JUDGMENT K. P. Singh, J. 1. IN the writ petition the contesting opposite party no. 5 Niadar had claimed tenancy right being brother of the original tenure-holder Kedhera on the ground that he was his real brother and that the present petitioner had remarried one Renuwa, hence she lost right in the disputed property and that the opposite party no. 5 Niadar continued in possession over the disputed property since the time of remarriage of the present petitioner, hence she acquired right in the disputed property on the basis of adverse possession for more than statutory period. 2. THE petitioner had contested the suit of the opposite party no. 5 in the present writ petition with the allegations that she had not remarried and that she continued in possession over the property of her husband and various other pleas were taken to negative the claim of the contesting opposite party Niadar in the present writ petition. The trial court through its judgment dated 23-11-1971 dismissed the plaintiff's suit and did not accept the theory of remarriage of the petitioner with Renuwa and also held that the plaintiff did not prescribe title to the disputed property on the basis of unlawful possession without the consent of the tenure-holder for more than statutory period. Against the judgment of the trial court Niadar went in appeal and his appeal was allowed by the appellate court through its judgment dated 25-4-1973. The appellate court accepted the contention of the plaintiff opposite party that the petitioner Smt. Somwati had remarried Renuwa and that the present petitioner was not in possession over the disputed land, hence the claim of the plaintiff opposite party was accepted by the appellate court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court the petitioner had filed a second appeal and the grounds of appeal is Annexure IV attached with the writ petition. The second appellate court dismissed the second appeal through its judgment dated 29-6-1973 holding that the finding of fact regarding the petitioner's marriage with Renuwa was pure finding of fact which could not be characterised as perverse or without jurisdiction and was based on appraisal of evidence by the lower appellate court. The second appellate court also observed that the entries of possession for any period of time by the petitioner after remarriage would not confer on her any valid title. The second appellate court also observed that the entries of possession for any period of time by the petitioner after remarriage would not confer on her any valid title. Against the judgment of the second appellate court dated 29-6-1973 the petitioner had approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the second appellate court has failed to examine the question of remarriage set up by the contesting opposite party no. 5 in the present writ petition. According to him the second appellate court dismissed the second appeal summarily without examining the record of the case. THE bare perusal of the judgment of the appellate court indicates that its judgment is based on irrelevant considerations and irrelevant documents but the second appellate court thinks that the finding of fact is neither perverse nor beyond jurisdiction and it is based on appreciation of the evidence by the lower appellate court. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to paragraph 11 of the memo of second appeal whereby the finding of fact has been challenged due to mis-appreciation of evidence. Secondly, it has been contended that the plaintiff's suit would be barred by the provision of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act if the plaintiff was found out of possession. Thirdly, it has been contended that the second appellate court is under wrong notion of law that the petitioner would not acquire any valid title to the disputed land by being in possession for any period of time. 4. THE learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him the second appellate court was fully justified to accept the finding of fact that the petitioner had remarried and on that finding the plaintiff's suit was rightly decreed. In rejoinder it has been stressed that the second appellate court has failed to examine the question of remarriage decided by the first appellate court, merely on the ground that it was a finding of fact. In rejoinder it has been stressed that the second appellate court has failed to examine the question of remarriage decided by the first appellate court, merely on the ground that it was a finding of fact. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the marriage of Karaon was not established in the circumstances of the present case and no ceremonies regarding the Karaon marriage have been established on the evidence on record, hence the findings recorded by the first appellate court and confirmed by the second appellate court deserve to be quashed. 5. THE learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a large number of rulings to the effect that regarding remarriage the custom and necessary ceremonies with regard to that should be established by the evidence on record. 6. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. To my mind, the second appellate court has patently erred in observing that any length of possession by the petitioner after remarriage would not confer any valid title to the disputed property upon the petitioner. It is note-worthy that the claim of the plaintiff opposite party was negatived by the trial court on the finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove remarriage of the defendant petitioner set up by him. He had also failed to prescribe title to the disputed property on the basis of adverse and continuous possession for more than the statutory period. The judgment of the trial court has been reversed by the appellate court and the reasoning given by the appellate court in paragraphs 9 and 10of its judgment do indicate that the appellate court has taken into account irrelevant documents and irrelevant considerations. If the second appellate court had applied its mind to the aforesaid paragraphs and would have examined ground no. 11 in the second appeal, I am sure the second appellate court could not have at least dismissed the second appeal summarily. To me it appears that the appellant could demonstrate before the second appellate court the grounds justifying interference with the findings of the first appellate court if the second appellate court had summoned the record and had perused the evidence on record. To me it appears that the appellant could demonstrate before the second appellate court the grounds justifying interference with the findings of the first appellate court if the second appellate court had summoned the record and had perused the evidence on record. It has also been emphasised before me that the judgment of the first appellate court was judgment of reversal and the appellate court has failed to meet the reasonings of the trial court and in this connection it has been pointed out that the trial court did not place reliance upon the report under Section 107/117 CrPC whereas the first appellate court has placed reliance upon the same without examining the question that report came into existence much after the litigation between the parties had arisen. In this connection it would be proper to invite the attention of the second appellate court to the ruling reported in AIR 1982 All. 248 = 1982 AWC 665 , Smt. Bibbe v. Smt. Ram Kali wherein a learned single Judge of this Court has indicated the guidelines for deciding the question of remarriage and custom relating thereto. He has also emphasised that the pleadings and evidence regarding ceremonies concerning remarriage should be pleaded and proved. In this view of the matter I think that the second appellate court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in dismissing the second appeal summarily. It would be proper for the second appellate court to re-examine the question in the light of the ruling mentioned supra and the finding recorded by the second appellate court should be in accordance with the dictum of law laid down in the above ruling. 7. IN the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate court dated 2 -6-1973 is hereby quashed and the second appellate court is directed to decide the second appeal after perusing the record and should jndicate in its judgment how far the ceremonies regarding remarriage and the custom relating thereto have been established by the evidence on record. I must point out that the petitioner does not appear to have challenged the question that there was no custom of Karaon marriage regarding the parties. However, this question would be examined in the light of the pleadings and evidence on record. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.