JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal directed against judgment and decree of Sri S. L. Adarsh, II Additional Civil Judge Agra dated 23-9-1974 in civil appeal No. 98 of 1974 arising out of suit No. 36 of 1973. By the impugned decree learned Civil Judge reversed judgment of Km. Saroj Bala, II Additional Munsif, Agra dated 23-4-1974 and dismissed plaintiffs suit with costs. 2. Premises in dispute are No. 15/375, Noori Gate, Agra. These premises were in tenancy of one Om Prakash at the rate of Rs. 8/- per month and were owned by Sri Radhey Govind Ji Maharaj Trust. Om Prakash vacated these premises in June, 1971 but surreptitiously inducted plaintiff in them. Inspector reported to Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the Premises have fallen vacant. Plaintiff applied for allotment of premises in his favour; respondent who was occupying the adjacent premises also applied for its allotment as he had a large family. On behalf of landlord there was a prayer for release of the accommodation in favour of the landlord vide the affidavit of Om Prakash the then Secretary of the Trust Sri Radhey Govindji Maharaj dated 7-10-1971. Parties were heard at length and the premises in suit were allotted in favour of respondent on 20-4-1972 by Sri S. P. Gupta the then Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 3. As premises were in occupation of. plaintiff-appellant so a notice under S. 7-A of U. P. Act. No. 3 of 1947 (U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act) was issued to him on or about 1-5-1972. Appellant did not quit but preferred an objection which is on record. On a perusal of that objection Sri C. K. Bajpai, successor of Sri S. P. Gupta cancelled the first allotment order and re-issued another allotment order in favour of plaintiff-appellant on 17-8-1972. Respondent went up in appeal to District Judge, Agra and additional District Judge allowed this appeal on 6-1-1973 and dissolved the order secured by plaintiff-appellant on 17-8-1972. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was further ordered to proceed with the ejectment proceedings of plaintiff appellant who preferred this suit for an injunction and declaration. 4. Respondent went up in appeal to District Judge, Agra and additional District Judge allowed this appeal on 6-1-1973 and dissolved the order secured by plaintiff-appellant on 17-8-1972. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was further ordered to proceed with the ejectment proceedings of plaintiff appellant who preferred this suit for an injunction and declaration. 4. Reliefs sought were that it be declared that order dated 20-4-1972 of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra and dated 6-1-1973 of the Court of the then Additional District Judge were illegal and ultra vires and without jurisdiction. Defendant was sought to be restrained permanently by means of an injunction from taking possession over the room and Verandah comprised by premises No. 15/375 in pursuance of the said order. Costs of the suit were also claimed. 5. The claim was resisted by respondent on the ground that outgoing tenant had no right to accommodate the respondent; Rent Control & Eviction Officer had no authority to review and cancel the order dated 20-4-1972 on 17-8-1972; the appeal before the District Judge was competent and the judgment of Additional District Judge was final and conclusive between the parties by virtue of S. 43, Sub-clause (2) (b) read with S. 18 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The suit was barred by S. 9, C.P.C. and provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act, 1972.) 6. Learned Munsif found that plaintiff was not an authorised tenant in the premises in suit; order dated 20-4-1972 passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not an order under S. 7-A of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947. That order was void and without jurisdiction. 7. It was further found that order dated 17-8-1972 of Rent Control and Eviction Officer was valid and order dated 6-1-1973 of the Additional District Judge, Agra was without jurisdiction. The suit was not barred by Sections 18 and 37 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 nor it was barred by S. 9 Civil P. C. In the result the claim was allowed. 8. This decree was reversed in appeal by the impugned Judgment. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. The suit was not barred by Sections 18 and 37 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 nor it was barred by S. 9 Civil P. C. In the result the claim was allowed. 8. This decree was reversed in appeal by the impugned Judgment. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. On behalf of the plaintiff- appellant it was argued before me that possession of plaintiff- appellant in the disputed premises on 20-4-1972 was not unauthorised. 11. He simply adopted the argument of learned Munsif who found that plaintiff was in occupation of the premises vacated by Om Prakash. He was admitted in the premises in suit as tenant by trustees vide a receipt of rent paper No. 11 Ka. No. 85 dated 21-12-1972. It appears that this receipt was procured by plaintiff-appellant after cancellation of allotment order dated 20-4-1972 and issue of fresh order dated 17-8-1972. No rent was accepted by landlord from the plaintiff-appellant on 20-4-1972 or thereafter till 21-12-72. In this connection there is an affidavit of Om Prakash D.W.2, who testified that as Joint Secretary of the Trust he applied for release of these premises. Plaintiff was simply a trespasser. Plaintiff himself stated that he was not related to Om Prakash, outgoing tenant who has not been examined in this case. A similar statement was made by Pritam Singh, D. W. 1. Om Prakash, D. W. 2, also proved his affidavit paper No. 30 Ga dated 7-10-1971 in which it was alleged that Dearam Singh plaintiff-appellant had taken the law into his own hands and was an illegal occupant of the premises in dispute. Under these circumstances it is obvious that the finding of learned Munsif was wrong and learned Civil Judge rightly found that plaintiff was an unauthorised occupant in the disputed premises. If a tenant removes his occupation the premises .become vacant regardless of the fact that the tenant may put in occupation any licensee, etc. In Mohd. Ishaq v. State Govt, of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1966 All L J 397 : ( AIR 1966 All 280 ) (F B) it was held that when a tenant ceases to occupy an accommodation by subletting it he brings about a vacancy and such premises can be validly allotted under S. 7, Sub-cl. (2) of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 by the District Magistrate. (2) of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 by the District Magistrate. In the instant case also as the occupation of plainitiff-appellant in the premises in suit was simply unauthorised so the report of the Inspector that the premises had fallen vacant after its vacation by out going tenant was perfectly correct and order of allotment dated 20-4-1972 by Sri S. P. Gupta was unassailable. 12. Learned counsel for appellant further argued that these proceedings were governed by U. P. Act No. III of 1947 and not by U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Thus it was open to learned Rent Control and Eviction Officer to review the order dated 20-4-1972 and cancel the same on 17-8-1972. This contention is not tenable. A mere look at S. 7 of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947 shall go to disclose that such power of review or revision of an earlier order had not been conferred on the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. A mere look at the two orders by Sri. S. P. Gupta and Sri. C. K. Bajpai shall go to disclose that order dated 20-4-1972 was a detailed order after hearing the parties and it could not be dissolved by Sri.C. K. Bajpai under any provision of law. Only the power of revision was conferred on the Commissioner under Section 7-A, sub clause(4) of the aforesaid Act which is worded as below: "No appeal shall lie from any order passed by the District Magistrate under this section, but the Commissioner may revise the said order if he is satisfied that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity or has wrongly refused to act and may make such order as he thinks fit." 13. It was not open to Sri. C. K. Bajpai to cancel the earlier order of Sri S. P. Gupta. Even the District Magistrate had no power to revise or review such order under any provision of U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act. It was not open to Sri. C. K. Bajpai to cancel the earlier order of Sri S. P. Gupta. Even the District Magistrate had no power to revise or review such order under any provision of U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The point came up for consideration in Jagjit Singh v. District Magistrate, Kanpur reported in 1956, All WR (HC) 240 : ( AIR 1956 All 486 ) It posited: -(at p. 487) "It is well established rule that a Court has no power to set aside an order which has been properly made unless it has been given by statute, and this is so on the principle that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation. That rule, applies equally to a final order made in quasi judicial proceedings, and proceedings under Section 7-A, are of that character. The rule is subject to certain expectations. The U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, does not confer upon the District Magistrate power to revise the order of a Rent Control and Eviction Officer under S. 7-A, or upon the latter Officer power to review his own order, on the ground that upon further consideration he has come to a different conclusion of the facts." 14. Learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant referred to S. 43 of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, sub-clause (k) which reads: "Any order passed by the District Magistrate, before the commencement of this Act under sub-s. (2) S. 7 or under S. 7-A of the old Act against which no revision has been filed shall- (I) if such order was made more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act be final; (2) in any other case, be subject to an appeal to the District Judge, which may be filed within sixty days from the commencement of this Act, and the decision of the District Judge shall be final." 15. Obviously this provision does not come into play. Order dated 20-4-1972 was not within 30 days of the commencement of I. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which came into force on 15-7-1972. Order dated 17-8-1972 would have been passed only under S. 16 of the New Act and not under Old Act. Obviously this provision does not come into play. Order dated 20-4-1972 was not within 30 days of the commencement of I. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which came into force on 15-7-1972. Order dated 17-8-1972 would have been passed only under S. 16 of the New Act and not under Old Act. It was for this reason that an appeal was preferred to the Additional District Judge against that order. S. 43, sub-cl. (h) reads: - "any Court or Authority before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the recovery any suit or other proceeding relaing to the recovery or determination or fixation of rent of, or eviction from, any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an application being made to it within sixty days from such commencement, grant leave to any party to amend its pleading in consequence of the provisions of this Act;" 16. It appears that the application had to be amended in the light of the new Act as such proceedings were to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of the new Act. S. 43, sub-cl. (b) reads: - "Any application or proceeding pending immediately before the commencement of this Act before the District Magistrate under S. 7 of the old Act or under Rule 6 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Rules, 1949 made under S. 17 of the old Act shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of this Act." Thus both these orders dated 17-8-1972 and 6-1-1973 were passed under the new Act and not under the old Act and there was no jurisdictional or procedural infirmity as alleged by learned counsel for plaintiff appellant. Learned counsel for appellant next relied upon sub-cl. (s) of S. 43 of the new Act which is worded as below:- "Any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted on any ground mentioned in sub-s. (1) of section 3 of the old Act, or any proceeding for the execution of a decree passed on the basis of any agreement, compromise or satisfaction), pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, may be continued and concluded in accordance with the old Act which shall for that purpose be deemed to continue to be in force." 17. This provision is inapplicable for the simple reason that it comes into play in suits for ejectment u/s 3 of old Act and not in such proceeding which are well covered by Sections 16 and 17 of the new Act. 18. It has been shown above that order dated 17-8-1972 which is the sheet-anchor of plaintiffs claim is unsustainable by any provision of the old Act or new Act. It has already been set aside and the proceedings were well covered by the provisions of the new Act as was held in Rameshwar Prasad Agarwal v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Allahabad reported in AIR 1976 All 323 where the facts were as below: - It appears that the petitioner was owner of premises No. 98, K. P. Kakkar Road, Allahabad. Two shops were situated on the ground floor of the accommodation. One shop was in possession of Purshottam Dass respondent No. 3. On 1st April, 1972, Purshottam Dass moved an application for regularisation of his tenancy over the disputed shop, alleging that he had been in possession of it as a tenant for the last thirteen years. Landlord contested these allegations. The Chief Inspector inspected the premises and found the tenant in possession and made a report to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Respondent No. 3 in support of his allegation filed an affidavit before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 20-4-1972. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an allotment order in favour of the respondent No. 3 on 24-4-1972. Petitioner prayed for cancellation of the allotment order vide objection dated 15-5-1972. That objection was dismissed on 7-8-1972. Petitioner preferred an appeal to the Additional District Judge which failed on 21-2-1973. The point which came up for consideration was about the application of new Act. It was held (at.P. 325) "That under S. 43 of the new Act, all proceedings under S. 7 of the old Act, which were pending, are to be treated as proceedings under S. 16 or 17 of the new Act, as the case may be. An application for setting aside an allotment order is nothing but a proceeding under section 7 of the old Act as it is inherently connected with the allotment order and allotment proceedings. An application for setting aside an allotment order is nothing but a proceeding under section 7 of the old Act as it is inherently connected with the allotment order and allotment proceedings. The use of the word 'proceedings' in S. 43 of the new Act is significant, and denote not only specific orders passed under section of the old Act but also applications and other miscellaneous proceedings connected with the final orders passed thereunder. This being so, the application for setting aside the allotment order passed under the old Act would be one which would fall within S. 16 of the new Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the application for setting aside the allotment order after the enforcement of the new Act, and as such an appeal, against that order lay under S. 18 of the new Act. The appeal, as such was competent." Thus it is obvious that plaintiff was simply unauthorised occupant of the premises. Order dated 17-8-1972 secured by him has already been set aside on 6-1-1973 and so the parties are relegated to the position dated 20-4-1972 under which respondent had every right to get the plaintiff ejected from the premises in dispute on the strength of the allotment order issued in his favour by Sri. S. P. Gupta. 19. No other point was argued before me in this appeal. 20. In the result appeal is dismissed with costs. Impugned judgment and decree are affirmed.