Order The Bihar Legislative Assembly passed Indian Penal Code (Bihar Amendment) and Code of Criminal Procedure (Bihar Amendment) Bill, 1982 on 31st July, 1982. The Leader of the opposition, Shri Karpoori Thakur (petitioner No 1), along with other nine members of the Assembly have filed this application praying, inter alia, to declare the proceedings of the Bihar Legislative Assembly dated 31st July, 1982, relating to the passage of the Indian Penal Code (Bihar Amendment) and Code of Criminal Procedure (Bihar Amendment) Bill, 1982, to be illegal and unconstitutional on the ground that the bill was passed by the Assembly in an unconstitutional manner violating all the established norms of the Parliamentary democracy. 2. Facts relevant for the appreciation of the points urged in support of the application are that the session of the Bihar Legislative Assembly commenced on 25th June, 1982. During this session of the Assembly, Indian Penal Code (Bihar Amendment) and Code of Criminal Procedure (Bihar Amendment) Bill, 1982 was circulated among the members. It is said that in the opinion of the petitioners and also in the opinion of some other members of the Assembly, the bill contained draconian measures which were intended to suppress the press and to completely wipe out the democratic form of the Government. it is said that in view of the grave consequence, as many as sixty members of the house gave notice proposing drastic amendment in the said bill. Besides that, ten member of the Assembly gave notice for circulating the bill for public opinion while other 14 members of the House proposed to send the bill to either the Select Committee or to the Joint Select Committee. The order paper circulated to the members of the Assembly indicates these facts Then in paragraph 10 of the application, it is said that when respondent No.2, the Speaker, gave leave to respondent No.4, the Chief Minister to introduce the bill, there was strong resentment by the members as a result thereof there was noisy uproarious scene and pandemonium in the House. The Speaker had to suspend the sitting of the House for ten minutes at 10.20 A.M., it is said, the House re-assembled. There was again noise, pandemonium, noisy scene and slogans for withdrawing the bill. The Speaker had to suspend the sitting of the House for ten minutes at 10.20 A.M., it is said, the House re-assembled. There was again noise, pandemonium, noisy scene and slogans for withdrawing the bill. In that confusion, and pandemonium which lasted for four to five minutes, it is said that the Speaker respondent No.2 declared the bill to have been passed and the House was adjourned till 11 A.M. The petitioners say that when a copy of the proceedings of the House dated 31st July, 1982 was received by petitioner No. 1, they were surprised to see that the proceedings did not record the actual facts. The grievance of the petitioners is that the proceedings as detailed in Annexure 3 (the proceeding) was never transacted within the hearing of the petitioners, who were inside the House. According to them, 24 members had given notice for proposal for circulation of the bill for the opinion and sending it to the Select Committee or the Joint Select-Committee. Another set of members numbering 60 had given notice proposing amendment to the bill. Under the Rules of the Assembly, it was incumbent upon the Speaker to call the names of all these 84 members individually asking them one by one to move their amendment or proposal but that was not done. This was in violation of mandatory rules, namely, Rules 64, 121, 122, 125, 128, 129 and 130. Further the statement made in the application indicates that the Speaker did not act in an impartial manner and without allowing any debate and discussion and without putting the bill to vote declared the same to have been passed within 3 to 4 minutes and that too during the pandemonium and confusion. 3. Although no Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents, but Mr. Advocate General appeared to oppose the admission of this application and produced before us a copy of the bill which had the necessary certificate regarding passage of the bill by respondent No.2, the Speaker. He also stated that the allegation that the bill was passed in violation of the rules and in a state of pandemonium without affording opportunity to the members to move amendment or to solicit public opinion or to send the bill to the Select Committee or the Joint Select Committee was incorrect. He also stated that the allegation that the bill was passed in violation of the rules and in a state of pandemonium without affording opportunity to the members to move amendment or to solicit public opinion or to send the bill to the Select Committee or the Joint Select Committee was incorrect. He further stated that the Business Committee of the House had allotted 45 minutes over this bill and it took roughly that time. 4. The result of this case depends upon the interpretation of Article 212 of the Constitution which is as follows :- "212. (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. (2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." Mr. Radha Raman, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that according to this Article, proceedings in the Legislature of the State cannot be called in question on the ground of any irregularity of procedure. According to him, the proceedings on 31st July, 1982 relating to the passage of the bill was not only irregular but wholly illegal and unconstitutional He, therefore, contended that this Court had ample jurisdiction to declare the proceeding ultra vires. In support of his argument, learned counsel referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab V. Satya Pal. In that case the Speaker adjourned the Legislature under rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure and conduct of business Punjab Legislative Assembly for two months beyond 31st March, 1968. The result of this adjournment was that it became impossible to get the finance bill passed before 31st March, 1968. The Governor of the State prorogued the Assembly and got rid of adjournment and promulgated Punjab Ordinance No.1 of 1968 to enable the Legislature to transact financial business. It was on these facts that Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was) observed as follows :- "The adjournment of the Assembly on 18th March by the Speaker is next presented as a valid and binding ruling. It was on these facts that Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was) observed as follows :- "The adjournment of the Assembly on 18th March by the Speaker is next presented as a valid and binding ruling. A word may be said here about what the Speaker decided. The Speaker in his ruling of the 18th based himself on the fact that in his opinion the order proroguing the Assembly on the 11th March was illegal and void. Therefore, the Governor had no power to resummon on the 14th the Assembly which stood adjourned for two months under rule 105. It appears from the proceedings that the Speaker was of the opinion that the Legislature was prorogued on the 18th and not the 11th. We have shown above that the Legislature was prorogued not on the 18th but on the 11th and the resummoning of the Legislature on the 14th after the ordinance was promulgated on the 13th was perfectly valid. His ruling, therefore, was based on wrong assumption. But can his ruling be called in question ? Our answer is in the affirmative. On the 18th the Speaker was faced by the ordinance. That ordinance, as we have shown above, was a valid law binding on the Assembly (including the Speaker) by virtue of Article 209(7). The Speaker was therefore, powerless and his adjournment of the session without taking the mandate of the Assembly by majority as required by section 3 of the Ordinance was null and void and of no effect. The 'proceedings clearly show that the Speaker himself was reluctant to adjourn the House till he was prompted by Sardar Gurnam Singh. He doubted his own powers. The Speaker did not attempt to order a fresh adjournment but only ruled that his earlier adjournment stood. Whether the Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or declared that the former adjournment continued to operate makes no difference. The former adjournment had come to an end by a valid prorogation and the fresh adjournment was null and void. The House transacted other business showing that the prorogation was considered valid. Whether the Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or declared that the former adjournment continued to operate makes no difference. The former adjournment had come to an end by a valid prorogation and the fresh adjournment was null and void. The House transacted other business showing that the prorogation was considered valid. If this was so the session had to continue unless adjourned by the House by majority." It is significant to note that in this very judgment, Hidayatullah, C. J. observed as follows: "Further again, there is Article 212 Clause (1) which provides that the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure." 5. Mr. Advocate General, on the other hand, referred to a decision in the case of The State of Bihar Vs. Sir Kameshwar Singh. In that case the proceeding of the relevant date did not show that the motion was put and carried but the original bill signed and authenticated by the Speaker was produced before the learned Judges of the Supreme Court which contained an endorsement by the Speaker that the bill was passed by the Assembly on 5th April, 1950. In view of this endorsement by the Speaker, the Supreme Court held, it could not be said that the bill was not put to the House and carried by it. Mr. Advocate General also referred to an unreported decision of this Court in Sri Karpoori Thakur Vs. The State of Bihar, In that case, the prayer was for declaring the session of the Bihar Legislative Assembly commencing from 10.12.1981 and terminating on 19.12.1981 and all the business transacted during the above session to be illegal, unconstitutional, improper and against the very basis of the Government of the people, by the people and for the people. Besides other grounds, one of the grounds on which the aforesaid prayer was based was that about 42 Ordinances were converted into Acts within the course of 3 to 4 days without there being any effective discussion with regard to their provisions. In that case also the scope of Article 212 of the Constitution was considered. Besides other grounds, one of the grounds on which the aforesaid prayer was based was that about 42 Ordinances were converted into Acts within the course of 3 to 4 days without there being any effective discussion with regard to their provisions. In that case also the scope of Article 212 of the Constitution was considered. This Court dismissed the application after noticing several decisions and held that even assuming that the rules of procedure had not been followed it was not within the purview of the Court to go into the question much less to hold that the business transacted and bills passed were invalid on that account. 6. It may be mentioned here that Mr. Radha Raman, learned counsel for the petitioners, laid great stress that Article 212 of the Constitution prescribes that the proceedings of the Legislature will not be questioned on account of non-observance of the procedure. The ordinary meaning of the word 'procedure' is 'course of action' according to the Chambers's Twentieth Century Dictionary. But to me it appears that the expression 'Procedure' has not been used in this Article of the Constitution in a narrow sense but has been used to carry a very wide area so as to include the proceeding relating to the conduct of business. After all what are the rules of business of which violation is said to have been made ? They are all procedure for the conduct of business. 7. Mr. Advocate General while opposing the application also urged that the bill was passed in public interest and not to gag the press. According to him, the press had become irresponsible and some check on the press was necessary so as to save the people from being blackmailed. In that connection, Mr. Advocate General also cited the observation of Mr. Justice Tulzapurkar which he made against the press in the famous Judges' case reported in S.P. Gupta & ors Vs. President of India & ors at page 437. It will be proper to mention here that Mr. Radha Raman has not challenged the validity of the bill in this case on any ground what so ever. His prayer was to declare the proceedings invalid and unconstitutional. We have not applied our mind to the constitutional validity or otherwise of the bill and we make no observation with respect to that. Radha Raman has not challenged the validity of the bill in this case on any ground what so ever. His prayer was to declare the proceedings invalid and unconstitutional. We have not applied our mind to the constitutional validity or otherwise of the bill and we make no observation with respect to that. We would also like to make it clear that in view of the interpretation, we have given to Article 212 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to decide as to whether the bill was passed within 3 to 4 minutes in a state of pandemonium as alleged by the petitioners or it was passed in about 45 minutes time in a proper way as said by the Advocate General. The original copy of the bill with an endorsement of the Speaker made on 31st July, 1982, certifying that the bill, Indian Penal Code (Bihar Amendment) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Bihar Amendment) Bill, 1981, was passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly on 31st July, 1982 is sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of this Court. To hold otherwise will mean that the proceedings of the Assembly will be subject to the control of this Court. This is neither envisaged by the Constitution nor desirable. 8. For these reasons, we do not find any merit in the application which is dismissed. Application dismissed.