The two petitioners who are facing a prosecution under the provisions of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act have approached this Court for quashing the proceeding against them, petitioner No. 1, Sunil Sarkar has challenged the proceedings on the ground of violation of section 20 (1) of the Act. The other petitioner M/s. Gopal Stores has questioned the exercise of powers under section 20A of the Act to implead it as a party. 2. The controversy relating to petitioner No. 2 may be taken up first as it lies within a narrow campass. According to Shri Khetri, it was not case where the powers under section 20 A could have been exercised against petitioner No. 2 as it name had been disclosed by the vendor, petitioner No. 1. even on 17.10.79 when the sample of the pasturised poison Table (Creamery) butter had been taken. It is because of this disclosure that notice in Form-VI had also been served on the Manager of petitioner No. 2. As such, according to the learned Counsel petitioner No. 2 must have been impleaded as an accused in the complains itself in view of the provisions in section 13 (2) as it stood after toe amendment of 1976; there can perhaps be no denial that the petitioner No. 2 could have been impleaded as an accused In the complaint itself. The question in whether this would bar the operation of section 20 A ? As is known, came to be inserted in the Act with effect from 1.3.65. This power had been given to the Court to effectively check the evil of food adulteration. To take care of unnecessary harassment to the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, this section, requires that the power would be used only if the Court is satisfied "On the evidence adduced before it" that the manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with the offence. In the present case as it appeared to the trial Court from the evidence of the Food Inspector that petitioner No. 1 had purchased the butter from petitioner No. 2, an order was passed to implead this petitioner as an accused. In the present case as it appeared to the trial Court from the evidence of the Food Inspector that petitioner No. 1 had purchased the butter from petitioner No. 2, an order was passed to implead this petitioner as an accused. It may be stated that by the order pasted on 5.5.81, the firm of M/s. Bridhichand Pannalal was also ordered to be impleaded as an accused because of the evidence of the Food Inspector that petitioner No. 2 had purchased the butter from that firm. After hearing arguments relating to framing of charge, the firm of M/s. Bridhichand pannalal was, however, disarrayed and a charge cams to framed against the two petitioners under section 7 (1)1 16 (IA) of the Act by an order passed on 15.12.81. 3. Thus the power under section 204 was exercised as per the requirement of this section. The authorities may not have though it fit to proceed against petitioner No. 2 merely on the basis of the information given by petitioner No. 1. It may also be that it was felt that it would be better to await for some evidence on this point before reping in this petitioner. I would not, therefore, think that the order to implead petitioner. No. 2 under section 20A, which was passed on 5.5.81, merits interference by this Court at this stage in exercise of its exceptional powers under section 482 of the Criminal procedure Code. 4. Coming to the case of petitioner No. 1 the proceeding against him has been questioned on the ground of violation of section 20 (1). The first submission in this regard is that the Chief Medical & Health Officer, (the local Health Authority), who had given consent to file the complaint had not applied his mind which would be apparent from the fact that though the name of petitioner No. 2 had been disclosed from the very beginning as the person from whom the vender had purchased the article, the sanction was restricted to the vender only. From what has been stated above, I would not read non application of mind by the consenting authority because of the omission to give consent to prosecute petitioner No. 2 also. From what has been stated above, I would not read non application of mind by the consenting authority because of the omission to give consent to prosecute petitioner No. 2 also. Despite this, one submission made by the learned public prosecutor in this regard has to be dealt with the submission being that while exercising power under section 20, the authority or the person has not to apply its or his mind. This contention is advanced relying on some observations made in paragraph 5 of Dhan Singh vs. Municipal Board, AIR 1970 SC 318 . The observations relied on are these: "Under section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, no question of applying ones, mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as authority to be conferred under that provision can be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designate d in that section arc alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question." These observations were made when a point had been urged regarding the non-application of the mind by the Food Inspector who had filed the complaint on being authorised by the Municipal Board. Reference was made to some cases dealing with the validity or sanction given for the institution of certain criminal proceedings. It was stated by the Court that tide ratio of these decisions had no bearing and then the above quoted observations were made. The facts of that case would show that the Food Inspector bad merely filed the complaint on being authorised by the Municipal Board. The satisfaction of the Municipal Board was not in question. The point urged was that the Food was not satisfied. The observations relied on by the learned public prosecutor have to be read in this context and what is conveyed by the observations is that there has to be no application of mind while conferring the authority as the authority to institute can be conferred, and is really conferred, before a particular offence had taken place. But that does not mean that while filling the complaint, no application of mind is necessary. But that does not mean that while filling the complaint, no application of mind is necessary. This would be belied by what was stated in State of Bombay vs. parshottam, AIR 1961 SC 1 . It was acknowledged in paragraph 13 that it appeared reasonable that "before granting a written consent, the authority competent to initiate a prosecution should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prim a facie exists for the alleged offender being put before a Court." 5. Another point urged by Shri Khetri as to the violation of section 20 (i) Is that the Chief Medical and Health officer who had given the consent cannot be regarded as the "person authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of this section 20. According to the learned Counsel, a person so authorised has to be an individual by name, that is, a real person in flesh and blood. No authorisation is permissible, contends Shri Khetri, in the name of an office. In the present case, the notification in question had authorised the Civil surgeons to perform this function. The designation of the office was changed to Chief Medical and Health officer in 1978 the authorisation in favour of Civil Surgeon being of 1961. 6. By referring to the definition of the word "person" in section 3 (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it is urged that by virtue of that definition only a company or associa­tion or body of individuals could be included within the meaning of the word person", and not any office as such. Some assistance is sought to be derived in this regard from the decision in Sarkar-E-Ali Zaria vs. Athar, AIR 1957 Andhra 7th. That was a case where a suit was filed against the Director of an Endow­ment claiming some damages. It was held that the suit as, framed did not lie as only the person occupying the office of Director of Endowment at the relevant time could have been sued and not the Director of Endowment as such. I do not think If this decision can assist the petitioner inasmuch as the relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code had dealt with institution of suits against "a Government servant" only and this was interpreted to mean the particular Govern­ment servant who had committed the tortuous act. I do not think If this decision can assist the petitioner inasmuch as the relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Civil Procedure Code had dealt with institution of suits against "a Government servant" only and this was interpreted to mean the particular Govern­ment servant who had committed the tortuous act. Another decision pressed into service by shri Khatri is Man ham vs. Union of India, AIR 1960 Bombay 196. It was held in that case that a suit in the name of Collector of Customs was not maintainable, as the Collector of Customs is not a legal entity, but is merely an office occupied by several persons from time to time. That was also a case where the plaintiff had appro­ached the Court for recovery of some gold confiscated or in the alternative to realise the value of the gold. According to me, this decision as well cannot be called in aid by petitioner No. 1. 7. The main reliance by Shri Khatri is, however on the observations of the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay vs. parshottam (supra). The question examined there was whether the written consent to institute a prosecution should be in favour of a named person. The apex Court did not accept this conten­tion. It was stated in paragraph 13 that section 20 (1) indicated that the written content is for launching of a specified prose­cution, and not one in favour of a complainant authorising him to file the complaint. It was then observed" omitting for the moment the State Government and the "local authority" which are specified in the provision as competent by themselves to in­itiate prosecutions, persons 'authorised by these two authorities are further included. The expression" person authorised in this behalf" obviously refers to named person who is so authori­sed". (Emphsis supplied). Relying on the emphasised portion of then quotation, it is submitted by Shri Khatri that the person authorised, must be a named person which according to him, would mean that if the authorisation is by virtue of an office, the holder of the office must be named in the authorisation. 8. The same submission had been made in the State of Mysore vs. Danjaya, AIR 1963 Mysore 157. This contention was met by the Division Bench by referring to section 15 of the General Clauses Act. 8. The same submission had been made in the State of Mysore vs. Danjaya, AIR 1963 Mysore 157. This contention was met by the Division Bench by referring to section 15 of the General Clauses Act. 1897 which reads ; "where, by any Central Act or Regulation, the power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided any such appointment if it is made after the commencement of this Act, may be made either by name or by virtue of office". It would be of some interest to note what the Select Commi­ttee had to say on the objects and Reasons of this section. It had stated:- "The practice hitherto observed in drafting in this coun­try appears to have been to state explicitly in each Act that a person may be appointed 'by name or by virtue of his office, if the admissibility of making ex-officio appointment is contemplated. This will lead to the infer­ence that no person can be appointed by office unless express authority to that effect is made. It will from an administrative point of view, be most convenient to gene­ralise the provision in the manner here indicated". 9. Though the Mysore High court had not noted the above, yet it had upheld the contention that a person could be authorised under section 20 (1) by virtue of his designation or the office that he holds. This had been by explaining the deci­sion of the Supreme Court in Parshottam, and by referring in the main to a Full Bench decision of Six Judges of Allahabad High Court in powell vs. Municipal Board, II R, 22 All. 123. The aforesaid object mentioned by the Select Committee would further fortify the conclusion arrived at by the Court. 9. This point had come up for examination in Subbayyan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1968 Kerala 339 also. After referring to the aforesaid decision of the Mysore High Court, it was stated by the Bench that it was unable to see why an authori­sation to institute prosecution under section 28(1) would not be given by the authorities empowered there under in favour of persons holding a particular office. It was stated' that a general authority to act was a familiar forum of authorisation. It was stated' that a general authority to act was a familiar forum of authorisation. When reliance was sought to be placed on the above quoted observa­tions of the Supreme Court in parshottam's case it was stated the question to that case was whether under section 20(1) of the Act, the written consent to institute a prosecution should be in favour of a named person. It was. therefore, stated that observation could not be of any help. It may be pointed out that the authorisation in both these cases (Danjaya end Subbayyan) was in favour of all the Food Inspectors. 10. I have not thought it necessary to refer to other cases which have taken a similar view. Suffice it to say that section 15 of the General Clauses Act makes it clear that the authorisation could be either by name or by virtue of office. It may be pointed out that the authorisation in Parshotiam's case was also in favour of the "Chief officer of the Munici­pality", and as such not by name but by virtue of office. No fault on this score was even pointed out. 11. Because of all the above, I would held that the written consent given in this case by the Chief Medical & Health officer did not suffer from any infirmity. These being the points urged by shri Khatri to quash the proceedings against the petitioners. I am not in a position to agree with him. 12. The result is that the petition stands dismissed.