fijji, had complained of non-selection by the Selection Committee under the IAS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations. These regulations required that the reasons for supersession of any State Administrative Service Officer should be recorded by the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee had not recorded those reasons as well, and the selection was as such vitiated. These regulations required that the reasons for supersession of any State Administrative Service Officer should be recorded by the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee had not recorded those reasons as well, and the selection was as such vitiated. The principles of natural justice were apparently applied to the particular selection because of the special provisions of the IAS (Appointment by Promotions) Regulations. The two decisions of the larger Benches mentioned earlier were not referred to by their Lordships and indeed one of them, namely, Bulail's case has been subsequently followed in the context of validity of an order of compulsory retirement in Union of India v. M. E. Reddi, AIR 1980 SC 563 : 1980 Lab IC 221. Thus the two decisions of the Constitution Benches in Butail and Sharma (Supra) are binding. There is no plea of any malice in fact against the selection Committee by these petitioners. It was thus merely fortuitous that representations against any adverse entry either remained pending or were not placed before the Selection Committee. There is no suggestion that any deliberate attempt was made by any one to withhold any representation or other relevant material from the Selection Committee or from the Commission. Moreover, as held in Mir Ghulam Husain v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1138 : 1973 Lab IC 795 mere absence of adverse remarks in one's character roll does not necessarily make an officer meritorious enough for a selection based on merit. We have already noted that these selections were based on merit and not on the principle of seniority subject to the rejection of unfit. Thus, in our view the selection cannot be assailed on the grounds advanced in the individual cases before us as noted above. We are not satisfied that these omissions had any substantial effect on the result of the selection. 37. A general ground advanced by various officers assailing the 1979-80 selection is that the Government orders, relating to reservation in favour of backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were not correctly implemented in this selection. The reservation in promotion posts in favour of backward classes (other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) was made for the first time by G. O. dated 13-1-78. The reservation in promotion posts in favour of backward classes (other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) was made for the first time by G. O. dated 13-1-78. In a G.O. dated 5-7-79 the Government clarified that this reservation was to be made available only in respect of vacancies occurring only after the date of the G. O. namely, 13-1-78. The reservation on promotions posts in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was made by G. O. dated 8-3-1973. By G. O. dated 18-1-1975 issued by the Appointment Department to the Secretary, Public Service Commission it was explained that this reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would be operative in respect of even earlier, i.e. pre-existing, vacancies which may come to be filled after 8-3-1973. These facts have been brought out in paras 19 and 20 of the counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 5663 of 1981, R. N. Tiwari v. State of U. P.. It has also been pointed out in the counter affidavit that these instructions were duly followed in the finalisation of the selection for 1979-80. The relevant charts were also produced before us by the learned State Counsel and the same could not be controverted. As such, there is no substance in the contention of any of the petitioners that the provisions regarding reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes were not correctly applied. 38. It has also been urged by Sri Brijesh Kumar that as the statutory rules did not provide for reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes, the executive orders in that behalf cannot prevail. We find no merit in this contention either. The rules are silent on the subject of reservation, and the Government orders merely supplement the rules. The two are reconcilable with each other - though it would have been better to mention in each set of rules that reservation in favour of backward classes, etc. shall be governed by executive instructions issued from time to time in that behalf. The further contention that executive orders regarding reservation could not validly cover pre-existing vacancies is also untenable. A provision of this nature is not treated as a retrospective provision. It is prospective in that it deals with the filling of vacancies in future. 39. shall be governed by executive instructions issued from time to time in that behalf. The further contention that executive orders regarding reservation could not validly cover pre-existing vacancies is also untenable. A provision of this nature is not treated as a retrospective provision. It is prospective in that it deals with the filling of vacancies in future. 39. Another point urged before us was that the State Government had made Rules on 14-5-1979 for regularisation of preexisting ad hoc appointments and that the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the same. This contention is without any substance because the said rules relate only to direct appointments from the open market on ad hoc basis and not to ad hoc officiating promotions. 40. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had already allowed similar writ petitions which had been filed at Allahabad as noted earlier. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the special leave petitions from an Allahabad Bench reported in Balram Prasad Rawat v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1575 does not however say anything about the validity or otherwise of the 1979-80 selection. On behalf of the petitioners before the Hon'ble Supreme Court the only relief pressed for was the quashing of Rules 7-A and 7-B of the promotion Rules of 1970 which were added in 1972 as noted earlier and it was this relief alone which was granted by the Hon'ble Court. If nothing else was asked for or considered it cannot be said by implication that their Lordships had by the said order set aside the selection itself. 41. We may now consider the submissions made by Sri B.C. Saxena learned counsel for the petitioners in the second and third sets of petitions. His contention is that the selection was valid and that it was wrong to revert the particular petitioners of the second set because of the stay orders obtained by the unsuccessful candidates. Reversions, if at all, should have been made in the reverse order of over all seniority. It has been explained in the counter affidavit and in arguments on behalf of the State that what was done was to prepare year wise selection lists and to rearrange the year wise lists in order of seniority. Reversions, if at all, should have been made in the reverse order of over all seniority. It has been explained in the counter affidavit and in arguments on behalf of the State that what was done was to prepare year wise selection lists and to rearrange the year wise lists in order of seniority. The officers picked out for reversion, though fighter in the overall gradation list than some who have been retained, figured in the selection lists for subsequent years while the latter figured in the selection lists for earlier years. The rearrangement in order of seniority was not made in one consolidated list but in the selection list for each year. It is thus that some juniors who were found more meritorious came to be retained while their seniors were reverted. The contention of Sri Saxena is that the rules did not require year wise re-arrangement of lists but a rearrangement in order of seniority of the consolidated selection lists A and B as a whole. 42. Rule 13 of the 1970 Rules clearly lays down that the Selection Committee shall prepare two lists, in order of merit, namely, list `A' containing the names of the candidates recommended for substantive appointment against permanent vacancies and list `B' containing the names of candidates recommended for temporary or officiating appointments. The proviso to rule 13 (1) lays down that if recruitment is made for vacancies occurring during more than one year the selection in respect of each such year shall be made from the eligibility list prepared for that year. In such a case the names of candidates selected against vacancies of one year will be excluded from the eligibility list or lists of subsequent year or years as the case may be before making the selection from the eligibility list of the second and subsequent years. Rule 14 provides that the Commission shall consider the recommendations of the Selection Committee and thereafter sent the lists A and B as approved to the appointing authority. Rule 15 lays down that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) and the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 16 the appointing authority shall re-arrange each of the lists A and B in order of seniority. 43. Rule 15 lays down that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) and the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 16 the appointing authority shall re-arrange each of the lists A and B in order of seniority. 43. The question that arises is whether the mention in Rule 15 of "each of the lists A and B" is to be read as mention of each of the said lists for every year separately or for each of the said lists for all the years combined. Rule 15 has to be read in harmony with rules 13, 14 and 16. It cannot be read in isolation. The entire tenor of the Rules 13, 14 and 16 is that there would be a separate list A and a separate list B for each year of recruitment. There is no combined list A for all the years of recruitment and no combined list B for all the years of recruitment taken into account at a particular selection. As such we agree with the learned Advocate General that there were no consolidated lists A or B for all the years which could be rearranged in order of seniority under Rule 15. The lists received by the appointing authority were for separate years and it was those lists for each year that were required under rule 15 to be rearranged in order of seniority. Thus, provided the selection for 1979-80 is good, the criterion adopted by the State for reverting the persons approved in that selection to make room for ad hoc appointees who had to be accommodated because of the stay orders obtained by them from this court, could not be objected to. 44. The learned counsel for these petitioners has pointed out that there were in fact quite a large number of vacancies and that the Government had also sanctioned thirty additional posts of temporary Tahsildars and that there was no need of reverting anyone at all. So far as these thirty posts are concerned they were sanctioned only because of the stay orders obtained by rival set of officers. The Government sanction, being itself related to the stay orders, cannot be used as a basis for final decision of the writ petitions. However, Sri Saxena pointed out that there were even otherwise a large number of vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Collectors and also in the cadre of Tahsildars. The Government sanction, being itself related to the stay orders, cannot be used as a basis for final decision of the writ petitions. However, Sri Saxena pointed out that there were even otherwise a large number of vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Collectors and also in the cadre of Tahsildars. The vacancies in the cadre of Deputy Collectors were to be filled by officiating promotions of Tahsildars. All this will however have to be taken into account by the Government and we expect that they would not unnecessarily revert any person who was found meritorious enough by the Commission and who could be accommodated against any available vacancy. Subject thereto and also to the decision in the third set, we find no merit in the second set of writ petitions. 45. The writ petition of the fourth set, namely, petition No. 3246 of 1979 has also no merit, there was no separate promotion quota for Sadar Qanoongos. These posts are treated as equivalent to those of Naib Tahsildars. Accordingly a combined seniority list had to be prepared for Sadar Qanoongos and Naib Tahsildars which both constitute parallel sources of promotion. It has been pointed out on behalf of the State that in both cases seniority had been counted from the date of their substantive promotion in the cadre of Naib Tahsildars or Sadar Qanoongon, as the case may be, as provided in their respective rules 23 and 10. Although there is no specific rule governing the preparation of such a combined list, it is always open to the Government to take a policy decision of this nature, so long as the decision is fair and reasonable and does not conflict with any statutory rule. As a uniform rule has been applied to both the categories of posts the policy decision is quite fair and reasonable and is thus unassailable. Whether separate promotion quotas should be prescribed for these parallel sources is a matter for policy decision by Government after considering all relevant aspects of the matter. 46. These petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rule 8 of the 1970 Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Brijesh Kumar has contended that rule 8 by laying down a formula of proportionality is inconsistent with the provision that the selection is to be based on merit. The criterion of merit required that every eligible person should be considered. These petitioners have also challenged the validity of Rule 8 of the 1970 Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Brijesh Kumar has contended that rule 8 by laying down a formula of proportionality is inconsistent with the provision that the selection is to be based on merit. The criterion of merit required that every eligible person should be considered. We find no substance in this argument. One rule cannot be held invalid on the ground of its inconsistency with another rule. Both the rules have to be read together. The rules themselves say that whenever the criterion provided is that of merit the selection shall be made in a particular manner as laid down in other rules. That manner visualises the preparation of an eligibility list which is confined to a certain number of senior-most eligible candidates, the number being a multiple of the number, of vacancies for various years. This is a normal formula which has been taken notice of by courts in numerous decisions, and there is nothing wrong with such prescription. The criterion of `merit' does not mean that even the junior-most eligible person who may have been several hundred places below must necessarily be considered for a promotion post. Even in respect of the so called criterion of `merit' some regard has invariably to be paid to the factor of seniority. Limiting the field of eligibility to the senior-most candidates in the manner laid down in rule 8 is in no way repugnant to the principle of selection on the basis of merit. We thus find no substance in this contention. 47. We are then left with the third and fifth sets of petitions which raise twin questions, namely, whether the selection made in 1979-80 for the post of Tahsildars was rendered invalid in consequence of invalidation of rules 7-A and 7-B and whether the confirmation of Naib Tahsildars was also rendered invalid by the invalidation of rules 7-A and 7-B. We have to consider the validity of the Government order dated July 18, 1981 setting aside the selection of 1979-80 and of the Government order de-confirming the Naib Tahsildars who had been confirmed on August 23, 1978, purportedly on the basis of rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 Rules. 48. 48. The main submission on behalf of the petitioners who have sought to up-hold the 1979-80 selection for the posts of Tahsildars and the confirmation of Naib Tahsildars is as follows : They have contended that the invalidation of rules 7-A and 7-B has not made any substantial difference to the position of either the Tahsidars whose names were included in the select list of 1966 under the Tahsildar Rules, 1966, or of the Naib Tahsildars whose names had been placed in the select list of 1967 under the Naib Tahsildar Rules, 1944. As regards Tahsildars it has been pointed out that only rules 7-A and 7-B of 1970 rules have been invalidated and not the other rules of 1970. The definition of `select list' as given in the newly added rule 4 (dd) may also be ignored, but the provisions of rules 8, 13 and 16 to 19 are to be assumed to be valid. These rules contemplate that a selection may take place not necessarily for only one year of recruitment but instead for several years of recruitment at one time. This is contemplated in the first proviso to rule 8. The proviso to rule 13 (i) lays down that separate lists of selected candidates prepared for these years of recruitment shall be taken into account at one selection, Sub-rule (2) of this rule lays down that list `A' need not be prepared in case the number of permanent vacancies does not exceed the number of candidates remaining to be absorbed in permanent vacancies from list B. Rule 18 contemplates, that the candidates whose names are included in list B shall be appointed not only against temporary or officiating vacancies but also after list A is exhausted, against permanent vacancies. Rule 19 contemplates that candidates remaining in list B shall be appointed against fresh substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected for list A at the succeeding year of recruitment for the first time. Rule 19 contemplates that candidates remaining in list B shall be appointed against fresh substantive vacancies in preference to any candidate selected for list A at the succeeding year of recruitment for the first time. It has further been contended that the `select list' of 1966, although not described as `list B' in the 1966 Tahsildar Rules, was for all practical purposes `list B' as contemplated in the 1970 Rules and should be deemed to be `list B' and the persons whose names are included in that list should have preference over persons selected for list A at the succeeding year of recruitment for the first time under the 1970 Rules. 49. Likewise, it has been contended in regard to Naib Tahsildar Rules, 1944, that under rule 17 (2) (vi) it has been laid down that the select list "will hold good only for one year or until such time as a review made at the following selection." It has been again urged that rule 20, which is headed "waiting list of candidates", lays down that the names of persons selected for vacancies to be filled by direct recruitment, by promotion, or under rule 18 (2). were to be collectively called listed candidates and were to be entered according to the year of their selection in a list maintained by the Board. Rule 22 lays down that the Board shall on the occurrence of substantive vacancies in the Service make appointments thereto in the order of seniority of candidates whose names are entered in the list maintained under rule 20. The contention of Sri B.C. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioners in the fifth set of writ petitions Nos. 4485 of 1981 and 92 of 1982 - is that the persons whose names were included in the 1967 select list should be deemed to have been included in the waiting list prepared under rule 20 and should accordingly be deemed to have been confirmed, i.e. substantively appointed, under rule 22 of the 1944 Rules, and as such, the mere invalidation of rules 7-A and 7-B of the 1970 rules should not lead to their de-confirmation. 50. 50. In this connection learned counsel Sri B. C. Saxena and Sri Misra have invited our attention to the observations made in State of U. P. v. Ram Gopal Shukla, AIR 1981 SC 1041 in para 12 to the following effect : "There appears to be no rational basis for such a departure from the ordinary operation of the 1970 Rules which envisaged the preparation of a new list every year and for singling out one particular list for according preferential treatment to the persons whose names were contained therein." 51. The learned counsel has also invited our attention to the observations in para 6 of the same report to the effect that "the procedure laid down in the 1970 Rules for promotion as Tahsildar was not substantially different from that laid down in the Tahsildar Rules 1966-", and that the respondent, therefore, did not feel aggrieved even by the introduction of the 1970 Rules. From these observations it has been sought to be contended that the rest of 1970 Rules, including the ones referred to above, which contemplated appointments against permanent vacancies from list B and which also contemplated a selection for several years of recruitment at one time, should be deemed to have received the approval of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 52. These passages, in our opinion, do not support the extreme contention of the learned counsel for these petitioners. All that these two passages show is that no occasion arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to examine the rest of the 1970 Rules the validity of which was not questioned before them. If at all, the passage in para 12 of the report goes against the petitioners because their Lordship construed the 1970 Rules to mean that they envisaged the preparation of selection lists every year. The contention of the respondent in that case AIR 1981 SC 1041 , State of U.P. v. Ramgopal Shukla in para 7 of the report to the effect that "the life of the Select List of 1966 was for one year only on the expiry of which it died its natural death" was noticed and was upheld in Para 12 of the report. Their Lordships have observed in this paragraph that if there had been a selection and the list had been revised every year as was the requirement of the rules, the respondents, and like him many others, would have been included in the list. By way of example (precaution) their Lordships added that some candidates who had not completed seven years could not be included in the select list of 1966 but after a lapse of time they became eligible and they might have been selected if fresh selection had taken place in subsequent years. 53. It has also been contended that the main ground on which the respondent Ram Gopal Shukla succeeded in that case was that it was represented to their Lordships that "unless the list of 300 persons is exhausted no other person can be selected," (vide para 15 of the report) and that "it would take twenty-four years to exhaust the above list and till then no selection is possible" (vide paras 12 of the report). It has been contended that the facts were not properly placed in that case on behalf of the state and that there was no question of the list taking twenty-four years to exhaust inasmuch as quite a large number of officers had already retired or died or were about to retire or in the meantime were promoted or were likely to be promoted to the posts of Deputy Collectors. The mere circumstance that these facts were not expressly placed before their Lordships is irrelevant, looking to the binding nature of the law declared in the case.. Indeed this case has been follow in Balram Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 1575 as noticed earlier. In this latter decision their Lordships have categorically declared rules 7-A and 7-B to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 54. We cannot thus read a stray sentence from here or a stray sentence from there in the judgment tearing it out of the context. 55. In this context we should first make it clear that we are not at all impressed by the contention of learned counsel for some of the petitioners to the effect that the reference to `List-B` occurring in 1970 Rules, in particular Rr. 13, 18, and 19, should be construed to take in even the `select list' prepared under the 1966 Tahsildar Rules. 13, 18, and 19, should be construed to take in even the `select list' prepared under the 1966 Tahsildar Rules. It is true that the nature of the `select List' under the Tahsildar Rules of 1966 and of `List-B' under the new Rules is similar, but that is not conclusive of the matter. It is the new Rules which require the preparation of List A and List B. So wherever the rules refer to List B, the reference could only take in a List B prepared under the new Rules. The reference cannot automatically take in any `select list' prepared under any preexisting rules for filling any officiating and temporary vacancies. If the rules automatically were construed to be as taking in even the old select lists, then there would have been no need at all of making the amendments in 1972 for adding new Rr. 7A and 7B. The very fact that these new rules were added indicates that the Government itself realised that while Rr. 13, 18 and 19 referred to a List B prepared under the new rules, there was no similar provision available for accommodating persons whose names appeared on a select list prepared under the pre-existing rules. It was for treating such select list on par with a List B prepared under the rules that the amendements were made in 1972. Those amendments having been invalidated, it cannot now be said that the amendments were redundant, and that the provisions of the 1970 Rules would still have the same effect notwithstanding those amendments and notwithstanding the invalidation of the said amendments. That would be clearly self-contradictory and also contrary to the settled rules of interpretation of statutes. 56. In this view of the matter the persons whose names were included in the old `select List' cannot derive any advantage out of the references to `List B' contained in Rr. 13, 18 and 19. It is, therefore, really unnecessary to go into the question of validity of the provisions of rules 8, 13, 18 and 19 which contemplate the preparation of select lists for several years at one time and for absorption of candidates figuring in List B in permanent and substantive vacancies. 13, 18 and 19. It is, therefore, really unnecessary to go into the question of validity of the provisions of rules 8, 13, 18 and 19 which contemplate the preparation of select lists for several years at one time and for absorption of candidates figuring in List B in permanent and substantive vacancies. However, it is quite clear that the said rules of 1970 can only be interpreted in the light of the law declared in Ram Gopal Shukla's case, ( AIR 1981 SC 1041 ) (supra). Learned Advocate General was right in conceding that the validity of the second part of rule 18 and of rule 19 has become doubtful in view of that decision. Without going to the extent of casting doubt on the validity of the said rules it cannot in any case be doubted that the rules have to be "read down" to some extent in order to make them constitutional. Possibly a selection may have to be made for more than one year under compelling necessity such as when a selection in a succeeding year could not take place due to any stay orders passed by-courts, and so on. In that case R. 8 will, no doubt, govern the number of persons to be included in the eligibility list. There may also be a few months' administrative delay in making selection for a succeeding year. Conceivably in a case there may be an error in calculating the numbers of permanent and temporary vacancies which were intimated to the commission. Possibly, some posts which were temporary when intimated to the Commission may be converted into permanent posts after the selection has been finalised. In such exceptional circumstances, particularly where the number included in List B is quite small, it may conceivably be permissible to transfer the names of such persons from a List B to List A or to give them substantive or permanent appointments. In such exceptional circumstances, particularly where the number included in List B is quite small, it may conceivably be permissible to transfer the names of such persons from a List B to List A or to give them substantive or permanent appointments. But it cannot be constitutionally permissible to transfer en bloc and in a routine manner and even under ordinary circumstances all the persons of List B to List A or to absorb them against permanent and substantive vacancies in preference to those who did not get a chance to be considered at the earlier selection because of their not completing the requisite qualifying service or who could not get selected because of some adverse entries which were expunged only subsequently and who are ultimately successful and are found more meritorious for being included in List A at the subsequent selection. This conclusion is inescapable in view of the categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal Shukla and Balram Prasad Rawat (supra) ( AIR 1981 SC 1041 and AIR 1981 SC 1575 ). 57. Thus, the contention that the invalidation of rules 7 A and 7 B has not made any difference to the right of the candidates whose names figured in the select list of 1966 to be absorbed in permanent vacancies under rules 18 and 19 is clearly untenable. 58. Likewise, the contention of the Naib Tahsildars that the waiting list mentioned in R. 20 of the Naib Tahsildar Rules, 1944 was to include persons whose names figured in the `Select List' as well cannot be accepted. R. 17 itself contemplates preparation of two lists, one for substantive appointments and other for officiating and' temporary appointments. R. 22 lays down that the listed candidates will be appointed against substantive vacancies. We have to harmonise all the rules. It is thus clear that R. 22 contemplates that only persons whose names figure in the list prepared for substantive vacancies are to be appointed on the occurrence of such vacancies. If persons whose names figured in the select list prepared for appointment against temporary and officiating vacancies were also to be given substantive appointments, then R. 17 to the extent it requires the preparation of two lists becomes meaningless. The distinction between the two lists would in that event stand obliterated. Such a construction would clearly be contrary to the intendment of the rules. The distinction between the two lists would in that event stand obliterated. Such a construction would clearly be contrary to the intendment of the rules. We, therefore, agree with the State's contention that the confirmation of these Niub Tahsildars could be justified only under rules 7A and 7B of the 1970 Rules which have been found to be invalid. In the circumstances their de-confirmation was a direct consequence of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which struck down the said rules. 59. Another contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the select list of 1966 was still valid, at least for officiating and temporary vacancies. As such there was nothing objectionable if the Government made another selection for only temporary and officiating vacancies after excluding from consideration the officers whose names already figured in the select list of 1966. On the other hand, learned Advocate-General has contended that it is not permissible to hold a selection for filling only temporary and officiating vacancies. The Explanation I (a) defines the number of vacancies as including the total number of substantive, temporary or officiating vacancies. Rule 8 gives the number of persons whose names shall be included in the eligibility list, as directly proportional to the number of vacancies taken into account. If permanent vacancies were to be excluded then the number of persons to be included in the eligibility list would be correspondingly reduced. Rule 13 also lays down that the selection Committee shall prepare two lists, in order of merit, namely, `List A' and `List B'. Sub-rule (2) of this rules contemplates that there would be only one eventuality in which `List A' need not be prepared and that eventuality is defined as "in case the number of permanent vacancies does not exceed the number of candidates remaining to be absorbed in permanent vacancies from List B." 60. While the rules contemplate the preparation of two lists, namely, `List A' and `List B' for permanent and temporary vacancies respectively, there may no doubt be circumstances in which `List A' need not or cannot be prepared. For instance, when for any reason the Government decides to keep the permanent posts in abeyance or decides not be fill them immediately, and accordingly there are no permanent vacancies available at all, then of course, `List A' cannot be prepared. For instance, when for any reason the Government decides to keep the permanent posts in abeyance or decides not be fill them immediately, and accordingly there are no permanent vacancies available at all, then of course, `List A' cannot be prepared. The learned Advocate-General also, conceded that minor discrepancies in the number of vacancies intimated to the commission would not make a selection invalid. For instance, if the number of vacancies according to the correct calculation was 10 and by some mistake only 9 vacancies were intimated, or even if, say, 11 vacancies were intimated, the selection may not be vitiated merely on the ground that the number of persons included in the eligibility list prepared under rule 8 was less than or more than the number which should correctly have been included. However, in the present case quite a large number of vacancies was deliberately excluded because of the Government's view as it then prevailed that Rules 7A and 7B were valid and because of the stay order it had obtained from the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the operation of this Court's judgment in Ram Gopal Shukla's case. The result was that as many as 107 permanent vacancies were excluded on this ground. The number of vacancies intimated was 275, while the number of persons called for interview was 387. It also appears that quite a number of persons included in the eligibility lists were those who had either retired or had died in the meantime but whose cases were nonetheless considered at the selection. There is some confusion on facts with regard to the number of posts which were actually available for being filled through a regular selection. Learned counsel for some of the petitioners, Sri B. C. Saxena, placed before us a G. O. dated 25th June, 1982 issued in connection with the implementation of the Pay Commission Report. It shows that on 1-7-79 there were in all 303 permanent posts and 22 temporary posts of Tashildars all over the State. It is not known as to how many were already holding permanent posts. Presumably all or almost all confirmed Tahsildars must have been promoted as Deputy Collectors though not confirmed in the cadre of Deputy Collectors. As such their lien would still be on the posts of Tahsildars. Those permanent posts could, therefore, be only filled by temporary and officiating appointments. Presumably all or almost all confirmed Tahsildars must have been promoted as Deputy Collectors though not confirmed in the cadre of Deputy Collectors. As such their lien would still be on the posts of Tahsildars. Those permanent posts could, therefore, be only filled by temporary and officiating appointments. The exact position is thus not clear as to how many permanent posts were available for being filled by substantive appointments or by temporary or officiating appointments respectively. Of course, temporary posts were all occupied by temporary appointees of the 1966 selection. Howsoever, that may be the fact remains that in the instant case the number of posts intimated to the Commission was short of the actual number available by roughly a hundred. This huge number did have the effect of making a substantial difference in the number of persons who could be considered for inclusion in the eligibility list. Some of them, namely, the Sadar Kanungos have indeed filed a writ petition complaining of non-inclusion of their names in the eligibility list. Thus the deviation from the requirement of rule 8 was not a minor deviation but was quite a substantial deviation which, in our opinion, did affect the validity of the selection. 61. In taking this view, we are ignoring the circumstance that the 66 persons who were available from the `select list' of 1966 had been excluded from consideration while preparing the eligibility list of 1979-80 on the ground that they had already been confirmed as Tahsildars under rules 7A and 7B. If rules 18 and 19 of the 1970 Rules were to be held to have operation to their fullest extent, then the result would be that the persons whose names are included in the 1979-80 selection would get a prior chance of absorption against permanent vacancies under rule 19, while the 66 persons who were earlier wrongly confirmed because of the operation of rules 7A and 7B (which have been subsequently discovered to be void) would stand deprived of a chance of absorption against permanent vacancies because of the striking down of rules 7A and 7B. Of course, if the latter parts of rule 18 and also the rule 19 were to be assumed to be invalid or to be inoperative to this extent, then the non-inclusion of the persons of the 1966, `select list' in the 1979-80 selection would not be causing any substantial prejudice to those officers. 62. Thus although the Government order dated 18th July, 1981 did not spell out the reasons for treating the selection list of 1979-80 as void, we are of the view that as the selection itself was void for reasons stated above, the question of examining the validity of the order dated 18th July, 81 can have only academic interest. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the order does not give reasons on the face of it, the court should not permit the State to advance additional reasons, nor should itself look into the State files for discovering whether there was any valid reason for issuance of the order dated 18th July, 1981. It has further been urged that even if the Government was of the opinion that the selection of 1979-80 was bad, it was not open to the Government to have passed such an order on its own. Only a Court could have set aside the selection. If at all the Government was competent to adjudicate on its validity, then it should have given opportunity to the persons affected of representing the legal position and also to the Commission of stating its views before passing such an order. The order was contended to be violative of the principles of natural justice. We find no substance in i hese contentions. A Constitution Bench in its decision in the State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521 , had occasion to consider a similar question. In that case a number of Tahsildars were confirmed by the Pepsu Government, after re-organisation of States the officers came to be allotted to the Punjab State. The Punjab Government found that actually there were no vacancies available against which the confirmations could be ordered by the Pepsu Government. In that case a number of Tahsildars were confirmed by the Pepsu Government, after re-organisation of States the officers came to be allotted to the Punjab State. The Punjab Government found that actually there were no vacancies available against which the confirmations could be ordered by the Pepsu Government. Accordingly, it issued an order to the effect that the Pepsu Government's order was wholly wrong and that the Punjab Government cancelled the notification regarding confirmation and also the notification regarding creation of certain supernumerary posts and further adding that the said officers would consequently stand de-confirmed reverting to their original status as officiating Tahsildars. The validity of this subsequent order was challenged by the officers concerned. Their Lordships found that the original order of confirmation was actually void. On this basis it was observed as follows in para 8 of the report : "The question then is as to the effect of a void order of confirmation. When an order is void on the ground that the authority which made it had no power to make it, it cannot give rise to any legal rights, and as suggested by the learned Advocate-General, any person could have challenged the status of the respondents as Tahsildars by instituting proceedings for the issue of a writ of quo warranto under Article 226 of the Constitution. Had such proceedings been taken it would not have been possible for the respondents to justify their status as permanent Tahsildars and the High Court would have issued a writ of quo warrantor depriving the respondents of their status as permanent Tahsildars. Now, where the Government itself realises that an order made by an authority under the Government is void, is it powerless to do anything in the matter? Is it bound to give effect to a void order and treat as confirmed Tashildars persons who have no legal right to be treated as confirmed Tahsildars? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the fact of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31, 1957 ? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the fact of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31, 1957 ? In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that persons a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status. No doubt, the Government has used the expression "de-confirming" in its notification which may be susceptible of the meaning that it purported to undo an act which was therefore valid. We must, however, interpret the expression in the light of actual facts which led up to the notification. Those facts clearly show that the so-called confirmation by the Financial Commissioner of Pepsu was no confirmation at all and was thus invalid. In view of this, the notification of October 31, 1957 could be interpreted to mean that the Government did not accept the validity of the confirmation of the respondents and other persons who were confirmed as Tahsildars by the Financial Commissioner, Pepsu." 63. This passage completely answers the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. If the selection itself was bad, it could not give rise to any legal rights in favour of the persons selected. They have, therefore, no locus standi to challenge the validity of the order dated 18th July, 1981. The principle that reasons cannot be supplemented subsequently by an authority applies only to order affecting the legal rights of the citizens and not to an order of an authority rightly realising or conceding the invalidity of its earlier action. In this view of the matter, the question of giving any opportunity to any party did not also arise. 64. To sum up (a) The first set of writ petitions filed by unsuccessful candidates at the 1979-80 selection has become infructuous in as much as the selection itself has been found to be invalid. In this view of the matter, the question of giving any opportunity to any party did not also arise. 64. To sum up (a) The first set of writ petitions filed by unsuccessful candidates at the 1979-80 selection has become infructuous in as much as the selection itself has been found to be invalid. Accordingly, the persons who were in the `select list' of 1966 would continue to officiate as Tahsildars subject to the right of the competent authority to revert any Government officer on any ground personal to him. The reversion order passed in consequence of the 1979-80 selection would automatically go. Indeed, the G. O. dated 18th July, 1981 itself states that the reversion order issued because of the 1979-80 selection has got to be cancelled. Learned counsel for the state, Sri Ashish N. Trivedi, also confirmed at the Bar that the authorities had also taken a decision to formally withdraw the reversion orders and had desisted from doing so till now only because of the pendency of these writ petitions, (b) The Second set of writ petitions filed by those persons selected at the 1979-80 selection who have been reverted because of the stay orders obtained by unsuccessful candidates has also become infructuous. These reversion orders were issued on the basis of the 1979-80 selection inasmuch as the `List B' prepared year wise was taken into account while deciding which officers were to be reverted. Now it is conceded on behalf of the State that fresh reversion orders would have to be passed against the persons who in the overall gradation list are juniormost. This is necessitated by the fact that ad hoc promotions have to be made on the basis of the principle of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit. The comparative appraisal of the candidates on merit at the 1979-80 selection having been nullified, seniority in the consolidated gradation list will have to prevail (c) The third set of writ petitions filed by successful candidates of 1979-80 who have challenged the validity of the G. O. dated 18th July, 1981 fails on merit, (d) The writ petition in the fourth set filed by certain Sadar Kanungos whose names were not included in the eligibility list of 1979-80 has become infructuous because of the invalidation of the selection itself. (e) The fifth set of writ petitions filed by the Naib Tahsildars who have been de-confirmed as a necessary corollary of the invalidation of rules 7A and 7B fails on merits. 65. In the result, all the petitions are dismissed. No order is made as to costs. 66. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment in these cases Sri B. C. Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 2699, 2738, 2739, 2752, 2782, 2851, 2876, 2877 and 2935 of 1980; 3052, 3213, 4485, 5897 and 6050 of 1981, 92 and 2332 of 1982 and Sri S. C. Misra, learned counsel for the petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 5661 and 5663 of 1981 made an oral application for certificate of fitness under Article 134-A read with Article 133 of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that the cases involve any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As such the certificate prayed for is refused.